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I 
INTRODUCTION 
In view of the amount of research that has been devoted to investigating 
the history of the Nazi Party and the life of Adolf Hitler in particular, 
any new study needs to justify itself. This work has been written in an 
attempt to remedy a serious, if understandable, imbalance in previous studies 
of the evolution of the Nazi foreign policy programme, namely the tendency 
to concentrate unduly on the ideas of Adolf Hitler to the consequent neglect 
of the contribution of other Nazi theorists. 
(1) 
This tendency undoubtedly 
derives, in part, from the belief, current for a long period, that the 
Third Reich was a monolithic, totalitarian entity, in which the only views 
that mattered were Hitler's. 
(2) 
The relative neglect of other Nazi 
thinkers in the 1920s is probably due also to the conviction that early 
Nazi political thought - especially the ideological ruminations of men such 
as Dietrich Eckart and Alfred Rosenberg - had little impact on decisions 
taken by the Nazis once they were in power. 
(3) 
Whatever the reason, Adolf Hitler has been portrayed as the prime mover 
in the development of a Nazi foreign policy programme in the 1920s. 
However, since the main sources for Hitler's ideas before 1923 are short 
police reports or newspaper reports on speeches lasting between two and three 
hours, one cannot be entirely confident about conclusions based on this 
evidence. 
(4) 
This study, however, assesses Hitler's ideas within the 
broad context of views expressed by the party as a whole in order to 
present a more comprehensive and hopefully historically valid analysis 
* The term 'programme' will be used throughout this study to distinguish 
the party's conceptual views on foreign affairs in the 1920s from the 
actual policy of the Third Reich after 1933. 
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of the evolution of the party's foreign policy programme. This will 
also serve to isolate Hitler's own contribution to this process and enable 
us to assess more accurately the influence which other Nazi propagandists 
may have exerted on the construction of the programme. 
As the foreign policy programme may, of course, have been influenced by 
the views of political theorists outside the Nazi party during the 1920s, 
it will be necessary to compare the party's emerging outlook on foreign 
affairs with those of influential individuals and groups with whom the 
party came into contact in the early 1920s. It will be necessary, for 
example, to sketch in the political philosophy of the Pan-German League 
and to delineate as clearly as possible the extent of contact and collab- 
oration between its Chairman, Heinrich Class, and the Nazi Party. At times, 
these contacts, as for example Hitler's notable confrontation with Moeller 
van den Bruck, may have left little discernible mark on the party's 
developing philosophy; at other times they may have produced, as perhaps 
in the case of the party's flirtation with the geopolitical theories of 
Professor Karl Haushofer, a substantive modification of that philosophy. 
But whether their influence was great or small, it is hoped that an 
investigation of these individuals and groups, and the contrasting of their 
opinions with those of the Nazis will help to throw into clearer relief 
the foreign political concepts of the party and of Hitler. 
No attempt has been made to relate the party's philosophy to long-term 
trends in German intellectual history or to investigate in any detail 
Hitler's own intellectual development before 1914, since these tasks have 
already been accomplished by more capable hands. 
(5) 
The first chapter 
examines the ideas which were current in Munich in 1918 and 1919 amongst 
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the men who provided the youthful German Workers' Party with the bare 
bones of a political philosophy before Adolf Hitler arrived on the scene. 
The second chapter investigates the extent to which Hitler brought with 
him, and sustained, a Pan-German outlook on foreign affairs. The third 
chapter assesses the impact of the antisemitic and anti-Bolshevik ideology 
on that outlook. The fourth chapter scrutinizes the motivations behind 
Hitler's evolving alliance strategy and the different concepts with which 
he came into contact. The fifth chapter attempts to lay bare the nature 
and extent of Hitler's territorial ambitions for Germany and the degree to 
which they can be fairly attributed to geopolitical inspiration. The 
sixth chapter shows how Hitler's foreign policy programme was challenged 
from within the Nazi Party and how it was refined, partly as a result of this 
challenge, by the time Hitler wrote his second book in 1928. 
It is hoped that the thesis as a whole will make a small contribution 
to the continuing debate about various aspects of the Nazis' foreign policy 
programme. Though it may be objected that, despite the author's good 
intentions, the finished product is still 'Hitlo-centric', the first 
objective of this study is to place Hitler's views in the context of pre- 
vailing political philosophy in the Nazi Party as a whole; it attempts, 
therefore, to elucidate the 'pluralism of conceptions' within the party to 
which recent historians have referred. 
(6 
Since the publication of 
Eberhard Jgckel's excellent analysis of Hitler's Weltanschauung, it has 
been customary to pay lip-service to the influence of ideological factors 
on the formulation of Nazi policy on foreign affairs; it is usual, for 
example, to note how neatly Hitler's self-proclaimed crusade against 'Jewish' 
Bolshevism dovetailed with his desire for'an empire in Eastern Europe; 
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nevertheless, there has been no systematic attempt to assess the extent 
to which ideological preconceptions shaped initial Nazi approaches to 
foreign affairs. 
(7) 
The second objective of this study is to fulfil 
this need as well as to provide an analysis, which some have called for, 
of the crucial question as to "whether it was considerations of racist 
ideology or pure power politics which decisively influenced Hitler". 
(8) 
Finally, it will attempt to determine whether Hitler's foreign policy 
programme was essentially restricted to the European theatre or whether 
(9) 
he envisaged - however distantly - German world domination. 
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1. BEFORE HITLER: IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE GERMAN WORKERS' 
PARTY 
Any examination of the development of Nazi attitudes on foreign affairs 
has to take into account the work of the three earliest theorists of the 
German Workers' Party: Dietrich Eckart, Gottfried Feder and Alfred 
Rosenberg. In the spring of 1919 the party was still a small, insignificant 
political group with vague anti-capitalist, anti-democratic, and 
antisemitic leanings but without a clearly defined or distinctive pro- 
gramme. During the summer of 1919, however, it attracted the support of 
Dietrich Eckart, the editor since December 1918 of a virulently antisemitic 
periodical, Auf gut deutsch; 
l) 
and Gottfried Feder, an outspoken opponent 
of finance capitalism. This seems to have been a turning-point in the 
party's development. On 14 August 1919 Eckart addressed an audience of 
thirty-eight people at a meeting held under the party's auspices. By 12 
September, when Feder, standing in for Eckart who was ill, spoke to an 
audience of about forty people, the party had engaged the attention of the 
Bavarian Reichswehr, who sent along Adolf Hitler to report on the nature 
of the party. 
(2) 
It should be emphasised that Feder and Eckart had been collaborating since 
the beginning of 1919; they probably met via the Thule Gesellschaft, the 
Bavarian branch of the Germanic Order, a fiercely nationalistic and antisemitic 
political club, at the end of 1918. 
(3) 
In March 1919, Agd carried a long 
extract from an article by Feder; 
(4) 
in April, Eckart distributed a 
leaflet, entitled An alle Werktät en:, which reiterated Feder's attacks 
on 'interest-slavery' ; 
(5) 
and in May, Agd carried an article by Feder himself. 
(6 
on 22 August, the two men spoke on the same platform in Nuremberg on the 
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subject of 'Loan Capitalism: its international power, and how to combat 
it'. 
(7) 
Earlier in 1919, Eckart had been joined by Alfred Rosenberg, a 
Baltic German 6migr6, who became a regular contributor to ABd after 
February 1919. These three men - Eckart, Feder and Rosenberg - had begun 
to fashion the political outlook of the German Workers' Party before 
Hitler's fateful first encounter with the party on 12 September 1919. 
All three were to exercise some influence over the new recruit, a fact 
noted by contemporary observers as well as by Hitler himself. Ernst 
Hanfstgngl, an early recruit to the party in the 1920s, believed that 
Hitler was "deeply under the spell of Rosenberg". 
(8) 
Konrad Heiden, the 
author of the first major analysis of the Nazi P arty, wrote with reference 
to Rosenberg and Eckart that "Hitler was little more than their mouthpiece 
for some years to come. Rosenberg taught him facts. Eckart polished his 
style. "(9) In May 1921 Hitler described Rosenberg and Eckart as "leaders 
of the antisemitic movement". 
(10) 
Mein Kampf is, of course, dedicated to 
Eckart, but in it Hitler also acknowledged the impact on him of Feder's 
lecture on the 'breaking of interest-slavery' delivered during a political 
indoctrination course organized by the Reichswehr in June 1919, when he wrote: 
"I knew at once that this was a theoretical truth, 
which would be of immense importance to the future 
of the German people. " (11) 
In view of these remarks, it may seem surprising that Eckart, Feder and 
Rosenberg have, until very recently, been poorly served by historians. 
(12) 
However, there are a number of reasons for this relative neglect. The most 
obvious reason is the fairly rapid eclipse of the three men by the 
meteoric rise of Adolf Hitler; Eckart's death in 1923 - very early in the 
Nazi party's history - has limited his appeal to biographers; Fader also 
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slipped into obscurity once his anti-capitalist ideas proved to be an 
inconvenience to Hitler when the latter was trying to attract the support 
of powerful industrialists in 1932; 
(13) 
and Rosenberg's rather inconspicuous 
career in the Third Reich has, perhaps, encouraged the belief that he 
possessed only limited intelligence and that, therefore, his contribution 
to Hitler's development can only have been marginal. 
(14) 
Another reason 
for the relative lack of attention paid to the early ideologists of the 
Nazi party is an understandable reluctance to analyse abhorrent and irrational 
prejudices in a systematic way for fear of endowing Nazi ideology with an 
unwarranted intellectual veneer. A further problem is the belief, still 
shared by many historians, that political theory is largely irrelevant 
to an understanding of the Third Reich, which they regard as motivated solely 
by the pursuit and exercise of power. The early ideas expressed by Nazi 
theorists are, therefore, usually dismissed as mere propaganda. 
(15) 
These 
obstacles should not, however, be allowed any longer to impede serious 
research into the origins of Nazi foreign policy. 
Indeed, it is impossible to present a coherent picture of the evolution of 
Nazi foreign policy attitudes without an understanding of the rudiments of 
Nazi ideology. For in the immediate post-war period, neither the German 
Workers' Party, under the initial direction of journalist Karl Harrer, nor 
'völkiah' writers such as Eckart, Feder and Rosenberg were really interested 
in articulating a carefully worked out foreign policy. What interested 
them was the unmasking of those responsible for the outbreak of the First World 
War and for Germany's defeat; in both cases, the Jew was found to be the 
main culprit, with England a close second. 
(16) 
It was on the basis of this 
antisemitic platform designed initially to explain Germany's internal 
collapse, that the framework of a foreign policy was slowly to emerge. 
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It is necessary, therefore, to analyse the early ideology of the German 
Workers' Party as it was evolving in 1919 and to examine its relationship 
to foreign affairs before Hitler appeared in order to throw into greater 
relief Hitler's own later contribution. 
This chapter, therefore, sets out first of all to examine the early ideas 
of Rosenberg and Eckart about the Jews, secondly, to outline the conspiracy 
theory of history central to these beliefs, and thirdly to relate these 
ideological concepts to questions of foreign policy. 
A native of the Baltic city of Reval and a product of a middle-classfamily, 
Alfred Rosenberg found himself at the end of 1918 in a defeated Germany, 
having fled in face of the Red Army which was sweeping through the Baltic 
Provinces. 
(17) 
An exile in an alien environment, he arrived in a Munich 
still suffering the shock waves of defeat sad revolution. In these circum- 
stances, even as a trained architect, there was little prospect of his 
obtaining employment and, in retrospect, antisemitism appears to have been 
his salvation. This has led Barbara Miller Lane to suggest that Rosenberg's 
antisemitism was neither sincere nor consistent but merely "a cynical 
concoction used whenever he found a favourable market". 
(18) 
As this 
interpretation challenges the generally accepted view that "Rosenberg, 
in contrast to the unscrupulous cynicism of most of his later political 
comrades and rivals took his principles and ideas seriously", it is necessary 
to look at it carefully before proceeding any further. 
(19) 
It is certainly 
true that antisemitism was Rosenberg's passport into Munich society and 
ultimately into Nazi government; his antisemitic articles for Eckart's 
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Auf gut deutsch and later the Völkischer Beobachter(20)gave purpose and 
direction to his life in Munich in the period before he received German 
citizenship in 1923. However, it would be wrong to suggest that his 
writing invested him with any degree of financial security. Rosenberg wrote 
later that "Dietrich Eckart paid me occasionally for my articles, but this 
did not stretch to securing my life in the long-term. " 
(21) 
In fact, he 
seems to have survived by eating at a communal kitchen and by obtaining, 
through a relief committee, free accommodation with a Bavarian family. 
(22) 
A more important criticism which can be made of Lane's thesis is that before 
1919, before he became a stateless ®migri in Germany, Rosenberg appears 
already to have been a pronounced antisemite. Lane's comment that Rosenberg's 
early articles written in 1917-18 before he came to Germany "contain 
little antisemitism" is misleading. 
(23) 
It is true that most of these 
articles, published in 1943, are mainly concerned with art, architecture and 
aesthetics; but there are three overtly antisemitic tracts as well. 
(24) 
Rosenberg's interest in the other subjects mentioned (an interest which he 
maintained throughout his life and is particularly apparent in his editing 
of the VB) did not in any way interfere with the development of his 
antisemitic ideas. The three antisemitic tracts dating from between May and 
July 1918, for example, already contained many of the views which he was 
to reproduce later on. Since they were written at a time when he did not 
have a 'favourable market' and, perhaps, did not need one - he was working 
as a teacher for the German administration at Reval at the time 
(25) 
- the 
argument that his antisemitism was motivated primarily by materialistic 
considerations must be regarded with some scepticism. This view is re- 
inforced by Rosenberg's account of two other incidents. He later claimed 
to have addressed fellow students on the Jewish question at the Technical 
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University in Riga (where he studied architecture between 1910 and 1915) 
and, on the day of his departure for Germany, he is supposed to have spoken 
at a public meeting on the steps of Revel town-hall on the same topic. 
(26) 
It is tempting to dismiss both stories as part of Rosenberg's attempt to 
present an image of himself as an experienced and committed antisemite 
but there is some corroborative evidence - albeit again originating from 
Rosenberg - for, at least, the second of these two exploits. 
(27) 
The most persuasive evidence, however, that Rosenberg was already a committed 
antisemite before he came to Munich is contained in his article, Der Jude, 
dated 10 July 1918 (one of the three referred to above). In it, he argued 
that every nation had to have an idea to fight for, but Europe was 
currently witnessing a struggle "for and against the Jewish Idea". Germany, 
he believed, was in the forefront of this struggle and the Jews sought to 
devalue her achievements and individuality and to create 'chaos' in the 
country. 
(28) 
Rosenberg went on to describe three Jewish characteristics, 
which, if not combatted, would see this goal realised. Firstly, parasitism; 
the Jews, he maintained, always lived off other people - living in houses, 
which they had not built, and eating food grown in fields, which they had 
not cultivated. Whilst Aryan peoples were concerned with matters of art and 
science, the Jews were preoccupied with "trade and usury"; the Jewish 
spirit, thus, reflected a "passion for exploitation". The use of the term 
'Aryan' as a counterpoint to the 'Jew' at this early stage is significant; 
it shows that already Rosenberg's view of the Jew was overwhelmingly 
biological; 'Jewishness' constituted not simply a different religion or 
philosophy, but a distinctive racial characteristic. 
(29) 
This alien 
presence inside German society had, therefore, to be eliminated: 
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"A spirit, which has a texture intrinsically foreign to 
us, which lives amongst us like a parasite feeding 
upon us, but which has not one single progressive 
achievement for our culture to show for itself, 
must be exorcised. " (30) 
The second characteristic, with which Rosenberg endowed the Jews, was 
religious intolerance; "the Jew", he asserted, "was the father of all 
religious hatred and fanaticism". The origins of this intolerance lay in 
the Jews' belief in their own exclusiveness, in the belief that they were 
God's chosen people and that they would eventually rule the world. They 
had disowned the messiah as the "son of a whore" because he did not conquer 
the world for them. The Jewish desire for Weltherrschaft, of course, 
clashed head-on with the forces of nationalism all over the world. This 
led the Jews to concoct or adapt doctrines of internationalism to 
undermine national unity. International socialism was, in Rosenberg's view, 
aý, battering ran', which was being propelled against Germany's , national 
freedom of conscience'. The ultimate result of socialist ideas - of the 
class war, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the tyranny of the 
masses - would be, in Rosenberg's opinion, a , racial catastrophe',, leaving 
the Jews triumphant. 
(31) 
Jewish intolerance, therefore, bred political 
radicalism and would result in racial disintegration. 
The Russian Revolution illustrated the third main Jewish characteristic 
identified in Der Jude - his destructiveness. After the overthrow of the 
Czar in March 1917, the Jews, Rosenberg claimed, led the socialist agit- 
ation against the provisional government of Kerensky. Accordingly, following 
the October Revolution, Jews such as Trotsky, Zinoviev and Stecklov had 
taken leading positions in the new government. Instead of feeling 
grateful to the Russian people, who had suffered as much, if not more, 
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than the Jew from Czarist oppression, and who had carried out the 
revolution, the Jew "placed himself... at the head of a movement, which 
had aimed consistently - either consciously or instinctively - at the 
destruction of Russia as a state. " All this led Rosenberg to conclude that 
"wherever one allows the Jews to come to power, the most relentless 
exploitation, the most relentless intolerance towards other ideas and 
customs, and the most relentless destructive frenzy... grips everything, 
which we regard as valuable in moral and artistic culture. " 
(32) 
Germany 
was, to Rosenberg's mind, now threatened by-this three-pronged Jewish 
assault on her life-style. 
On the evidence of Der Jude, it is difficult to sustain the argument that 
Rosenberg's commitment to antisemitism was opportunistic, as Lane 
suggests. It is also difficult to accept without reservation Werner Maser's 
assertion that "unlike Hitler, in the year 1918 Rosenberg did not yet have 
at his disposal concrete political notions". 
(33) 
The remarkable feature of 
Der Jude isfhe early evidence which it provides of ideas which Rosenberg 
was to repeat so often in the 1920s and 1930s. The conspiratorial world- 
view, later adopted by the Nazi Party, was clearly present in outline in 
Rosenberg's arguments in 1918; the association of marxism and international 
socialism with Jewry and the 'revelation' of the leading role played by the 
Jews in the Bolshevik Revolution are clearly discernible in this early 
essay. Although Rosenberg admitted in his memoirs that it would be untrue 
to suggest that he had grasped immediately the full significance of the 
October Revolution, he does appear to have formulated the basic framework 
of a political philosophy by the middle of 1918. 
Furthermore, it seems clear that Rosenberg had decided before his departure 
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for Germany at the end of 1918 to propagate his ideas in his new home- 
land. Werner Maser, however, in an attempt to prove that Rosenberg was 
a political novice, in 1918, has quoted (out of context) the latter's 
comment in his memoirs that "he had never thought of getting involved at 
any time with politics". 
(34) 
In fact, in his memoirs, Rosenberg explained 
his decision to go to Germany partly in terms of his ability to 
"contribute in the Reich to the clarification of questions concerning 
Bolshevism, which were then appearing 
(35) 
in their full magnitude there. " 
And the full context of Rosenberg's comment about not getting involved in 
politics suggests that his early indifference to politics had been eroded 
by his experience of the Russian Revolution: 
"So I came to the Reich. Originally a man devoted 
completely to art, philosophy and history, who had 
never thought of getting involved in politics at any 
time. But I had observed the present; it too would be 
history and tradition one day. I had seen many forces 
pushing their way in to positions of leadership and had 
been able to witness the course of a revolution. " (36) 
The Russian Revolution, it seems, was all the political education which 
Rosenberg deemed necessary. Perhaps one might dismiss Rosenberg's implied 
sense of a mission to clarify to the Germans the danger posed by Bolshevism 
as a retrospective glamourisation for the benefit of his memoirs; but, on 
the other hand, it should be stressed that, as early as 1928 (before the 
Nazi Party had emerged from relative obscurity), he was already writing 
in the same vein. In his brief biography of Dietrich Eckart, published in 
1928, Rosenberg explained that, on arriving in Munich, he sought out 
(on the recommendation of a friend) a man (Eckart), "who had already 
begun here a similar struggle to the one I had before me. " 
(37) 
If this 
account is trustworthy, it would seem to dispel any lingering doubts 
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about his commitment to antisemitism in 1919. 
Rosenberg's meeting with Eckart was far more crucial for the former than 
the latter. Dietrich Eckart, born on 23 March 1868 the son of a lawyer 
in Neumarkt, Oberpfalz, was a playwright and sometime literary critic, who 
had already gained a certain notoriety in literary circles for a rather 
free translation of Peer Gynt. Though he was not a great success either 
as a playwright or as a critic, his artistic temperament and air of 
sophistication (his predilection for hard-drinking and drug-taking seemingly 
being the main outward signs of this) must have impressed a youthful and 
rather reticent Rosenberg. A month before he met Rosenberg, Eckart had 
begun to publish the journal, Auf gut deutsch, as a vehicle for his literary 
skills and his antisemitic views. 
Eckart's biographer, Margarete Plewnia, suggests that his antisemitism 
probably derived from his failure to achieve real recognition as a playwright; 
Jewish theatre-owners and critics, he felt, had been responsible for the 
boycotting of his plays. 
(38) 
Whether or not this was actually the case is 
impossible to determine, but he certainly seems to have been a fervent anti- 
semite during the First World War. 
(39) 
The suggestion that Eckart was a 
Jew-baiter in the mould of Julius Streicher, the later Gauleiter of Middle 
Fran cnia, is, as has recently been pointed out, completely inaccurate. 
(40) 
Though by no means identical to those of Rosenberg, Eckart's views on anti- 
semitism do share the former's intellectual rather than physical 
abhorrence of Jewry. In fact, Eckart's antisemitism was highly distinctive. 
'Jewishness', by which he meant at root the preoccupation with worldly 
or material considerations, resulting from a religious denial of 
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immortality, was, according to Eckart, a spiritual rather than a racial 
characteristic. 'Jewishness' was not, therefore, the preserve of one 
race - the Jews - but was visible in all races. In essence, Eckart's 
antisemitism was metaphysical not biological (as Rosenberg's was) and 
in theory at least, it bore little relation to policies of persecution, 
expulsion, let alone extermination of the Jews as a race. As he wrote in 
1919, "it is not a question of fighting the Jew as a person, but of fight- 
ing the Jewish spirit. " 
(41) 
What made his ideas different from those of other antisemites, as Eckart 
explained in an early contribution to Agd, was "the desire for self- 
knowledge". 
(42) 
Everyone has 'Jewishness' in him and Eckart aimed to 
spotlight, as the title of his first series of antisemitic articles indicated, 
"the Jewishness in and around us". Early in this series, he used a simple 
analogy to elucidate his views: 
"Jewishness belongs to the 
like... certain bacteria on 
indeed just as essentially 
contains, as we know, a ma 
without which, despite the 
it, it must perish. " (43) 
organism of mankind 
the human body, and 
as these.... Our body 
so of tiny lifeforms 
fact that they feed on 
'Jewishness' (and therefore hence the Jew) was a necessary evil, a necessary 
counter-weight to Aryan values. It seems very likely that Eckart's views 
on the duality of the human character were derived from Otto Weininger's 
book Geschlecht und Charakter (published in 1903); it is certainly of 
interest that Eckart referred to Weininger's work early in the series. 
(44) 
These rather esoteric philosophical ideas, however, did not prevent 
Eckart from treating the Jews as an identifiable racial group when he 
reviewed Germany's contemporary political situation. In the first edition 
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of Agd, Eckart attributed Germany's misfortunes not, as one might expect, 
to the Jews but to "the representatives of capitalism, the uncrowned 
kings of the stock exchange and its offices". 
(45) 
However, in January 
1919 Eckart clearly laid the blame for Germany's destruction at the door 
of the Jews: 
"Whatever way an empire is destroyed whether (it be) 
by means of Christianity as with Ancient Rome, or by 
means of Bolshevism as with the German state, matters 
little to the Jew: every tool, even if it is more 
odious in itself than the plague, is to him suitable 
so long as it has done his bidding. " (46) 
It is interesting to note that Eckart referred to Bolshevism in Germany, 
but made no reference to Russia, suggesting that he had not yet uncovered 
any link with the Jews there. He did, however, believe that the Jews were 
supporting the powers of the Entente; "behind Wilson's policy, behind the 
entire Entente policy", he wrote, "stands no other than Jewry, not just 
literally but in spirit also";, Germany's decline had been determined]ong 
before the war by "the entire Anglo-Jewish world of capital". 
(47) 
Eckart 
was also claiming that the ultimate aim of Jewry was world conquest. St. Paul, 
according to Eckart, had never fully freed himself of his 'Jewishness' and, 
therefore, had worked instinctively "to unseat the Roman Empire, the 
overmighty rival of his people for world-rule". 
(48) 
So before their first 
meeting early in 1919, Eckart possessed in outline a conspiratorial 
world-view similar to Rosenbergs, the initial premise of which was the 
belief that the Jews were out to conquer the world. 
Eckart welcomed Rosenberg as a fellow "warrior against Jerusalem" and was 
impressed - according to the latter - by the draft speeches and articles 
which he had brought with him from Eastern Europe. 
(49) Rosenberg's 
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distinctive contribution to the development of Nazi theory was his 
interpretation of the Bolshevik Revolution. His first article in Agd in 
February 1919 was entitled Die russisch-jüdische Revolution and it provided 
the basis of the Nazi interpretation of events in Russia in 1917 repeated 
again and again during the 19208. 
(50) 
The article, whilst reflecting the 
general philosophy revealed in his essay Der Jude, is more informative 
and helps to isolate the essence of Rosenberg's contribution to the later 
Nazi Weltanschauung. 
Rosenberg began by repeating the view that Jews were determined to destroy 
European culture, and that the Russian Revolution provided an ominous 
warning example. What emerges most clearly from Rosenbergs account of the 
February Revolution is his opposition to Czarism: 
"Whoever witnessed this type of government (Czarism) 
must acknowledge that any kind of self-assertiveness, 
whether it be in the economic or communal or intellectual 
field, was impeded by every means and that the rule of 
the corrupt officialdom was oppressive. " (51) 
The February Revolution was, therefore, welcomed by the Russian people and 
by Rosenberg - later he was to refer to it as a "liberation". 
(52) 
The 
second striking feature of the article is Rosenberg's sympathy for the 
Russian people -a stark contrast to the hatred of Russians so often 
attributed to Rosenberg as a Baltic German. 
(53) 
In Me russisch-JUdische 
Revolution, Rosenberg related how the initial optimism of the Russians 
evaporated into bitterness and disillusionment, once "centrifugal forces 
set in in the form of the soldiers' councils", which quickly came to be 
dominated "by a number of Jews who streamed together from all corners of 
Russia and from abroad. " 
(54) 
The October Revolution of 1917 was, 
according to Rosenberg, secretly inspired and led by Jews and financed 
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from abroad and once the Bolshevik seizure of power was secured, "they 
let the mask fall and constructed an almost entirely Jewish 'Russian' 
government". The use of inverted commas around Russian signified that 
the government was not genuinely Russian; indeed, given Rosenberg's views 
it could not be if it was also Jewish. In fact, to Rosenberg's mind the 
new regime was consciously anti-Russian. For example, he argued, the new 
government now introduced a censorship stricter than anything known under 
Czarist rule and fostered class war against the Russian bourgeoisie: 
"The entire Russian intelligentsia which, for 
decades, had taken care of the Russian people and 
which had been hanged or forced into exile for 
its well-being, was simply exterminated. " 
The National Assembly, "the long-cherished aim of all Russian patriots", 
was dispersed by the Red Guards. The Bolshevik Revolution was, therefore, 
at odds with Russia's traditions and current aspirations and its success 
was not yet assured: 
"One can see, and every piece of recent news 
confirms it, that the hatred against the Jews 
in Russia... is attracting ever wider circles. 
The most weak-willed and the most tolerant Russians 
are now as imbued with it as any former Czarist 
official. If the present regime falls, then no 
Jew would remain alive in Russia. " (55) 
Rosenberg felt, therefore, that there was still hope for the Russian people. 
The most significant aspect of Rosenberg's interpretation of the Russian 
Revolution, as far as Eckart was concerned, was the identification of 
Bolshevism with Jewry. Bolshevism in Russia as well as in Germany was 
evidently the tool of Jewry. Introducing Rosenberg's article in the 
Agd, Eckart displayed his excitement at the new 'revelation': 
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"Whoever reads the report on the Russian Revolution 
will realize what the final goals (hidden from us) of 
Jewish Asiatic blood are.... The conformity of 
revolutionary developments in Russia with those 
here no longer leaves anything to be desired as 
far as clarity is concerned. " (56) 
Clearly then by the beginning of 1919 before either came into contact with 
the German Workers' Party, Eckart and Rosenberg had an antisemitic world- 
view, albeit one which was sketchily drawn in places. To Eckart's belief 
that the Jews were manipulating the capitalist western world, Rosenberg 
added evidence of Jewish abetment of Bolshevism in Eastern Europe. As 
yet, no evidence was adduced to prove that the two activities were directly 
connected in a coordinated, clandestine conspiracy to advance the Jewish 
cause and to realise the goal of Jewish world domination. Nevertheless, 
Rosenberg's references to the financing of Bolshevism from Jewish sources 
abroad and to the Jewish adoption of socialism in Western Europe could be 
seen as pointers in this direction. 
(57) 
The second task of this chapter is to show how the 'world conspiracy theory', 
so central to Nazi ideology thereafter, evolved effectively between 1919 
and 1921. By 1921 the Nazis had 'unearthed' a vast web of Jewish intrigue; 
the relationship between the Jewish capitalists and Jewish Bolsheviks had 
been substantiated; and three other components had been worked into the 
conspiracy theory - namely, Zionism, Freemasonry and Jesuitism. An 
explanation of how these developments occurred is essential for an under- 
standing of the relationship between this ideology and foreign affairs as 
well as for an accurate assessment of the contributions of individuals 
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to it. 
Much of the credit for the development of this theory must go to Alfred 
Rosenberg; which is not to say that his ideas themselves were particularly 
original. Karl Harrer, the first chairman of the DAP, for example, used 
many of the themes, such as Jewish control of the press and Jewish 
collaboration with the Freemasons. 
(58) 
It was Rosenberg who investigated 
these themes further and synthesized them in his articles for Agdd and 
presented most of the 'evidence' later used to build up a composite picture 
of the secret machinations of World Jewry. Eckart acknowledged Rosenb erg's 
growing expertise in these matters by quoting him extensively. For example, 
in July 1919 in an article on the German poet, Heine, Eckart allowed his 
"Baltic friend", Alfred Rosenberg, "to say a few words in a short study of 
the relationship of the Jewish spirit to European culture". 
(59) 
Rosenberg 
took the opportunity to expound his later notorious theory about the lack 
of creativity shown by the Jews. 
In June 1919, Rosenberg published his first detailed examination of the 
role of Jewry in politics, particularly in foreign affairs, entitled 
Judenheit und Politik. Rosenberg noted, first of all, the Jews' peculiar 
aptitude for foreign affairs: 
"The Jews were dispersed (note, of their own 
volition) throughout the whole world, but they 
not only maintained the closest-knit community 
where they lived together abroad, but they also 
remained in constant contact with their countrymen 
in the most distant lands: trading ships and 
caravans brought news of all kinds from all 
quarters of the globe and took the same back 
again. " (60) 
These international contacts meant that the Jews were well-equipped to be 
advisers on foreign affairs; they were, therefore, in a position to render 
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great service to the state in which they lived. However, as a community, 
the Jews chose to live a separate existence in whatever state they 
settled; they remained "a self-contained people, which never, ever, showed 
the slightest inclination to have any dealings with the inhabitants, 
other than those necessary for trade. They regarded other peoples as 
inferior and fit only to serve their purposes. " Thus the loyalty of the 
Jews, even those in the highest offices, might be suspect, though this 
was not necessarily the case, for "the interests of the land could coincide 
with those of their (that is, the Jewish) nation, then they would be 
supported; if not, they were abandoned without scruple. ' 
61> 
As we shall 
see, Rosenberg's assessment of the status of a country would depend in part 
upon the degree of identification, which he perceived between its national 
interests and those of the Jews. 
The loyalty of the Jews was unpredictable, according to Rosenberg, because 
of a certain duality in their nature: 
"In every cold appraisal of the Jewish manner it is 
necessary to differentiate between two different 
impulses: between national drives and those of a 
more emotional nature. To the former belongs the 
clear pursuit of personal as well as national interests 
and the assessment of the same when interfering in the 
politics of states; to the latter, the passions of 
hatred against other peoples, which often disturb 
such assessments. " 
As a result, Rosenberg argued, even the most dispassionate Jewish business- 
man or politician could easily be transformed into a rabid xenophobe by 
the basic Jewish desire to destroy other peoples. 
(62) 
Hence the Jewish 
politician was a most dangerous political animal, who could easily 
subvert policies dictated by national interest for his own ends or 
those of Jewry. It followed then that in assessing a prospective ally 
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(or enemy), one had to establish not only which policies were in its 
national interest, but also how far the leadership of the country concerned 
had been infiltrated by the Jews, for this 'fifth column' might prevent 
their policies from being pursued. 
The Jews also played a role in foreign affairs at another level, according 
to Rosenberg in Judenheit und Politik. They could build up and lead an 
international alliance against the powers who opposed Jewish ambitions; 
Rosenberg felt that at that time such a vendetta was being directed (for 
reasons which will be dealt with later) "primarily against two peoples: 
against the Russian and the German. " 
(63) 
The First World War, Rosenberg 
maintained, had divided the world into two opposing groups of powers, 
consequently dividing the Jewish people into two camps also. However, since 
the richest and most influential Jews in the world lived in France, England, 
Italy and North America and opposed German policies, most Jews supported 
the Entente powers against Germany in the war. The reasons for the 
opposition to German policies were self-evident for Rosenberg. Firstly, 
the German Empire opposed the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine; the 
Entente powers, and especially England, did not. Therefore, "all Jews 
gradually came to agree with the English orientation, whether they were 
zionists or anti-zionists. " The other main reason for the collaboration 
between the "Jewish world speculators" and the Entente powers was that the 
leading statesmen of the Entente nations, Poincare, Briand, Clemenceau, 
Lloyd George, Balfour, Orlando and others, were all freemasons. Like the 
Jews, they were members of "the lodge, whose effectiveness extends over 
the whole world, and without whose knowledge and assistance, no political 
event occurs. " 
(64) 
The anti-German coalition, had, therefore, been 
orchestrated by Freemasonry. Hence, in this very early article on the 
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Jewish question in June 1919 - much earlier than has hitherto been 
suspected 
(65)- 
Rosenberg identified Zionism and Freemasonry as two major 
instruments of Jewish influence and control, both of which gave the Jews 
the ability to manipulate international diplomacy against opponents of 
their ambitions and were thus important considerations in the formulation 
of foreign policy. Thus it was Rosenberg's conviction that the Jews 
could determine the course of international diplomacy at two points: 
firstly at the national level, by preventing the implementation of policies 
in the national interest, and secondly at international level, by forming 
hostile coalitions of powers through their zionist and freemasonic contacts. 
While the role of the freemasons in this judeo-masonic conspiracy remained 
largely unexplored at this point, Rosenbergs ideas on the zionist 
component of the conspiracy had already begun to crystallize as his article 
Judenheit und Politik shows. Scrutinizing the early history of the 
zionist movement, Rosenberg found evidence to support his view that the 
Jews were a distinct race. He quoted the programme drawn up by Theodor 
Herzl for the first zionist congress in Basle in 1897, which called upon 
delegates "to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by 
public law". 
(66) 
Rosenberg noted that in the programme "the Jews were 
expressly designated a people", hence they could not claim immunity as a 
"religious community", as they had done in the past when under attack. 
Quoting the claim of Chaim Weizmann, Herzl's successor as leader of the 
zionist movement, that "the existence of the Jewish nation is a fact and 
not a question for dispute", Rosenberg concluded that "the Jew cannot be a 
citizen in any state" (other than his own, presumably). 
(67) 
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Correspondingly, Rosenberg's solution to the Jewish question, lbrmulated 
somewhat later and publicized in Die Spur des Juden im Wandel der Zeiten - 
a detailed exposi of Jewish machinations past and present - was based on 
the assumption that the Jews were a foreign community inside Germany. The 
Jew should not, therefore, be allowed to hold public office or to serve 
in the German army, or to manage cultural establishments such as theatres, 
art galleries etc, or to hold posts (teaching or professional) in German 
schools and universities or to represent Germany in economic negotiations 
or to direct banks. Rosenberg reached the perhaps surprising conclusion 
that "Zionism must be supported", however only "in order to get rid of 
a certain number of Jews each year to Palestine or over our frontiers. " 
(68) 
Such a solution was perfectly consistent with his view of Zionism and his 
recommendations for the treatment of Jews in Germany as aliens. Yet the 
fact that he had to oppose Jewry and yet support Zionism, perhaps, 
indicates that Rosenberg had some problems fitting Zionism into his 
conspiratorial thesis. The zionists were, as Rosenberg was forced to admit, 
"Jewish nationalists" (Nationaljuden), wanting to create a nation state 
in Palestine. 
(69) 
How then was this aim compatible with the internationalist 
aspirations (Jewish world rule, world revolution etc) attributed to the 
Jews in general? In 1920, apparently scare of this dichotomy, Rosenberg 
claimed that the Jews only pretended to be nationalistic, whilst in fact 
harbouring internationalist pretensions, because, after all, he argued, 
"Jewish internationalism is anti-national, and that means, in principle, 
civil wars in all nations. " 
(70) 
But how, Rosenberg asked, could a nation 
which had preserved strong nationalist tendencies for a 1,000 years 
support internationalism? His answer was that "the call for internationalism 
in the sense of anti-nationalism is (my italics) the call of national 
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Jewry, the call for class conflict in the sense of civil war is the call 
of the exploiter who recognises no classes. " 
(71) 
The contorted logic of 
Rosenberg's argument indicates that he found it difficult to accommodate 
the zionist demand for a nation state in Palestine into the general theory 
of 'world conspiracy'. 
When Rosenberg examined the attitude of the allegedly 'Jewish-Bolshevik' 
government to Zionism, again he found the conspiracy theory a little 
difficult to sustain. That government 'predictably' condemned antisemitism 
as "counter-revolutionary"; but it also, as Rosenberg had to concede, 
condemned the zionist movement on the grounds that it was sponsored by 
capitalist forces and was a nationalist movement. 
(72) 
This stance was 
quite in accord with Marxist-Leninism but did it mean that the Bolshevik 
Jews condemned Zionism? If so, Rosenberg could scarcely argue that 
Bolshevism and Zionism were two arms of a Jewish world conspiracy. Perhaps, 
because he perceived this flaw in his argument, Rosenberg maintained that 
whilst Zionism had been denounced by Marxist theorists, the zionist organ- 
isation had not been declared counter-revolutionary "by any single decree 
of the Russian government. " 
(73) 
Thus the Jews, and not the Marxist 
intellectuals, were holding away in Bolshevik Russia. 
In this way, Rosenberg tried to disguise the fact that the 'Jewish-led' 
world revolution and Zionism were incompatible bedfellows in a conspiracy 
theory. However, whilst Zionism was difficult to assimilate into his 
conspiracy theory at this level, at another it could be put to good use. 
The fact that Zionism had its supporters in all the major states furnished 
plentiful evidence in Rosenbergs eyes of an international Jewish menace, 
which cut across national frontiers. It should not be forgotten, of course, 
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that it was the zionist conference in Basle in 1897, which later provided 
antisemites with 'proof' of the existence of a Jewish plot to achieve 
world domination as laid bare in the famous tract The Protocols of the Elders 
of Zionc74Zionism was, therefore, according to believers in the Protocols, 
a front for aspirations of a more ominous nature than the creation of a 
Jewish state in Palestine. 
There can be little doubt that Rosenberg was responsible for incorporating 
Zionism into the world conspiracy theory, despite Barbara Miller Lane's 
belief that Eckart may have inspired Rosenberg's early anti-zionist tracts. 
(75) 
In fact, Eckart's views on Zionism differed markedly from Rosenberg's. 
Eckart, as has been seen, regarded 'Jewishness' as a metaphysical rather than 
biological attribute and as a necessary counterweight to Aryan qualities. 
Indeed, early in the series of articles entitled Das Judentum in und ausser 
uns in Agd, he prophesied that "if... the Jewish people perished, there would 
be no more nations-the end of all time would come", but added that "that 
would also be the case if the zionist idea were to be realised, that is, 
if the whole of Jewry amalgamated into one unified state, whether it be in 
Palestine or elsewhere. " 
(76) 
This was because the Jews had always been 
dispersed, living amongst the Gentiles and it was precisely this cohabitation 
between Jews and Gentiles, which maintained the natural balance; "the 
world could not exist", he argued, "if the Jews lived alone by themselves. " 
(77) 
Eckart doubted, in any case, whether the Jews possessed the ability to 
create a state of their own, but his opposition to zionist aspirations was 
unequivocal. 
(7s) 
Rosenberg would have endorsed the former argument, but 
would not have accepted the need for Aryans and Jews to live in close proximity. 
Significantly, it was Rosenberg's views on Zionism, which seemed to commend 
(79) 
themselves to the Nazis of a later generation. So, it seems fair to credit 
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Rosenberg with ferreting out damning evidence about the zionists and with 
its incorporation in the overall synthesis. 
Another example of Rosenberg's contribution to Nazi theory was the idea 
of masonic complicity in Jewish plans, which he introduced to readers of 
Agd in 1919. Rosenberg was not the first to suggest a possible link between 
the Jews and the freemasons; as he readily admitted, writers before him 
like Dr. F. Wichtl, from whose Weltfreimaurerei, Weltrevolution, Weltrepublik 
he quoted often, had investigated this relationship. 
(80) 
However, Rosenberg 
did the spadework for the Agd and later the VB, collecting information 
from often obscure secondary sources to support the claim that the Jews 
had infiltrated the ranks of the freemasons. 
As early as June 1919, Rosenberg had alluded to this idea when he accused 
the Jews of having used the lodges in order to increase their influence 
over the Entente powers by means of secret consultations with high-ranking 
government officials, who were allegedly freemasons. 
(81) 
In1920 he summed 
up Freemasonry in his pamphlet, Die Spur des Juden in Wandelder Zeiten, 
as "a secret order with the aim of erecting an anti-religious World Republic., 
(82) 
The similarity between this goal and that of the Jews was, probably, in 
Rosenberg's view, the main reason for judeo-masonic collaboration. Other 
reasons soon became apparent. For example, the methods used by the free- 
masons were compatible with the subversive tactics of the Jews. Every 
revolution since 1789 was, in Rosenberg's opinion, attributable to the 
influence of the freemasons; the French Revolution had been only the first 
step towards control of the world. (The fact that the battle-cry of 'Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity' was an axiom of the freemasons was sufficient proof 
for Rosenberg of masonic inspiration behind the French Revolution. ) 
(83) 
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The hostility towards monarchism was another point of contact between the 
Jews and the freemasons; from the middle of the nineteenth century, 
Rosenberg alleged, the socialist International and Freemasonry had formed 
the two wings of the anti-monarchical movement. 
(84) 
The Alliance 
Israelite Universelle, in reality a purely philanthropic society formed 
to reprint basic Jewish texts, became, in Rosenberg's scenario, a central 
agency coordinating Jewish subversive activities, and providing a link 
with judaicized freemasons. 
(85) 
Rosenberg held the freemasons responsible for all the major assassinations 
since 1789; even Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria had been a victim of a 
freemasonic plot -a 'fact' which enabled Rosenberg to claim that the world 
war had been unleashed by the Jews and freemasons as a tactic to foster 
revolution and that it was the first stage towards the creation of a New 
Jerusalem; "world war, world revolution, world republic, this was the 
freemasonic programme", Rosenberg concluded. Freemasonry, therefore, 
became a second arm (along with Zionism) of the world conspiracy to secure 
a "cosmopolitan world empire". 
(86) 
There can be no doubt that the period between his publication of his initial 
observations on Freemasonry in June 1919 and the appearance of Die Spur des 
Juden im Wandel der Zeiten early in 1920 was a formative one for Rosenberg. 
By wide reading he was slowly accumulating a store of knowledge and 
propaganda material on the freemasons; Dietrich Eckart, in fact, testified 
to this fact in August 1919, when he referred in an article entitled Das 
fressende Feuer, to one of "the many books of recent times, which my tireless 
friend Alfred Rosenberg has collected for an understanding of Freemasonry. " 
(87) 
Eckart began to treat Rosenberg as an expert on the freemasons; in the 
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same article, Eckart wrote that "wherever one looks, one finds traces 
of planned subversive activity. Let us follow them.. . with the sure hand 
of Alfred Rosenberg. " 
(88) 
Eckart went on to quote Rosenberg at some length 
and many of the arguments and evidence (quoted above) which later appeared 
in Die Spur des Juden made their first appearance in this article. On 
another occasion, Eckart quoted Rosenberg as his authority on the freemasons, 
pointing out that "our Baltic friend Rosenberg... advises us not to condemn 
the masons as a whole. " 
(89) 
Rosenberg believed that most freemasons were 
ignorant of the Jewish connection and were being duped. He developed this 
idea further in a series of articles, entitled Das Verbrechen der 
Freimaurerei, published in Agd during 1920 and 1921 and later as a pamphlet. 
(90) 
Introducing the series, Eckart welcomed this exposition of the internal 
character of Freemasonry in the interests of the German lodge brothers, "who 
are moved by the best human and national interests" and "who have no idea 
that they are serving the enemies of our people by belonging to this 'Ideal' 
World Association. " 
(91) 
Eckart had, it would seem, adopted Rosenberg's view 
of the rank-and-file freemasons as misguided people and paid this tribute 
to his work: 
"My friend Rosenberg has undertaken by the most 
careful scrutiny of the pertinent sources, in a 
thankfully most professional way, to reveal, even to 
the most prejudiced eye, a clear picture of the criminal order. " (92) 
However, apart from the addition of greater detail in the Das Verbrechen 
der Freimaurerei series, Rosenberg's conclusions on freemasonic influence 
had changed little since 1919. 
However, Rosenberg's series on Freemasonry did spawn another 'enfant terrible' 
to be slotted into the world conspiracy theory: Jesuitism. The idea that 
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freemasons and Jesuits could be allies appeared, at first sight, -even 
to Rosenberg, to be ludicrous. He freely admitted thin early in one 
installment, remarking that the fact that "the freemasons and Jesuits are 
deadly enemies is a truism. " 
(93) 
"By their very nature", he continued, 
"Jesuitism and Freemasonry are two rivals for one and the same prize: world 
rule"; the Jesuits wanted a universal, spiritual monarchy or the Roman 
Papacy under their control, the freemasons a "social, theocratic world 
republic. " These were on the face of it incompatible aims. The way in 
which Rosenberg managed to reconcile two seemingly irreconcilable elements 
in his conspiracy theory provides some insight into the infinite malleability 
of a conspiratorial ethos as well as into the fertility or perversity of 
Rosenberg's mind. He began by pointing out that, even if the freemasons 
and Jesuits were poles apart, the Jews and the Jesuits were not; they 
could agree on their oppositionto Germany because "Jesuitism is by its 
very nature intrinsically anti-germanic"; throughout its history it had 
worked against Germany until "in the fateful years from 1914 to 1918 
the Roman (Catholic) party (the Centre Party) under the leadership of 
Matthias Erzberger went through the thick and thin with the enemies of 
Germandom: the judaicized Democrats and Social Democrats. " 
(94) 
Jewry and 
Jesuitism also shared "the principled absolute intolerance", which 
Rosenberg called the "Jewish-Roman spirit"; "in the Jesuit order, the 
Roman-Old Testament spirit fused with a cunningly-constructed semitic 
politico-religious secret organization with hypnotic methods of attraction. " 
(95) 
Hence Rome and Jerusalem were identical in their politico-religious claims 
to power, each believing that it represented the chosen people. 
(96) 
To 'prove' that the Jews and Jesuits have similar outlooks and aspirations 
would not appear to help in resolving the problems posed by the deadly 
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rivalry between the Jesuits and the freemasons (the third element in the 
supposed conspiracy). Indeed, Rosenberg ackowledged in the sixth 
installment of Das Verbrechen der Freimaurerei "that nothing stands 
further from the principles of Jesuitism than the ideas of the freemasons. 
On the one side intolerance, on the other absolute freedom, there hatred, 
here brotherhood. " 
(97) 
Similarities, however, were evident in their 
methods; Freemasonry aped Jesuitism. As in the Jesuit order, the majority 
of freemasons were harmless and ignorant of the conspiracy behind the 
scenes; "just as the Jesuit order strives for world tyranny from a despotic 
base, so in the same way the league of freemasons strives for a world 
republic from a despotic base. " "The relationship between Jesuitism and 
Freemasomry", Rosenberg concluded hopefully, "ought now to be clear. 
Jesuitism (like Judaism) aimed directly at subjugation - spiritual as well 
as physical - and held the picture of Christ before one's face and preached 
'humility'; Freemasonry originated in a generous and thoroughly unjewish 
movement, which had to become, however, because of its immoderation and 
foggy notions, a tool of intriguers. Its mask was called freedom and 
brotherhood. The more Jews penetrated it, the more the practices, the goals 
of Freemasonry approached not only the semitic and basque methods and goals 
of the Jesuits but also the principles of the Talmud. " The tyranny and 
absolutism of all three: Freemasony, Jesuitism, and Jewry - were inimical to 
the political and cultural ideas of the Germans. 
(98) 
Hence in the final 
analysis, they were compatible allies in the conspiracy directed against the 
Germans. 
Rosenberg, therefore, managed in face of evidence of the perennial 
hostility between the Papacy and Freemasonry, to make it appear as if the 
Jesuits and the freemasons had something in common, which made them 
co-conspirators. This semantic feat was a tribute to the adaptability of the 
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conspiracy theory; atnd, of course, the secrecy surrounding the affairs of 
the freemasons gave Rosenberg plenty of scope for his extravagent claims. 
Once again, the 'credit' for the assimilation of Jesuits and Freemasons 
into the world conspiracy must go to Rosenberg alone, although he was not 
the only antisemite to broach the same subject; Eckart referred in an 
early article on Erzberger, the leader of the Catholic Centre Party, to the 
cooperation between the Catholic Church and Jewry: "Rome and Jerusalem", 
he wrote, have "found each other onee again; in common vengeance on the 
German character, in whose genuine Christian profundity, they sense at all 
times the greatest danger to their world rule. " 
(99) 
Clearly, the central 
idea may not have been originally Rosenberg's; indeed, the alliance 
between the Catholic and Jew was quite a familiar one in antisemitic circles, 
but his unique contribution was its development and incorporation into the 
conspiracy theory. Rosenberg has, therefore, the dubious distinction of 
being the dedicated, hard-working researcher who unearthed the 'evidence' 
needed to give the conspiracy some plausibility. 
The final link in the chain of conspiracy was provided by the capitalists 
of Western Europe. The evolution of this particular element in what 
became the Nazi Weltanschauung is more difficult to unravel than some of 
the others because the capitalists were commonly held to be responsible 
for the German defeat in 1918 in view of America's financial aid to the 
Entente powers during the war. As early as December 1918, Dietrich Eckart 
in an article, entitled Der grosse Krumme had identified the representatives 
of "stock exchange capitalism" as the main cause of Germany's misfortunes. 
(100) 
Germany, he continued, had been defeated not by military might but by usury, 
"by the supra-state rule of money, the financial militarism". The capitalists 
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or the "Princes of Gold" as he called them were exploiting nations by 
playing one off against another, "creating Empires here, Republicsthere, 
chaos with us, as it suits them... they promote and combat Bolshevism in one 
and the same land. " The tactics of the capitalists and their crucial 
instruments of power, the banks, were, therefore, very unpredictable, but 
their subversive influence was never in doubt. Capitalism was growing 
ever more powerful according to Eckart, because "its many banks suck up 
the millions of our savers. " 
(101) 
At this point, Eckart did not equate capitalism with Jewry and, indeed, the 
emphasis on the growth of capitalism as a result of private investment 
suggests that Eckart might be drawing on the ideas of Gottfried Feder, 
the third of the Nazi theorists whose ideas have to be examined in this 
chapter, and the only one to concern himself seriously with economic affairs. 
In 1919, Gottfried Feder was a thirty-six year old civil engineer and 
manager of a small firm of building contractors. 
(102) 
There can be little 
doubt that the difficulties which he experienced during the First World War 
in obtaining credit for building projects first instilled in him a distaste 
for high interest rateson loans. The near-bankruptcy of Germany in 1918 
as a result of war loans probably inspired him to launch his campaign for 
"the breaking of the slavery of interest"; in 1919 he published his pamphlet 
Manifest zur Brechung der Zinsknechtschaft des Geldes(103)and though somewhat 
outside the parameters of a study of foreign policy concepts, his ideas 
are not without relevance for the development of the folkish Weltanschauung. 
To put it in a nutshell, Feder wanted state socialism; he wanted the state 
to extend its control over the system of banking and transportation, and 
into private enterprise; he wanted the state to own land and to regulate 
rents and in some cases to abolish mortgages (ways of destroying the power 
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of 'Interest'). In the financial field he wanted to abolish non-productive 
'finance capital' - that is, capital not directly devoted to the production 
of goods - and to lift restrictions on 'industrial capital', which was so 
used. 
(104) These economic demands coloured Feder's approach to foreign 
affairs. it seems. 
For example, he optimistically referred to Bolshevism as an "acute reaction 
against this mammonistic enslavement". 
(105) 
He was also very disappointed 
with the outcome of the German Revolution of November 1918, which, he had 
hoped, would lead the new German state to a similar rejection of the values 
of Western Europe. "The underlying significance of the Revolution" had 
been in his view, "the liberation of active labour from the international 
economic enslavement to the Golden International"*; but this had not been 
followed through and, as a result, "the economic subjugation of productive 
capital to the interest-slavery of the mammonistic powers" was now sealed. 
(106) 
The limited endorsement of the Bolshevik Revolution should be noted as a 
significant pointer at an early date to divergent views on foreign policy 
amongst the D. A. P. 's main propagandists. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
to suggest that Feder identified the great evil of finance capitalism with 
the Jews; indeed, he stated that it could NOT be identified with any part- 
icular section of the community. 
(1f)7) 
It would seem, therefore, that the 
initial inspiration behind the attack on capitalism was not antisemitism, 
and that, in Feder's case at least, Bolshevism was a praiseworthy attempt 
to liberate Russia from the 'bondage of interest'. 
How then did the alleged alliance between 'Jewish' capitalists and 'Jewish' 
* the collective name used by early Nazis (and others) for the powers of 
international capitalism. Rosenberg. was frequently to refer to the coll- 
aboration between the Red (i. e. socialist), Black (i. e. Roman Catholic), and 
Golden (Jewish) internationals; these terms were popularised by the Pan- 
Germans; D. Frymann, Wenn ich der Kaiser war (Leipzig, 1913), pp. 192-93. 
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Bolsheviks - the lynch-pin of the Nazis' conspiratorial world-view - 
emerge? The answer lies in the collaboration between Eckart, Feder, and 
Rosenberg in 1919. Feder began to work with Eckart early in 1919 at about 
the same time as Rosenberg and the latter later recalled these days in his 
memoirs; he remembered that Eckart "picked up the ideas (on interest- 
slavery) in a spirited fashion and advocated the idea of the nationalisation 
of all credit. " 
(108) 
However, Rosenberg himself remained rather cautious 
about Feder's ideas, perhaps out of jealousy, perhaps out of a genuine 
conviction (as he later claimed) that Feder had mistaken the symptom of 
a disease for its cause. Nevertheless, Rosenberg did recognise the propaganda 
potential of Feder's attack on finance capitalism; it provided, as he admitted 
in his memoirs, "an additional piece of verification for so many a theory. "(109) 
And it was probably Rosenberg who mixed Eckart's bitterness towards 
capitalism and Feder's phobia about interest-slavery with the prevailing 
antisemitism into the heady brew which Hitler was to find so appealing. In 
October 1919, Rosenberg pointed out that "everywhere the Jew was the master 
of interest (Zinsherr) "(110) adding later that "whoever knows the Jewish 
nature, knows that the Golden International will move mountains to bring 
(111) 
empires to ruin. " 
However, whilst Rosenberg had helped to establish a fairly obvious link 
between Jewry, international high finance and the fairly novel slogan of 
'interest-slavery', there seems to have been no clearly defined link between 
the Jews of the capitalist West and those of Bolshevik Russia. It is true 
that in Der Jude Rosenberg had played down the significance of the class 
struggle, epitomized by the conflict between the proletariat and the capitalist, 
as a major factor in history, but this is not proof that he had already 
adopted the standpoint, so consistently maintained later, that there was no 
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real dichotomy between capitalism and socialism. 
(112) 
However, the fact 
that Rosenberg's ideas were approaching this conclusion is undeniable. 
He had already argued, as has been seen, that socialism had become stronger 
in the West because of Jewish backing. 
(113) 
Furthermore, in June 1919 
Rosenberg denied that there was any significant difference between the 
'democratic' and the 'revolutionary' Jews; both, he felt, wanted to weaken 
Germany: 
"What separates the 'democratic' and the 'revolutionary' 
Jews from one another are questions of tactics and 
personal egotism: their goal is the same, namely 
Jewish rule in Germany, and it can really be immaterial 
to the German whether the Mark is gradually sucked out 
of him... or whether he is abandoned immediately to anarchy. " (114) 
These comments, whilst showing awareness of what Jews of different political 
persuasions had in common, fall short of a clear commitment to the proposition 
that 'Jewish' capitalists and 'Jewish' Bolsheviks were actively engaged 
in a conspiratorial exercise. 
The missing link in the chain of international conspiracy was, of course, 
the suggestion that the Jewish capitalists supported the Bolshevik regime 
and that they had financed the Russian Revolution. it is not easy to 
determine when this missing link was 'discovered'. 
(115) 
By 1920 Rosenberg 
certainly seemed to have decided that a connection existed between the 
representatives of international capitalism and the formative influences on 
communist ideology, for he described "the Black, Red, and Golden Internationals" 
as "the dreams of the Jewish philosophers from Ezra, Ezekiel, and Nehemiah 
to Marx, Rothschild, and Trotsky. " 
(116) 
The key to an understanding of the 
Jewish world conspiracy was, therefore, that the 'Jewish Stock Exchange 
capitalists' like the Rothschilds were in league with the Jewish advocates of 
anti-capitalist revolution, like Marx and Trotsky. In an article in 
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February 1921, when he clearly felt the message ought to have sunk in, 
Rosenberg complained that "still today, many Germans have not got it into 
their heads that. . . High Finance Jewry has long ago conferred with the 
Jewish revolutionaries and in 99 out of 100 cases, have come to an agreement. " 
(117) 
Furthermore, he claimed, Jewish money had often financed revolution, 
for example, that of 1870-71 in Paris; such facts 'proved' incontrovertibly 
the destructive power of "a close amalgam of Jewish-led radicalism and 
Jewish High Finance. " 
(118) 
In March 1921 Rosenberg stated explicitly 
that the February Revolution of 1917 had long been "prepared by liberal- 
socialist Russians and Jews and paid for with English money. " 
(119) 
Hence 
Rosenberg claimed that world communism and world capitalism were not deadly 
enemies as was so often claimed; the Soviet regime was in fact supported 
by the Jews of Western Europe: 
"Bolshevism is the continuation of Jewish usury by 
other, more savage, means. " (120) 
Hence, in Rosenberg's view, world communism and world capitalism were 
merely two devices by which the Jews sought to undermine the nation states 
of the world and to lay the foundations of their own world domination. 
Barbara Miller Lane is perfectly correct, therefore, when she maintains 
that "the equation between the Jews, bankers, and bolsheviks, which appears 
in Mein Kampf, stems from the combined influence upon Hitler of Feder, Eckart, 
and Rosenberg. " 
(121) 
Nevertheless, Rosenberg's central role in the 
development of an overall synthesis of these various contributions must 
be emphasised. Eckart and Feder had their own ides fixes, which may 
have produced impressive-sounding slogans such as 'the breaking of interest- 
slavery' or 'Jewishness in and around us' but, doctrinally, were not easily 
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accessible to rank and file Nazis in later years. It is Rosenberg 
again who has the dubious distinction of having incorporated the gist of 
their ideas into a self-contained and, given the insane premises on which 
it rested, reasonably coherent philosophy, which became the stock-in-trade 
of the Nazi movement. 
By 1921, therefore, the delicate web of intrigue, in which the Jews were 
allegedly enmeshed, had been successfully unravelled - principally by 
Rosenberg. One question remains: what part was played in this denouement 
by The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the famous forgery which purported 
to reveal evidence of the machinations of this vast subterranean conspiracy? 
This is the subject of some debate amongst historians. A recent biographer 
of Rosenberg assigns to the 'Protocols' a prominent part in his account 
of Rosenberg's political education, repeating Konrad Heiden's colourful 
account of how the 'Protocols' were left on Rosenberg's desk by an unknown 
visitor in the summer of 1917. 
(122) 
Most historians have, without any 
substantial evidence, faithfully followed this line, and refer to Rosenberg 
as bringing the 'Protocols' to Germany 'under his arm'. This interpretation 
is far from convincing. There is certainly no concrete evidence in his 
articles in 1919 to suggest that Rosenberg was well-acquainted with the 
text of the 'Protocols'. If the 'Protocols' did make a great impact on 
Rosenberg, it is strange that he never mentioned the source of his 
inspiration, especially since the 'Protocols' would clearly have added 
weight to his arguments and also because Rosenberg was in the habit of 
disclosing his sourses. Doubts about the reliability of the 'Protocols' 
are unlikely to have prevented him from using them in 1919 since the fact 
that they were revealed as a forgery in 1921 did not prevent him from 
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later publishing a commentary on them. 
(123) 
Furthermore, Rosenberg did 
not write a review of the 'Protocols' until February 1921, over a year 
after their publication in Germany which again seems unusual if they were 
(124) 
the source of his ideas. 
It would appear, therefore, that Rosenberg may not in fact have been aware 
of the existence of the 'Protocols' when he came to Germany and that the 
conspiratorial ideas about which he wrote in 1919 were culled from other 
sources; the belief in the existence of a Jewish plot was hardly a novel 
idea and, as we have seen, recent publications had 'uncovered' masonic 
complicity in Jewish plans. The case for Rosenberg's ignorance of the 
'Protocols' is further strengthened by his article, Judenheit und Politik, 
published in June 1919, in which he referred to the existence of a "world 
conspiracy to secure a Jewish cosmopolitan world empire", and also to the 
first zionist conference in 1897, but made no connection between the two. 
This would be very surprising if Rosenberg had been familiar with the 
'Protocols' because they 'revealed' that the conference in Basle was the 
venue at which the plot was hatched. In fact, Rosenberg mentioned the 
conference only to highlight the programme of the zionist movement, formulated 
there, and its goal - the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. 
(125) 
The most 
likely explanation of Rosenberg's failure to make use of the 'evidence' of 
the world conspiracy being plotted at the 1897 zionist conference is quite 
simply that he had no detailed knowledge of the 'Protocols' at this time. 
This interpretation seems to be confirmed by Eckart's apparently accidental 
discovery of a related source of evidence for these alleged Jewish intrigues. 
In October 1919, Eckart published an extract from the Evangelische Viertel- 
jahrshefte aus dem Syrischen Waisenhaus in Jerusalem, entitled Der Bote von 
Zion. 
(126) This described a Russian Jewish Lodge fraternity, 'Die Weisen von 
Zion', which in 1911 published a small pamphlet bearing the same title. 
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In it, according to Eckart, the Jews were referred to as the chosen 
people "whose triumph over Christianity would lead to a Jewish world-rule". 
The pamphlet predicted that Russian Czarism, the German Empire, and 
militarism would be overthrown and that all nations would be "driven to ruin". 
(127) 
Although, in retrospect, this document can be seen as deriving from a source 
related to the 'Protocols', significantly Eckart made no mention of the 
'Protocols' in the article. He seemed unaware of their existence and later 
when he reviewed the 'Protocols' in November 1920 after they had been 
published as Die Geheimnisse der Weisen von Zion by Auf Vorposten, he was 
at pains to point out that his earlier article had been composed "without 
(my) having the slightest inkling of the undertaking planned by this 
publisher". 
(128) 
He was, he argued elsewhere, in "no doubt that the book 
published by 'Vorposten' and the pamphlet of the Lodge brotherhood, circulated 
amongst those in the know, stemmed from one and the same source. " 
It is possible, therefore, that Eckart, like Rosenberg, was unaware of 
the contents of the 'Protocols' before their publication in December 1919. 
Eckart's description of the impact on the publication of the 'Protocols' 
on him suggests that they came as a kind of revelation; he wrote in his 
review that he had believed himself adequately informed about the deceit- 
fulness of Jewry but he realised now that he had been wrong: 
"I have truly grasped the entire scope of its 
deception only since the book 'Die Geheimnisse der 
Weisen von Zion' (began to) weigh upon me like the 
most frightful nightmare. " (129) 
It is, of course, a common ploy when trying to establish the authenticity 
of a claim to assert that one has been swayed by the weight of the evidence 
and the extent of the revelations. It is conceivable, therefore, that 
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Eckart was merely feigning ignorance of the 'Protocols', whose existence 
had been made public by Auf Vorposten in April 1919, 
(130) 
and that in 
October 1919 he 'stole a march' on Auf Vorposten by publishing Der Bote 
von Zion in advance of the 'Protocols' and then after the publication of 
the 'Protocols' proceeded to make the maximum political profit out of 
their disclosures. 
The truth about this may never be known. But what seems almost certain is 
that Rosenberg did not bring the 'Protocols' to Germany. In all probability, 
Rosenberg, like Eckart, was ignorant of their contents, if not their 
existence, until the end of 1919. Indeed, Lane argues that "the first hint 
of familiarity with the Protocols in Rosenberg's work comes in Die Spur 
des Juden (1920) in which Rosenberg's references to Tolstoy echo the 
writings of Fyodor Vinberg, one of the purveyors of the Protocols". 
(131) 
Claims of textual conformity between two writers are difficult to substantiate 
at any time and it is doubly difficult in this case if one is persuaded by 
the evidence that Rosenberg's conspiratorial view of the Jews was well- 
established before the 'Protocols' were published. Rosenberg certainly 
referred in1920 to some of the tactics, which, according to the 'record' 
in the 'Protocols', were discussed at the conference in Basle; the idea, 
for example, that the Jews encouraged class conflict then withdrew into 
the background when the fighting started, only to reappear once it was over, 
is certainly in line with the tactics outlined in the 'Protocol$'. 
(132) 
However, it would be pointless to pursue this line of investigation further, 
listing all possible comparisons, since it is impossible to pinpoint 
exactly when Rosenberg began to take cognizance of the 'Protocols' and 
the results would, in any case, be inconclusive for the reasons given above. 
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One either believes that Rosenberg knew of them in 1917 and derived 
most of his ideas from them or that he first learned in detail about the 
'Protocols' in December 1919 when they confirmed his earlier suspicions 
about Jewish machinations. The evidence certainly favours the latter 
interpretation. 
Perhaps Rosenberg's own commentary on the 'Protocols', written in 1922, 
provides a key to an assessment of their impact. He did not assert that the 
'Protocols' were genuine; "as matters stand today", he wrote, "it is impossible 
to furnish juridicially conclusive proof either for their absolute 
authenticity or for their fabrication. " 
(133) 
This circumspection was 
obviously an acknowledgement of the evidence presented in 1921 by The 
Times' correspondent, Philip Graves, to show that the 'Protocols' were a 
forgery. Nevertheless, Rosenberg was undaunted; he still maintained that 
the "intrinsic authenticity of the plans of the Protocols" was "beyond 
doubt", 
(134) 
He could, he claimed, produce documents, either older or more 
recent than the 'Protocols', which conveyed the same ideas as the 'forgery' 
and "every expert on Jewry maintains that the thoughts and plans of the 
'Protocols' signified nothing unprecedented in Jewish history, but can be 
illustrated in Jewish literature throughout the centuries up to the present 
day. 11(135) Rosenberg had been engaged since 1919 in collecting just such 
illustrations so that even if the 'Protocols' were discredited, his inter- 
pretation of Jewish affairs remained unaffected. 
So it would seem that the 'Protocols' only reinforced what Rosenberg (and 
other convinced antisemites) had felt for some time - that a Jewish 
conspiracy to achieve world domination really did exist. The 'Protocols' 
provided him with further ammunition relevant to the present world situation, 
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but Rosenberg's researches had already traced its progress through the 
ages. 
The third and final task of this chapter is to examine how the ideological 
concepts outlined above affected the way in which Rosenberg - and to a 
lesser extent Eckart, who showed little interest in the Jewish question 
outside Germany - approached questions of foreign policy. 
The Jewish problem, because of the all-embracing nature of the world 
conspiracy, affected all nations. In earlier times, Rosenberg explained in 
Judenheit und Politik, Jewish policy had been restricted to fewer states 
and had been far less "purposefully planned" than today; today, however, all 
the nations of the world were held in its embrace. 
(136) 
Since the Jews 
as members of a distinct race formed a 'state within a state' or, as 
Rosenberg preferred it, a "state above the state" 
(137) 
and since they always 
pursued their own interests, in every country there ought to be evidence 
of two probably - but not necessarily - divergent policies - one 'Jewish' 
and one reflecting the priorities of the host nation. Rosenberg felt 
that the fluctuating relationship between the corrupting influence of the 
Jews and the assertion of national interests was the quintessential guide 
to political action. If a nation's interests coincided withlhe ambitions 
of the Jews, the Jews "would render service to the state concerned"; 
(138) 
if they clashed, the Jews would attempt to alter its political course (as 
explained above) either by influencing the process of decision-making in 
foreign affairs or by constructing a combination (f hostile powers against it. 
Hence, Rosenberg's appraisal of a nation, at least in the short term, 
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seemed to be determined by his perception either of the degree of 
compatability between the national aspirations and those of the Jews or 
of the extent of Jewish influence in governmental circles. 
This approach to foreign policy is, perhaps, best illustrated by Rosenberg's 
assessment of England in 1919. In Judenheit und Politik, he argued that 
London had developed into the centre of the anti-German camp, not only 
for the allied powers of Britain, France, Italy, and America during the 
First World War, but also for most influential Jews in the world: "outwards 
... (i. e. from London) extended the activities of the Jewish confederation, 
and here lay, and lies even today, the kernel of the Jewish question". The 
main reason for this, in Rosenberg's view, was the fact that "the 
internationally-led national goals of Jewry are to be regarded as coinciding 
with thosect the English Empire". 
(139) 
Because of the compatibility 
between English and Jewish policies, he argued, the British Empire had 
beenacclaimed as "the protector (Schutzpatron) of the Jewish people". This 
led Rosenberg to refer to an "A nglo-Jewish world dominion (Welthexrachaft)". 
(140) 
The main area where English and Jewish interests coincided, according to 
Rosenberg, was Palestine. The zionist dream of creating a Jewish state in 
Palestine required the support of a major power to stand any chance of 
realization. More specifically, the Jewish people wanted "to depend on a 
strong state, which represents a force in the East, powerful enough to 
be able to afford to the Jews the maximum of national security. " Fortunately 
for the Jews, to play this role would be in accordance with British imperial 
strategy and wartime diplomacy. "At that time", as Rosenberg pointed 
out, "England possessed Egypt, India, and footholds on the Persian coast; 
(and) lacked a territorial connection between these lands, and there 
Palestine fell into place excellently as a link in the chain", while during 
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the First World War, "Turkey was the enemy (of England) and to promise 
her land to the Jewish people as state territory, meant acquiring their 
sympathy. " 
(141) 
So British scruples were overcome and Zionism became 
"thoroughly English-orientated! ', 
(142) 
The inevitable result of this 
community of interest to Rosenberg's mind, was the Balfour Declaration of 
2 November 1917, which affirmed the British government's support for the 
creation of a home for the Jews in Palestine. In return, England had 
received financial aid from Jewry throughout the war; in particular, 
Rosenberg claimed, the Jewish National Fund, set up in 1901 to help to 
purchase land in Palestine, was placed at the disposal of the English 
government. 
(143) 
By 1920 Rosenberg had located another area where English and Jewish policies 
might be compatible: Russia. In a lengthy extract quoted by Eckart is 
an article, entitled Zwischen den SchRchern, Rosenberg claimed that British 
foreign policy was misunderstood in Germany; few grasped "why big business 
Britain, instead of stretching every nerve to annihilate Russian Bolshevism, 
looks on to the whole affair as if powerless, so that she seems unable even 
to protect General Yudenich (one of the White Russian leaders), who was 
equipped by her, from defeat. " 
(144) 
The reason was, Rosenberg revealed, 
that the destruction of Russia worked to the advantage of the 'stock exchange 
speculators' and the capitalists in the short term and the maximum amount 
of destruction could be guaranteed by ensuring that civil war between the 
bolsheviks and nationalists continued. However, "the key to England's 
policy towards Russia", in Rosenberg's opinion, was that "the localization 
of the contagion (Bolshevism) is desired for the moment, hence some support 
for the Russian nationalists. Since, however, a complete victory of this 
party would result in the annihilation of the Russian Jews, without the 
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English Jews being able to prevent it, so both forces must be played off 
against one another. " So the British did not pursue an anti-Bolshevik line 
wholeheartedly because, according to Rosenberg's information, "the goals of 
the English Empire are identical to the goals of the Jewish people" and 
the Jews in England feared for the safety of counterparts in Russia if 
the nationalist forces were to triumph; "therefore", he concluded, "the 
Soviets are not allowed to fall". 
(145) 
Here, then, was another example of 
Anglo-Jewish cooperation. 
The inference to be drawn from this description of two cases of Anglo- 
Jewish collaboration is, of course, that Rosenberg rejected Britain as a 
possible ally for Germany. However, one cannot conclude that Britain was 
ruled out as a suitable ally simply because of her adoption of the zionist 
cause - that is, because of the synchronization of the interests of the 
British Empire and World Jewry. In Judenheit und Politik Rosenberg also 
stressed the extent of Jewish influence over policy-making in Britain. 
Be noted, in particular, the stranglehold on the British press held by the 
Jewish press magnate and wartime Propaganda Minister, Lord Northcliffe, to 
whom "three-quarters of the most influential English newspapers belong". 
Jewish influence was not restricted to newspapers either; "besides 
Northcliffe", Rosenberg insisted, "a dozen ennobled Jews of the Upper House 
steer the ship of English political'. 
(146) 
So was Britain eliminated as 
a prospective ally for Germany because the interests of her empire 
momentarily coincided with those of the Jews or because the Jews were 
determining Britishibreign policy? In the absence of an unequivocal statement 
from Rosenberg, it is difficult to say for certain. 
Indeed, it is possible, of course, that his antipathy towards Britain had 
entirely different roots. It may have been simply the continuation of wartime 
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hostility towards an intractable enemy - this would be quite feasible, if 
impossible to prove from the evidence available - or even the result of 
racial prejudice. There is certainly a hint of this in his estimation of 
Britain and France in Judenheit und Politik. In this article, Rosenberg 
made it clear that, given their desire to dominate the world, the Jews had 
eventually to "debilitate all nations"; but, he argued, the Jews did not 
treat all the nations in the same way: 
"The Jew has always hated the German people. 
Indeed, he does not exactly love the French or 
Anglo-Saxon either but he feels closer to them, 
and they provide him with far more points of 
contact than the Germans. The vain and ever 
more superficial Frenchman, the Anglo-Saxon, 
sensible and at the same time prone to bigoted 
superstition, both increasingly divorced from their 
original race, can become at any time far more 
approachable characters for the Jews than the 
German, despite all attempts at amity. " (147) 
Hence the declining racial quality of the British and the French made them 
particularly susceptible to Jewish Influence. Two other nations, Russia 
and Germany, had, however, proved more resistant to the Jewish tactics of 
friendly collaboration and subtle control and, for this reason, the hatred 
of the Jews was directed primarily against those nations. 
(148) 
so the 
actual reason for Rosenberg's hostile view of Britain is far from clear 
from these antisemitic meanderings; but it is, at least, possible that 
racial considerations played a part. 
In sharp contrast to Rosenberg's essentially negative attitude to England 
was his positive evaluation of Russia as a potential ally for Germany. In 
Judenheit und Politik, Rosenberg described the German and the Russian, whose 
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soul was "closely related to the German", as "intrinsically the spiritual 
antithesis of the Jews". 
(149) 
In terms of contemporary politics, this polarity manifested itself not 
only in German but also in Russian opposition to Zionism and in the 
prevailing antisemitism in those countries. German and Russian national 
interests were therefore frequently at variance with the interests of the 
German Jews. As he remarked: 
"When the war (1914-1918) broke out, the zionists 
found themselves in two opposing camps. It could 
be that a section of the German Jews at the outset 
conceived the struggle as one conducted against the 
antisemitic Russian government, (and) that the 
zionists, in part, believed that they could identify 
their interests with those of a German Eastern policy. " 
However the situation for German zionists proved increasingly difficult, 
more especially because Turkey - the power which controlled the land of 
their dreams, Palestine - was still Germany's ally. Ultimately, according 
to Rosenberg, they were forced to look to the Entente and especially England 
for support since neither the German nor the Russian government was 
enthusiastic about zionist plans. 
(150) 
Germany and Russia were therefore the arch-enemies of the Jews, and this 
was the reason, in Rosenberg's eyes, for the Jewish-led Russian Revolution. 
Jewry was plainly determined to destroy Russia and the Russian people, 
accordingly the 'Jewish-Bolshevik' government had unleashed a 'pogrom' 
against the Russian people, even against "the Russian patriots, who under the 
czarist regime lay in prison or had gone into exile because they openly 
opposed a rotten system, these same people are now being cold-bloodedly 
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murdered or pushed out of Russia by the new rulers". 
(151) 
Tens of thousands 
of people were being eliminated just for being good Russians; no state 
had ever been laid so low, in Rosenberg's view and now the Jews were 
longing "to help Germany... to a similar fate". 
(152) 
Thus, Germany and 
Russia were perceived as being in the forefront of the battle against Jewry. 
As one might expect from this analysis, Russia was in Rosenberg's opinion 
a fitting ally for Germany on the basis of their mutual interest in 
resisting Jewish machinations. As Rosenberg argued in an article in March 
1919: 
"German politics has scarcely any alternative than 
to make an alliance with the new Russia after the 
elimination of the Bolshevik government, and no 
indication of a possible approach ought to pass unutilized. " (153) 
So Germany and Russia were drawn together by their national interests - 
that is, their mutual hostility towards the Jews - but they were for the 
time being kept apart by the 'Jewish-Bolshevik' regime in Russia. But was 
this projected alliance simply, as it seems at first sight, the product of 
Rosenberg's ideological outlook? Or did racial considerations or observations 
of a power-political nature affect his decision? 
Historians have generally assumed that Rosenberg's rejection of Bolshevik 
Russia as a potential partner for Germany was the prime example of how 
ideological considerations could determine alliance strategy. After all, 
Rosenberg did write in 1920 that "it is absolutely certain that in the 
event of fraternization between the present Germany and the present Russia, 
the men of the USP and XPD (the left-wing socialist and communist parties) 
would come to power" in Germany; 
(154) 
in other words, an alliance with 
Bolshevik Russia was out of the question because it would serve only to 
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promote Jewish influence in Germany. But the fact of the matter is that 
an alliance with the same country would be welcomed by Rosenberg, once 
Jewish influence had been eliminated. In other words, the present position 
occupied by a country in the contemporary world ideological conflict was 
NOT a decisive bar to a future alliance with Germany. If Rosenberg applied 
this guideline consistently, then the alleged current predominance of Jews 
in British politics did not automatically rule out the prospect of an Anglo- 
German alliance at some future date (provided that the Jewish influence were 
removed). Indeed, as we shall see below, 
(155) 
Rosenberg appeared to take a 
moreigvourable view of Britain when he perceived a clash between her 
interests and those of the Jews. This seems to suggest that, perhaps, the 
degree of infiltration achieved by the Jews in a particular country or the 
degree of compatibility between its interests and those of the Jews did 
not determine the long-term attractiveness of that country in Rosenberg's 
eyes, though they might well prevent an agreement in the short term. Clearly, 
whilst Rosenberg did attach great importance to a nation's attitude towards 
the Jewish question as a yardstick by which to measure its political reliability, 
it was certainly not the only criterion which he used. 
Strategic considerations, for example, were also evident in his appraisal 
of an alliance between Germany and a non-Bolshevik Russia. In March 1919 
Rosenberg was afraid that the Entente Powers were about to curtail their 
intervention in Russia and to abandon the nationalist cause in the Russian 
civil war. This would have serious consequences for Germany; as he 
observed: 
"alone, unless all appearances are deceptive, she will 
have to share the role as outcast Cinderella with Russia 
and the same fate must lead both empires together. " (156) 
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Evidently, Rosenberg believed that the balance of political power in 
Europe was also pushing Russia into the German orbit. But, even here, 
power politics was indistinguishable from ideology in Rosenberg's analysis 
because he believed that the policy of the Entente powers was being deter- 
mined by the Jews of the London and New York stock exchanges, who "reckoned 
the size ct their profits... in direct proportion to the degree of Russian 
bankruptcy" 
(157) 
On another occasion, Rosenberg pointed out that Jewish 
politicians were supporting the new Polish state in order "to build her 
into a breakwater between Russia and Germany". 
(158 
So it would seem that 
considerations based on the balance of political power in Europe may have 
affected Rosenberg's judgement on the Russian issue but they appear to have 
been inseparable in his mind from the ideological struggle. 
Another factor, which cannot be ignored when piecing together Rosenberg's 
attitude towards Russia, is the possible influence exerted by racial 
considerations; in other words, his policy towards Russia may have been 
inspired by a predilection for the Russian people or, at least, by the 
feeling that the Russians and the Germans shared some kind of spiritual 
affinity, rooted in their racial origins. The latter thought had clearly 
crossed Rosenberg's mind because in April 1919 in an article entitled 
Russe und Deutscher he set out to examine whether the similar fates of the 
two countries after the First World War corresponded to similarities in 
national character. In fact, Rosenberg argued that the Russian and German 
psyches were very different, moving on different planes and in different 
directions. Whilst the German could be characterized as a "man of action", 
the Russian displayed a marked propensity for a "brooding preoccupation with 
the infinite"; "just as his land is limitless, stretching out like an 
unending plain before him", Rosenberg explained, "so the Russian spirit 
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easily loses itself in uncertainty, resulting in the most unproductive 
musing and doubts". 
(159) 
However, the Russians and the Germans did share one common characteristic 
in Rosenberg's opinion; that was a "toleration - so basic to their nature - 
of foreigners, even those (who are) outspokenly hostile". In the Russian 
case, "the pampering of non-Russians... had, without question, caused much 
humiliation" and, as a result, there had been an increase in Russian 
nationalism. Dostoevski, for example, had attempted to endow Slavism 
with a positive mission - the renovation of Christianity - and, predictably, 
wanted to see all the Slavs united in one state. In the German case, 
toleration of foreigners had led to "national disaster", with Germans 
constantly being "at daggers drawn with each other, not infrequently 
blaming themselves for everything unpleasant and presupposing... idealistic 
motives amongst the enemies". Since the end of the First World War, Germans 
had been far too servile with regard to their victorious opponents. 
(160) 
However, whilst it is true that Rosenberg felt that excessive tolerance 
towards foreigners was a characteristic which the Russians and the Germans 
shared, there can be little doubt that he believed the Russians to be 
inferior to the Germans. In an untitled essay, dating from 1917, for example, 
he listed the good and bad qualities of the Germans and Russians as follows: 
"One attributes to the first (the Germans) as good 
features fidelity, sincerity, honesty, perseverance 
(leaving aside intellectual qualities), as bad, coarseness 
and arrogance; to the latter friendliness and humanity on the 
one side, insincerity, inconsistency and inactivity 
on the other. " (16 1) 
The Russians definitely fare worse in Rosenberg's comparative analysis, 
especially when he sought to identify the source from which these traits 
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of character derived; those of the Germans derived from a "physical, 
intellectual and moral strength", those of the Russians from a "physical and 
intellectual strength and moral frailty". "In a nutshell", Rosenberg 
concluded, "the German has character, the Russian is characterless ". 
(162) 
There is clearly, therefore, some justification for the claim that 
Rosenberg at this early stage, at least, articulated "a certain resentment 
of the Russo-Germans towards the Slavs,,. 
(163) 
Nonetheless, even though 
Rosenberg did regard the Russians as inferior to the Germans, one cannot 
assume that he viewed them as sub-humans or that he wanted Germany to 
expand at Russian expense; in both the articles quoted, Rosenberg was 
concerned merely to refute the case made by Dostoevski for the Slavs as a 
'chosen people'. The denial of Russian superiority, therefore, did not 
invalidate the argument for a Russo-German alliance on racial grounds. 
For all their differences, Rosenberg stressed in Russe und Deutscher, 
both countries seemed to face the same fate: the destruction of the 
framework of the state and its culture at the hands of the Jews. This was the 
ultimate consequence of their tolerance towards aliens - "chaos amongst 
the host people" fostered by the Jews. 
(164) 
It would appear, therefore, 
to have been their suffering at the hands of the Jews (itself the result 
of a shared weakness) rather than any feelings of close racial or cultural 
affinity, which persuaded Rosenberg that Germany and Russia should become 
allies. 
So, once again, Rosenberg's antisemitic ideology seems to have determined 
his approach to foreign affairs. But was this simply what Rosenberg 
wanted his readers to believe? Were his ideological ruminations merely 
a cover for convictions which were, in fact, based on power political 
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considerations (or even racial prejudice)? On the evidence surveyed 
so far and, in particular, on the basis of his early essays dating from 
1917 and 1918 which were not originally intended for publication and, 
therefore, perhaps not written for effect, this seems unlikely. For the 
moment one would have to conclude firstly that the degree of Jewish 
predominance in a particular country, for example Britain, and the 
extent to which its national interests coincided with those of the Jews, 
do appear to have affected Rosenberg's evaluation of that nation and do 
appear to have determined its attractiveness as a prospective ally for 
Germany, at least in the short term. The provisional support for a German 
alliance with a post-Bolshevik Russia would seem to confirm this as well as 
perhaps suggesting the possibility of change in the long run. Secondly, 
from the limited evidence available in this early period, it seems likely 
that racial bias did not decisively colour Rosenberg's attitude towards 
a particular country. Thirdly, power political considerations were evident 
in his writings but were not easily separated from the ideological frame 
of reference. In Rosenberg's case, perhaps, the dichotomy between a 
conspiratorial vision of world politics and the realities of world politics 
is a false one. His ideological flights of fancy seemed to have been 
stimulated by one or two concrete events, in particular the Balfour 
Declaration by the British Government and the prominent role played by a 
number of Jews in the Russian Revolution. These facts are almost certain to 
have influenced the response of an already committed antisemite to Britain 
and Russia. 
Despite the world-wide ramifications of the Jewish question, Rosenberg's 
interest in foreign affairs was restricted essentially to the European 
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continent at this time. 
(iss) 
Dietrich Eckart, on the other hand, did 
take an interest in American affairs, perhaps because of his preoccupation 
with the power of capitalism and the evils of 'interest-slavery'. In 
Eckart's view, America was Germany's "deadly enemy", who had been neutral 
at no time during the First World War; she had wanted Germany's annihilation 
throughout. 
(166) 
The reason for this was that America was very much the 
tool of "Anglo-Jewish world capitalism", which was also determined that 
Germany should be defeated. In 1919, however, Eckart believed that Woodrow 
Wilson had prevented the complete destruction of Germany in order to 
forestall French ambitions to become "master of the continent"; to do this, 
Germany had, therefore, to retain "at least the semblance of a certain 
dangerousness". 
(167) 
Eckart's interpretation of American foreign policy 
in]919 was clearly a mixture of strategic and ideological preconceptions. 
In general, Eckart referred rarely to foreign affairs. When he did, it is 
fair to say that his comments were more outspokenly racist than Rosenberg's 
but, nevertheless, reflected a very similar outlook. For example, Eckart 
described England as "the arch-Pharisee amongst the Aryan people" and 
France as "the Gallic Jezebel, this embodiment of feminine vanity and 
vindictiveness". 
(168) 
He agreed with Rosenberg that Britain was "our chief 
enemy inside the Entente", 
(169) 
and that Russia and Germany would be 
natural allies once the 'Jewish' regime in Russia had been removed. 
(170) 
Hopefully this chapter has demonstrated that between the end of 1918 and 
the end of 1919, Rosenberg, Eckart, and to a lesser extent, Feder, were 
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publicizing a number of ideas (none of them particularly original), which 
collectively would become the Weltanschauung of the young Nazi Party. 
Eckart expounded on the nature of 'Jewishness'; Feder warned about the 
excesses of 'interest-slavery'; and Rosenberg revealed the 'Jewish' 
manipulation of the Bolshevik Revolution. It was Rosenberg, however, who 
seemed to recognize the need to weave these fairly disparate ideas into a 
coherent antisemitic philosophy - in effect, to substantiate a Jewish 
world conspiracy theory by reference to back-stage intrigue in the 
twilight world of Freemasonry, Jesuitism and Zionism and to secret agreements 
behind the closed doors of the world's Stock Exchanges. Though we cannot 
be absolutely certain, the resulting Weltanschauung appears to have pre- 
determined Rosenberg's and Eckart's assessment of the major foreign 
powers. How far it would permit of subsequent modifications and what would 
cause such changes are questions to which we will return in Chapter 4. 
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2. HITLER AND HIS DEBT TO THE PAN-GERMANS 
What political philosophy did the young Adolf Hitler bring to the German 
Workers' Party, when he attended its meeting on 12 Septembor 
1919? The generally accepted answer is that Hitler was 'Pan-German' in 
outlook; that his ideas were gleaned from the publications of the Alldeutscher 
Verband(1) (the Pan-German League) and especially from its long-serving 
chairman, Heinrich Class. Recently Helimuth Auerbach, reviewing the 
period of what he called "Hitler's political education" (1919-23) concluded 
that "his notions in these early years largely corresponded to the watch- 
words of the Pan-Germans". 
(2) 
Alfred Kruck, analysing the organisational and 
ideological contact between the ADV and the NSDAP, has gone further, 
suggesting that the Pan-Germans' influence on the NSDAP was "until 1923 
almost decisive". 
(3) 
In the area of foreign policy in particular, Axel 
Huhn has noted that in 1920 Hitler seems to have been markedly influenced 
by Pan-German goals. 
(4) 
The 'special relationship' which is reputed to have 
existed between the ADV and the NSDAP came to an end, it has been argued, 
after the Mutich putsch, which the ADV condemned as the work of a "prima 
donna", and Hitler's attempt in retaliation to implicate Class in the 
treasonous plot against the state. 
(5 
Finally, during his imprisonment 
in 1924, Hitler, according to accepted opinion, seems to have thrown off 
the intellectual heritage of the Pan-Germans when writing mein Kampf which 
laid down his own anti-Russian Lebensraum ideology. 
(6) 
Several elements in this historical record, however, need careful re- 
examination. Did a 'special relationship' exist between the ADV and the 
infant NSDAP in the early 1920s? When did Pan-German influence cease to 
affect Nazi fortunes? How far was Hitler Influenced by Pan-German ideas on 
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foreign affairs at the beginning of his political career? Only the latter 
question is strictly within the purview of the present chapter and it 
is also the most important in view of the frequent, and often unsubstantiated, 
attribution of Hitler's views to Pan-German sources. 
(? ) 
But clearly 
an adequate answer to this crucial question is impossible without some 
general consideration of the relations between the ADV and the Nazi Party. 
Close and frequent collaboration could have led to direct organisational 
as well as ideological guidance by the ADV. What is more, fuller examination 
of the entire subject of relations between the ADV and the Nazi Party is 
possible now that Class's second and unpublished volume of memoirs about 
the 1920s is available. 
(a) 
Therefore, the nature and political purpose 
of the ADV and its contacts with the NSDAP will be examined before we 
assess Hitler's debt to Pan-German ideology. 
The ADV Was one of the most significant and durable non-parliamentary political 
associations in recent German history. Between 1890 and 1939 it formed a 
kind of unofficial 'National Opposition' to governmental policy. Foreign 
affairs was the original inspiration behind the ADV and, until the defeat 
of Germany and the outbreak of the German Revolution in 1918, remained its 
abiding pre-occupation. The ADV originated in the hostile response by 
right-wing opinion to the Anglo-German treaty of 1890, which transferred 
the North Sea island of Heligoland to Germany. Though impressed by the 
island's strategic value, Pan-Germans opposed not only the reciprocal 
concessions to Britain in East Africa but also the very idea of an agreement 
with Britain, which represented the main obstacle to the creation of a 
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world-wide German Empire. 
(9) 
This desire for empire, which the Pan- 
Germans fully endorsed believing (perhaps mistakenly) 
(10) 
that they were 
following the advice and ambitions of their great mentor Bismarck, led 
them to urge the German government to pursue an anglophobic colonial policy 
and to construct a large navy to compete successfully with Britain's. 
(11) 
According to one recent authority, there is no doubt that the ADV managed 
to "influence a considerable portion of the German middle class in an anti- 
English direction and indeed to stir up feelinip of hatred in times of national 
excitement during the Boer War 1899-1901 and the Agadir crisis 1911'". 
(12) 
Bismarck's dismissal as chancellor in 1890 ensured, however, that the ADV 
did not concern itself solely with foreign affairs. At home, successive 
chancellors attempted - without much success - to emulate Bismarck's 
feat of balancing the often conflicting forces within the German political 
system: the landed aristocracy, the increasingly powerful industrialists, 
the Emperor, and the popularly-elected but relatively impotent Reichstag. 
Bismarck himself, out of office and aggrieved, orchestrated the chorus of 
criticism of the new regime until his death in 1898; this led Heinrich Class 
to dub him "the father of the National Opposition". (13) Class, a lawyer 
from Mainz who joined the ADV in 1897, became its deputy chairman in 1904 
and chairman in 1908, felt compelled to take up Bismarck's mantle and to 
build up the 'National Opposition' to official 
(14) 
government policy. Most 
of Class's invective was reserved for Chancellor BethmannHollweg, whom he 
considered "had none of the qualities needed to lead the German people in 
time of crisis". 
(15) 
The ADV sustained its dual role of criticizing the lack of effective leader- 
ship at home and of advocating a more dynamic and expansionist policy 
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abroad through the pages of its weekly paper, the Alldeutsche Blatter 
(founded in 1894) and through the writings of its adherents, in particular 
Class himself. In 1909 he published an ideosyncratic interpretation of German 
history, Deutsche Geschichte, which was apparently "successful beyond all 
expectations", 
(16) 
and in1912 Wenn ich der Kaiser war, the book for which 
he is best remembered, appeared. In it, Class enumerated his grievances 
against the existing government (its failures, the absence of great 
personalities and especially the growing power of the Reichstag) and called 
for a dictatorship. 
(17) 
The 'Kaiserbuch', as it later became known, was 
tremendously successful, going through five editions before the start of the 
(18) 
First World War. 
The First World War gave a great boost to the fortunes of the ADV and, more 
especially, to those of Class himself. In the field of foreign affairs, the 
sweeping victories in August and September 1914 whetted German appetites 
for territorial expansion, and the Executive Committee of the ADV quickly 
produced on 28 August a memorandum on German war aims, later published by 
Class under the title Zum deutschen Kriegsziel; its proposals for expansion 
at the expense of Belgium, France and Russia went far beyond those of 
Bethmann Hollweg's September Programme. 
(19) 
The civilian government was 
afraid of alienating both neutral opinion abroad and socialist opinion at 
home, which supported the war (as far as it did) only as an act of self- 
defence. Therefore it tried to prohibit public discussion of expansionist 
ambitions and to prosecute Class, whose memorandum, circulating widely in 
Germany in December 1914, had stirred up considerable public interest. 
(20) 
The courts, however, supported Class and he was able to organise a War Aims 
Movement in 1915 making contact with leading German industrialists such as 
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Alfred Hugenberg, then a director of Krupps, who felt, like him, that the 
war was Germany's opportunity to establish herself in Central Europe and 
to achieve autarchy. 
(21) 
The ADV , therefore , proved to have a powerful 
voice during the war aims controversy, helping to fashion public opinion 
and influencing governmental policy. 
On the home front, the war, as Class later recalled, only reinforced his 
conviction that a real dictatorship was required, not the so-called 'silent' 
dictatorship of the German High Command, which had evolved out of wartime 
necessity by 1916; the best place for Hindenburg and Ludendorff, in Class's 
view, was directing the war effort and their involvement in domestic affairs 
was a needless distraction. 
(22) 
This arbitrary separation of domestic pol- 
itics fromthe coordination of the war effort, showing little understanding 
of the nature of total war, led Class predictably to demand the removal 
of Bethmann Hollweg. But the Pan-German campaign to discredit the German 
Chancellor received little support, mainly, Class surmised, because a change 
of leadership in wartime might be construed by the enemy as a sign of 
weakness. 
(23) 
A series of controversies first over the suspension of 
unrestricted submarine warfare in face of the American threat of inter- 
vention, then over the future of the Polish state, which was re-emerging 
from the ruins of the Russian Empire and finally over the Hilfsdienstpflicht - 
the Auxiliary Service Law which required all men not in uniform to work in 
designated occupations - convinced Class that he must try to persuade 
General Ludendorff of the need for a Ally-fledged military dictatorship. 
He apparently wrote to Ludendorff in 1917 pointing out that the High Command 
was suffering because of its involvement in politics and offering to 
discuss his proposals with him. 
(24) 
Perhaps surprisingly, Ludendorff seems 
to have agreed to meet Class in Kreuznach on 5 October 1917. The meeting 
proved fruitless; Ludendorff agreed that the High Command required a 
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political adviser (presumably eliminating the need for a civilian chan- 
cellor! ) to prevent its impromptu and improvised excursions into politics 
in times of crisis; but he firmly rejected the idea of a formal dictatorship, 
preferring the existing position of nominal subordination to the German 
Emperor. 
(25) 
With typical immodesty, in his memoirs, Class attributed the collapse and 
defeat of Germany to the fact that his advice had been ignored ("If only 
Ludendorff had taken my advice at Kreuznach"). 
(26) 
Writing in 1936, Class 
saw no reason to alter his conviction that Germany had been 'stabbed in the 
back'; the German Army had not been defeated in the field but by the very 
forces which he had warned against in the 'Kaiserbuch' - the Jews and 
the Socialists. 
(27) 
Defeat and revolution, therefore, brought no fundamental 
change in Class's outlook but they did galvanise and radicalise the ADV 
because after the collapse of the Empire the last Pan-German qualm about 
constitutional change - loyalty to the Emperor - was now removed. The ADV 
became a subversive force working for the overthrow of the Weimar Republic. 
The Bamberg Declaration issued by the ADV on 18 February 1919 was a virtual 
declaration of war on the new republic. 
(28) 
It is noteworthy that it 
insisted that a prerequisite for the reconstruction of Germany was the 
restriction of the influence of the Jews; antisemitism, so long advocated 
by Class, was now accepted for the first time as part of the official Pan- 
(29) 
German programme of reform. The events of 1918 evidently made antisemitic 
ideas more acceptable to the ADV. The result of this change was the 
creation in February 1919 of the Deutschvölkische Schutz- und Trutzbund, a 
sister organization designed to promote popular antisemitism. 
(30) 
In the 19209 the ADV and, more especially, Heinrich Class engaged in various 
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forms of covert and subversive activity designed to overthrow the hated 
republic. Class opposed all suggestions for gradual reform, fearing the 
perpetuation of the November Revolution. Instead he worked for the 
establishment by force of the 'folkish dictatorship' outlined in the 
'Kaiserbuch' in 1912. Class, whose ideas were notoriously hazy, appears to 
have envisaged a two-stage plan for the rejuvenation of Germany: a 
military dictatorship following a putsch, to be succeeded by a political 
dictatorship, probably exercised by the Hohenzollern Prince, Frederick 
William, a man who was very susceptible to Pan-German influence. 
(31) 
But how was. this process to be set in motion? The ADV did not attract 
the support of the masses. It had, however, always attracted men of 
experience and position, as the war aims controversy had shown. After 
1919, Class began to cultivate a number of new collaborators, some of whom 
could call upon their own private army of supporters, others who could 
place their financial resources at his disposal. In 1920 the ADV helped 
to establish the Norddeutscher Ordnungsblock (NOB) to coordinate ties 
between the counter-revolutionary forces. 
(32) 
In1920 Class collaborated 
briefly with the Bavarian counter-revolutionary, Georg Escherich, (and his 
Orgesch militia) but personality clashes led to an early breach. 
(33) 
The 
ADV seems to have played little part in the Kapp putsch in March 1920. 
Though Kapp had visited an ADV meeting in3919, close contact had not been 
established, and though Class's friend, Dr. Paul Bang, was offered a 
post in Kapp's short-lived government, the ADV appears to have kept its 
hands clean on this occasion. 
(34) 
In 1922 Class formed a 'Dreibund' with 
Organisation Consul, the successor to the more famous counter-revolutionary 
group Brigade Ehrhardt, and with Dr. Otto Pittinger, leader of Bund Bayern 
und Reich who was working for the restoration of the Bavarian royal house, 
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the Witteisbachs. Predictably this misalliance proved unreliable and 
short-lived; conflicting aims and petty jealousies were the main stumbling- 
blocks to successful collaboration. 
(35) 
Opposition to the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr in 1923, however, 
seemed to impose on right-wing circles a much-needed unity of purpose and 
a cause to which personal ambition might be subordinated. Class, sensing 
an opportunity, began to cast his net further afield. In February 1923 he 
approached General von geeckt, the head of the Reichswehr, with talk of a 
war against the French invaders and the establishment of a military 
dictatorship. Von Seeckt, though seemingly sympathetic to Class's ideas, 
rejected military action. 
(36) 
Undeterred, Class made contact with a number 
of Ruhr industrialists, notably Baron Heinrich von Thyssen (brother of 
Fritz Thyssen) and Willy Scheidt; both were kben to curtail the disruption 
of the Ruhr industries wrought by the occupation and even promised financial 
support for a private army against the French if one could be raised. But 
this support proved to be as elusive as the'people's army'zumoured to exist 
in the Ruhr and on which Class pinned his hopes for a short time. 
(37) 
As his previous undertakings had come to nought, Class again looked to 
Bavaria for support because this Land under the benevolent rule of Minister- 
President and later State Commissioner, Gustav von Kahr, and Munich Police 
President, Ernst Pöhner, was becoming a haven for counter-revolutionary 
forces. In mid-October, after one last effort to win the support of von 
Seeckt and the Reichswehr, 
(38) 
Class arranged several meetings with von 
Kahr and Pdhner in an attempt to organize a national uprising. Their plans 
were, apparently, to come to fruition on the night of 8-9 November 1923, 
but the action of the Hitler-Ludendorff group forestalled and ruined a 
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more widespread rising. Whether this rising would have been any more 
successful than any of the other hair-brained schemes in which Class had 
been involved over the years is at least doubtful. 
The history of the ADV's and Class's machinations under the guise of a 
'National Opposition' shows a remarkable, not to say fanatical, consistency 
of purpose combined with a considerable degree of unreality. Until 1918 
they did have some success in influencing public opinion and, perhaps, 
even in modifying governmental policy; but after the Revolution the chances 
of success for a right-wing counter-revolution were extremely slight even 
without the intervention of Hitler and his followers in November 1923. 
This, of course, raises the question to which we must now turn of the 
relationship between the ADV and the NSDAP, and in particular between 
Class and Hitler before the rather abrupt parting of ways after 9 November 
1923. 
(39) 
In 1928 Eckart Kehr remarked perceptively that the ADV was a "sort of 
political ideological holding company, which delivered intellectual arm- 
aments to other agitation associations". 
(40) 
That one of the beneficiaries 
of this ideological arms trade was the youthful German Workers' Party is 
clear. 
(41) 
However, the ADV influenced the development of the party quite 
substantially on a political and financial as well as on an ideological 
level. This claim has often been made but until now it has been difficult 
to substantiate it. The full extent of the ideological debt of National 
Socialism to the ADV will always remain the subject of speculation, since 
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few of the Nazi leaders revealed their sources of inspiration. But it 
is now possible on the basis of Class's admittedly partisan memoirs to 
be a little more precise about the nature of the contacts between the ADV 
and NSDAP and about the former's political and financial aid to the latter. 
In a sixty-three page memoir, written in October-November 1936 and 
recently made available in full for the first time, Class gave a fairly 
detailed account of his relationship with Hitler and his party before 1933. 
(42) 
As a historical source, this document has, of course, to be treated with 
care for several reasons. Firstly, Class felt, like many Pan-Germans, 
that the debt of gratitude owed by the Nazis to the ADV had never been 
adequately acknowledged and he clearly intended to set the record straight 
for posterity. 
(43) 
It is, therefore, quite likely that Class may have 
exaggerated his own and the ADV's importance and belittled Hitler's. 
Secondly, as the account was written in 1936, some sixteen years after the 
earliest events which it describes, allowance has to be made for lapses 
of memory; these are most evident in Class's recollections of his first 
meetings with Hitler which include observations, which were evidently only 
made later. 
(44) 
The third reservation is the difficulty of locating 
corroborative evidence for these meetings, when quite often only Hitler and 
Class were present. Despite these important limitations, the document 
does provide a fascinating, if largely unsubstantiated, account of the 
financial and political assistance given by the ADV to the infant Nazi party. 
It seems likely that Class first met Adolf Hitler in March 1920 and on at 
least two further occasions in that year. 
(45) 
Class's impression of 
Hitler was, as he recalled in his memoirs, to say the least, mixed. After 
being addressed like a public meeting -a fate shared by many of Hitler's 
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visitors - Class labelled Hitler "a political savage" and a "pronounced 
hysteric". 
(46) 
Nonetheless, Class was impressed by Hitler's powers of 
political observation and his apparently genuine beliefs and, perhaps, 
recognised his true potential; "if he could manage to make contact with the 
Marxist following, it seemed probable that he could be capable of at least 
loosening the bonds that tie them to that party". Since Hitler offered 
the prospect of a more popularly-based 'National Opposition', Class decided 
to keep in touch with him. He asked his friends in the Bayerische 
Ordnungsblock (BOB), the political arm of the Bavarian counter-revolutionary 
group Organization Escherisch (Orgesch), to keep him informed of the 
(47) 
progress of the DAP. Dr. Helmut Hopfen, Class's associate in Bavaria, 
helped to publicize the DAP in the Pan-German press. 
(48) 
Hopfen also 
facilitated contacts between the Nazis and the Austrian Pan-Germans as well 
as apparently persuading Hitler of the folly of supporting the Bavarian 
separatist movement led by Dr. Georg Heim. Following the Salzburg meeting 
of Austrian and German folkish groups from 7-8 August 1920, Hitler was 
in fact induced to undertake a speaking tour of Austria during which he 
attacked Heim's ideas for a Danubian confederation which would unite Bavaria 
and German Austria. The tour was probably paid for by the ADV. 
(49) 
Whether this was the first occasion on which the ADV rendered financial 
assistance to the Nazi cause is a matter of some debate. Several historians 
have claimed that the ADV gave the DAP considerable material assistance in 
its early years but, as Franz-Willing has pointed out, none has produced the 
slightest piece of solid evidence to substantiate this. 
(50) 
It has been 
claimed that the ADV came to the party's financial aid during the Kapp 
putsch, 
(51) 
that Class gave Hitler 100 marke after their meeting in August 
1920, and that in December 1920 Hitler requested 60,000 marks to buy the 
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Vdlkischer Beobachter (VB) as a party newspaper. 
(52) 
Class's memoirs 
make no mention of these transactions but he does mention Hitler's request 
in the middle of 1921 for 60,000 marks to cover the cost of establishing 
a party cell in Berlin -a development, which he had probably suggested to 
Eitler through the offices of the BOB in an attempt to bring the party 
more directly under Class's influence. Class promised to raise 30,000 marks, 
but Hitler, according to Class, rejected the idea on the grounds that he 
could not afford to spend three or four weeks in Berlin, setting up the 
cell; since he had no-one to represent him in Munich and there was no 
other speaker of note in the party, his first duty was to remain and build 
up the Munich party base. 
(53) 
One wonders whether Hitler suspected the 
ulterior motive behind Class's offer or whether he was more influenced by 
the fear of an impending leadership crisis within the party in the middle 
of 1921. Since it now seems likely that Hitler did not plan the leader- 
ship crisis beforehand, the probable explanation is that his negotiations 
with Class were curtailed by events in Munich. 
(54) 
There can be no doubt, 
of course, that the leadership crisis made Hitler aware, if he was not 
aware already, of the danger of creating an alternative focus of authority 
in Berlin. 
(55) 
However, one assumes that no money changed hands on this 
occasion since Hitler abandoned the Berlin project. 
According to Class's account, his next meeting with Hitler was on Whit 
Sunday 1923, but meanwhile Pan-German money had begun to flow into Nazi Party 
coffers. In 1922 Class apparently intervened reluctantly to save the VB 
from bankruptcy by raising two installments of 15,000 marks to pay off the 
paper's creditors. Class complained in 1936 that he had not received any 
thanks from the paper or the party for this assistance. 
(56) Though this was 
Class's usual grievance and the main reason why he claimed more credit than 
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he had been given for the rise of Hitler, it is probable that this story 
or one quite like it is genuine. On occasion, even Hitler admitted 
privately his financial indebtedness to the ADV; in 1923, for example, when 
Bruno Wenzel, the founder of the party cell in Hanover, asked Hitler 
whether he should accept an offer of over a million marks from the business 
manager of the ADV, Freiherr von Vietinghoff-Scheel, Hitler replied: 
"if you can get 10 million so much the better. Those are the sources 
from which I also in part draw". 
(57) 
Clearly the ADV did give financial 
succour to a party, which, it felt, might attract the mass support which 
the ADV itself could not attract. Equally clearly, Hitler had no qualms 
about accepting such assistance provided his leadership and freedom of 
manoeuvre remained unimpaired. 
The political assistance given by the ADV to the NSDAP was, of course, 
indistinguishable from the financial. ADV recommendations undoubtedly 
helped to open doors for Hitler in the difficult early years of the 1920s. 
But class's recollections make it clear that the NSDAP was only one of many 
recipients of ADV patronage. This, of course, conflicts with Alfred Kruck's 
suggestion that a "special relationship" existed between the ADV and the 
Nazi party, a claim which he bases primarily on the ADV's recommendation 
that members of the Deutschvölkische Schutz-und Trutzbund - dissolved in 
1922 in the aftermath of the murder of Walter Rathenau - should join the 
NSDAP. 
(58) 
This episode should perhaps be seen as an illustration of the 
cynical pragmatism of Class's dealings with extremist groups rather than 
as a display of firm commitment to the Nazi party. Such groups were 
vehicles for Pan-German propaganda and were abandoned as soon as they 
created problems. When the Trutzbund was dissolved, the NSDAP was its 
natural their,, 
(59) 
since it was of very similar character, the only 
difference being "not in forms of organization or structure and methods 
but in energy". 
(60) 
The NSDAP, therefore, enjoyed no special relationship 
70 
with the ADV, and certainly the ADV had no great control over the Nazi 
party as the events of 1923 were to show. 
Indeed in 1923 when Class was trying to coordinate the counter-revolutionary 
forces of North and South Germany, he was reluctant to approach Hitler 
since, as Class recalled in his memoirs, Hitler "had lost contact and gone 
his own way". 
(61) 
Hitler obviously felt under no obligation to flatter his 
benefactors with attention. Nevertheless, when Class did meet Hitler on 
Whit Sunday 1923 in Berlin to brief him on a projected national rising, Hitler 
promised to cooperate and indeed to go with Class "through thick and thin". 
However, only two days later, Hitler indicated the depth of his personal 
commitment to Class's cause by failing to attend an important meeting of the 
counter-revolutionary leaders in Munich, sending Göring instead. 
(62) 
Class 
speculated on the reasons for Hitler's absence; perhaps his attitude to 
the Pan-German leadership had been poisoned by Class's enemies or perhaps 
Hitler considered the contact to be "politically useless". 
(63) A simpler 
explanation might be that Hitler, since he had sent Göring and had not 
therefore completely abandoned the project, was merely maintaining his free- 
dom of action. Later, as Class revealed, Hitler learned of everything 
discussed at the meeting but "committed himself to nothing". 
(64) 
Thus even 
before the abortive putsch of 8-9 November l923 - Hitler's attempt to 
pre-empt the counter-revolution plotted by von Kahr and Class - Hitler had 
displayed what the Pan-German Deutsche Zeitung was later to call "the 
vanity of a prima donna". 
(65) 
It would be wrong, therefore, to suggest that a special relationship existed 
between the ADV and the Nazi movement. Their political goals may have been 
compatible but their personalities were not. At his trial following the 
Munich putsch, Hitler did his best to implicate Class and the ADV in a plot 
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to overthrow the Republic, a ploy which, as Class rightly perceived, could 
do nothing to help his own case and could only damage the reputation of 
the ADV. Class escaped indictment but relations with Hitler were permanently 
embittered and Class felt justified in labelling Hitler a 'homo afidelis', 
a man incapable of keeping his word. 
(66) 
However whilst Hitler's actions certainly did not imply any gratitude towards 
the ADV leadership, his appreciation of the political significance of the 
Pan-German League is discernible in isolated references in his speeches 
and letters. Early in his career, Hitler was very much inclined to spring 
to the defence of the ADV, which was frequently under attack in the Weimar 
Republic. In September 1921, for example, Hitler berated a Bavarian separatist, 
Otto Ballerstedt, for dwelling on the old question of Prussian-Bavarian 
rivalry, which distracted attention from the real struggle between the Germans 
and the Jews, and for "putting the blame on the Prussians, Pan-Germans and 
Junkers for things for which today the Jews are exclusively accountable". 
(67) 
The most common criticisms levelled at the ADV were that it had caused the First 
World war and then prolonged it by its virulent propaganda. 
(68) 
On various 
occasions, Hitler defended the ADV on both charges; "one always blames the 
Pan-Germans for 'war guilt' but who", he asked in April 1920, "conducted 
German policy in the last years before the war? It was not the Pan-Germans 
but the Pan-Jews". 
(69) 
In April 1923, Hitler denied that the Pan-Germans 
were responsible for prolonging the conflict: "the guilty ones.. . are not 
Ludendorff, Wilhelm II, not the Pan-Germans but those who always prevented 
Germany from creating a strong Wehrmacht" (i. e. those who fought the 
military budget and militarism). 
(70) 
So most certainly Hitler was 
inclined to defend the pre-war record of the Pan-Germans. 
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Nonetheless, Hitler's attitude towards the Pan-Germans after the war 
was always rather ambivalent; he respected what they had tried to do before 
the war but felt that they had had their chance and had failed to take it. 
Hence in 1923 he remarked that "we all depend politically on the All- 
deutscher Verband about which we can only complain that, despite its correct 
analysis and the long existence of such an influential organization, up to 
now it had done no practical work. But we can make up for that by using 
its resources". 
(71) 
These comments may help to explain Hitler's reluctance 
to commit himself whole-heartedly to Class's cause in 1923. Certainly 
after the failure of the planned counter-revolution in 1923, Hitler's att- 
itude towards the ADV became more critical. During his imprisonment in 1924, 
the Nazi party had to respond to several proposed political alliances; in 
March 1924, Otto Wenzel, chairman of the Hanover party cell, received the 
following communication from party headquarters: "in order to prevent 
continuedadsunderstandings, it is once again reiterated that all kinds of 
special alliances with the 'Deutschnationale Volkspartei', with the 'Bund 
Wiking' and with the 'Alldeutscher Verband ', with the 'Vereinigte. 
Vaterländische Verbände ' are out of the question". 
(72) 
In May 1926 
Hitler was particularly disparaging about the "frightful danger" posed by 
the recently uncovered plot by the "bloodthirsty society of the Pan-German 
League and Class" to murder von Seeckt and to overthrow the government; 
"we all know", Hitler commented, "that they will not launch a coup .... You 
know that we have nothing to do with the agents of the Pan-Germans". 
(73) 
Hitler's main criticism of the ADV, therefore, seems to have been of its 
continued failure to put its principles into practice by means of a 
seizure of power. 
Heinrich Class complained in 1936 that Hitler made no reference to himself 
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or the ADV in Mein Kampf. 
(74) 
Whilst itis true that they are not mentioned 
by name, Hitler did, in fact, discuss, or to be more accurate, launch a 
verbal assault on the activities of the ADV in his autobiography. Hitler 
described how he had often to warn the young Nazi party "against the 
deutschvölkisch wandering scholars whose positive accomplishment is always 
practically nil, but whose conceit can scarcely be excelled". His 
description of these people leaves little doubt as to their identity, "people 
whose sole recommendation for the most part lies in the declaration that 
they have fought for thirty and even forty years for the same idea. Anyone 
who fights for forty years for a so-called idea without being able to 
bring about the slightest success, in fact, without having prevented the 
victory of the opposite has, with forty years of activity, provided proof 
enough of his own incapacity". 
(75) 
Surely only Class and the Pan-Germans 
and a few others could claim forty years in service of the folkish idea? 
If one accepts that the Pan-Germans, amongst others no doubt, were being 
attacked in Hein Kampf, then it is possible to analyse in more detail 
Hitler's attitude towards the ADV. "The danger above all lies inthe fact 
that such natures do not want to fit into a movement as links, but keep 
shouting off their mouths about leading circles in which alone, on the 
strength of their age-old activity, they can see a suitable place for 
further activity". Hence Hitler was suspicious of their claims to leader- 
ship; in his view a new movement should not be led by proven failures. 
A second danger was their resistance to new ideas: "they do not want to 
benefit the idea of a new doctrine, they only expect it to give them a 
chance to make humanity miserable with their own ideas". Almost equally 
reprehensible in Hitler's view was their cowardice; "they rave about old 
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German heroism... but in reality are the greatest cowards that can be 
imagined". 
(76) These were Hitler's main grievances against the ADV; they 
were all implicit in his dealings with Class before the Munich putsch but 
emerged with greater virulence after it. 
In short then, there was no special relationship between the ADV and the 
infant Nazi party, but one built on mutual reticence and suspicion. 
Contact between the two groups was intermittent, if at times financially 
beneficial to the Nazis. The Munich putsch proved to be the occasion not 
the cause of the rupture; it confirmed Class's worst fears about Hitler; 
it proved to Hitler that he, unlike Class, was a man of action. Nevertheless, 
despite the growing disillusionment of Hitler with Class and the Pan- 
Germans in the 1920s, Hitler clearly embarked on his political career full 
of veneration for the pre-war achievements of the ADV in particular in the 
field of propaganda and ideology. And contacts with the ADV in the early 
1920s enabled Pan-German thinking to influence the ideological development 
of the Nazi party. Hitler was most certainly interested in their ideas on 
foreign policy; during the meeting on Whit Sunday 1923 for example, Hitler 
asked Class for his views on the international impact of the Franco-Belgian 
occupation of the Ruhr. 
(77) 
This incident shows that Hitler still respected 
Class's opinion on international affairs in 1923 and it raises the crucial 
question, to which we must now turn, of how far Hitler's outlook on foreign 
affairs had been fashioned by Pan-German influences. 
At his trial in 1924 Hitler claimed that he had left Vienna in 1913 "as an 
absolute antisemite, as a deadly enemy of the whole Marxist outlook and as 
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a Pan-German in my political persuasion". 
(78) 
It must be enphasized at 
this point that Pan-Germanism was not entirely synonymous with the ADV 
and it is clear from Hitler's fulsome praise of the Austrian Pan-Germans 
in Mein Kampf that they, rather than Berlin-based ADV, were responsible 
for his early (pre-war) political education. 
(79) 
However, as we shall see, 
Hitler was well-acquainted at the end of the First World War with the major 
pro-war publications of the ADV leadership. So what ideas did the Pan- 
Germans propagate before 1914? And did the First World War transform the 
Pan-German outlook? In attempting to answer these questions a composite 
picture of Pan-Germanism can be built up as an essentialprerequisite to an 
assessment of the extent to which Hitler shared these views. 
It is less difficult than one might imagine to isolate the essential 
characteristics of pre-par Pan-Germanism because the members of the ADV were 
in fact committed to a distinctive approach to domestic and foreign affairs, 
one fashioned in conscious imitation of what were felt to be Bismarck's 
guidelines and in opposition to the 'New Course' followed by his successors. 
(80) 
There were, of course, differences of opinion and emphasis but general 
agreement existed on the broad outlines of policy. The basic aim of the 
Pan-German movement was the defence and fortification d the German race 
throughout the world. Inside Germany this meant the re-animation of national 
consciousness and the curbing of threats to it within the country. 
(81) 
Outside Germany this entailed, firstly, the protection of the Germandom of 
German communities in foreign lands (with their eventual re-unification 
with the German Reich as a distant objective) and secondly, the expansion of 
German influence abroad. 
(82) 
Heinrich Class in the most famous Pan-German publication, Wenn ich der 
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Kaiser war, written in 1912, gave the clearest exposition of the policies 
behind these principles. In order to preserve Germandom at home, Class 
recommended, for example, the expropriation of Polish property to limit 
Polish influence in Upper Silesia, Posen, and West Prussia. Similar measures 
were envisaged for the population of Alsace-Lorraine which remained 
"curiously" pro-French and anti-German, though here measures to limit French 
influence might, he felt, follow another war with France. 
(83) 
In foreign 
affairs the Pan-German creed was expansionism. "All the states surrounding 
Germany, who had not lost their 'will to power' ", Class pointed out, 
"are gaining ground and widening their spheres of influence. " If ever a 
state had cause to increase its sphere of influence, Class argued, it 
was the German Empire "because her population figures are rising so quickly, 
her industry needs new markets, her whole economy (needs) land for the 
production of tropical and semi-tropical products of all kinds, the supply 
of which has brought us into an unbearable dependence on others". 
(84) 
Hence, to Class, German expansionism was justified by the need to avert 
demographic catastrophe and to promote economic self-sufficiency. 
As Class realised that his plea that Germany was overpopulated would fall 
on deaf ears because of clear evidence of underpopulation in some areas, 
he acknowledged the need for internal colonization: "the correct colonial 
policy lies in the East of the Empire", he wrote, but this was "not suff- 
A 
icient argument against overseas colonization. It means doing one and not 
neglecting the other - the government, on the other hand, is nsglecting 
both". 
(85) 
There was no mistaking Class's preference for overseas colonies, 
however; they would provide not only markets for German industry and 
supply vital raw materials, but also a reservoir of "land for the settlement 
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of Germans for whom some day the fatherland will have no more room". 
(86) 
Behind this fear of future overpopulation lies Class's horror of Germans 
emigrating and his determination never again to allow a "loss of people 
through emigration to foreign states". 
(87) 
The German government remained unimpressed by Pan-German logic and declared 
that Germany was 'satiated' as far as territory was concerned, and, much 
to Class's evident disgust, concentrated on the defence of German economic 
interests during any international crisis that arose. 
(88) 
However, the 
government's reaction to successive Moroccan crises in 1905,1908, and 
1911 seems to have led Class to re-examine his arguments for overseas 
colonization. Whilst Class believed that West Morocco was "aptly suited 
to meet all (Germany's) needs, industrial and demographic", the government 
chose to give up its claims to it in return for concessions in the Congo 
basin. This compromise, Class felt, was an "offence against the future 
of our people", 
(89) 
presumably because settlement of the Congo basin by 
Germans was out of the question and links with the fatherland would be 
extremely tenuous. 
(90) 
It seems he now felt it preferable to acquire 
colonies nearer home in Europe rather than overseas. However, he did 
recognise the difficulties involved in colonization on the European con- 
tinent, not least of which was that "any expansion in Europe from now on is 
only to be brought about by successful wars since neither France nor 
Russia will be so humanitarian as to cede parts of their country to us", 
ý81) 
Even if land were acquired by war, there was the problem of what to do 
with the indigenous population; evacuation was one solution but it con- 
travened the laws of "historical development and modern rights of citizen- 
ship"; it was, therefore, Class argued, only to be adopted as an expedient 
in case of extreme necessity. 
(92) 
It should be noted though that some of 
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Class's colleagues expressed no such qualms about territorial expansion 
inside Europe, nor, of course, did Class once the First World War began; 
(93) 
but in the 'Kaiserbuch', he maintained that the only realistic choice 
facing an increasingly overpopulated Germany was between overseas colonies 
suitable for settlement by Germans and "deciding again to allow emigration 
of Germans into foreign states". 
(94) 
However, once war began in 1914, a 
war which Class welcomed incidentally as "the greatest piece of luck that 
could have happened to us", 
(95) 
the ADV rapidly produced its programme of 
war aims, published somewhat later by Class as Zum deutschen Kriegziel. 
This programme called for extensive annexations in both Western and Eastern 
Europe at the expense of France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Holland, and Russia. 
(96) 
So it would seem that Class's stated preference for overseas colonization 
as the main goal of the ADV was purely tactical. It was geared to the 
requirements of a period of international peace and did not imply a 
commitment to uphold the territorial status quo in Europe. 
Such foreign policy objectives either determined or derived from the ADV's 
assessment of the major powers as the 'Kaiserbuch' again shows. Overseas 
colonization, for example, raised problems, especially with England. 
In Class's view, England regarded the development of Germany's economic 
and naval potential as a direct threat to her security and generally 
"feared for the basis of her own position as a world power (Weltmacht- 
Stellung}". 
(9? ) 
To these existing economic and naval tensions was added 
a third: "the German striving for land overseas and the English decision 
not to allow such acquisitions". English fears were unfounded in Class's 
opinion; "we have no political plans that will be dangerous to England"; 
there were, therefore, "no grounds for rivalry, even less for enmity, 
if only England were willing to recognise that 65 million people can 
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live in Germany proper (Stammdeutschland), perhaps even 75 if necessary, 
but not 80 or 90 million". 
(98) 
In short, then, if England accepted 
the demographic argument in favour of German colonial expansion, the 
"two germanic blood cousins" could "shape the fate of the world together". 
(99) 
So whilst he hoped for Anglo-German collaboration, realistically Class 
anticipated a struggle to establish German colonies overseas. 
The second power, with whom Germany was likely to have trouble, was France. 
once again, Class felt Germany to be blameless. Frenchmen were motivated 
by the desire to avenge the defeat of 1871 and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, 
but in reality they were now "in üe tow of others -. Russia and England" 
and hence had become the enemies of Germany. 
(100) 
Since 1871 the French 
had provoked Germany on many occasions, now she was prepared to take the 
offensive if provoked again; in such a situation, Class considered that 
"France would have to be destroyed", part of her territory would have to 
be taken as "lasting security" and her colonial possessions to help to 
meet Germany's needs. 
(101) 
This seems to confirm Class's determination to 
seize territory in Europe should conflict occur. 
As far as Russia was concerned, Class stressed German passivity and mod- 
eration towards her; "viewed from the German standpoint", he wrote in the 
'Kaiserbuch', "no sensible reasons are to be found which ought to 
alienate the two (powers)". 
(102) 
The Russians, he believed, saw things 
very differently because "the Russian hates the German with the instinctive 
hatred of one who is an absolute inferior in face of his superior". Hatred 
of Germany was, according to Class, the driving force behind Pan-Slavism 
and Russia was likely to go to war to protect the Slavs in the Balkans; 
he saw "nothing tempting but also nothing to be feared" from a war with 
Russia or even Russia allied to France, since the enormous potential of 
the Russian army was more than offset by the indiscipline of the Slavs. 
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In the event of a German victory in such a war, Russia should be 
"required to make territorial concessions which give us a better frontier 
as well as land for settlement, a process in which evacuation cannot be 
avoided". 
(103) 
So, once again, Class seems to have been arguing that 
Germany should not risk war to win land for settlement inside Europe - 
overseas colonies prevented far fewer problems - but if war broke out, she 
should take the opportunity to acquire land in Europe. 
In effect, therefore, Class was already elaborating Pan-German war aims 
in 1912. These plans also included Belgium and the Netherlands towards 
whom Class believed his Pan-German colleagues had been too patient. He 
applied the law of the jungle to these states; "such small states", he 
argued, "have already lost their right to exist, for only the state, which 
can carry it through with the sword in the hand, can assert its right to 
indo endence": 
(104) 
Should war occur, the would be p, they presented with a 
choice between limited national independence in alliance with the German 
Empire or cooperation with England and France, in which case "they would 
be annexed". 
(105) 
So Pan-German policy made no secret of the fact that 
it intended to neutralize possible opponents either by agreement or by 
conquest. 
How then did the Pan-Germans regard Germany's allies in the Triple Alliance? 
Class's views on both Austria-Hungary and Italy in the 'Kaiserbuch' were 
equivocal. On the whole, he supported the Aistro-Hungarian alliance "because 
it corresponded to the needs of both allied powers and carried with it 
the security of permanence 
(106) 
He did have doubts about the internal 
strength of a state in which the two halves were mutually antagonistic but, 
ultimately, he put his faith in the alliance because of the Austrian army: 
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"the alliance with Austria-Hungary has value for us 
only if her army is strong and efficient; should the 
army decay because of the further internal disintegration 
of the states, then any interest in this alliance 
will disappear. " (107) 
In brief, Class felt that Germany should continue to aid Austria-Hungary 
in maintaining her great power status, just as she had done during the 
Bosnian crisis in 1908, when German support had, he believed, forestalled 
hostile intervention by Russia and possibly France. 
(108) 
It should be stressed at this point that Class's views were not shared by 
the Austrian Pan-Germans, whom Hitler admired so much or even by all 
members of the ADV inside Germany. The Austrian Pan-Germans were very 
critical of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a racial conglomeration and in 
1906, their leader, Georg von Schönerer, published the Alldeutsches 
Zukunftsprogramm, which called for preparations for a 'German-Austrian' 
Anschluss with Germany. 
(109) 
This was to be accomplished by a German 
agreement with Russia. This anti-Hapsburg and pro-Russian stance became 
the object of considerable controversy after 1912 with the emergence after 
the Balkan Wars of a Russian-backed Serbia as a direct challenge to the 
security o! the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This polarized Pan-German opinion 
in Austria-Hungary and Germany; in 1913 Reismann-Grone, one of the leading 
members of the ADV inside Germany, criticized Class's commitment to the 
Hapsburg alliance, claiming that "if we were tied to this cadaver any longer, 
it would bring us to ruin". 
(110) 
After a trial of strength in September 
1914 the pro-Austro-Hungarian and anti-Russian line of Class and his 
friends carried the day. But it is important to emphasise once again 
that Hitler was in all probability exposed to the anti-Hapsburg, pro- 
Russian propaganda of von Schönerer in the years immediately prior to 
the outbreak of the First World War. 
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Of Italy Class was more critical; from her, he argued in the 'Kaiserbuch', 
Uwe may expect nothing and we have nothing to fear". Italy lacked weight 
in the power-political sense and was really in the Anglo-French orbit; 
"she is not our ally but plays at being it". 
(111) 
Class predicted that 
Italy would not fulfil her duties as an ally in the event of war with 
Britain and France. 
Of the other powers, only America received due consideration from Class. 
Whilst she was overtly hostile to Germany, America would, Class fore- 
casted, be neutral in an Anglo-German war since none of her interests 
would be in jeopardy. Indeed, America would exploit all the economic 
advantages that war in Europe would bring and "afterwards exploit all 
the political advantages which would accrue from the necessary weakening 
of Europe". 
(112) 
Class also thought that Germany should limit her 
economic dependence on America for certain goods by colonizing areas "in 
which we could produce those products ourselves in order to liberate 
ourselves from American suppliers". 
(113) 
So the Pan-German attitude towards 
America was, it seems, primarily determined by the drive for autarky. 
It is interesting to examine the criteria by which Class formulated Pan- 
German foreign policy. At first eight it might appear that Class's views 
were dictated by Realpolitik or Machtpolitik. It was usually power-political 
considerations - such as England's fear of Germany's economic and imperial 
rivalry, or the French desire for revenge or America's economic pre- 
eminence - which led to his conclusions. However, there is evidence of 
ideological motivation behind some of his suggestions. At root, of course, 
the whole pan-German credo was racially inspired; it aimed at the preser- 
vation, and extension of the influence of the Germanic race. Class's 
assessment of the English seems coloured by admiration for the achievements 
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of his 'Germanic cousins'. There is a suggestion of racial arrogance 
in his condemnation of Russia and the Slavs within the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. He regarded America's blatant rejection of German wooing as 
typical of an American "Unkultur". 
(114) 
The Belgians and the Dutch mean- 
while suffered from the common ailment of "lower-quality German blood". 
(115) 
In all these cases, it is difficult to estimate the relative contributions 
of racial and power-political factors to Class's assessment of the power 
concerned; but, in the case of Japan, racial characteristics appear to 
have been of decisive significance. Despite his admiration for the 
"heroic patriotism of the Japanese", Class rejected the idea of exploiting 
Russo-Japanese tensions in the event of a war between Germany and Russia 
because this "contradicted the German racial conscience (Rassegewissen)"; 
for if, he explained, "we want to build our whole internal policy on race 
and want to make (it) sound again by establishing the rule of idea of 
race, then external policy must be subordinated to the law of race". 
(116) 
This law, Class explained, "prevents us from joining with a coloured race 
against a white race... from joining with any other race against a white 
race". On these grounds, therefore, an alliance with Japan was out of the 
question, a decision which Class himself recognized would cause a "so- 
called Realpolitiker" to smile. 
(117) 
It is difficult not to accept Class's 
words at their face value, since the common hostility of Germany and 
Japan towards Russia certainly provided tactical grounds for cooperation; 
but this was rejected because of racial scruples. 
At this point, there does not appear to have been any link between Class's 
antisemitism and foreign policy. Whilst he identified Jewry as a force 
at work behind social democracy and the press in Germany, he did not yet 
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see any international coordination behind Jewish policy. 
(118) 
Indeed, 
when he argued that the Jews were pursuing the moral and political dest- 
ruction of Germany not "according to a plan and intentionally" but 
instinctively, this seems to preclude any suggestion of an international 
conspiracy. 
(119) 
Such then was the Pan-German outlook on foreign affairs with which Hitler 
was probably acquainted before the outbreak of the First World War. Pan- 
Germanism was expansionist ostensibly in the colonial rather than the 
European sphere; it assumed English, French and Russian hostility to 
German ambitions, though its own attitude towards Britain was not unfavourable; 
a majority of Pan-Germans supported the alliance with Austria-Hungary 
but not with Italy; its strategy was a combination of Realpolitik and 
racial prejudice. 
Was the Pan-German view of the world transformed by the First World War? The 
answer seems to be in the negative. Events appeared to confirm Class's 
predictions; Germany stood by Austria-Hungary and Italy proved to be an 
unreliable ally. The only prediction which went sadly astray concerned the 
outcome of the war; Germany's defeat was a terrible blow to Pan-German 
pride. Yet when with the publication of the Bamberg Declaration of 16 
February 1919 the ADV announced its return to political life, the old 
optimism about saving Germany (if the right steps were taken) had returned. 
Despite a greater emphasis on measures to combat Jewish Influence, the 
ADV's prescription for Germany's ills was very much in line with the pre- 
war formula; the build-up of the army and the revival of national spirit; 
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in essence, the goal which the ADV set 
of the German people. Foreign affairs 
the ADV since it believed that "the ex 
questions of external policy" would be 
achieving this goal. 
(120) 
itself was the political education 
remained of crucial importance to 
planation of the fundamental 
"the most significant way" of 
According to the Bamberg Declaration, little had changed in foreign affairs 
during the war; the ADV placed no faith in the League of Nations or in 
hopes of a lasting peace and was more than ever convinced that Germany's 
enemies were out to destroy her. 
(121) 
In fact, Europe had been transformed 
by the war and the ADV could not escape the consequences of Germany's 
defeat. For example, the re-emergence of a Polish state meant the loss 
of territory in West Prussia acquired at the time of the partition of 
Poland; this, the ADV was not prepared to accept; "the Imperial region 
in the East as far as it encompasses portions of the earlier Polish state, 
belongs because of the facts of history to Germany; also the parts settled 
by the Poles have become through German endeavour the genuine possession 
of the German people which can never be renounced". The same principle 
applied to the Nordmark and to Alsace-Lorraine; this, according to the 
ADV's Bamberg Declaration, was all German land. 
(122) 
The collapse of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire and the November Revolution in Germany in 1918 
also changed the ADV's attitude towards Germandom in Austria. The ADV 
now supported the Anschluss of German-Austria with the German state, and 
demanded "that the whole of German-Austria including the German western 
area of Hungary as well as the ancient German colonial area of the Baltic 
lands be taken into the National Federation". (123) In addition, the war 
deprived Germany of her overseas colonies and not surprisingly, the ADV 
wanted the return of these "stolen" territories. 
(124) 
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As well as changes brought about by the defeat of Germany and her allies, 
the Pan-Germans had to adjust to changed circumstances in Russia. The 
two revolutions of 1917 had been unexpected but, in the short term, 
helped to realize Pan-German ambitions. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 
signed by Germany and the new Bolshevik government in March 1918, seemed 
to satisfy the requirements laid down by Class in the 'Kaiserbuch' and 
again in his pamphlet on Pan-German war aims in 1917. The Alldeutsche, 
Blatter wrote in March 1918 of the treaty: 
"if we compare what the German sword has gained 
for us in the East with the war aims of the 
Alldeutscher Verband, as our League's 
chairman Heinrich Class has presented them 
in the belief of a German victory in his 
pamphlet 'Zum deutschen Kriegsziel, then it 
shows that the armistice has in the main 
realized what we hoped for from the fates.... 
In the East our goals have become facts. " (125) 
Class, speaking at an ADV conference in Berlin on 14 April 1918, expressed 
his satisfaction with the Brest-Litovsk Peace ; in 1912 he had wanted 
the greatest possible weakening of Russia, who had for so long threatened 
Germany's eastern frontier, and, in his opinion, the war had to be "waged 
until Russia's alien border states had been detached and she was divorced 
from her economically productive areas.... This goal had been reached. The 
eastern flank is relieved, Russia is destroyed and will not in the 
forseeable future pursue a policy of conquest". 
(126) 
Of course, Germany 
was very rapidly deprived of the fruits of victory over Russia in 1918. 
But it seems likely that the ADV kept the 'solution' of March 1918 in mind 
as its policy aim for the future. 
Class believed that Russia under Bolshevism was no longer a serious threat 
to Germany. In a speech on the general international situation at an ADV 
conference in Frankfurt in late September 1920, Class suggested 
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that "of Russia (it) need only be said that it is languishing in 
frightful decay... dangerous for our fatherland only if it succeeds in 
assisting Bolshevism to victory on German soil". 
(127) 
The identification 
of Jewish leaders behind the Bolshevik regime did not, therefore, signif- 
icantly alter what was already an anti-Russian outlook; it merely reinforced 
it. 
(128) In general, however, Class was worried about Germany's position 
"being reliant on the goodwill of her enemies, of whom the strongest at 
present, like France and England, want our complete destruction, or like 
the United States who watches our fate with heartfelt indifference, of 
whom the basest, like the Poles, pursue the policy of naked robbery 
which conforms to their character and their history". 
(129) 
Though the political constellation of Europe had been transformed by the 
First World War, the Pan-German outlook changed very little; the collapse 
of the Hapsburg Empire made the Anschluss with German-Austria a more urgent 
demand; the loss of overseas colonies and territory in Europe merely 
reinforced Pan-German arguments about Germany being overpopulated; the 
Pan-German view of the major powers remained essentially the same, since 
events seemed to have borne out Class's forecast about them. But much as 
the pan-Germans tried to suggest that Germany faced an external situation 
similar to that of 1912, they could not ignore the changes which had occurred; 
Germany was now defeated, weakened, and isolated -a fact of life as 
unpalatable to the ADV as it was to a young Austrian-born orator just 
beginning his career in politics in 1919. 
How far was the young Adolf Hitler a 'typical' product of Pan-Germanism? 
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How far did he accept the general approach to foreign affairs? How 
far did he agree with Pan-German assessments of individual great powers? 
Accurate answers to these questions are very difficult to find because 
relatively little is known in any detail about the early, and presumably 
politically formative, years of Hitler's life in Linz, Vienna, and Munich 
before 1914. This has in fact led to some highly inventive interpretations. 
(130) 
Unimpeachable sources for Hitler's early political development are few in 
number and limited in content. Among them, the recollections by August 
Kubizek of a youthful friendship with Hitler, The Young Hitler I Knew, and 
a number of letters and postcards from Hitler to his friends are the most 
valuable and act as an essential corrective to Hitler's idiosyncratic 
account of his early life in Mein Kempf. 
(131) 
As noted above, Hitler declared in 1924 that he had been a Pan-German before 
he left Vienna in 1913. In Mein Kampf he went even further suggesting that 
when he arrived in Vienna in 1907, his "sympathies were fully and wholly 
on the side of the Pan-German tendency". 
(132) 
But whilst he fully accepted 
the ideas of the Austrian Pan-Germans, he was critical of their methods; 
"the Pan German movement", he wrote, "was right in its theoretical view 
about the aim of a German renascence but unfortunate in its choice of 
methods. It was nationalistic, but unhappily not socialistic enough to win 
the masses. But its anti-semitism was based on a correct understanding 
of the importance of the racial problem, and not on religious ideas. 
Its struggle against a definite denomination (Schönerer's campaign against 
the Catholics), however, was actually and tactically false. " 
(133) 
Kubizek 
confirmed that Hitler was both an enthusiastic supporter of Pan-Germanism 
- he suggests that Hitler was influenced by his history teacher, Leopold 
Pötsch 
(134)- 
and a critic of its tactics; "the Schönerer movement would 
have needed much stronger socialist tendencies to capture Adolf fully". 
(135) 
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The most obvious effect which Austrian Pan-German propaganda had on the 
young Hitler was his hatred of the Hapsburg Empire. When Kubizek 
received his call-up for Austrian national service, Hitler urged his 
friend, if he was passed as fit, to cross into Germany secretly and avoid 
the draft because "this moribund Hapsburg Empire did not deserve a single 
soldier". 
(136) 
Hitler, like his fellow Austrian Pan-Germans, despised 
Austria-Hungary because it was a 'racial menagerie' in which Germans were 
no longer predominant. "Was this Vienna", Hitler evidently asked himself, 
"into which streamed from all sides, Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Poles, 
Italians, Slovaks, Ruthenians, and above all, Galician Jews, still indeed 
a German city? " Hitler clearly felt not; as Kubizek recalled later: "in 
the stated affairs in Vienna, my friend saw a symbol of the struggle of 
the Germans in the Hapsburg Empire..., He hated this state which ruined 
Germanism". 
(137) 
On 5 February 1915 writing from the front to his friend 
Ernst Hopp, an assistant judge in Munich, Hitler revealed in one cryptic 
remark that his opinion of his homeland had not changed during the war; 
"Austria will fare", he wrote, "as I have always said she will". 
(138) 
It seems likely that Hitler as early as 1914 wanted the Anschluss of German- 
Austria with Germany after the break-up of the Hapsburg Empire; this 
desire was shared by most Austrian Pan-Germans, whose anti-Hapsburg 
sentiments Hitler so adequately mirrored. 
(139) 
The other assertion about Hitler's politics before 1914 that can be made 
with some certitude is that he was already a confirmed antisemite. In 
Mein Kampf Hitler claimed that he had not really noticed the Jewish 
question before he arrived in Vienna; and that there had been few Jews 
in Linz and even they were so assimilated that he did not know that they 
were not Germans. 
(140) 
But Kubizek later recalled that "when I met 
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Adolf Hitler first (in Linz in 1904), his antisemitism was already 
pronounced". 
(141) 
There seems less reason to doubt Kubizek than Hitler 
on this matter; in Mein Kampf, Hitler seems to have been trying to suggest 
that the large numbers of Jews in Vienna led to his conversion to anti- 
semitism - this lent more justification as well as drama to the story of 
his political awakening. Would he have been justified in becoming an 
antisemite in Linz with so few Jews around? In November 1921, fDr 
example, Hitler wrote to an unidentified 'doctor': "though I came from a 
fairly cosmospolitan family, the school of harsh reality turned me into 
an antisemite within a year (of arriving in Vienna)". 
(142) 
There can 
be no doubt, of course, that Hitler's experiences in Vienna deepened his 
convictions. Even Kubizek noticed how Hitler's "accumulated hatred of 
all the forces which threatened the Germans was mainly concentrated on 
the Jews, who played a leading role in Vienna". 
(143) 
Whether Hitler picked up his antisemitism and anti-Hapsburg sentiments from 
the Austrian Pan-Germans or whether they sprang from inner conviction or 
from another source will perhaps never be known for certain. Once formed, 
however, his outlook remained constant; indeed, this is hardly surprising 
if, as Kubizek claimed, Hitler's "attitude towards books was the same as 
his attitude towards the world in general.. . He was a seeker certainly, 
but even in his books he found only what suited him". The vast amount of 
reading which Hitler started in Vienna was self-educating only in the 
narrowest sense; "I never felt", Kubizek recalled, "that he was seeking 
anything concrete in his piles of books, such as principles and ideas for 
his own conduct; one contrary, he was looking only for confirmation of 
those principles and ideas he already had". 
144) 
Whilst accepting Kubizek's 
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central observation, it must nevertheless be stressed that it is 
unlikely that Hitler's opinions on all subjects were fully formulated by 
1908, by 1914 or even by 1918. Hitler did learn from his studies even 
though his frame of reference remained the same. There can be little doubt 
that the period in Vienna and especially in Munich after 1912, was the 
period of Hitler's political education as he himself later admitted: 
"from the age of 20 to 24 years (1909-13), I became 
more and more involved in politics, not so much 
through meetings as through a thorough study of 
practical economics and also of all the available 
antisemitic literature. From my 22nd year onwards, 
I applied myself with special fervour to military 
writings and throughout these years I never missed 
a chance of studying general history. " (145) 
Just what Hitler read and was affected by is very difficult to determine 
since Hitler very rarely quoted his sources or acknowledged a guiding 
influence on his political development. This was undoubtedly due to his 
own self-image of a self-taught tribune of the people, which did not allow 
him to acknowledge publicly an intellectual mentor. Privately, however, 
and especially in the early years of his political life, when he regarded 
himself as a Trommler drumming up mass support for his ideas rather than as 
the FUhrer who would eventually lead the German people, 
(146) 
Hitler displayed 
a fawning and almost sycophantic reverence towards his spiritual guides. 
This is likely to have been his attitude towards Heinrich Class and 
the ADV with whose work he must have been acquainted before the outbreak of 
war in 1914. According to one account, when Hitler met Class for the first 
time in 1920, he "kissed the hands of the Justizrat and acknowledged 
himself to be his faithful pupil. He had read with inner excitement the 
'Einhart' and after reading 'Wenn ich der Kaiser wgr' was convinced that 
in this book was contained everything important and necessary for the 
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German people". 
(147) 
This account cannot be corroborated but it does 
accord with accounts of other encounters between Hitler and his mentors. 
(148) 
Hitler was very reluctant to pay tribute in public to the contribution 
of the ADV to his early political education. Class described in his 
unpublished memoirs a meeting of the executive committee of the ADV in 
Potsdam on 18 May 1930, in which closer relations with the Nazi Party were 
proposed. The proposal was rejected on the grounds that "the leader of the 
party had let it be known that he did not intend such a move". 
(149) 
it 
seemed that Hitler wanted little close contact with the ADV, which surprised 
one of the members of the committee (identified only as 'Landgerichtsdirektor 
R') who, as Class recalled, knew Hitler quite well and "from many conver- 
sations knew how highly Hitler valued the work of the ADV, my Deutsche 
Geschichte, and the Kaiserbuch, he followed the Deutsche Zeitung and the 
Alldeutschen Blätter closely. He could say that the philosopiy with 
which he, Hitler and his party were working stemmed in the main from 
the ADV^. When asked why he did not express his debt to the ADV publicly 
and win Pan-German support, Hitler had evidently replied: "that I cannot 
do. A FUhrer can never admit that what he advocates he has got from others". 
(150) 
This story, if true, and one has to remember that Class was hardly the most 
objective of chroniclers, would suggest that the ADV's publications were 
a formative influence on Hitler's political development. 
If Hitler's debt to Pan-Germanism cannot be fully established in the period 
before he embarked on a political career in 1919, it is somewhat easier 
to do so after 1919. Hitler's earliest speeches in 1919 and 1920 revealed 
his thoughts on the goals of a future German foreign policy as well as 
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his impressions of the major powers and it is possible by comparing 
these to Pan-German sources such as the 'Kaiserbuch' and Deutsche 
Geschichte to estimate Hitler's indebtedness to Pan-Germanism. 
The foreign policy goals pursued by Adolf Hitler at the start of his 
political career were those summarized in the first three points of the 
DAP programme in February 1920: 
"1. We demand the unification of all Germans in a Greater 
Germany on the grounds of the right of national 
self-determination. 
2. We demand equal status for the German people with 
regard to the other nations, the abrogation of the 
peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. 
3. We demand land and soil (colonies) for the sustenance 
of our people and the settlement of our surplus population. " (151) 
Elaborating on the first demand in a speech on 24 September 1920, Hitler 
described it as the duty of the post-war German generation "to agitate for 
the unity of all Germans in Europe" which, he argued, woIld "make possible 
the achievement of freedom from the fetters of slavery". 
(152) 
He urged 
his audience to agitate in particular for the Anschluss; he wanted to go 
to Austria himself and to speak because "the border posts must disappear". 
(153) 
Clearly the Anschluss with German-Austria was only part of the task of 
uniting all Germans in one empire. Hitler's concept of Grossdeutschland 
was linguistic not racial in inspiration: it was to contain all German- 
speaking peoples; as he put it in a speech on 5 September 1920, "as far 
as the German tongue is heard, we want to strengthen continually the 
feeling of belonging together". 
(154) 
These views clearly bear the imprint 
of the ADV. 
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This linguistic concept of Grossdeutschland may indeed be the most 
obvious intellectual legacy of Pan-Germanism to Hitler. But the ADV 
claimed a more direct and tangible role in Hitler's political education. 
Dr. Helmut Hopfen, Class's contact in Bavaria, claimed to have persuaded 
Hitler not to support the Bavarian separatist movements led by Otto 
Ballerstedt, Georg Heim, and Graf Bothmer during the meeting of folkish 
groups in Salzburg in August 1920. 
(155) 
On the whole, this claim seems 
rather dubious; Hitler's commitment to Grossdeutschland, proclaimed in 
many of his early speeches, 
(156) 
makes it unlikely that Hitler would consider 
cooperation with Bavarian separatist movements(except for purely narrow 
tactical purposes). Indeed, on 6 July 1920 (before the Salzburg meeting) 
Hitler had attacked the idea of a Danubian Confederation - the main 
separatist scheme advocated by Ballerstedt - for two reasons. Firstly, 
he disapproved of the House of Hapsburg, which might be restored to rule 
such a confederation; this, he argued, was the "dynasty of the criminals who 
bear the greatest responsibility for our collapse". Secondly, he questioned 
the anti-Italian rationale behind the proposed confederation; he believed 
that for Germany "the enemy stands on the other side of the Rhine, not in 
Italy or elsewhere". 
(157) 
The Bavarian separatists could, therefore, 
expect little succour from Hitler. Nor did he need any Pan-German per- 
suasion to condemn attempts to divide North and South Germany. In September 
1920 Hitler's attacks on the aeparatisls did become more frequent, possibly 
because of Pan-German advice or because of the increased prominence of the 
separatist themselves but Hitler's opposition cannot be attributed with 
any certainty to direct ADV intervention. 
(158) 
The demand for the unification of all Germans in a Greater Germany was, of 
course, very closely related to the second demand of the DAP's programme, 
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the abrogation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, which 
deprived Germany of areas with German-speaking populations. Hitler in 
his speeches, therefore, called for the protection (and eventual return) 
of Germans in the South Tyrol which had been ceded to Italy, in the 
Sudeten part of the newly created Czechoslovakia, and in Upper Silesia, 
whose ultimate fate awaited a League of Nations plebiscite. 
(159) 
It is a point often overlooked that Hitler opposed the Versailles Settlement 
on economic as well as folkish grounds. On 24 September 1920, he put his 
case most succinctly: "the shameful and humiliating peace of Versailles 
has robbed us of all our economic powers. The three main supports, coal, 
iron, and potash have for the most part been taken from us". 
(160) 
Germany, 
he claimed, had a 55 million mark deficit, mainly for payments made to 
coal producers for the free export of coal in the form of reparation 
payments, a deficit which would increase over the years because of interest 
payments (here the influence of Feder is perhaps apparent). In short, 
he argued, Germany would be economically enslaved by the Versailles 
Settlement. (161) 
The needs of Germany's economy and her people dovetailed also into the 
third point of the DAP's programme - the demand for colonies. "The 
confiscation of the colonies", Hitler declared in an early attack on 
Versailles, "signifies for us an irreparable loss. We are compelled to 
take our raw materials from the Allies and indeed at so high a price that 
we are eliminated as competitors on the world markets". 
(162) 
The DAP 
also demanded the return of Germany's colonies "for the sustenance of our 
people and the settlement of our surplus population". Hitler referred 
very rarely to these arguments in the first few months of his political 
career and the relative weight attached to each is uncertain. In August 
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1920, however, Hitler pointed out that "because of the loss of our 
colonies our industry stands at the point of collapse. Either we get 
back market outlets or 20 million Germans must emigrate". 
(163) 
It would 
seem from this that, like Class, Hitler saw the return of German colonies 
as a way of averting emigration by boosting the economy; in other words, 
colonies for Hitler were primarily an economic boon and only secondarily 
land for settlement. The ideal solution seemingly favoured by Hitler at 
this time, was a strong Germany with colonies which supplied her raw 
materials and bought the products of German industry, thereby sustaining 
the 90 million Germans in Europe. 
(164) 
This solution would appear to be entirely compatible with the aims of the 
ADV, which, as we have seen, also abhorred the idea of Germans emigrating. 
But did Hitler share Class's pre-war reservations about expansion in 
Eastern Europe or was he already in 1919-20 dreaming of a large continental 
empire? From the available - admittedly fairly sparse - evidence, this 
latter suggestion has to be rejected. The only hint of imperialist 
pretensions in Eastern Europe is a vague, equivocal statement in a speech 
on 19 November 1920 when Hitler, after describing the measures designed 
to restore Germany internally, declared, "and thus, when we are strengthened 
internally, we can also turn towards the East"ý165ý Other accounts of this 
speech, however, give the impression that Hitler was referring to liberation 
of German areas lost in 1919 (perhaps Upper Silesia and the Sudetenland). 
The VB, for example, reported Hitler as referring to "the emancipation 
from foreign servitude which is only possible when the Germans pursue 
shoulder-to-shoulder internal reconstruction". 
(166) 
This would certainly 
suggest, as reports of other speeches at that time do, that Hitler was 
calling for the liberation of "German brothers" in areas lost in 1919, rather 
than the conquest of non-German territory in Eastern Europe. 
(167) 
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Hitler did express resentment of the inequitable distribution or 
maldistribution of land in Eastern Europe. "Is it right"_, he asked in 
an early speech, "that 18 times more land is available to each Russian than 
to every German? " 
(168) 
Speaking on the same theme in September 1920, 
Hitler asked: "What remains of the most natural of rights of men that of 
nourishment, when one reckons on 20 million too many (people) in Germany? " 
(169) 
Here Hitler cleverly used Clemenceau's famous statement that there are 
20 million Germans too many as evidence of German overpopulation (not 
Clemenceau's point at all). However, there is no evidence to suggest 
on either occasion that Hitler was advocating a redistribution of European 
territory by force as a solution to Germany's spatial problems. The 
return of Germany's lostlerritories seems to have been the proferred solution 
at this time; as Hitler put it on 27 April 1920: "We are hoping that a 
united German Reich may soon arise again which reaches from Memel to 
Bratislava and from Königsberg to Strasbourg". 
(170) 
To be accuratre, here 
Hitler was advocating Slightly More tha n the resurrection of 
Germany's 1914 frontiers but not the conquest of non-German areas in 
Eastern Europe. 
We may conclude, then, that Hitler and the DAP were aiming to restore Germany's 
Weltmachtstellung, her position as a world power, which had enabled her to 
follow an expansive economic and colonial policy before 1914. All this, 
of course, suggests a close acquaintance with pre-war Pan-German propaganda. 
Not only that, Hitler on occasion showed that he fully appreciated the 
role of the ADV in attempting to warn Germany's leaders about the mistakes 
which they were making. In April 1923 for example, Hitler admitted, 
when commenting on the erosion of the German Army's morale by pacifist ideas 
during the war and its tragic outcome, that "no-one except the Pan-Germans 
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has the right to protest, they alone have consistently warned against 
this policy". 
(171) 
He continued that "only the y party of the National 
Socialists, which is free of all guilt, has the right to rescue Germany 
from her misfortune"; it would seem, therefore, that Hitler saw the 
NSDAP as assuming the mantle of the Pan-Germans. As early as November 
1919, Hitler appeared to recognize the need to construct a kind of 
'National Opposition' and was clearly aware of the Pan-German precedent; 
he declared: 
"The present government cannot govern because it has 
not the faintest idea how to govern. When people 
criticise, one calls it reaction, one calls them 
Pan-Germans. We want to inculcate the people with 
defiance. " (172) 
It is, perhaps, therefore, not surprising that Hitler, like the ADV, 
gave the highest priority to internal reform as a prerequisite to the 
revitalization of German fortunes abroad. "Nations", he stressed in a 
speech in November 1920, "are first capable of a great rise when they have 
carried through internal reforms, which enable them to convert the whole 
race completely to foreign policy goals". 
(173) 
Again, Hitler reflected 
Pan-German thinking when he argued that Germany's revival must be generated 
from within and that she could count on no external assistance: "Germany 
can only help herself; she has to expect nothing from abroad". 
(174) 
In 
July 1920 Hitler criticized those in government who "ogle at France and 
England" and who hoped thereby "to glean concessions from abroad". 
(175) 
On the face of it, this would appear to be a specific rejection of inter- 
national alliances but, in reality, Hitler was suggesting that the initial 
surge of national revival had to come from within, quite unassisted, and 
that only evidence of this could make Germany attractive to prospective 
allies; 'first awaken national feeling, then win power in order to become 
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alliance-worthy and to throw off the yoke", Hitler exclaimed on another 
occasion. 
(176) 
As we shall see, this approach did not prevent Hitler (or 
the ADV) from discussing prospective alliance partners. 
Above all else, Hitler's early ideas on German expansion to meet the needs 
of a growing population - the key goal of his foreign policy - seems to 
hark back to the Pan-Germans and in particular to Heinrich Class's Wenn 
ich der Kaiser war. Axel Kuhn has compared the 'Kaiserbuch' with Mein Kampf - 
a misleading comparison which tends to stress how far Hitler had moved 
by 1924 from Pan-German aims, rather than how close they were earlier. 
(177) 
If Hitler's early speeches in 1919-21 are compared with the 'Kaiserbuch', 
however, they reveal that Hitler was aware of four alternative policies 
outlined by Class before the war from which Germany had to choose in order 
to deal with the increasing problem of overpopulation. Internal colonization 
- increasing the output of existing German land - was the first possibility 
discussed by Class. "But is it possible", Hitler asked, "to increase 
the yield of the land indefinitely? " 
(178) 
Like Class, he felt not, this 
was only a temporary solution; Germany had to acquire land - the second 
alternative. 
(179) 
This raised the question of territorial acquisition in 
Europe or overseas. As has been seen, in 1920 at least Hitler did not seem 
to be thinking of expahsion in Eastern Europe and so there are no indications 
whether or not he shared Class's scruples concerning the annexation of 
inhabited territory in Europe. Evidently, Hitler, like Class, preferred 
(or at least pretended to prefer) colonial expansion. 
(180) 
If this second 
alternative was not chosen there remained, in Hitler's view, only emigration 
or world trade as solutions to Germany's demographic problems. Hitler was 
concerned about "the export of people" - the third alternative - as a 
solution, feeling like Class that Germans who emigrated were lost to 
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Germandom: "Our emigrants were only slave workers, they were fertilizer 
(Eunstdtinger) for the nations". 
(181) 
The fourth alternative - "world trade" 
in Hitler's shorthand 
(182) 
- denoted the policy actually followed by the 
German government before the war - one which ignored colonization in favour 
of commercial development. Class called the policy "politically dis- 
interested" - one which required of Germany in any crisis "only the guarantee 
of her economic interests" and which eventually would result in Germany's 
being reliant for food supplies on foreign countries. 
(183) 
It would seem therefore that Hitler was indebted to the ADV or the Austrian 
Pan-Germans for the general goals of his foreign policy, but were his 
impressions of the major world powers derived from the same sources? The 
power most likely to oppose Germany's aspirations in the colonial field 
was - as before the war - England. For this reason, England was portrayed 
in Hitler's early speeches as one of Germany's "absolute enemies". 
(184) 
The reasons for English enmity towards Germany were spelt out by Hitler: 
"England, for centuries the world power, possessing all 
world monopolies. After the English had first sent out 
her own trading ships into the whole world, we succeeded 
later in making ourselves independent of her and in 
competing with her. Germany had gained a footing on 
every continent and was about to emerge as the head 
of the world powers. That was also the reason for the 
English to make war on us. " (185) 
Hence in Hitler's view, the threat of German economic competition heightened 
by German colonial expansion, which aroused British envy, had led to Anglo- 
German enmity - precisely the explanation offered by Class in the 'Kaiserbuch', 
(186) 
It is also significant that Hitler obviously admired the English and felt 
that Germans had something to learn from them. "The English", he declared 
in one speech, "have, as a people, reason to be proud., ' 
(187) 
The reasons 
for this admiration are not difficult to establish: "England with a few 
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million (people) rules practically one fifth of the whole earth. English 
naval power! English colonial power, the greatest in the world! England 
controls world trade", he declared on another occasion. 
(188) 
Clearly, 
on naval, colonial and economic grounds alone, England was a model 
state which Hitler's Germany was to emulate. Hitler was also impressed 
by England's skillful diplomacy - in particular the use of alliance strategy. 
On the one hand, she had the ability to turn conquered enemies to allies 
and, with them, to conquer other lands; 
(189) 
on the other she played with 
great dexterity the game of divide and rule. Hitler supplied a few 
examples: "the annihilation of Spain with the help of Holland, the latter's 
annihilation with the help of France, the latter's annihilation in 22 years 
with the help of other peoples and recently the annihilation of Germany". 
(190) 
This cynical policy, Hitler admired as an example of "might making right" 
and one which ought to be followed. England was also quite capable of 
using "objectionable means" other than war, for example, the annihilation 
of the indigenous population of North America with whisky, the attempt to 
do the same in China with opium, the starvation of Indians by the export 
of corn and cultivation of cotton and rubber, and the use of concentration 
camps for Boors. 
(191) 
Where did Hitler acquire this sort of information? 
One possible source is Emhart's (i. e. Class's) Deutsche Geschichte, 
which described, in some detail, the ways in which cynical British states- 
manship defeated Spain, Holland and France. 
(192) 
Though the similarities 
are often striking, clearly this was not Hitler's only source. In all 
probability, Hitler was synthesizing themes gleaned from a wide variety 
of folkish sources. 
Certainly, the Pan-Germans respected the English for the same reasons as 
Hitler - the strength of the British Empire and the skillful diplomacy 
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and often underhand methods by which they maintained British primacy in 
the world. There can be no doubt either that, like the Pan-Germans, 
Hitler envisaged in 1920 English opposition to his own foreign policy plans; 
in so far as they were precisely those which had led to conflict in 1914 
and therefore contravened the Versailles Settlement of which Britain was 
a staunch defender, this was inevitable. 
(193) 
England in 1920, in Hitler's 
view, was one of Germany's "absolute enemies" and he would have fully 
endorsed Class's assertion in a speech in September 1920 that "England 
(along with France) wanted our complete annihilation". 
(194) 
If Hitler did 
harbour secret designs of a future Anglo-German alliance in 1920 (indeed 
if Class did also), it was not the time to make a public avowal of this 
alliance policy. 
(195) 
Hitler's hostile attitude towards France was one of the constant elements in 
his ßbreign policy analyses between 1919 and 1945. France was, in his view, 
the hereditary enemy, traditionally seeking to annex the left bank of the 
Rhine and so obtain her 'natural'frontier. 
(196) 
France's Rhenish aspirations 
must have been common knowledge at the time, so it is unlikely that they 
can be traced to one source, Pan-German or otherwise. 
(197) 
The events of 
the First World War and the Versailles settlement, aß which France was seen 
as the arch-defender, only reinforced Hitler's contempt for France. Hitler 
would support a war of revenge against the French at any time: "we are 
suppressed but even if we were defenceless, we would not avoid a war with 
France". 
(198) 
The extent of his hatred for the French can be gauged from 
a comment rejecting the idea of a Danubian Confederation which, he felt, 
would make southern Germany dependent on French and Czechoslovakian coal: 
"rather a Bolshevik Grossdeutschland than a South Germany dependent on the 
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French and the Czechs". 
(199) 
This comment is interesting also forfhe light it throws on Hitler's 
feelings towards Bolshevik Russia. National Socialism was to be so self- 
consciously moulded as the antithesis of Bolshevism that it is natural 
to assume that Hitler's hatred of Bolshevik Russia was an all-consuming 
passion from the start. Yet here he clearly expressed a far deeper hatred 
of France. So what was Hitler's attitude towards Russia and towards 
Bolshevism in 1919? In 1919 and early 1920 Hitler seems to have been quite 
favourably disposed towards Russia if one can rely on his retrospective 
analysis of Germany's pre-war foreign policy. In one of his earliest 
speeches, Hitler placed Russia in the category not of Germany's "absolute 
enemies" but of "nations, which as a result of their own unfortunate 
situation or as a result of special circumstances became our enemies". 
(200) 
He identified two reasons why Russia had become Germany's enemy in the 
First World War. Firstly, her traditional desire for an "outlet to the sea" 
had brought Russia into conilict'With various nations". Secondly, Germany's 
diplomacy - in particular the failure to renew the Reinsurance Treaty - 
had alienated the Russians; "since Bismarck", Hitler explained, "we have 
pursued a Poland-policy (Polen-Politik). The so-called Reinsurance 
Treaty ran out in 1892 sic), it was not renewed. "(2TFiIs led to the Franco- 
Russian alliance of 1893 and ultimately the outbreak of war. It would 
seem therefore that, in Hitler's view, no real conflict of interests had 
existed between Germany and Russia. One might suggest that Russia's drive 
to the sea (the Baltic) ultimately threatened German interests but the 
fact that Hitler played this down indicates a certain predilection for 
cooperation with Russia on his part. 
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This apparent dichotomy in Hitler's belief in the compatibility of Russian 
and German aims before the war and his awareness of Russia's drive to 
the sea which clearly impinged on German interests in the Baltic states, 
clearly calls for clarification. It may be explicable in terms of Pan- 
German philosophy; in fact, Class's expose of Russian foreign policy in the 
post-war edition of Deutsche Geschichte may have provided the framework 
of Hitler's own analysis. Class referred to Russian ambitions to gain 
access to the sea at Constantinople and in the non-Russian coastal areas 
of the Baltic. But these ambitions were not grounds for Russo-German 
opposition because they were not a threat to the Reichsdeutschen, i. e. 
to the Germans living within the Empire, but only to the Volksdeutschen, 
i. e. those Germans living outside the Empire, for example, those in the 
Baltic provinces. Hence Class could conclude that "the Reich German and 
Russian national interests ran nowhere contrary to one another but rather 
coincided in many places with each other". 
(202) 
Class was arguing in 1919, 
as he had in 1912, that the Baltic Germans should not be allowed to spoil 
Russo-German relations, 
(203) 
and it is possible that Hitler adopted the 
same line. Alternatively, Hitler may have considered Russia an Asiatic 
power, whose predominantly "Asiatic policy of conquest" posed no real 
threat to German ambitions. 
(204) 
What ultimately had spoilt Russo-German relations and led to confrontation 
in the First World War had been Germany's decision to support Austria- 
Hungary; as Class put it, "only the reichsdeutsch need that we protect the 
Austro-Hungarian empire stood between Russia and our fatherland. Over 
that it came finally to the breach. " Hitler certainly on the basis of 
evidence dating from 1923 agreed with this interpretation of events. 
(205) 
It has to be remembered, of course, that in 1913 Class supported the pro- 
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Hapsburg policy of the German Empire in face of criticism from the 
Austrian Pan-Germans, who were pro-Russian and he had revised his views 
after the war in a new edition of Deutsche Geschichte. Hitler seems to 
have been unaware of this controversy because in April 1923 he argued that 
Germany "had counted on Austria, against which the Pan-Germans would always 
have advised; by so doing Germany was greatly mistaken. " 
(206) 
This would 
suggest again that Hitler had been a disciple primarily of Austrian Pan- 
Germanism, unless of course his views were simply gleaned from one of the 
postwar ADV publications such as the later editions of Deutsche Geschichte. 
There is some evidence to support the latter interpretation; Hitler's 
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reference to Germany's support for Austria-Hungary's "Polen Politik" - that 
is the policy of stirring up Polish demands for independence within the 
Russian Empire - may betray his indebtedness to Class's own analysis. 
(207) 
Hitler's favourable view of Russia, therefore, may have derived from pre-war 
Austrian Pan-German propaganda, though it may have been reinforced by 
Class's postwar re-evaluation of the Dual Alliance. The surprising point 
about Hitler's analysis is that he made no reference to Russian hatred of 
Germans, which breathed life into the Pan-Slav movement before the war. 
Perhaps this omission is itself attributable to Hitler's eagerness to show 
that Germany and Russia ought not to have been on opposing sides in 1914. 
Curiously enough, during the course of 1920 when Hitler's previously 
friendly attitude towards Russia became tinged with distaste for 'Jewish 
Bolshevism', he'discovered' a Pan-Slavic threat to Germany, for he declared 
that "the ones who bear arms in Russia, are not fighting for Bolshevism, 
but for Pan-Slavism, if also with the help of Bolshevism. The Pan-Slav 
wave will soon wash away Bolshevism. An alliance with Russia would be 
(208) 
impossible without the precondition of complete national solidarity in Germany. " 
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Possibly, therefore, Hitler's use of the Pan-Slavic threat was opportunistic; 
he either exaggerated or ignored it according to his own needs. On the 
whole, it seems that, at the start of his political career, Hitler saw 
Russia as a possible ally for Germany, a not altogether surprising 
attitude in a man steeped in Pan-German veneration for Bismarck and 
Bismarckian diplomatic expedients such as the Dreikaiserbund and the 
Reinsurance treaty, which had kept Germany and Russia together for so long 
in the late nineteenth century. 
Italy also belonged to Hitler's second category of powers, who were not 
absolute enemies of Germany but who fought against her in the First World 
War. In the Italian case, the problem had been caused once more by Austria; 
"originally Italy had nothing against Austria", Hitler pointed out in a 
speech in December 1919, but then hatred of Austria began to be taught in 
the schools (just as French hatred of Germany was) though it took fifty years 
to erupt. 
(209) Hitler also stressed the limitedadvantage of the Italian 
alliance to Germany before 1914; "men like Höltzendorf (sic), Bismarck and 
Ludendorff had long seen that Italy would not be on Germany's side if 
she took an active part in the war". Once again, Hitler's retrospective 
analysis was strictly in accordance with Pan-German propaganda; Class, as 
has been shown, questioned Italian reliability as an ally in the 
'Kaiserbuch'. 
(210) 
Axel Kuhn has argued that the idea of an alliance between Italy and a 
Nazi Germany emerged in Hitler's statements in 1920; it was the first element 
in the foreign policy programme to emerge. 
(211) 
This would certainly 
appear to have been the case. As we have seen, on 6 July 1920, Hitler 
argued that Germany's enemy lay on the other side of the Rhine and not in 
Italy. 
(212) 
This rather negative expression of pro-Italian feeling soon 
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received positive reinforcement. On 1 August, in the knowledge that 
France and Italy were in conflict over the port of Fiume, which Italy 
had been denied at Versailles, Hitler declared: 
"Away with the peace treaty! To this end we must 
use all means at our disposal: chiefly to make use 
of the conflicts between France and Italy so that 
we can get Italy on our side. " (213) 
Clearly Hitler saw that Italy would be useful in destroying the Versailles 
Settlement. But did this mean that an Italian alliance was now part of 
his own foreign policy programme? Or was Hitler simply giving contemporary 
politicians a piece of advice, namely, to exploit Italo-French tensions? 
It is impossible to say with certainty which interpretation is correct. 
However, if an Italian alliance was now part of Hitler's awn foreign policy 
programme, as Kuhn suggests, it must be emphasised that Hitler had not yet 
fully thought out his attitude towards Italy. The question of the return 
of South Tyrol from Italian to German rule had certainly not been resolved. 
This was a problem which seemed to affect Hitler deeply. The DAP's party 
chairman, Anton Drexler, first noticed Hitler in a meeting in August 1919 
when this subject was being discussed: "A guest, a Professor Baumann, had 
said that 'Tyrol wants to join Bavaria but not Germany'. Thereupon Hitler 
answered so sharply that I gave him my book, 'Mein politisches Erwachen' ", 
Drexler later recalled. 
(214) 
In November 1920 Hitler referred to a comment 
by the German Foreign Minister Dr. Simons who had disclaimed any desire on 
the part of Germany to relieve the Germans in South Tyrol of Italian rule 
as "proof of a national incompetence": "the German state", Hitler went on, 
"must intervene every time for every single German". 
(215) 
The South Tyrol 
was clearly an obstacle to Italo-German friendship and Hitler had clearly 
not thought through at this time the political consequences of the alliance 
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with Italy, which he was advocating. 
It is often said that Hitler was too narrowly European in his approach to 
foreign affairs and, even in the first year as a political speaker, a 
relative neglect of extra-European powers is evident. Japan, for example, 
received short shrift from Hitler: in the pre-war period, in Hitler's 
view, she had been one of the powers with no conflict of interest with 
Germany, she wanted merely "to keep the whites out of East Asia". 
(216) 
Significantly again this was in line with Pan-German opinion. America 
received rather more frequent attention. She, with England and France, 
was one of Germany's "absolute enemies". 
(217) 
Her prime preoccupation, 
however, was business and as "a land of money she had to intervene in the 
war in order not to lose her loans. It was also America who had the lion's 
share of the profits of war". 
(218)It 
should be noted once again that Hitler's 
interpretation of American Intervention in the First World War was 
precisely the same as the one given by Class in the postwar edition of 
Deutsche Geschichte, and which denied the significance of submarine warfare, 
which is usually regarded as a major factor in bringing the USA into the 
war. 
(219) 
In 1920 Hitler displayed a curious mixture of hatred and respect for 
American President Wilson; hatred because he believed that Wilson had raised 
the hopes of the German people for a just settlement with his talk of the 
'Fourteen Points' and the League of Nations - the gap between the high 
ideals of the 'Fourteen Points' and the Versailles treaty was plain to see: 
"the Versailles treaty... in the work of the lowest secret diplomacy", he 
declared. 
(220) 
On the other hand, Hitler seemed to admire what he regarded 
as Wilson's cunning; "although this criminal Wilson was a great rascal, 
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one has to respect him because, by these means, he acquired advantages 
for his people". 
(221) 
"Wilson", he declared on another occasion, "is 
without doubt a genius". 
(222) 
This verdict seemed, to Hitler, to be 
vindicated by the Senate's rejection of the Versailles Settlement and the 
League of Nations and elicited from Hitler grudging respect for the United 
States; "she is mighty enough and does not need the help of others,... 
and she feels restricted in her freedom of action", he commented. 
(223) 
In conclusion, then, it must be said that during his first year in politics 
in 1919 and 1920, Hitler's outlook on foreign affairs was one largely 
derived from Pan-German literature. He seemed to endorse the goals of 
the ADV -the recreation of Germany's boundaries as of 1914, the Anschluss 
of German-Austria with Germany and the pursuit of an overseas empire. He 
may have harboured secret designs on territory in Eastern Europe but, if so, 
these were certainly not aired in public. In the main, Hitler's views on 
the major world powers can be gleaned only from an occasional retrospective 
analysis of the diplomatic origins of the First World War but they certainly 
bear the hallmark of pre-war Pan-German propaganda. Hence Britain, France 
and America were described as "deadly enemies" of Germany since they 
opposed her ambition to become a major world power. The only differences 
were Hitler's total lack of respect for the old Austro-Hungarian Empire 
and his corresponding belief that Germany and Russia had no major conflicting 
interests in 1914 and it seems likely that these were attributable to 
Hitler's exposure to the anti-Hapsburg propaganda of the Austrian Pan- 
Germans before 1914. In 1920, however, Hitler began to recognise the need 
to utilize Italian dissatisfaction with the postwar settlement as a way 
of advancing the cause of Germany's recovery. This may indeed have been 
no 
the first sign of Hitler's emerging foreign policy programme; it was, 
perhaps, also the first sign that he was no longer satisfied with the 
old platitudes of the ADV. 
In short, whilst Hitler does appear to have been profoundly influenced by 
Heinrich Class and Pan-Germanism in the formative stages of his political 
development, Hitler, as his postwar dealings with the ADV leadership 
after 1920 show, was increasingly inclined to go his own way. Just when 
and how Hitler outgrew his Pan-German heritage will be examined in 
later chapters. 
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3. THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY ON HITLER'S OUTLOOK CN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1919-20. 
During the first few months of his collaboration with the German Worker's 
Party, Adolf Hitler's comments on foreign affairs seemed largely to reflect 
Pan-German convictions, probably acquired before the First World War. The 
Versailles Settlement, by depriving Germany both of German-speaking lands 
in Europe and of her colonial possessions overseas, appeared to legitimize 
again the Pan-German demands for the unification of all Germans in one 
empire and the creation of an overseas empire. Furthermore the attitude 
of the major powers to the Versailles Treaty seemed to confirm the correctness 
of Hitler's diagnosis of foreign affairs mainly derived from Wilhelmtnian 
Pan-German propaganda. Britain and France, the two powers most hostile to 
Germany before the war were the settlement's chief defenders; America, rather 
disinterested in German affairs before 1914, proved unwilling to sign the 
treaty; Italy and Russia, whose enmity, Hitler believed, could have been 
averted by more skillful German diplomacy before 1914, opposed the treaty; 
the former was dissatisfied with her share of the spoils, the latter had 
not been consulted even though Russian territory had been disposed of. 
However, it was not long before Hitler's analysis both of the pro-war 
diplomatic scene and the postwar diplomatic settlement began to show a 
subtle change. In his early speeches, for example, Hitler had argued that 
Russia and Germany had come into conflict only because of Germany's failure 
to renew Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty with Russia and because of Germany's 
commitment to Austria-Hungary. By April 1920 Hitler was arguing that before 
the war only "the international Jewish press concern" had prevented an 
alliance between the two powers. 
(1) 
This comment, implying as it did that 
the Jews had been undermining Germany's international position before the 
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First World War, represents the first modification of Hitler's outlook 
on foreign affairs. Deeply rooted antisemitic prejudices were seemingly 
beginning to colour his assessment of world affairs. 
Historians have been pre-occupied, quite understandably in view of later 
events, with the origins of Hitler's antisemitism. The debate over the 
timing and inspiration behind Hitler's original 'conversion' to antisemitism 
has already been referred to. 
(2) 
It could be argued, however, that just 
as important is the date when he adopted an antisemitic world-view, that is 
when he ceased to regard the Jewish question solely as an internal problem 
for Germany and began to accept its international ramifications. At this 
point, arguably, Hitler might have begun to look beyond the more expulsion 
of the Jews from Germany for a global solution tofhe "Jewish question"; the 
road to Auschwitz and the policy of extermination would then be clear. 
However that may be, the emergence of an international dimension to Hitler's 
antisemitism is clearly of relevance in the evolution of Nazi attitudes 
towards foreign policy and this chapter will attempt first to explain its 
origins and, secondly, to assess its impact on Hitler's approach to 
foreign affairs. 
It has been argued that Hitler's ideas underwent an ideological transformation 
in the early months of 1920. Both GUnther Schubert and Fritz Dickmann have 
tried to establish a causal connection between the emergence of a Jewish 
dimension in Hitler's references to foreign affairs and the publication of 
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. 
(3) 
However, since no such change is 
discernible in Hitler's speeches before April 1920 and the 'Protocols' had 
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been published in Germany in December]919, some have found this interpretation 
unconvincing. 
(4) 
Certainly this time-lapse needs explaining. 
One explanation, of course, could be that Hitler's attitude towards 
antisemitism changed early in 1920. Heinrich Class, in fact, claimed in 
his memoirs that the party programme proclaimed by Hitler on 24 February 
1920 came as a shock to him since Hitler had, in private, given him to 
understand that the Jewish question would not feature prominently in it. 
(5) 
Alfred Kruck has explained that Hitler was afraid of losing the "majority 
of his support, if he made his party antisemitic". 
(6) 
Since the party 
programme was overtly antisemitic, Kruck believes that Class must have 
convinced Hitler that antisemitism, far from alienating support, would in 
fact attract it on a large scale; thus, Kruck concludes, the ADV had 
pressurized "the NSDAP into becoming an anti-Jewish shock-troop". 
(7) 
This 
theory that Hitler was uncertain whether to commit the party wholeheartedly 
to an antisemitic course might, of course, explain Hitler's failure to 
make use of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion early in 1920. 
However, in fact, it does not stand up to serious scrutiny. Heinrich Class's 
determination to stress his own contribution to the Nazi Party's success 
story has been noted already and though he was, perhaps, justified in 
drawing attention to the similarity between the antisemitic clauses of 
The Twenty-Five Points and his own demands in the 'Kaiserbuch', his claim 
that he effectively persuaded Hitler to commit the DAP to an overtly 
antisemitic course is a little difficult to accept. 
(8) 
After all, it 
seems very likely that Hitler had been a committed antisemite at least 
since he left Vienna in May 1913. 
(9) 
Furthermore, in a letter to Adolf 
Gemlich written in September 1919, Hitler had criticized the "emotional 
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antisemitism", which took the form of spontaneous pogroms and suggested 
instead a more rational and legal campaign against the Jews. "Antisemitism 
as a political movement should and can not be determined by the feelings 
of the moment", he argued, "but only by knowledge of the facts$,, 
(10) 
Since the Jews were a distinct race and not a religious community and,. 
therefore, formed a state within a state inside Germany, Hitler advocated an 
antisemitism based on reason, not emotion, which "must lead to the system- 
atic legal opposition to and elimination of the rights of the Jew, which 
he alone of the foreigners living amongst us possesses (a law for aliens)". 
The final goal of such a policy, Hitler concluded, "must however be the 
removal of the Jews altogether". 
(11) 
This letter, written four months 
before the party programme was publicized, would appear to leave little 
doubt about Hitler's commitment to apDlitical campaign to limit Jewish 
rights in Germany. 
Finally, it is difficult to accept that Hitler had 'soft-pedalled' on 
antisemitism in his speeches to the DAP between October 1919 and February 
1920. On different occasions, he accused the Jews of being responsible 
for the Versailles Treaty, fratricidal strife in Germany and the American 
decision to intervene in the First World War. 
(12) 
All told, therefore, it 
is extremely unlikely that doubts about the adoption of an aggressively 
antisemitic programme prevented Hitler from exposing in public the inter- 
national machinations of world Jewry. 
A second explanation could be that Hitler was well aware of the international 
ramifications of the Jewish question in the period before April 1920 but 
chose for tactical reasons not to exploit the issue. It is quite evident, 
for example, from his letter to Gemlich that Hitler believed that the 
115 
effects of Jewish influence were felt throughout the world. He wrote 
of the Jewish preoccupation with materialism as follows: 
"His power is the power of money, which in the form 
of interest effortlessly and endlessly multiplies 
itself in his hands and establishes over nations 
that most dangerous of yokes, the sad consequences 
of which are so difficult to perceive because of 
the initial glitter of gold.... His activities 
produce a racial tuberculosis among nations. " (13) 
Hitler clearly believed that the Jews intended to undermine not only the 
German state but also other nations as well. Jewish methods varied from 
one state to another; "in an autocratically governed state he whines for 
the favour of the 'Majesty' of the prince and abuses it to batten on to his 
subjects like a leech. In a democracy he courts the favour of the masses, 
grovels before the 'majesty of the people' and yet knows only the 
majesty of money". 
(14) 
Since Hitler clearly recognised in this letter and his earlier speeches 
that the Jews represented a world-wide menace why did he fail to make use 
of the 'evidence' of a world-wide Jewish conspiracy at this time? One 
possible reason is that in his early speeches he was primarily concerned 
with explaining Germany's problems and calling for a German national revival 
and, perhaps, felt that propaganda about an international Jewish menace 
would divert attention from the task at hand -a national revival. 'The 
revival", Hitler wrote to Gemlich, "was being prepared for not by political 
leadership of irresponsible majorities under the influence of particular 
party dogmas (or) of an irresponsible press, not by phrases and slogans 
of international coinage, but only through the ruthless action of personalities 
(15) 
with the capacity for national leadership and an inner sense of responsibility". 
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In other words, perhaps, Hitler played down the international aspect of 
the Jewish question lest it reinforce the tendency to look for international 
solutions, a trend which Hitler had long abhorred. 
(16) 
A third explanation, of course, would be that Hitler was ignorant of the 
supposed world Jewish conspiracy until the publication of Die Geheimnisse 
der Weisen von Zion in December 1919 and that this book gradually wrought 
the transformation of Hitler's antisemitism evident in his speeches after 
April 1920, as Schubert and Dickmann suggest. 
(17) 
However, the view that 
Hitler was ignornantof the world conspiracy theory at the beginning of 
1920 is a little difficult to accept. Such theories had been circulating 
in antisemitic circles throughout 1919 and, as has been seen, Eckart had 
published extracts from a document very similar to the Protocols of the 
Eldersaf Zion in October 1919 and had previewed the 'Protocols' in December 
1919 in x. 
(18) 
Furthermore, Alfred Rosenberg asserted in a later aide- 
memoire that "Adolf Hitler had already read Dietrich EcKart's periodical" 
and knew of his own articles in it before they met at the end of 1919. 
(19) 
It would, therefore, have been quite remarkable if Hitler had not been 
aware at least of the alleged Jewish manipulation of the Bolshevik Revolution. 
One final explanation is worth exploring; namely that Hitler was fully 
briefed on the subversive activities of the Jews around the world at the 
beginning of 1920 and that he made full use of this potent propaganda material 
in his early speeches. The problem is that the reports which we have of these 
speeches drawn up by the Munich Police or Reichwehr observers do not reveal 
this. It should be remembered that these reports are very incomplete 
records of what Hitler said; they are short accounts of speeches lasting 
in fact between one and two hours and what was recorded depended very much 
on the interests of the recorder. 
(20) 
The latter argument should not, 
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perhaps, be carried too far. The police observer at the DAP meeting on 
24 February 1920 was evidently waiting for antisemitic comments from 
Dr. Johannes Dingfelder, a physician and racist writer, who delivered 
the opening address, but was disappointed because, as he noted, "the word 
Jew never came into his mouth". 
(21) 
This might suggest, therefore, that 
the political intelligence services were on the look-out for expressions of 
antisemitic prejudices. Also it should be remembered that after April 1920 
referencesto the role of international Jewry were recorded in similar 
reports. Even so doubts about the nature of the accounts of his earlier 
speeches should prevent confident assertions about what Hitler did not say. 
In addition one piece of evidence from February 1920, in fact, suggests 
that the DAP was already exploiting the propaganda value of the international 
Jewish menace and the supposed world conspiracy. This is a neglected 
report of a speech by Dietrich Eckart to the DAP on 5 February 1920 on the 
subject of "German Communism". "The links between the German type of 
communism and the desires of the Jews for world-rule through capitalism 
are so clearly evident", Eckart claimed, "that it is not possible to 
avoid referring to them. " 
(22) 
"All in all", he continued, "the communism 
fomented by the agitation of foreign alien races is in the last resort 
merely the means of realizing the goals of the supra-state plans of world 
capitalism. " The German Workers' Party was, therefore, already making 
propaganda out of the alleged collaboration between 'Jewish' communism and 
'Jewish' capitalism - the pivot of the conspiracy theory - nearly three 
weeks before the proclamation of the party programme and over two months 
before Hitler's first recorded and unequivocal invocation of the Jewish 
'factor' in international diplomacy. 
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Eckart's emphasis is, however, undoubtedly on the threat from "German 
Communism" to the German state so, perhaps, the most judicious, if tentative, 
conclusion to be drawn, since Hitler seems at this time to have shared 
Eckart's preoccupation with the domestic threat from communism, 
(23) 
is that 
Hitler was well acquainted with the international dimensions of the Jewish 
question early in 1920 but was afraid of reinforcing the very internation- 
alist trends which he saw as causing Germany's current problems. And, 
perhaps, it was the widespread interest generated by the publication of the 
'Protocols' and their serialization by several right-wing journals which 
convinced Hitler after April 1920 that more political capital was to be 
made out of exploiting the world-wide Jewish menace. Ultimately Hitler 
and his party could not ignore the appeal of an all-embracing conspiracy 
theory. 
If we accept that the publication of the 'Protocols' may have encouraged 
Hitler to exploit the supposed Jewish world conspiracy as propaganda for the 
Nazi cause, this does not mean that the ideas which Hitler now espoused were 
taken from the 'Protocols'. We should, therefore, examine the nature of 
Hitler's revised antisemitic philosophy and the likely origin of the 
revisions. 
It should be stressed again at the outset that the fragmentary records of many 
of his speeches do not permit a full analysis of the change in Hitler's 
outlook. Nonetheless, on 17 April 1920 Hitler referred to two components 
of the Jewish world conspiracy - "the international Jewish press concern", 
which had prevented an understanding between Russia and Germany and eventually 
turned the whole world against "the model German state" in 1914, and 
"international high finance", which had robbed Germany of victory. 
(24) 
On 
31 May Hitler declared that the ultimate aim of Jewry was to destroy 
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individual nations and to establish its own world-rule. 
(25) 
On 27 July, 
Hitler argued that the Jews were already in power in Bolshevik Russia. 
(26) 
These isolated recorded comments, whilst showing Hitler's awareness of the 
supposed goal of Jewish activity and some of their tactics, do not reveal 
whether Hitler as yet recognised how the various component parts of the 
Jewish conspiracy were subtly connected. 
On 13 August 1920, however, he delivered a speech entitled "Why are we 
antisemites? ", a fairly full account of which has survived and which 
succinctly illustrates the evolution of Hitler's antisemitism since his 
letter to Gemlich in September 1919. He began by establishing the differences 
between the Aryan and the Jew; the Aryan, hard-working, racially pure, 
spiritually vibrant and possessing state-building capacity was "the father 
of all later culture"; the Jew, work-shy, racially weak, and lacking 
spiritual or cultural creativity was materialistic, parasitic and, above all, 
instinctly driven to destroy other states. 
(27) 
Conflict between the 
Aryan and the Jew was, therefore, inevitable. Whilst the emphasis on 
Aryan qualities was a novel departure at least compared to the letter to 
Gemlich, this list of Jewish characteristics is a familiar one. 
He went on, however, to expose the weapons and tactics which the Jews used 
to destroy other states. The first major weapon was international (loan) 
capitalism; its aim, according to Hitler, was to undermine the work ethic 
and to destroy national economics. "The Jew", Hitler revealed, "had 
learned how to acquire wealth without lifting a finger, without sweat and 
blood, by means of money-lending at huge rates of interest and of the 
manipulation of stock exchanges. In short they accumulated loan and stock 
exchange capital. " 
(28) 
The Influence of Gottfried Feder's ideas on 'interest 
slavery' is unmistakeable here, but, unlike Feder, Hitler identified the 
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money-lenders with a particular race or races. "Interest slavery", he 
declared on another occasion, "must be broken; we are fighting the races 
who are the representatives of money. , 
(29) 
However, Hitler did draw a 
distinction - one carefully elaborated by Feder in his manifesto on the 
breaking of the slavery of interest in 1919 - between 'industrial' capital and 
'loan' or 'finance' capital. 
(30) 
'Industrial capital' - money invested 
in tools, places of work and factories and working capital to tide a business 
through bad times - was, in Hitler's view, indispensable to production and 
a sound economy and should not be attacked. 
(31) 
This had been the mistake 
of the past according to Hitler; attention had been diverted from the real 
enemy - 'loan' or 'finance' capital. This was an international form of 
capital primarily "because its bearers, the Jews, are international by 
their dispersal over the whole world'and it worked to "destroy whole 
states, annihilate whole cultures, to neutralize national industries, not in 
order to socialize them but to throw everything in to the jaws of 
international capitalism". 
(32) 
So international capitalism was one weapon used by the Jews to realize 
their ambition to rule the world; it undermined the economic independence 
of individual nations. Significantly, Hitler stressed that the new 
international element in the anti-Jewish struggle did not require an inter- 
national response; this would be foolhardy since the Jews were behind 
international movements as well. Hitler was convinced that "one cannot 
put out fire with fire but only with water, that one will only break 
international capital, which belongs to the international Jew, by national 
strength". 
(33) 
Once adopted, the international dimension to the DAP's 
antisemitism was evidently not allowed to dilute the demand for a national 
revival and clearly Hitler was sensitive to the danger of a campaign 
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directed against an international threat and this may explain his initial 
reticence about utilizing the Jewish world conspiracy. 
The second tactic of the Jewish conspiracy which Hitler identified in his 
speech on 13 August was internal subversion; its aim was to weaken the national 
purity of a people which was the source of its strength: "in order to be 
able to organize, build up, and maintain his definitive world-rule", the 
Jew needed, Hitler explained, "the lowering of the racial level of other 
peoples so that he as the only racially pure (one) is able in the last 
resort to rule over. all the others". 
(34) 
The methods used to achieve 
this were many: the control of food supply via trade enabled the Jews to 
cause famine; they encouraged moral laxity and "the destruction of prod- 
uctivity and... when necessary, of the people's means of production as 
well". This, Hitler claimed, had happened in Russia, where the Bolshevik 
Revolution had brought the Jews to power; the factories had been destroyed 
not because they were not needed anymore but because they were. Another 
method was to destroy national culture; this, Hitler pointed out 
elsewhere, had also been attempted in Russia with "the mass murder of the 
Intelligentsia". 
(35) 
A final way of destroying national unity was by 
fostering class conflict; under the guise of extending democracy, the Jews 
would divide and rule a people. Once again, Russia provided the evidence. 
(36) 
In short, therefore, the two main weapons in the Jewish armoury were inter- 
national capitalism and world-wide revolution: "the revolutionary Jew makes 
the revolution and destroys everything", as Hitler once put it, "the bank 
Jew then rebuilds in order to fill his pockets". 
(37) 
The link between 
Jewish-led revolution and international capitalism was most obvious in 
post-revolutionary Russia; "it was the intention of Jewish high finance to 
ruin Russia completely in order to increase profits". 
(38) 
But the problem 
was not confined to Russia: "the Jew sits in Russia exactly as in Berlin or 
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Vienna, 80 long as capital is still in the hands of this race, there can 
be no question of reconstruction because the Jews are working hand in 
hand with the international capitalists, who are likewise Jews and (they) 
sell out us Germans". 
(39) 
By the end of 1920 Hitler had evidently adopted the idea of a Jewish world 
conspiracy. It is true that many of Hitler's notions about the Jews - 
their lack of creativity, materialism, their destructiveness - can be 
traced back to the antisemitic writings such as those of Heinrich Class. (40) 
The difference was that in 1920 Hitler now identified an orchestrated plan 
behind Jewish activities whereas Class(and Hitler too in 1919), had regarded 
them as instinctive. This brings us to the crucial question: where did 
Hitler get these ideas from? 
It is interesting to note that Class's first reaction to the apparent 
change in Hitler's attitude on antisemitism as revealed in the party prog- 
ramme was to suspect that "Dietrich Eckart's influence had been decisive". 
(41) 
Indeed, point 24 of the programme seemed to echo Eckart's own 'spiritual' 
antisemitism when it stated that the party "is fighting the Jewish- 
materialistic spirit in and around us". 
(42) 
One historian has objected 
that, according to Eckart's own account, his relationship with Hitler grew 
closer only during the Kapp putsch in March 1920 and that therefore Eckart 
could not have influenced Hitler's antisemitism. 
(43) 
However, this ignores 
the fact that Hitler knew of Eckart's work in Aid and indeed knew Eckart 
well enough at the end of 1919 for the latter to arrange an introduction 
for Alfred Rosenberg in his home. Whilst it would be wrong to suggest, 'as 
Eckart's biographer has done, 
(44) 
that he ' pushed' Hitler into satisemitism 
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(Hitler needed no external propulsion in that direction), it is possible 
that Eckart may have exerted some influence over Hitler and Drexler - 
the two main authors of the party programme. 
(45) 
Eckart had spoken on at 
least two occasions prior to 24 February 1920 at DAP meetings and on 
5 February, as has been seen, he delivered a lecture on 'German 
Communism' which contained the main ingredients of the conspiracy theory - 
the secret manipulators, the power of the Jewish press, and the chaotic 
state of Russia as an example of the impact of direct 'Jewish' rule were 
all mentioned. 
(46) 
Eckart's influence on the DAP should not therefore 
be discounted. 
Nevertheless other evidence suggests that there can be little doubt that 
Hitler's ideas on Jewish machinations bore the imprint of Alfred Rosenberg, 
who took a special interest in uncovering various facets of the Jewish 
conspiracy. It would be erroneous to suggest that Rosenberg supplied 
Hitler with all his ideas since Hitler probably kept abreast of current 
antisemitic literature in general at the time, as well as the output of 
Eckart and Feder. We have already referred to Hitler's adoption of Feder's 
views on interest-slavery, 
(47) 
but it is, Y, perhaps, significant that 
Hitler chose to follow Rosenberg's line, ascribing loan capitalism to the 
influence of the Jews and that he chose to use Rosenberg's favourite 
euphemism for the powers of world-wide high finance "the black-red-gold 
international. " 
(48) 
This, of course, may be pure coincidence. However, it is very probable 
that Hitler drew on Rosenberg's revelations about the 'Jewish' Bolshevik 
Revolution and the involvement of the Freemasons in Jewish plans and, perhaps, 
also on Rosenberg's interpretation of Zionism. Hitler argued that Bolshevism 
was "completely a Jewish affair" 
(49) 
and held the Jews entirely 
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responsible for the famine and misery from which the Russian people were 
currently suffering. 
(50 
Almost certainly, Hitler relied for information 
about Russia on the reports written by Alfred Rosenberg for Agd in 1919 
and 1920. 
(51) 
By the middle of 1920, Hitler had also accepted Rosenberg's explanation 
of how the Jewish conspiracy was being coordinated inside Russia; as he 
argued in his 'fundamental speech' on antisemitism on 13 August 1920, 
behind the few Jewish millionaires who were running the state stood 
"another organization, which is not even inside the state: the 'Alliance 
israelite' and its grandiose propaganda organization and driving force 
... Freemasonry". 
(52) 
Though Rosenberg was, by no means, the only anti- 
Semite to investigate these organizations, Hitler's frequent contact with 
Rosenberg and his knowledge of the latter's writing make Rosenberg the 
likely source of these ideas. 
(53) 
On the Issue of Zionism, it is again quite possible that Hitler had merely 
imbibed Rosenberg's arguments first aired in Agdd in 1919. It was, of 
course, difficult for Hitler to avoid taking a stance on the issue of 
Zionism since he was constantly advocating the expulsion of the Jews from 
Germany. This, of course, raised the question of basic human rights, for 
which Hitler had a suitable answer: "he (the Jew) ought to seek these 
where he belongs in his own state in Palestine". 
(54) 
So, like Rosenberg, 
Hitler supported the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine but, in 
common with Eckart too, he doubted the ability of the Jews to create a 
viable state of their own. In view of the Jews' alleged lack of creative 
ability, Hitler believed that the attempt to erect such a state would be 
"nothing more than a comedy". 
(55) 
Were it to succeed, however, it would 
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be an "academy for international dirty tricks" and a centre for the 
direction of Jewish affairs. 
(56) 
Not only did Hitler endorse Rosenberg's 
qualified and expedient approval of zionist aspirations, he also attempted 
to explain away the apparent contradiction between this evidence of Jewish 
nationalism and the alleged Jewish commitment to internationalism in the 
same way as Rosenberg: 
"the Jew exists 9S a state within a state... and 
nevertheless represents the most nationalistic 
race. Nationalism and religion complement one 
another and push him towards world-rule. " (57) 
Like Rosenberg, Hitler believed, therefore, that Zionism was merely a cover 
for aspirations of a more international if not global nature. There is 
no indication that Hitler had accepted Eckart's rather more esoteric view 
that Zionism had to be combatted since the cohabitation of Jews and Gentiles 
was necessary to preserve the national order. 
It seems probable, therefore, that the international dimension to Hitler's 
antisemitism may have derived as much from the work of Alfred Rosenberg 
as from the publication of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Indeed, the 
contribution of Alfred Rosenberg to the evolution of the entire Nazi 
Weltanschauung seems to have been seriously underestimated by recent 
historians. 
(58) 
Rosenberg's later career in the Third Reich may have been 
relatively inconspicuous; he failed in his ambition to become German 
Foreign Minister in the 1930s and was not a particularly successful 
Governor-General of the Eastern Occupied Territories during the Russian 
campaign. But this did not mean that in the earliest years of the party's 
existence he was a mere'disciple' of Hitler. 
Indeed, such an assessment flatly contradicts the view of well-informed 
contemporaries, whether friendly, hostile, or indifferent to Rosenberg. Kurt 
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LUdecke, who joined the party in 1922 and later became a friend of 
Rosenberg's, was advised by Hitler to get to know Rosenberg better; "he 
is the only man whom I always listen to. He is a thinker. His large 
conception of foreign policy will interest you. " 
(59) 
At the other extreme, 
Ernst Hanfstängl, a savage critic of Rosenberg in party circles, bemoaned 
the fact that "Rosenberg wielded tremendous influence over Hitler and his 
associates when it came to propagating this anti-bolshevist, anti-Russian 
line. "(60 Even the Berlin Police President, who in 1931 requested further 
information on Rosenberg's activities at the end of the First World 
War, formed the same impression: "Rosenberg is said to exert a strong 
police had in fact been influence on Hitler. " 
(61) 
The interest of the 
roused by a claim made by Otto Strasser, another of Rosenberg's opponents 
Mithin party circles that the young Baltic German had spent the latter months 
of the war in Paris engaged in espionage for the Entente powers. 
(62) 
The 
reason for this attempt by his own party colleagues to discredit Rosenberg 
was clear b the (unnamed) police investigator at the time; they acted, he 
claimed "out of envy of Rosenberg's influence on Hitler". 
(63) 
That party 
colleagues should stoop so low indicates the apparent strength of Rosenberg's 
hold over Hitler during the Kampfzeit. The relationship between the two 
men, therefore, merits close investigation. 
When the two men first met is a little difficult to date accurately. 
Rosenberg's memoirs refer to a meeting at Eckart's house at a time when 
Hitler had already delivered several speeches to the DAP. 
(64) 
However, 
a short aide-memoire written by Rosenberg in 1934 is more specific. 
According to this, Rosenberg first heard Hitler's name mentioned when 
Eckart had agreed to deliver a speech on "Bolshevism and the Jewish Question" 
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to the DAP in the autumn of 1919. 
(65) 
He did not actually see Hitler 
until the latter spoke at the 'Zum deutschen Reich' tavern on 10 December 
1919 and it was "shortly afterwards" that Rosenberg met Hitler for the first 
time with a small circle of party colleagues at Eckart's house. On the 
strength of these two encounters with Hitler, Rosenberg decided in December 
1919 to join Hitler's cause. As he wrote in 1934; "so this first 
acquaintance with Adolf Hitler as a speaker and then the further meeting 
shortly afterwards became for me the decisive turning-point of my political 
and intellectual life, the concrete affirmation of that which had once 
driven me thousands of kilometers from my home". 
(66) 
In his memoirs written under the shadow of the gallows at Nuremberg, 
Rosenberg claimed, rather more honestly perhaps, that he had not been very 
impressed by his first discussion with Hitler at Eckart's house but it did 
lead to a subject which interested them both; they had "a not very 
detailed conversation about the Bolshevik danger ". 
(67) 
Rosenberg 
recognised at their first meeting a remarkable similarity between their 
political ideas: "it only needed a few words to discover that in a most 
remarkable way (our) entire outlooks coincided so much that there were 
really no problems of substance". 
(68) 
Both were perhaps attracted to each 
other as 'self-taught' men; as Rosenberg put it later, "there, I found 
suddenly in another man the same opinions which I had formed through study 
in various areas". 
(69) 
Even in his memoirs, Rosenberg was still intrigued 
by the degree of agreement between Adolf Hitler and himself; they did, he 
admitted, have their "small controversies" but it was "uncanny how similar 
our opinions frequently were". 
(70) 
He remembered Hitler remarking after 
reading Rosenberg's notes for a speech at a party conference that "this is 
as much like mine as if we compared notes beforehand". 
(71) 
The cynic might 
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put down this similarity of ideas to mutual intellectual impoverishment 
but it was this cerebral compatibility which cemented the relationship 
between Hitler and Rosenberg in the Kampfzeit. Ideological affinity, 
however, did not breed intimate friendship or personal warmth between the 
two men, probably because Rosenberg was too serious and introverted for 
Hitler (possibly even too much like Hitler in some ways); Hitler seemed to 
prefer the company of more light-hearted acquaintances, men of the mould of 
Eckart or Max von Scheubner-Richter, a soldier of fortune, who entered 
Nazi circles in 1921. Hence, as Rosenberg rather bitterly remarked in 1945, 
Hitler "valued me highly, but he did not love me". 
(72) 
Hitler's respect for Rosenberg was the result of the latter's tireless 
contribution to the ideology of the party which he chose to join late in 
1919. During 1920, Rosenberg was busy publishing his first pamphlet and 
writing two more. 
(73) 
At the same time, he was contributing articles to 
Eckart's Auf gut deutsch and producing the journal himself "whenever the 
idleness of the poet came over Eckart and he felt incapable of political 
work". 
(? 4) 
When the NSDAP managed to purchase its own newspaper at the end 
of 1920, Rosenberg initially contributed only an occasional article (the 
first being in February 1921) because of his work for Agd. 
(75) 
However, 
once Eckart abandoned his own journal recommending its readership to transfer 
their allegiance to the VB and Eckart became its editor in chief with 
Rosenberg working as an assistant, very soon the cycle of events on Agd 
repeated itself: Eckart found himself incapable of sustained periods of 
regular work aid Rosenberg "relieved him, in practice, of the entire editorial 
work-load". 
(76) 
During 1923 Eckart's attendance at the VB offices in the 
Schellingstrasse in Munich became so intermittent that Hitler declared that 
since Rosenberg was doing all the work he should get all the credit; 
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accordingly "on 10 March 1923 he became the editor responsible for 
politics in the VB". 
(77) 
As Rosenberg was deeply involved in the day-to-day running of the VB, he 
was particularly well placed to exert considerable influence on the 
interpretation of current events. He did not shirk his responsibilities, 
accepting regular punishment in the form of fines or imprisonment meted 
out by the local courts for libellous articles published in the paper. 
(78) 
It has, of course, to be admitted that there were limits to Rosenberg's 
value to the party. He delivered relatively few speeches to Nazi gatherings 
since he evidently lacked Hitler's ability to sense the mood of his 
audience; his first talk at the Rosenheim Ortsgruppe taught him that 
religion (and in particular Jesuitism) was far too sensitive an issue to 
discuss in Bavaria. 
(79) 
Also Rosenberg was not a rousing public speaker in 
the mould of Hitler or Hermann Esser. In June 1922 the VB reported on 
several speeches by party officials but tactfully commented that Rosenberg's 
was "a longer, tactical lecture dealing with the fundamentals". 
(80) 
Another 
possible reason for Rosenberg's reluctance to speak in public was his desire 
to keep a low profile until he gained German citizenship; as he commented 
in his memoirs, "until then (February 1923) I could easily have been deported 
as an 'undesirable alien' ". 
(81) 
How serious a threat this was is difficult 
to establish, but Rosenberg, in retrospect, made a lot of it, claiming that 
on receiving German citizenship he "called Eckart and told him that ... all 
our former caution was now superfluous". 
(82) 
Whatever the truth of this, 
Rosenberg's talent evidently did not lie in oratory but rather in the day- 
to-day political editorship of the VB and in the painstaking culling of 
useful snippets of antisemitic information from folkish literature and 
current affairs. 
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Nevertheless, on the eve of his arrest following the failure of the Munich 
putsch, Hitler sent Rosenberg a note which read quite simply: "Dear 
Rosenberg, lead the movement from now on. " 
(83) 
The reasons for Rosenberg's 
selection as party leader have intrigued historians ever since. Many have 
assumed that Rosenberg was chosen because he would not be a serious rival to 
Hitler himself when he returned after a short imprisonment. 
(84) 
Robert 
Cecil, Rosenberg's latest biographer, however, has argued that, since 
Hitler could not have anticipated a prison sentence of barely a year, Rosenberg 
may have been chosen on merit, admittedly given that the Munich putsch had 
narrowed Hitler's options considerably. 
(85 
Now it has to be conceded 
that Hitler could not have predicted how leniently he would be treated by the 
German courts but the idea that Rosenberg was selected on merit to lead 
the rump of the Nazi Party is difficult to accept. Hitler had little choice; 
Eckart's health was deteriorating rapidly; Scheubner-Richter had been killed 
during the putsch; Ernst Rdhm was in hiding; and Herman Esser and Hermann 
Goering had fled the country. 
(86) 
Furthermore, Hitler must have realized 
that Rosenberg had in Esser and Ernst Hanfstingl strong jealous critics 
within the party. 
(87) 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Hitler must 
have appreciated that Rosenberg did not possess the qualities of leadership; 
his undoubted achievements as political editor of the VB and his status 
as resident party philosopher did not equip him for party leadership. He 
was aloof and uncharismatic and, what is more, as Rosenberg acknowledged 
later, totally ignorant of "questions of an organizational nature". 
(88) 
Hitler's appointment of Rosenberg was largely the product of necessity; 
Hitler had little choice but to commit the movement to a solid, competent, 
but uninspired leadership and hope it might survive his imprisonment. 
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Rosenberg, of course, proved unequal to the task of keeping the banned 
party together. This was partly because Hitler undermined Rosenberg's position, 
receiving and encouraging visits from Rosenberg's rivals in Landsberg, 
denouncing Rosenberg's decision to contest the Landtag and Reichstag 
elections in 1924 and the suggested fusion of the rump of the Nazi Party 
with the Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei, vhich finally led to Rosenberg's 
relinquishing the party leadership. 
(89) 
Nevertheless, Hitler still valued 
Rosenberg's collaboration; in April 1925, Hitler wrote to Rosenberg to 
persuade him not to proceed with libel actions against his two rivals, 
Esser and Hanfsthngl, and though Hitler did have this ulterior motive for 
flattering Rosenberg, the letter is worth quoting: 
"I know you, Herr Rosenberg, and regard you not only as 
one of the most valuable collaborators with our movement, 
chief editor of my former VB, to whom was due the main 
share in developing the paper so far as content was concerned, 
but also a man of whose integrity of personal intention 
I am absolutely convinced. In the difficult period in 
which, unexpectedly and without explanation, you took 
over the leadership of the movement, you tried to advance 
the cause of the movement as much as possible - with me, 
this conviction goes without saying; in the process, 
mistakes have crept in, as can happen with you as with 
anyone else. But it is not my object to give an opinion 
on mistakes, but solely on intentions and goodwill. For 
this I must give you the highest credit in everything. " (90) 
For a man who was ever grudging in his praise of others, this letter bears 
witness to the contribution which Hitler felt Rosenberg had made to the 
party in the period 1921-25. Evident in the letter, also, is a certain 
coolness and formality which characterized their relationship. Hitler 
needed Rosenberg's collaboration but did not have to make a friend of him. 
Rosenberg's contribution to the Nazi Party was, therefore, limited to the 
development of its ideology but the full extent of Hitler's indebtedness 
to Rosenberg in matters of ideology win become clearer as we now examine the 
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impact of the ideological transformation of 1920 on Nazi thinking on foreign 
affairs (and later when we trace the development of Hitler's alliance 
strategy). 
The usefulness of the alleged world-wide Jewish conspiracy to Nazi propagandists 
should not be underestimated. It enabled Hitler and others to utilize current 
events abroad in their antisemitic campaign; it enabled them to criticize 
the diplomacy of successive Weimar governments; and, finally, and perhaps 
most important, it enabled them to interpret foreign affairs for their 
followers. Put another way, Nazi propagandists were able to give the 
impression that the Nazi Party had a foreign policy of its own (even when 
it did not). Pan-German analyses of pre-war diplomatic change were of 
limited use in formulating a day-to-day response to postwar developments; the 
Jewish world conspiracy provided an adaptable frame of reference. 
Jewish influence in foreign affairs could, as Rosenberg had explained in 
1919, be traced at several different points and, as 1920 wore on, Hitler began 
consciously or otherwise, to illustrate these in his speeches. At a national 
level, the Jews were shown to be impeding foreign policies dictated by 
national interest and the popular will, for example, on 6 July Hitler 
claimed that "all Germans want the Anschluss, only the Jews do not because 
otherwise too many antisemites would come into the Reichstag". 
(91) 
In 
the same speech Hitler complained bitterly about the Jews who were representing 
Germans at the Spa conference. 
(92) 
At an international level, the Jews 
were manipulating internationalist ideas to their own advantage: "the 
League of Nations", Hitler claimed in June, "is there only to guarantee 
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the relentless execution of this 'peace' which means the enslavement 
of the German people under the authority of international world- 
capitalism". 
(93) 
These 'revelations' about the Jewish manipulation of 
foreign affairs were, of course, very much in line with Rosenberg's 
earlier analysis in x. 
(94) 
But did such observations bring about any real change in Hitler's outlook? 
Were the goals of his foreign policy or his view of the major powers 
fundamentally altered by the revelation of the hidden hand of international 
Jewry in world affairs? 
Turning firstly to Hitler's foreign policy goals, it has been suggested 
recently that Hitler began to harbour dreams of eventual German world conquest 
in 1920 "as a reaction against Jewry's presumed goal of world-rule". 
(95) 
In other words, his own dreams of German "world-rule" were fired by the 
propaganda about similar Jewish ambitions. This seems to imply that Hitler 
may have mapped out his long-term goals for Germany before he formulated 
his intermediate goals of European hegemony and "the claim to world-rule 
he hid behind the fight against Jewry with its supposed striving for world- 
rule". 
(96) 
This is a neat and attractive theory, which acknowledges the 
significance of the antisemitic ideology to Hitler's foreign policy. 
Unfortunately it is pure speculation. 
There is in fact no evidence to suggest that in 1920 Hitler's crusade against 
Jewish imperialism concealed his own dreams of world conquest. All one 
can say with certainty is that by the end of 1920 Hitler had developed 
a two-stage strategy for defeating the Jewish menace: firstly, a new 
revitalizedGermany was to eradicate the power of the Jews inside Germany, 
then the struggle was to be carried out beyond Germany's frontiers. This 
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latter stage, by which the Jews would be rendered harmless, would 
certainly be carried out through the medium of an imperialistic foreign 
policy, but whether the result was to be a German world-dominion or 
simply the re-emergence of Germany as a 'world power' (amongst others) is 
nowhere made clear at this time. 
(97) 
On 13 August in his 'fundamental 
speech' on antisemitism, Hitler explained that "should we succeed (in 
the struggle against Jewry), and of that we are convinced, then we may 
perish wholly destitute - we will nevertheless have assisted in the greatest 
movement, which will now stretch over Europe and the whole world". 
(98) 
One might read into the word "assist" the idea that Germany would not be 
alone in the struggle and the possibility of Germany "perishing" (though 
undoubtedly included in part for purposes of rhetoric) did not suggest 
that German world domination would result from the defeat of the Jews. 
So the only legitimate conclusion to be drawn from the evidence available 
is that the introduction of an international dimension to Hitler's anti- 
semitism, though pregnant with possibilities, did not alter his basic 
foreign policy goals. Indeed, the goals as outlined in the party programme 
were treated after the spring of 1920 as part of the ideological struggle 
against Jewry. 
As far as the first goal of the programme - that is the creation of a 
Grossdeutschland - was concerned, the Jews in Germany were now seen by 
Hitler as opponents of the Anschluss with Austria. 
(99) 
As Hitler described 
Austria as being "almost completely in the hands of international high 
finance", the need to effect the Anschluss was even more urgent. 
(100) 
The Anschluss was, of course, only the first stage in the re-creation of a 
German Empire which would "stretch from Memel to Bratislava and from 
Köni®berg to Strasbourg". 
(101) 
Significantly, Hitler now labelled the 
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various separatist schemes mooted in 1920 as "Jewish humbug"; that is as 
Jewish attempts to destroy German unity in accordance with the principle 
of divide and rule. 
(102) 
Clearly the acceptance of an antisemitic world- 
view did not alter but merely complemented Hitler's basic Pan-German 
aspirations. 
Also, in accordance with the second and third points of the Party Programme, 
Hitler continued to demand the dismantling of the Versailles Settlement 
and the return of Germany's colonies. 
(103) 
It is interesting to note that 
the post-war settlement was now portrayed as part of the Jewish intrigues 
against Germany; reparations payments were designed to keep Germany 
permanently in debt, as Hitler explained: "international capitalism only 
wants to use us as a source of interest, and to make us slaves". 
(104) 
The 
struggle against the Jews thus became an integral part of Hitler's scheme 
to revive Germany's fortunes abroad; as he put it in May 1920: 
"(The) precondition mr any German recovery is however 
(the) revision of the peace, (the) precondition for 
this is (the) regeneration of our internal national 
solidarity. (This) can only be achieved by the struggle 
against the destroyers (Jews). " (105) 
However, Wolfgang Horn has argued that the influx of ideas about an 
international Jewish conspiracy caused not just a revision of Hitler's 
attitude towards foreign affairs but brought about a complete volte-face. 
Ideology, so Horn argued, achieved pre-eminence over power politics in 
Hitler's assessment of foreign relations. 
(106) 
One can best examine this 
claim by tracing the impact of ideological considerations on Hitler's 
appraisal of individual nations. It is an obvious point, but one which 
needs to be made, that the implications of the 'world conspiracy' were 
global; in theory, at least, therefore, the conspiracy affected all the 
major powers, not just Bolshevik Russia which was overtly (in Hitler's eyes 
at any rate) in Jewish hands. On 22 September 1920, for example, Hitler 
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described the First World War as "nothing more than the endeavour on the 
part of international loan capitalism to destroy the national economy in 
Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, in order to make these countries 
colonies of international interest capital". 
(107) 
On the other hand, 
those countries which Hitler regarded as Germany's deadly enemies - Britain, 
France, and America - were, significantly, already "practically ruled" by 
international loan capitalism in Hitler's view. 
(108) 
Hence every nation 
was at risk; some had already succumbed, others were still under attack. 
But did this identification of a world-wide Jewish 'threat' seriously 
modify Hitler's views on the attitude of foreign powers or did he cynically 
adapt the conspiracy theory to reinforce his earlier convictions which were 
based on power political considerations? 
Despite his reference to the control which finance capitalism exerted over 
Britain, France, and America, there is little to suggest that Hitler's 
view of these 'deadly enemies' had altered. 
Hitler still combined an implacable hostility towards Britain with a 
sneaking respect for her empire. His main criticism and at the same time 
the quality which he, perhaps secretly, most admired about Britain was that 
her strength was built on the ruin of other states; the British Empire was 
built on the suffering of indigenous peoples - the North American Indians 
were destroyed by guns, the Chinese by opium, the Indians by mass murder 
and the Boers by concentration camps. 
(109) 
In each case, 'Might made Right', 
a principle with which Hitler had complete sympathy; but this same 
British might could, of course, also be applied against Germany. England, 
"the expert destroyer of the health of nations", had been doing just that 
in the First World War; the conclusion of the peace, so Hitler claimed in 
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November 1920, made it clear that the object of the war had been "the 
economic and political annihilation of Germany". 
110) 
Hitler identified 
no ideological motive behind British policy - it was not explained in 
terms of Jewish machinations - but he did observe that the destructiveness 
of the British mirrored that of the Jews, referring to the British on one 
occasion as "almost a second Jewry". 
(111) 
This, of course, was the worst 
possible insult and indicates a deepening hostility towards England and 
heralded his adoption of the idea of an identity of interest between British 
and Jewish imperialism, which Rosenberg had already been at pains to stress. 
(112) 
However, Hitler's attitude towards England seems still to have been based 
primarily on a historical analysis of her desire to remain the foremost power 
in the world; the main cause of Anglo-German hostility, in Hitler's view, 
was the rise of Germany as a commercial and colonial rival to Britain. 
(113) 
Hitler's attitude to France also remained unaffected by the ideological 
revision of 1920. France and Germany were eternal enemies for purely 
tactical reasons: the French wanted to control the left bank of the Rhine 
and were willing to espouse any cause, as for example, that of separatist 
movements inside Germany, to achieve this goal; on one occasion he claimed 
that the French Chamber of Deputies had raised 300 million francs to finance 
German separatists. 
(114) 
On other occasions, he did ascribe precisely the 
same tactics of 'divide and rule' to the Jews, but once again Hitler did 
not at this stage attribute French policy to Jewish influence in Paris, but 
simply and solely to French Weltpolitik, which aimed to destroy Germany. 
(115) 
The uncovering of a Jewish world conspiracy had little impact also on 
Hitler's assessment of America, the third of Germany's deadly enemies, since 
American foreign policy had Lng been associated with the power of high 
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finance in folkish circles. Hitler had argued in December 1919, like the 
Pan-Germans before him, that America had intervened in the First World War 
not because of Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare but 
"as the land of money... in order not to lose her loaned wealth". 
(116) 
it 
was a small step for Hitler to lambast President Wilson as "the represent- 
ation of high finance", whose conciliatory Fourteen Points had been 
deliberately designed to deceive the German people. 
(117) 
Clearly, America 
already had a well-defined place in Hitler's outlook as a result of folkish 
propaganda about America before and during the war. After the war, Germany's 
need for American loans to finance her recovery provided plentiful 
ammunition for Hitler's attacks on 'interest-slavery'; on one occasion, he 
estimated that "new loans from America, which are worth only 1300 milliard 
(marks), (would) devour 65 milliard in interest". 
(118) 
so initially at least, Hitler's view of the three powers, whom he con- 
sidered to be Germany's most clear-cut opponents, seemed to have been little 
affected by the adoption of a more conspiratorial antisemitic world-view. 
But what of the powers whom Hitler considered to have become Germany's 
enemies only because of the failings of German diplomacy before the First 
World War? 
Italy had joined the Entente powers against Germany, Hitler argued, only 
because of her hostility to Germany's ally, Austro-Hungary. 
(119) 
Italy and 
Germany had no conflicting interests before the war and, after it, they 
shared an intense antipathy towards the Versailles Settlement. In 1920 
at any rate, Hitler did not produce any ideological motive to justify 
his support for future Italo-German collaboration. The same applied to 
Japan; Hitler believed that before the war Japanese Weltpolitik, which 
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consisted of establishing her own predominance in East Asia by excluding 
the white races, did not conflict with Germany's ambitions. 
(120) 
In 1920 
Hitler did not publicly advocate German-Japanese collaboration nor did 
he appear to trace a Jewish factor in Japanese policy-making. 
The situation is far more complex with regard to Hitler's appraisal of Russia, 
the other power in this category. His view of Russia seems to have undergone 
a very marked ideological revision in thecourse of 1920. Hitler's 
sympathetic treatment of Russian foreign policy has already been noted; in 
December 1919, he claimed that Germany and Russia ought to have been 
allies before the war: Russia's policy of Asiatic conquest did not infringe 
upon German interests and her search for an outlet to the sea ought not 
to have brought her into conflict with Germany if German diplomats had 
not shortsightedly discontinued Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty with the 
Russians. 
(121) 
By April 1920, however, Hitler had uncovered another force 
which had kept Germany and Russia apart: "an understanding between us and 
Russia could not take place because the international Jewish press concern 
had prevented it". 
(122) 
This new "insight" was, undoubtedly, the product 
of Hitler's introduction to the world conspiracy theory: Germany and 
Russia, as Alfred Rosenberg had revealed in 1919, were the arch-enemies 
of the Jews and, therefore, these natural allies had to be kept apart and 
indeed the two states had to be destroyed. 
(123) 
The Jewish-led Bolshevik 
Revolution was, therefore, an attempt to subjugate the Russian people, 
a fate which Germany would soon share. Armed with this knowledge, Hitler 
began to devote more and more time to descriptions of Russian conditions in 
his speeches. On 27 April 1920, Hitler talked about Russia "which is 
economically destroyed, about the 12-hour-day there, about Jewish terrorism, 
about the mass murder of the intelligentsia"; the same, Hitler predicted, 
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was likely to happen in Germany. 
124) 
On another occasion he claimed 
that Russia had fallen "into the clutches not of the Russian proletariat 
but of capital". 
(125) 
It is important to emphasize that most of Hitler's 
comments on Bolshevik Russia can be traced to the writings of Alfred 
Rosenberg; Hitler's revised view of Russia seemed to rest on the 'fact', 
constantly reiterated by Rosenberg, that the revolutionary Jews in 
Russia were secretly in league with tie capitalist Jews in the West. 
(126) 
There can be no doubt that this reflected a changed attitude towards Russia 
as a prospective alliance partner. When a brave 'Communist' at a Nazi 
party meeting on 6 July 1920 suggested that Germany should ally with 
England's arch-enemy in Asia, Soviet Russia, Hitler "spoke against Soviet 
Russiaahere hunger and misery reigned". 
(127) 
Later that month, Hitler 
was even more explicit: "an alliance between Russia and Germany can only 
come about when Jewry is removed". 
(128) 
An alliance between the two 
states had therefore in the course of 1920 become conditional on the 
removal of 'Jewish' Bolshevism. 
However, whether this change was entirely the product of Hitler's adoption 
of the world conspiracy theory is difficult to say because Hitler also 
perceived in Russia in 1920 the resurgence of Pan-Slavism, which had, 
he believed, been revived by the Russo-Polish war of 1919-20. This could 
signify the launching of an expansionist phase in Russian foreign policy 
which could endanger German interests; Bolshevism, Hitler suspected, 
was "only a pretext for the construction of a great Russian Empire ". 
(129) 
He was clearly opposed to Russian imperialism; in a meeting on 19 November 
1920, he answered a critic in the audience who blamed the absense of genuine 
reconstruction in Russia on the latter's continuing need to fight her 
enemies, by arguing that "the Russians were responsible for the fact that 
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they had not achieved peace. If they were to bother only about the purely 
Russian areas, then no Ukrainian, no Pole, no Latvian etc. would dare 
to take a stand against Russia. " 
(130) 
So it is possible that Hitler's 
caution about advocating German-Russian collaboration resulted from the 
perceived revitalisation of Russian imperialism. 
On the other hand, Hitler's comments on Pan-Slavism were rarely divorced 
from his ideological broadsides against Bolshevism. 
(131) 
And it seems 
as if Hitler welcomed the revival of Pan-Slavism as a sign of the imminent 
collapse of Bolshevism; in other words, Pan-Slavism might accelerate the 
progress towards Russo-German collaboration. As Hitler argued on 27 July: 
"The nationalistic wave will wash away Bolshevism. An 
alliance with Russia can be of use to us only when we 
are ourselves a single, strong, nationally aware nation. " (132) 
It is possible, therefore, that Hitler was postulating an alliance between 
a future Pan-Slavic Russia which had liquidated Bolshevism and a future 
National Socialist Germany. 
What is clear is that a Russo-German alliance was not possible in the 
circumstances of 1920. Hitler left his audience in no doubt about this 
point: 
"If we wanted today to conclude an alliance with 
Russia, England and France would come along and, with 
the utmost ease, we would be smashed. Germany must 
not be made into a battlefield. " (133) 
Here contemporary diplomatic alignments, the weakness of Russia and 
simple facts of geography seem to underlie Hitler's analysis, but it is 
important also to note the difference between what one might call an emerging 
Nazi Party foreign policy programme and Hitler's comments on contemporary 
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international affairs. A future Russian alliance was certainly conceived 
of as part of a Nazi programme in 1920, but it was not a course recommended 
by Hitler to the diplomats of Weimar Germany. 
Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that Hitler's view of Russia did 
alter in 1920. Several obstacles to the collaboration between Germany and 
Russia, which Hitler had favoured in his analysis of pre-war diplomacy, 
had emerged. It is impossible to say whether the charge was brought about 
solely by revelations about the "Jewish" nature of Bolshevism; certainly 
this possibility cannot be ruled out. The rise of Pan-Slavism, which 
Hitler identified in the Russo-Polish campaign, could have been responsible, 
but then again Hitler appeared to welcome the revival of Russian nationalism 
as a sign that Bolshevism was on the wane, which suggests that Russia's 
Soviet regime was the real stumbling-block to Russo-German collaboration. 
By the end of 1920, therefore, Hitler's aspirations for Germany in foreign 
policy and his attitude towards the major powers were being increasingly 
caught up in an antisemitic world-view, pieced together largely by Alfred 
Rosenberg. The first three points of the party programme - the union of all 
Germans in one empire, the dismantling of the Versailles Settlement, and 
the return of Germany's colonies - were now seen as essential stages in 
the conflict against the two arms of the Jewish world conspiracy - 
international high finance and revolutionary socialism. These strove to 
keep Germans divided, to enslave the German economy through reparations 
and to deprive Germany of world-power status and the land to feed her 
population. 
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It must be stressed that the initial impact of an international antisemitic 
ideology seems to have been to reinforce Hitler's prior conceptions of 
the party's aims and existing prejudices towards the major powers (with the 
exception of Russia). If ideology did revolutionise Hitler's outlook on 
foreign affairs, as Horn argues, then the transformation was incomplete in 
1920. Indeed, it should be emphasised once again that Hitler's first 
priority in 1919-20 was the revival of Germany's internal fortunes. He 
did not want to be side-tracked into discussions of alliance policy; as 
he told an audience in Nuremberg in August 1920, "a people, which relies 
on foreign assistance is lost.... We Germans must decide whether we shall 
be slaves forever or whether we want to be free. For freedom, we need 
in the first instance solidarity in our own land. " 
(134) 
In 1920, therefore, 
Hitler devoted little time to the construction of an alliance strategy. 
Gradually between 1921 and 1924, one would emerge and attention must now 
be given to how and why this occurred and the role (if any) played by 
ideology in this process. 
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4. IDEOLOGY AND ALLIANCE POLICY, 1921-23 
Between 1921 and 1923 Hitler's thoughts on foreign policy crystallised 
into a full-blown alliance strategy. How this occurred is a matter of 
considerable interest to historians. Most have argued, in the first place, 
that Hitler's choice of allies and enemies was not conditioned by ideological 
considerations. Even Eberhard JBckel, who has emphasized the importance 
of ideology in Hitler's Weltanschauung, believes that "the politics of alliance 
were for him (Hitler) always simple power politics,,. 
(1) 
His pupil, Axel Kuhn, 
has reached a similar conclusion. 
(2) 
Secondly, recent historians have 
also maintained that Hitler's decisions to advocate an Anglo-German alliance 
and a campaign of expansion largely at Russia's expense were his alone; not 
only that, but the choice of England as an ally, reversing as it did the 
general trend of previous Nazi propaganda, was, it is claimed, taken in 
the teeth of opposition from within the party; 
(3) 
whilst the anti-Russian 
stance, which had vocal supporters within the party, was also "Hitler's 
solitary decision". 
(4) 
One must question the validity of these unequivocal 
interpretations. Did ideology have no effect on Hitler's choice of allies? 
Were the decisions really Hitler's alone? These are the two key questions, 
which will be examined in this chapter. 
In fact, lhe entire treatment of the evolution of the Nazi Party's 
alliance policy up to the present needs re-examination since previous studies 
have concentrated almost exclusively on the speeches and writings of 
Hitler himself. It is absolutely essential that Hitler's views are placed 
in the context of a representative cross-section d party opinion, for 
Hitler was never its sole spokesman on foreign policy. After January 1921 
when the VB became the official party newspaper, it provided a forum, in 
the absence of any clear 'party line' on foreign affairs, for writers of 
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varying points of view. By careful scrutiny of this paper it is, 
therefore, possible to assess the extent of support for any emergent alliance 
strategy as well as to chart more accurately changes in Nazi attitudes. 
Furthermore, in order to explain how Hitler reached his decisions on 
alliance policy and, indeed, to throw light on some of the concepts, which 
underlay those decisions, it is necessary to describe Hitler's response to 
the ideas of the leading political theorists, with whom he came into contact 
at this time. 
What is more, Hitler's ideas need to be examined within the context of Nazi 
ideology, which, as stressed above, did not constitute a static corpus 
of rational ideas but was essentially a way of looking at the world, a 
framework of reference, by which any event could be judged. So even if the 
party's antisemitic ideology did not determine the nature of Nazi foreign 
policy but merely reinforced convictions based on other considerations, 
it would still reflect any changes of emphasis. The study of the Nazi 
Party's ideological statements would be justified on these grounds alone. 
But Hitler's own comments in Mein Kampf on the evolution of the party's 
outlook on foreign affairs makes it absolutely essential not to neglect the 
ideological factor. For Hitler admitted frankly that, apart from ful- 
minations against the Versailles Settlement, foreign policy had been neg- 
lected by the party at first. There were, he explained, two reasons for 
this: firstly because as long as the party "possessed only the scope of a 
small little-known club, problems of foreign policy could possess only a 
subordinate importance in the eyes of many adherents" and, secondly, 
because the Nazis believed that a successful foreign policy was conditional 
upon a position of internal strength: 
"Only the elimination of the causes of our collapse, 
as well as the destruction of its beneficiaries, can 
create the premise for our outward fight for freedom. " (5) 
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Later as the party grew in stature, Hitler went on, "the necessity arose 
of taking a position on the questions pertaining to the developments in 
foreign affairs. It became necessary to lay down guiding principles, which 
would not only not contradict the fundamental views of our world concept, 
but actually represent an emanation of this line of thought. "(s) (My italics) 
The inference is quite unmistakeable: the foreign policy programme had 
to be compatible with the Weltanschauung of the party. This does not 
necessarily mean that Nazi foreign policy was merely an outgrowth of the 
ideology, though some believe it may have been, 
(7) 
because the latter was 
continuously evolving and was extremely flexible and could easily accommodate 
some preconceived notions. What is certain, however, is that one must not 
neglect ideological developments when studying the origins of the party's 
alliance policy. 
It is difficult to discern at which point in time the NSDAP became aware 
of the need for a clearly-defined foreign policy. The young party certainly 
had to comment on the contentious issues arising from the Versailles Settlement 
- reparations, disarmament, and 
the coming plebiscite in Upper Silesia - but 
during 1920 it is fair to say that, whilst the French occupation of 
Frankfurt in April in response to the German army's incursion into the 
demilitarised zone caused a predictable outcry in Nazi circles, generally 
the party did not pay too much attention to foreign affairs. However, 
the acquisition at the end of the year of a party newspaper (appearing 
twice weekly at first) meant that the party had to comment on foreign 
affairs on a regular basis. But it was at this point that the value of a 
flexible Weltanschauung became clear. All events on the world stage were 
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readily explicable in terms of the world conspiracy by the Jews to 
liquidate Germany as the next step on the road to world domination. So 
it is likely that the malleability of this ideology postponed the need to 
design a more stratified alliance policy. Certainly as a means of explaining 
the solidly anti-German policies of the major powers, it was an ideal 
device in a world in which Germany was diplomatically isolated. Perhaps, 
therefore, the turning-point would come when that isolation ended. How 
would the Nazis explain gestures favourable or friendly towards Germany? 
Perhaps, such a change in the diplomatic scene would require the NSDAP to 
produce its own alliance programme. 
Early in 1921, this prospect was not really on the horizon. Despite 
British protests against the French occupation of Frankfurt and their 
rejection of persistent French demands for the occupation of the Ruhr 
district to force Germany to fulfil her treaty obligations, the world still 
seemed hostile to Germany. However, if we trace Nazi attitudes towards 
first Britain, then Italy and finally Russia over the next two years, the 
process by which the NSDAP acquired an alliance policy will become clearer. 
In the early months of 1921 the Nazi attitude towards Britain remained 
unremittingly hostile. As we have seen, Hitler was fond of listing the 
crimes committed by the British Empire in order to expose the hypocrisy 
of talk of British respect for the rights of smaller nations. On 3 
February Hitler added the British persecution of the Irish people and 
"the extermination of half (of them)" and "the crushing of the ancient 
state of India" to his catalogue of criminal acts perpetrated by the British 
againstpeaceful nations. 
(8) 
Furthermore, at this time, Hitler and 
other writers in the VB still believed that the overriding aim of the 
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British was the enslavement of Germany. 
(9) 
The negotiations in the 
early months of 1921 were seen as an attempt to do just this by forcing 
Germany to accept the huge reparations bill, and Hitler reproached the 
German government "for courting the allegedly available favour of England 
and France at a time when she really ought to have realised that one 
cannot negotiate with the motivating force which has activated these 
Western democratic states" - this "force" was the Jewish Stock Exchange, 
which Hitler regarded as the ultimate recipient of German reparations 
payments. 
(10) Thus, British attempts to find a more equitable solution to 
the reparations issue were not appreciated as such by Hitler. 
British efforts to find an acceptable solution to another intractable 
problem, that of Upper Silesia, an area rich in mineral resources and vital 
to the economies of both claimants, Germany and Poland, initially met 
with a similar lack of appreciation in Nazi quarters. On 15 March 1921 
Hitler predicted that the Entente - including "perfidious Albion" - 
intended to give Upper Silesia "wholly or partly to Poland", irrespective 
of the results of the plebiscite promised in the Versailles Treaty which 
(11) 
was to be held on 21 March. When disturbances occurred between Poles 
and Germans in Upper Silesia after the indecisive plebiscite (roughly 60% 
of the vote went to Germany, 40% to Poland), Hitler discounted reports of 
English protests to the Polishopvernment. 
(12) 
It is, of course, true that 
France was trying to ensure that Poland, her ally since the treaty of 
February 1921, gained possession of the disputed province. But Hitler 
gave no credence to news of British opposition to these plans. When the 
British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, delivered a speech criticizing the 
Polish rebels, Hitler was concerned to correct both the impression gained 
by "many Germans" that the attitude of the English had changed fundamentally 
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and the belief that "if we ourselves do not disturb our decent image, 
but remain respectable and well-behaved, and deliver all that is to be 
delivered, then England will become very shortly a 'friend' of ours". 
(13) 
This was a deception; the Jews were behind "Lloyd George's honey-sweet 
words". 
(14) 
However, when an army of German volunteers clashed for the 
first time with the Poles on 22 May 1921, the British troops in the area - 
far from turning on the Germans - appeared willing to collaborate with them, 
as Hitler admitted. 
(15) 
Nevertheless, Hitler did not take this as evidence 
of a genuine change of heart by the British government towards Germany but 
simply as proof of what he had been saying all along, namely that if Germany 
showed a fighting spirit and proved that she was worthy of support, she 
would get it. It is doubtful, therefore, that evidence of British sympathy 
for the German cause on this occasion had drastically altered Hitler's 
view of the British. Intact, further conciliatory moves by Lloyd George 
led Hitler to label him the new "Pied Piper" enticing Germans to ruin; "an 
intrinsic change in England's attitude towards Germany was impossible", 
Hitler explained, "because the same society of Jewish press bandits directs 
(16) 
the state there as it does here. " 
It is interesting to note here that Hitler resorted to an ideological 
observation to question the motives behind Britain's pro-German stance. The 
Upper Silesian question obviously posed problems of interpretation for the 
Nazis. For the first time a split had occurred in the ranks of Germany's 
enemies and they were obliged to comment on pro-German policies. However, 
the world conspiracy theory enabled Hitler to discount Lloyd George's 
friendly words as a "Jewish trick" designed cruelly to raise the hopes of 
the German people, only to dash them again later, thereby "accelerating the 
internal destruction of the final remnants of her ability to resist. , 
(17) 
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Thus Hitler invoked the Jewish factor to explain away Britain's seemingly 
pro-German policy and to dispel any illusions about a meaningful revision 
of British foreign policy. 
(18) 
Thus Hitler remained very critical of 
Britain early in 1921 and he used ideology to discredit actions apparently 
inconsistent with the previously established interpretation of British 
ý19) 
foreign policy. 
Hitler's view that Britain remained fundamentally hostile to Germany 
coincided with that of Alfred Rosenberg. As has been seen already, Rosenberg 
believed that, on the whole, British interests were compatible with those 
of the Jews - at the moment at least. In Russia, Britain's intermittent 
support for the White Russian forces against the Bolsheviks ensured the 
continuation of a civil war, from which both the Jews (out to destroy 
Russia) and the British (the arch-enemy of Russian imperialism in Central 
Asia) drew comfort; in the Near East, British support for the creation of 
a Jewish state in Palestine not only warmed the hearts of the zionists but 
offered Britain the prospect of another base in the area. All this, in 
Rosenberg's eyes, made Britain the protector of Jewry and London the centre 
of Jewish activities; hence, by inference, she was no friend of Germany's. 
This basic scenario was often repeated during 1921. In his first article in 
the VB, Rosenberg claimed that British money from Sir George Buchanan, the 
British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, had helped to destroy Czarism. 
(20) 
Early in 1921 a trade treaty signed by London and Moscow provided Rosenberg 
with 'proof' that British industrialists were working hand-in-glove with 
the Bolsheviks. 
(21) In March Rosenberg noted the steady advancement of 
Jews in England: "step by step one Jew after another is stepping into 
(22) 
the highest positions in the land. " On 1 May Rosenberg drew attention 
to the opening of a Bolshevik bank in London as further evidence that world 
capitalism and world revolution were collaborating: the trade treaty, he 
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claimed, was "no more and no less than a political treaty". 
(23) 
It is significant that two days later Hitler referred to Lenin as "the 
mass murderer who is now turning towards England in order to establish 
trading relations to ease the economic distress of Russia. "(24) Clearly 
Hitler shared Rosenberg's belief in the compatibility of English and 
Jewish policy. In preparing a speech entitled Arbeiter und Friedensvertrhge, 
delivered on 31 May, Hitler jotted down the following key words: 
"England's goal) 
Judah's goal ) 
The Means 
the peace treaty of Versailles". (25) 
on another occasion Hitler suggested that the English and the Jews had both 
been behind the attempt to starve Germany to defeat in the First World War. 
(26) 
So it would seem that in 1921 Hitler and Rosenberg both felt that Germany 
should not pin any hopes on Britain since British and Jewish interests were 
so alike. At this stage, therefore, the party's ideology confirmed Hitler's 
continuing prejudice against England (if it did not give rise to it), 
and evidence of apparent British sympathy towards Germany was ignored. 
However, this attitude began slowly to change. The first signs of 
change occurred during the continuing crisis over Upper Silesia, which may, 
indeed, in retrospect, have been the turning-point. Though Hitler still 
dismissed England's pro-German policy as Jewish trickery, Rosenberg 
reacted to it differently. On 18 August 1921 he wrote: 
"There is now, without question, in England a strong group, 
who want to pursue only an English national policy 
(englisch-nationale Politik). This can only consist 
of the European balance of power, not the creation of 
an absolute predominance of France or Germany.... These 
circles have already established multifarious trade 
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relations with Germany, and however much they welcome 
the German Empire as a helpless victim they cannot 
want, in their own interests, her complete destruction. 
Consideration of this English realpolitische thinking has, 
without doubt, caused Lloyd George to advocate officially 
and very forcefully a partly German Upper Silesia. " (27) 
Nationally-minded British politicians and businessmen - not the Jews - 
were now seen as the instigators of Lloyd George's pro-German policies; 
such policies were at odds with the interests of the Jews. But Rosenberg 
was cautious about the prospects for a decisive change of policy; world 
Jewry still wanted to destroy Germany and If Lloyd George were to act 
against the wishes of the London Stock Exchange, "he would be a political 
corpse ,, 
(28) 
at that very moment. Nevertheless, for the first time, a 
basis for possible Anglo-German collaboration emerged (provided, of course, 
that Jewish influence in Britain was eradicated). It should be noted 
that it was the traditional British policy of maintaining a balance of 
power in Europe, which would provide the basis for Anglo-German co-operation 
although the needs of the British economy were a secondary, if still 
significant, factor. For Rosenberg, evidence of Anglo-French dissension 
over Upper Silesia was of some importance, this was not a Jewish trick but 
a sign that the national interest was beginning to assert itself in 
England. 
Rosenberg's conviction that true British interests could be reconciled 
with those of Germany appears, in retrospect, to have been the embryo, from 
which the party's later support for an Anglo-German alliance grew; but, 
at the time, there was no question of a public endorsement of such a 
strategy. The only noticeable sign of a change was the henceforth 
ambivalent attitude towards Britain shown by Rosenberg and, occasionally, 
by other writers in the VB. On the one hand, they showed increasing 
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sympathy with British needs and a tendency to explain away anti-German 
policies as the result of Jewish influence; on the other, they were 
markedly critical of the current British government and of past British 
diplomacy. 
The first trend was evident in Rosenberg's interpretation of the Irish 
question in an article in September 1921. Whilst, like Hitler, he felt 
that the Irish were "one of many oppressed peoples", whose "folkish" 
struggle for freedom ensured them the support of the Nazis, Rosenberg 
had grave doubts about their leader, de Valera, who was, he claimed, 
"laden with American money" and also "half-Jewish"; moreover, his programme 
(29) 
bore comparison with Bolshevism. Rosenberg concluded, therefore, that 
"Ireland is the Jewish stock exchange's means of fashioning the policy of 
Great Britain. , 
(30) 
In other words, the Jews were manipulating the Irish 
question to make difficulties for the British and to maintain their own 
influence over British policy-making. Another illustration of this trend 
was the apparent shift in the location of the centre of Jewish activities 
from London to New York, which is evident in Rosenberg's writings. In 
January 1921 he identified the centre of the conspiracy against Germany as 
London with the rider "(and) recently perhaps in New York". 
(31) 
In 
February]921 he wrote that "next to England, the United States had the 
honour of being the stronghold of Jewish high finance". 
(32) 
By August 
1921 America had replaced Britain as the focus of Jewish activity and 
Jewish financiers were beginning to exert pressure on the American government 
by means of financial blackmail: "over America hangs the sword of Damocles. 
In case gold were to trundle across the Pacific Ocean, as it now threatens 
to leave the British Isles, which until now has been such a trusty land. " 
(33) 
The Washington Naval Conference from November 1921 to February 1922 seemed 
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to confirm to Rosenberg the relocation of Jewish headquarters; "today", 
wrote Rosenberg on 26 November 1921, "Washington has become the centre 
of this thieving world conspiracy". 
(34) 
80 whilst the Jews retained control 
of British policy-making, the British were no longer, in Rosenberg's view, 
the patrons of the Jews. 
This barely discernible moderation of Rosenberg's anti-British stance was 
taken up by some writers in the VB, which by January 1922 was under 
Dietrich Eckart's editorial control. One wrote that genuine British 
interests were in line with Germany's and required an anti-French posture: 
"If the 'England' ruled by the Hebrews were really 
Great Britain, then there would be reason for such 
hopes (those pinned on recent conferences). Then 
the English representatives would give weight only 
to English national interests, which would have of 
necessity to consist of a vigorous cooking of the 
French goose. " (35) 
However, the same writer criticised the German government for expecting 
that the present British regime would follow such a policy. 
(36) 
This 
illustrates the second theme running through the paper's treatment of 
Britain -a marked scepticism about British overtures to Germany allied 
with criticism of the present British government and past British diplomacy. 
On 14 August 1921, for example, Rosenberg, referring to "apparent tensions 
between London and Paris", had written that "we Germans have not the 
slightest hope that it could come to a final breach between the Entente 
powers in the foreseeable future. A policy based on this hope alone would 
be without firm foundation. In February 1922 Rosenberg criticised 
the Frankfurter Zeitung for welcoming the outcome of the Washington 
Conference; the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the increase 
in Anglo-American collaboration brought about by the conference were not 
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to be applauded, in Rosenberg's view, for they laid the foundations 
of an "Anglo-Saxon world-rule", behind which stood, inevitably, the 
Jewish stock exchange. 
(38) 
At the end of February 1922 Rosenberg was 
still prepared to challenge those who praised the League of Nations' 
humanity in searching for an equitable solution to the problem of Upper 
Silesia by questioning the humanity of England's "hunger blockade" during 
the First World War and by suggesting that the English were hardly 
innocent of charges of "war guilt". 
(39) 
Hence the first sign of a moderation of Nazi hostility towards Britain was 
Rosenberg's ambivalent attitude towards her in his articles in the VB. 
To the untrained eye, he remained highly critical of Britain, particularly 
of her past record and present government, but occasional references to 
signs of life amongst nationalist circles in Britain and to the compatibility 
of British and German national interests betrayed Rosenberg's belief in 
the feasibility of future Anglo-German cooperation. Furthermore, since 
British interests were increasingly out of step with those of the Jews, 
Britain became, in theory, as suitable an ally for Germany as Russia, once 
of course -a rider which applied to Russia also - Jewish influence had 
been removed. The question is: did Hitler's ideas undergo the same change 
at this time? Did Hitler enjoy the same freedom of choice when he came 
to formulate an alliance policy? 
On the whole this seems likely. It is true that in his 1921 analyses of 
pre-par German diplomacy, Hitler consistently appeared to favour a Russo- 
German over an Anglo-German alliance; the failure to achieve the former 
alliance was, in Hitler's opinion, the "first huge error" made by 
Wilhelminian diplomats, whilst an alliance with England was considered to 
have been "impossible in the long run". 
(40) 
Admittedly when Hitler discussed 
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the projected Anglo-German alliance against Russia, mooted between 1898 
and 1900, he did remark that "that would have been the opportunity to 
achieve territorial expansion", but he went on to say that "the other 
alternative would have been an alliance with Russia against England! 
Thereby an unlimited possibility for expansion towards the East would have 
been created. " 
(41) 
Exactly how an alliance with Russia could result in extensive 
German expansion eastwards will be explained later but if one reads into 
these retrospective observations Hitler's own ideas on Nazi alliance policy, 
then an English alliance was obviously less attractive to him than a Russian 
one in 1921. 
(42) 
It shouldbe stressed that such comments were, in fact, 
substitutes for an alliance policy, opinions in the main culled from Pan- 
German literature and rooted in the pre-war diplomatic environment. In 
all probability, Hitler had not yet considered a foreign policy strategy 
to encompass postwar diplomatic realities. As we have seen, foreign policy 
was not the party's first priority in its early years. 
what is certain, however, is that by the middle of 1922 Hitler had adopted 
the antisemitic world-view, popularised by Alfred Rosenberg, which would 
prove to be a very flexible instrument when he did begin to consider a 
concrete foreign policy programme. In a speech on 28 July1922, Hitler 
delivered his own account of the international menace of world Jewry: 
,, We all feel today that two worlds are struggling with one 
another and not only at home, but everywhere we look in the 
now oppressed Russia and in Italy, in France and in 
England etc. The poor struggle inexorably between 
the ideals of those who are nationally folkish-minded 
and the intangible supra-state International. It is 
a struggle, which stretches back already now about 120 
years. It began at the moment when the Jew obtained the 
right of citizenship in the European states. " (43) 
In the nineteenth century, Hitler continued, Europe stood at the cross-roads. 
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Western Europe became industrialised and a relatively small number of 
"fully Europeanised" Jews established themselves as captains of industry 
and founded and manipulated political parties, ostensibly in the name of 
democracy but in reality to establish their own rule; "on the whole, 
England and France have already put on the chains of slavery. These 
states will lie in Jewish fetters... as long as the Jew himself does not 
sense the need and the acpediency of a change in this situation. This 
change will occur there in the foreseeable future: ' 
(44) 
In Eastern and 
Central Europe, things developed differently; industrialisation took place 
at a slower pace; there were more Jews and therefore more antisemitic 
sentiment but the Jews came to positions of power by manipulation of left- 
wing socialist ideals and revolution first in Russia and now it seemed 
likely to happen in Germany. 
(45) 
Quite clearly by July 1922 Hitler was, at the very least, paying lip- 
service to a Weltanschauung, according to which all nations were suffering 
or about to suffer under the Jewish yoke. All these nations, therefore, 
became theoretically candidates for association with a Nazi Germany in the 
struggle against world Jewry. The important point is that, by adopting 
this world-view, Hitler acquired absolute. flexibility in his eventual 
choice of allies; whichever power he chose could be given ideological 
sanction by merely citing evidence of antisemitic inclinations. This did 
not mean that Hitler was likely, for example, to choose France as an ally 
since her desire for a Rhenish frontier still, in his view, motivated her 
foreign Policy. 
(46) 
Essentially what the ideological world-view gave 
Hitler was complete freedom to exercise his own and his colleagues' 
in-built prejudices and ideas about foreign relations. Thus, Hitler may 
not yet have drawn up his "guiding principles" in foreign affairs, but 
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when he did, it was clear that they could be presented as an "emanation" 
of the party's Weltanschauung. 
In the winter of 1922-23 Hitler made two statements, which committed him 
in public for the first time to a foreign policy programme of alliances 
with Britain and Italy. At a party discussion evening in Haidhausen on 
14 November 1922, Hitler talked about the creation of a nationalist 
regime in Germany on the Italian Fascist model; to survive, Hitler argued, 
it would need success and "in the political field, there is only one 
possibility of achieving a big increase for Germany: the Anschluss of 
Austria with Germany. The precondition for this Anschluss would be the 
agreement of England and Italy. ý, Then at the party conference on 27 
January 1923, in the wake of the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr, which 
brought the reparations crisis to a head, Hitler asked his audience which 
powers had an interest in the further existence of the German state. Hitler 
answered his own question thus: 
,, of course, not France and not Russia and not even 
America, who would like to look on Germany's internal 
conflicts with the impassioned partisan sympathy of a 
prospective bull-fighter in order to learn the 
specific methods of combatting Marxism and Bolshevism. 
England and Italy, however, probably. " (48) 
These two isolated remarks are usually taken as indicating the emergence 
of a pro-English strategy in Hitler's programme. If this was so, why did 
Hitler choose England (not Russia) as a prospective ally and why did he 
give notice of this late in 1922? 
The most obvious explanation of Hitler's adoption of the English alliance 
is that the Ruhr crisis revealed once again that Britain could not support 
France's aggressive policy towards Germany. For, although Hitler's first 
statement supporting collaboration with England and Italy was delivered 
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before the actual invasion of the Ruhr on 11 January 1923, 
(49) 
the French 
premier, Raymond Poincare, had been threatening to take this step since 
the summer of 1922 and Britain's opposition to it was well-known. The 
German-Russian agreement at Rapallo in April 1922 had resurrected French 
fears of a German revival and had made her more adamant that Germany should 
pay reparations in full. In mid-July 1922 Germany had requested a full 
moratorium on payments and Britain, fearing that Germany genuinely could 
not afford to pay, felt inclined to agree. The French did not, afraid 
that, once stopped, payments would not be resumed. Since the United States 
refused to consider cancelling allied war debts, the French could not afford 
to waive their claim to German reparations. 
(50) 
Clearly, Hitler had 
adequate warning of the general thrust of French policy and the probability 
of British opposition to it before January 1923. 
It is also true that Hitler's alliance strategy hinged on the existence of 
Anglo-French tension; in December 1922, Hitler pointed out, in a private 
discussion of his strategy, that "England has an interest in seeing that 
we do not go under because, otherwise, France would become the greatest 
continental power in Europe, whilst England would have to be content with 
the position of a third-rate power. " 
(51) 
The Ruhr crisis was, therefore, 
important to Hitler; in Mein Kampf, he wrote that it "for the first time 
really alienated England basically from France. , 
(52) 
However, it needs to 
be emphasised again that there were signs that Britain was being rehabilitated 
in articles in the VB dating back to the middle of 1921; certain writers 
clearly perceived even then that British interests really dictated 
opposition to French policies in Europe. It is more likely, therefore, that 
the culmination of the reparations crisis at the end of 1922 and 
beginning of 1923 merely reinforced the trend towards support for a 
future Anglo-German alliance. 
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In fact during 1922 the hints that Britain was about to be rehabilitated 
appear (in retrospect) to have been stronger. Certainly in Rosenberg's 
ideological diatribes against world Jewry, the softening of the earlier 
anti-British tone is quite marked. In his pamphlet, Der staatsfeindliche 
Zionismus, written between May and September 1922, several changes in the 
relations between the British and the Jews (some intimated earlier) emerge 
with greater clarity. Firstly, the alleged compatibility of the aims of 
world Jewry and British imperialism, a feature of Rosenberg's earlier 
writings, had disappeared; for example, the zionist leader, Chaim Weizmann, 
is quoted as saying in March 1922 that "Palestine is useless for England 
from the strategic (and) military point of view. " 
(53) 
Secondly, Rosenberg 
noted that an anti-Jewish faction in England was growing larger and more 
vocal. 
(54) 
Thirdly, he argued that the Jews were undermining British 
interests in India and Ireland; in India they were encouraging the artic- 
ulation of anti-British sentiments, whilst in Ireland "a threat by Jewish 
finance to support the Irish has induced the English to make many 
concessions". 
(55) Fourthly, British foreign policy, which was "co- 
determined (mitbestimmt) by the Jewish bankers and journalists" was 
running counter to Britain's best interests; 
(56) 
at the Washington Naval 
Conference, for example, England had capitulated to the Americans: 
"for centuries, England had fought ruthlessly for 
her naval supremacy... and always realised the need 
to drive the strongest from the field. In Washington, 
this England gave up her position with a great gesture and 
without a struggle and renounced the alliance with Japan 
and transferred the leadership of world politics to 
the United States. " (57) 
In Pest in Russland, also published in 1922, Rosenberg quoted another example 
of Jewish distortion of British foreign policy: 
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" 'England' herself is doing what she can to 
maintain the Soviet government as a negotiating 
partner. Despite the fact that the real Great 
Britain would have had every cause to fight tooth 
and nail against supporting a revolution which is 
spreading towards Afghanistan and India, the 
opposite happens. " (58) 
Hence, Rosenberg believed, the Jews were pushing the British towards 
extinction because they had acquired a new patron in the United States; 
the relocation of the centre of Jewish affairs from London to New York was 
complete, America was now "the stronghold of Pan-Judaea", 
(59) 
"the newly 
chosen cherub of Israel". 
(60) 
This account of the growing disenchantment between the British and the Jews 
seems in retrospect to have heralded the new attitude towards Britain. The 
fall of the British prime minister, Lloyd George, in October 1922 
encouraged Rosenberg to present the case for potential British aid to 
Germany. "Against all British tradition", Rosenberg argued, "Lloyd George 
had abandoned, or rather had to abandon (in face of Jewish pressure) the 
policy of the European balance of power", thereby playing into the hands of 
the Jewish stock exchange and the French. 
(61) 
Lloyd George's resignation, 
Rosenberg felt, wasche opportunity for the British to stand up to the Jews 
but he was not confident that it would be taken; however, he did believe 
that the British would soon face "an invincible France" and "in this 
situation", he concluded, "assistance for Germany would, of necessity, have 
to result. " 
(62) 
Rosenberg was not the only writer in the VB to suggest a growing disparity 
between the interests of the British and the Jews and the compatibility 
between the interests of the British and Germans. On 5 August 1922, an 
unsigned article in the VB argued that England's policy was dictated "not 
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by British powers but by the same powers of high finance which (dictate) 
that of France"; 
(63) 
"Iß on the other hand", wrote mother unidentified 
writer on 4 October 1922, "England were ruled by the British, then the 
hostile stance towards Germany after Versailles would have had to have ended. 1t(64) 
In ideological terms, Germany and England could, therefore, be allies in 
the fight against international Jewry. 
Thus the way had been prepared for an Anglo-German alliance to be included 
in a Nazi foreign policy programme over a year before Hitler first referred 
to it in November 1922. The Ruhr crisis of 1922-23 is, therefore, not 
likely to have been the reason for Hitler's conversion from his previous 
anti-British outlook. It is possible that British support for Germany in 
the Upper Silesian crisis had been crucial but other factors may also have 
affected Hitler's decision and we will return to this question later. 
However what has also to be stressed is that Hitler's adoption of the 
English alliance does not appear to have been a "solitary decision against 
the opinion in the party", as Axel Kuhn has argued. 
(65) 
Kuhn has suggested 
that "the party" was sceptical about the prospects of a transformation of 
British foreign policy. That is true , 
(66) 
but it is also true that Hitler 
expressed similar doubts about current British diplomacy in public after 
November 1922. One has to distinguish between comments about the merging 
(and for the most part concealed) Nazi foreign policy programme, which 
was intended for future use, and the party's commentary on current 
developments in the diplomatic arena. The adoption of an Anglo-German 
alliance as part of the foreign policy programme did not mean that Nazi 
propaganda could suddenly abandon its criticism of contemporary British 
diplomacy. Hence when Rosenberg wrote in July 1923 that, despite Anglo- 
French tensions over the invasion of the Ruhr, "England is not contemplating 
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a serious break with France at all,,, this did notmean that he was 
questioning the assumptions behind Hitler's alliance strategy but merely 
commenting on the current state of Anglo-French relations. 
(67) 
Indeed 
Rosenberg shared Hitler's assumptions; he argued again in July 1923 that 
"England was always the opponent of the strongest state on the European 
continent" and, as a result, was bound at some time to challenge the 
emerging French hegemony in Europe. He simply felt th&t "under present 
conditions", with Germany so weak that she was not alliance-worthy 
(btlndnisf hig), "we can expect no advantages from the eventual breach in 
Anglo-French relations. This was precisely the same argumenttsed by 
Hitler in 1923; "in view of our lack of energy", he pointed out on one 
occasion, "England will not feel obliged to do anything for us, even if it 
is not at all in her interest that France attain predominance in Europe. 
The same goes for Italy. " 
(69) 
In short, therefore, Hitler and Rosenberg 
argued that England and Italy would aid Germany only when she was worthy 
of assistance, in other words when a National Socialist government had 
taken over. Hence, criticism of current British policy would continue, 
despite the incorporation of an English alliance in the Nazi foreign policy 
programme. 
This dualism was probably a deliberate attempt by the Nazi party to 
camouflage its anbitions in foreign affairs. The need to comment regularly 
on current events posed problems, as Rosenberg revealed on one occasion 
when he wrote in the VB that "we want to hold back our positive appraisal 
(of foreign affairs) for the time being... and we will wait reservedly on 
events (and) not lapse into daily cackle over every piece of news. " 
(70) 
The reasons why the Nazis were concerned to avoid public disclosure of 
their long-term foreign policy schemes will become clear later but this 
smokescreen, of course, makes it difficult to gauge the extent of opposition 
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within the party to Hitler's thinking on the English alliance; there is 
evidence, however, that Rosenberg and other writers in the VB supported 
Hitler. 
In view of the relative secrecy surrounding the emergent alliance policy, 
one wonders why Hitler was tempted to make the remarks he did in November 
1922 and January 1923. On the first occasion at a local party discussion 
evening in Haidhausen, it was significant that Hitler was discussing a 
National socialist state on the Italian Fascist model. It is important 
to recognize the impact of the emergence of Fascist Italy in October 1922 
on the Nazi Party; the success of a movement with similar aims must have 
been an encouraging sign for the NSDAP but, in the field of foreign affairs, 
coinciding as it did with the political demise of Lloyd George, the last 
of the main architects of the hated Versailles Settlement to lose office, 
it amounted to a considerable diplomatic revolution. 
(71) 
This may have 
tempted Hitler to speculate about the future in November 1922. His comments 
at the party conference in January 1923, on the other hand, were in all 
probability a response to the Ruhr invasion and the renewed evidence of 
Anglo-French tensions. It has to be stressed, though, that Hitler's 
remarks on both occasions were not presented as part of a Nazi Party 
alliance strategy; they were isolated comments, in which historians have 
identified things to come. In other words, Hitler probably did not take 
any conscious decision to reveal parts of his emerging strategy for foreign 
affairs in public at this time. 
To sum up, therefore, the emergence of an English alliance as part of the 
NSDAP's foreign policy programme was not an isolated or a sudden decision 
taken by Hitler late in 1922; the Umwendung with regard to England had 
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been evolving for over a year, judging by the changes in the party's 
antisemitic world-view. 
(72) 
It is, of course, difficult to accept that 
changes such as the alleged disparity between British and Jewish ambitions 
and gradual transfer of Jewish allegiance from London to New York could 
have wholly determined Hitler's choice of alliance partner. However, this 
is not quite so implausible as it appears, if one bears in mind that 
concrete developments could have given rise to such fantasies: for example, 
the British disagreement with the French over reparations and the American 
insistence on full repayment of allied war debts. Nevertheless, a more 
likely reason for Hitler's choice of England would be the mounting evidence 
of British sympathy for Germany, which the Nazis interpreted as a sign of 
the resurgence of Britain's traditional balance of power strategy. However, 
one cannot rule out the possibility that Hitler turned to England as a 
direct result of his re-evaluation of Germany's other prospective ally, 
Russia, which we will examine shortly. 
The rise of Mussolini's fascists in summer and autumn of 1922 might well 
have contributed to the evolution of Hitler's alliance strategy late in 
that year. The presence of a regime ideologically akin to National 
Socialism in Italy could not be ignored by Hitler and his friends. But 
historians are agreed that as the origins of Hitler's alliance ideas date 
back to 1920 at least, these can have had little to do with the success 
of the Fascists in Italy. 
(73) 
In 1920 Hitler had made it clear that Italy 
had not been one of Germany's "deadly enemies" before the war; Italian 
grievances had been directed against Austria-Hungary not Germany; Hitler 
had dismissed Bavarian separatism and a Danubian Confederation on the grounds 
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that Germany's real enemy lay across the Rhine not in Italy; and in 
August 1920 he argued for the exploitation of Franco-Italian differences 
over Fiume in order to win Italian support for the German campaign against 
the Versailles Settlement. Obviously, therefore, the alliance was a product 
of strategic considerations. 
However, it needs to be stressed that, as in the case of England, it 
was never intended that an Italian alliance should be the immediate 
objectivect Weimar diplomats; in the speech in which he first called for 
Italo-German cooperation, Hitler criticised those who suggested that 
"there must be a union (Anschluss) carried out with a strong state. For 
this plan it is now too late; our view would still be the same if we 
had not given up our weapons, but had continued to fight. We are more 
cannon fodder and defenceless. We in Germany lack national solidarity. " 
(74) 
International agreements, therefore, were of no use until Germany had been 
revived internally. Since Hitler almost certainly associated the 
resurgence of Germany with the rise to power of the Nazis, the Italian 
alliance could only be implemented when the National Socialists were in 
power in Germany and the nationalists in Italy. 
Because the alliance lay in the future, therefore, the policies of the 
present Italian government could still be criticised. Once again, there 
was the duality in approach to foreign nations noted above. So despite 
the talk of possible German-Italian collaboration in August 1920, the 
Nazi Party remained critical of Italian policy and indeed of Germany's 
conciliatory stand towards Italy. In November 1920, for example, Hitler 
accused German foreign minister, Walter Simons, of lacking national feeling 
because of a statement on the South Tyrol, the Austrian province transferred 
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to Italy by the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which evidently did not hold 
out any hope of its return to Germany; "Simon's declaration over the 
Tyrol", said Hitler, "is proof of national incompetence, otherwise the 
German state would have to intervene for every single German at any time. 
Nations are only capable of a great ascent if they have carried through 
internal reforms, which make it possible to convert the whole race - united - 
to foreign policy goals. " 
(75) 
ClearlY, therefore, Hitler remained , publicly 
committed to his Pan-German ambitions of uniting all Germans in one Reich. 
In February 1921, the VB published an article entitled Deutschland und 
Italien which criticized those "harmless souls who are still always dreaming 
of a re-awakening of German-Italian friendship. "(76 The article made it 
quite clear that Italians were very much afraid of a German-Austrian 
Anschluss because, it was felt, Germany would "acquire an Austrian outlook 
with regard to Italy. Italy, therefore has no interest whatever in encouraging 
a union. "(?? 
) Whether Hitler realized it or not, Italy could be 
expected to oppose two of the Nazi Party's most fervent demands: the 
Anschluss and the return of German territories lost at Versailles. There 
would seem to have been, therefore, an inherent contradiction between 
Hitler's support for an Italo-German alliance and his stated grossdeutsch 
ambitions for Germany: in all probability, Hitler had not fully thought 
out his ideas on the Italian alliance at this stage; he merely had an 
instinctive feeling that Italy and Germany were compatible because of their 
mutual hostility towards the Versailles Settlement. 
Perhaps surprisingly the rising fortunes of Mussolini and his movement 
received a hostile reception in the VB. An unnamed writer on 29 July 
1922 attacked the idea of building a party on Fascist lines in Germany 
because of Mussolini's background; he had wanted a war against Germany in 
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1914 and "for this reason every folkish-minded German ought already to 
have most keenly shunned contact with the trickster Mussolini.,, 
(78) 
Worse than that, the Fascist movement had no antisemitic aims, indeed 
it had been founded with Jewish money; honourable Fascists had been seduced 
by Jewish capital, and the fault lay with their leader, Mussolini, who 
was "a hired traitor". 
(79) 
A further article on 2 August stressed the 
similarities between National Socialists and thebest Fascists; the 
Fascists were believed to be in the front line of Italy's struggle against 
Bolshevism, but, once again, Mussolini was criticised because his struggle 
was not directed against "the world's enemy". 
(80) 
The absence of antisemitism 
in Mussolini's programme seemed to damn him in Nazi eyes until on 17 
August, with Mussolini's ultimate victory still far from certain, Hitler 
made it clear (without mentioning Mussolini) that the new Italy would be 
ideologically akin to National Socialism: he referred again to the 
struggle between nationalism and internationalism, "the struggle which up 
to today only the Italian state is willing to carry on, we also must 
fight and this struggle must emanate from Bavaria. " 
(81) 
However, in the 
same speech Hitler reasserted the need for the Anschluss with German- 
Austria, showing that he had still not seriously thought about the implications 
of a future German-Italian alliance. 
(82) 
Hitler would, undoubtedly, have let the thorny issues of the South Tyrol 
and the Anschluss remain unresolved for the time being if the rapid success 
of the Fascists had not altered the situation drastically. And this is 
the sense in which the Italian alliance was ideologically fashioned (if 
not originally ideologically motivated). The presence of a nationalist 
leader in Italy, whose success the Nazi party could emulate as well as 
exploit for propaganda purposes, and from whom, perhaps, direct aid might 
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be forthcoming, brought Hitler's theoretical speculation about future 
allies down to earth. If Italian aid were to materialise, there could 
be no obstacles to Nazi-Fascist collaboration. It was this situation 
which moulded the Italian alliance in Hitler's programme. 
At precisely this moment, a new face appeared in the ranks of the NSDAP: 
Kurt LUdecke, the son of a manager of a chemical works in Oranienburg 
(Berlin), who had worked as a travelling salesman after the war. 
(83)Liidecke's 
arrival in the party coincided not only with the emergence of Mussolini 
in Italy, but with Hitler's own maturing as a political leader, which 
Mussolini's success only accelerated. The summer of 1922 had seen Hitler 
conspiring with Heinrich Class and associates to launch a national revolution 
and he was clearly beginning to display "the arrogance of the Primadonna"., 
which so offended his Pan-German associates. The newly self-confident 
'Fyhrer, according to Ltidecke, quickly agreed with his proposal to try to 
establish contact with Mussolini, for "to have an ally who was succeeding, 
even though the alliance was purely one of mutual sympathy, would be 
encouraging. " 
(84) 
Hence LUdecke set oßß for Paris (to test the strength 
of antisemitic movement there) and for Italy, if possible, to visit 
Mussolini. 
(85) In the resulting interview, almost certainly in September 
1922, Mussolini made quite plain his position on the South Tyrol: "No 
discussion about that ever .... Alto Adige is Italian and must remain so. "(86) 
So the South Tyrol was clearly revealed as the stumbling block to possible 
collaboration between the Fascists and the Nazis and also to Hitler's 
alliance plans for the future. According to Ltidecke, on his return "a 
serious discussion of Mussolini and Italy" ensued, "in which, for the first 
time Hitler was really considering the ultimate possibilities of his 
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programme in relation to the rest of Europe". Whether 
the first time Hitler had spelt out his alliance plans 
it was, then this would suggest that Mussolini's rise i 
in determining the timing of the evolution of Hitler's 
LUdecke's account of the discussion is interesting for 
on Hitler's foreign policy as a whole: 
it was, in fact, 
is uncertain. If 
was a major factor 
alliance policy. 
the light it sheds 
"The natural future alliance of our new Germany, 
we agreed, should be England and eventually the 
northern European states, therefore, our logical 
effort - when we had the power - would be to alienate 
England from France. As a corollary of our organic 
growth, a German-English alliance was imperative. 
Forces currently dominant in England were and would 
indefinitely remain opposed to Nazi Germany, that we 
envisioned. With France holding a military trump 
card, and Germany isolated politically and economically, 
we were in no position to bargain with England. If 
we had any hope of understanding amongst the major 
powers, we should find it in Italy, - if Mussolini 
came to power. " (My italics) (87) 
Hitler's argument clarifies a number of points. Firstly, it illustrates 
precisely the approach to alliance policy indicated above; namely that 
the alliances were meant for a future (Nazi) Germany and a future English 
or Italian government. The present government policy in England was 
opposed to this and would remain so for an indefinite period. Secondly, 
the English alliance was vital to the process of German expansion, but 
Hitler knew already that it would be difficult to obtain. Thirdly, the 
Italian alliance was the most practicable prospect but it too was dependent 
on Mussolini's rise to power. For this reason, therefore, Hitler decided, 
"the Tyrol was not too great a price to pay for Mussolini's friendship". 
(88) 
Hitler also felt that an Italo-German alliance would "create a spirit of 
(89) 
cooperation in Austria. " 
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One has to say that Ltidecke's recollection in his memoirs of discussions 
with Hitler some sixteen years earlier was remarkable but, nonetheless, 
his account of Hitler's thinking does seem to be borne out by other 
evidence. When on 14 November 1922, following Mussolini's rise to power, 
Hitler argued that the only way to increase German power was by executing 
the Anschluss with Austria, he stressed that prior Italian (and English) 
agreement would be necessary and continued that "Germany must collaborate 
with Italy, which is experiencing her national re-birth and has a great 
future. For that a clear and binding renunciation by Germany of the 
Germans In South Tyrol is necessary. The idle talk over South Tyrol, the 
empty protests against the Fascists only harm us since they alienate Italy 
from us. In politics there is no sentiment, only cold-bloodedness. Why 
should be suddenly get excited over the closure of a dozen German schools 
in South Tyrol, when the German press keeps quiet over the closure of a 
thousand German schools in Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, and Czechoslovakia? " 
(90) 
Clearly Hitler believed that the renunciation of the South Tyrol would 
make the Anschluss palatable to the Italians. 
Though Hitler might still argue in private that "the South Tyrol question 
is, perhaps, more simply solved later by way of compensation", there was no 
denying his public commitment to the renunciation of the province or the 
fact that it flatly contradicted his Pan-German outlook. 
(91) 
It has to 
be admitted, though, that the ADV itself rather 'soft-pedalled' the 
issue following Mussolini's rise to power, announcing on 20 October 1922 
that , If the Italian government and the Italian people wish to live 
honourably in peace with us and on good terms: we are ready. A precondition, 
however, is that the national life of our South Tyrolean fellow-countrymen 
is not disturbed further and that the damage done so far is made good and 
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atoned for. Otherwise, consequences could arise, which could cause a 
violent end and not only for many of the Fascists... but also for many 
others in the decaying Italian states. " 
(92) 
It should be noticed that the 
Pan-Germans were not insisting on the return of the South Tyrol either. 
Nonetheless, Hitler's outright public abandonment of the South Tyrol was 
markedly different and he had to have good reason to specify in advance the 
concessions, which a National Socialist government would be prepared to 
make to secure an alliance. 
This, of course, was the possibility of direct financial assistance from 
Mussolini or, at least, of association of some kind with his government, 
which, itself, would greatly enhance the prestige of the Nazi movement. To 
this end, LUdecke made further visits to Italy in 1922 and 1923. 
(93) 
Probably as a result, Mussolini commissioned Tedaldi, the Italian repres- 
entative on the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission, to report on the political 
situation in Bavaria. In November 1922, Tedaldi, having heard Hitler 
expound his ideas on the Italian alliance and place the South Tyrol in the 
context of more oppressed German communities elsewhere, could tell 
Mussolini that only Hitler's party could be relied on not to lay claim to 
(94) 
In any event, as the German Embassy officials, who the South Tyrol. 
were monitoring these events in Rome concluded, Mussolini was "too clever 
to compromise himself by an agreement to loan money which is being sought 
openly by the Hitler people. " 
(95) 
But whilst the search for short-term 
pecuniary gain proved fruitless, Hitler's alliance policy was, in no way, 
impaired by Mussolini's refusal to commit himself, the Nazi Party's 
renunciation of South Tyrol did at least bring it to Mussolini's attention 
and provide a common link; that was all Hitler could reasonably hope for 
at the time. 
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It would seem, therefore, that the accession of Mussolini to power 
in many respects crystallized Hitler's thoughts on an alliance with Italy. 
Though he may have noted earlier the advantages of exploiting Italian 
dissatisfaction at the Treaty of Versailles against France, the prospect 
of Mussolini as ruler of Italy forced Hitler to relate his alliance 
theories to reality and to confront the issue of the South Tyrol. To 
suggest that the rise of Mussolini played little part in fashioning the 
Italian element in Hitler's alliance policy is at least misleading. The 
presence of a Fascist government with a compatible ideology, (albeit short 
of antisemitism), was something which Hitler could not ignore. The rise of 
Fascism may also, as has been suggested, have been the crucial factor in 
the timing of the evolution of Hitler's alliances; it may have forced him, 
as Lttdecke suggested, in the autumn of 1922 to relate his instinctive 
convictions to a real life situation perhaps for the first time. 
The decision on the Italian alliance does seem to have been Hitler's alone. 
Rosenberg had little to say about Italy before 1923, though no doubt he, 
along with others, noted with regret the absence of antisemitism from the 
Fascist programme. 
(96) 
He may also have had qualms about the renunciation 
of the Germans in the South Tyrol; 
(97) 
in a revealing article on Nazi 
attitude towards Fascist Italy in June 1923, Rosenberg implied that the 
South Tyroleans would not be abandoned in perpetuity. He made it quite 
clear that the finalaim of Nazi Policy was the unification of all Germans 
in one state but, in Germany's present parlous state, she needed allies, 
principally Italy, and sacrifices had to be made accordingly. Hence, he 
stressed, "the South Tyrolean question is not be be allowed to become a 
casus belli between the German and Italian people. "(95) However, once 
Germany had recovered her true diplomatic standing, then it might be possible 
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"to incorporate our separated brothers in the new German Empire. For 
there are many (other) places more valuable to Italy than the possession 
of the South Tyrol. " 
(99) 
Clearly, whilst accepting Hitler's renunciation 
of the South Tyrol as a temporary expedient, Rosenberg refused to abandon 
all hope. This may have been the result of his own genuine grossdeutsch 
convictions or an attempt to soften the blow of the abandonment of German- 
speaking people, which so transparently contradicted the grossdeutsch 
orientation of party propaganda. 
(100) 
That does seem likely is that Hitler 
made the decision and the party, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, 
concurred. 
As far as Russia was concerned, Hitler continued during 1921 to stress the 
pre-war compatibility of Russia and Germany and to criticize the Imperial 
government's failure to ally with her eastern neighbour before or during the First 
World War. He also claimed, of course, that Germany and Russia were the 
two greatest enemies of world Jewry and that the Jewish-led Bolshevik 
Revolution was the prelude to a similar onslaught on Germany. So, although 
Bolshevik rule prevented it at the time, a Russo-German alliance did 
seem likely to form part of a National Socialist alliance programme for 
the future. 
By the time Niter was writing Mein Kampf in 1924, however, Russia was no 
longer a prospective ally, but had been decisively relegated to the ranks 
of Germany's foes. When and why did this dramatic change occur? The 
obvious answer would be in 1921 or, at the latest 1922, when the Bolsheviks, 
victorious in the civil war, were clearly unlikely to be unseated in the 
foreseeable future. But historians have, in general, been unwilling to 
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acceptthis simple explanation of Hitler's alliance strategy. This is due 
to the lack of unambiguous evidence to this effect and also, it must be 
admitted, to a reluctance by historians to take seriously the possibility 
that Hitler was genuinely motivated by an antisemitic ideology, in other 
words that the survival of 'Jewish' Bolshevism made a German-Russian 
alliance unthinkable as anything other than a temporary expedient. Instead 
it is argued that Hitler remained undecided as to his position on Russia 
until 1924 when, at his leisure in Landsberg gaol following the Munich 
putsch, Hitler finally thought through his alliance strategy and saw that 
the Anglo-German and German-Italian alliances would be equally applicable 
against Russia as against France. 
(101) 
Most historians do at least pay lip- 
service to the view - frequently supported by contemporaries - that on 
Russian affairs Hitler listened to Alfred Rosenberg. Nevertheless, the 
latest researcher has concluded that Hitler made a "solitary" decision in 
1924. 
(b02) A re-examination of Hitler's alienation from Russia should 
begin, therefore, by discussing to what extent Hitler relied on Rosenberg's 
ideas and then proceed to analyse exactly when and why Hitler changed his 
mind about Russia. 
That Hitler's view of the Russian Revolution was coloured by Rosenberg's 
accounts, especially with respect to the liaison between the capitalistic 
Jews of the West and the revolutionary Jews of the East has been illustrated 
already in the last chapter. As time went by, Hitler, who knew no 
Russian, would rely even more on information which Rosenberg gleaned from 
Russian newspapers. That Hitler fed off others in this way was apparent 
at the time. Konrad Heiden wrote in the 1930s that Hitler "sucked up 
information which he could use hurriedly and greedily, as a dry sponge 
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sucks water. , 
(103) 
Ernst Hanfstängl, a close collaborator in the early 
1920s, also recalled Hitler's receptivity: "I had been feeding him ideas 
and items of news culled from the foreign press and had been agreeably 
surprised to find them cropping up in his speeches. " 
(104) 
Rosenberg must 
have had the same experience: indeed, Hanfstängl's reason for trying to 
enlighten Hitler, particularly with regard to America was to counteract 
Rosenberg's influence on Hitler, which he considered to be too narrowly 
eurocentric. 
(105) 
In 1921 with the publication of the party newspaper, the unmistakeable 
similarity between Rosenberg's and Hitler's view of Russia became more 
evident as the paper and the party leaders began to comment on current 
events abroad. A change soon emerged. In 1920 Hitler's fearct Bolshevism 
seems to have been heightened, in part at least, by the danger of a 
resurgence of Pan-Slavism in Russia, and a revival of Russia's expansionist 
ambitions already visible in the Russo-Polish war. With the conclusion 
of the war, this primarily strategic consideration soon disappeared and in 
January 1921 Hitler wrote that "the threatening Bolshevik flood is not so 
such to be feared as a consequence of Russian-Bolshevik victories on the 
battlefields as of a systematic destruction of our own people (by Bolshevik 
ideas). " 
(106) As pressure on Germany from the Entente countries over 
reparations was being stepped up, Hitler, writing in the VB on 6 March 
1921, criticized those Germans who were calling for a Russian alliance to 
counterbalance the Western threat. Whilst re-stating his conviction that 
an understanding between Russia and Germany would have been the latter's 
salvation in 1915 or 1916, he firmly rejected one with a "Russia, which 
represents, at least in power-political terms, little more than a cripple 
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compared to the former Czarist state. " 
(107) 
In the same issue, Rosenberg 
revealed the reason for Hitler's low estimate of Bolshevik Russia when he 
commented that "the whole of Russia is in revolt against the terror of 
the Jews. We do not know whether it will now be finally broken... (but) 
the days of Jewish Bolshevism in Russia are numbered. " 
(108) 
On the other 
hand, if Germany were to accept a diktat on reparations, then ehe too 
would face the Jewish terror "as in Russia carried out by foreign troops. 
In Russia, it is the Latvians and Chinese who 'pacify' the workers-with 
machine guns. " An alliance with the Bolsheviks, however, was not the 
solution; the Germans, according to Rosenberg, had to resist both the 
Jewish bankers in London (who were behind the reparations issue) and "the 
enticements from the East. " 
(109) 
Significantly enough, nine days later, Hitler repeated not only Rosenberg's 
general assessment on 6 March of the situation in Russia but also many 
incidentals as well. "After an unprecedented 3 years of bloody dictatorship", 
Hitler wrote, "the Bolshevik regime is beginning to totter. " The Russian 
worker, Hitler continued, was turning against "the Jewish bloodhounds, 
which lay him low with knouts and machine guns", and against the torture 
administered by "the Chinese and Latvian terror-guards"; finally the Russian 
proletariat was being moved to revolt against Bolshevism and in Russia 
this could only mean, in Hitler's view, "the rooting out of the Jews. '"(110) 
The close correlation between Hitler's and Rosenbergs accounts is too 
striking to be coincidental. 
On 3 May 1921, Hitler referred to the fact that Lenin was trying to 
establish trading relations with England to alleviate Russia's economic 
problems, a fact which Rosenberg had highlighted as evidence of collusion 
between capitalism and communism only two days earlier in the Vß. 
(111) 
On 
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4 August, Hitler spoke disapprovingly of attempts to collect food in 
Germany for the starving Russian people because "all relief aids not them, 
but their tormentors, the Jewish commissars, (the) Latvian and Chinese troops". 
Once again, this repeated a news item published by Rosenberg in the VB the 
same day that supplies of bread were not reaching the Russian people. 
(112) 
The Nazis continued to predict the downfall of Bolshevism for some time 
and clearly Hitler seems to have followed Rosenberg's line and to have 
drawn snippets of information from Rosenberg's articles on Russia. 
Alongside the day-to-day criticism of events in Bolshevik Russia, ran the 
frequently expressed sympathy for the Russian people (though this did not 
extend to helping them fend off starvation! ) and for those nationalist 
forces which were working to overthrow Bolshevism. As Rosenberg had 
written on several occasions, if these - predictably anti-semitic - forces 
were to succeed, then they would be the natural allies for Germany. In 
January 1921 he expressed the hope that his revelations about a Judeo- 
Masonic conspiracy against Czarist Russia would lead to "a German-Russian 
national (that is, anti-Jewish) united front". 
(113) 
Hitler seems to have 
accepted this ideological scenario claiming that a German-Russian alliance 
could only come into being when Jewry had been overthrown. In August 1921, 
Hitler claimed that the only assistance which the German people could give 
the Russians was in "the annihilation of the present rulers of Russia. "<114) 
These ideological comments seem to indicate that Hitler and Rosenberg would 
not have been averse to having a Russo-German alliance as part of a future 
Nazi Party foreign policy programme. Further indications to this effect 
can be found in their discussions of pre-par German diplomacy. As has 
been shown, Hitler felt the two countries had been natural allies. Inter- 
estingly, Rosenberg followed the same line in a rare excursion out of the 
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ideological field; he criticized German diplomats for maintaining a 
dialogue with Britain in the last years before the war and for "counting on 
Great Britain's 'magnanimity' instead of - as sound German interests 
dictated - uniting also with Russia, in my opinion at the expense of 
Austria-Hungary". 
(115) 
It is not altogether clear whether Rosenberg was 
really suggesting German alliances with both Russia and England here; if so, 
then he evidently did not share Hitler's view that the two alliances were 
mutually exclusive alternatives. 
Nevertheless, Hitler and Rosenberg seemed to agree on what pre-war German 
diplomats ought to have done and though these comments had little 
immediate relevance to Germany's postwar position, taken with the outspoken 
support for the Russian people, it seems fair to assume that when the 
Nazis finally decided to formulate an alliance strategy of their own, a 
Russo-German alliance would form part of it. There are no signs of the 
belief in Slav inferiority which was to underlie later anti-Russian policies. 
Rosenberg did make, as has been seen, some ambivalent statements about the 
Russians in 1919, but, though the Russians were regarded as inferior to 
the Germans, the two peoples were felt to have a natural affinity; they 
were "the noblest peoples of Europe", who would be assigned to one another 
"not only politically but also culturally". 
(116) 
Nor was there concrete 
evidence of a desire to see the break-up of the Russian Empire. It is true 
that Hitler had hinted that Russia would have had fewer problems if she did 
not try to keep control of non-Russian areas but Rosenberg, though later 
a supporter of Ukrainian separatism, seemed to feel that demands for national 
self-determination inside the Russian Empire had fatally weakened the anti- 
Bolshevik cause and that German politicians, instead of trying to unite 
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Russians behind the nationalist regime, had in fact mistakenly preached 
"deliverance from the Czarist yoke" and stressed differences between 
Ukrainians and Greater Russians: the treaty of Brest Litovsk had been the 
result. 
(117) 
Thus Hitler and Rosenberg were broadly in agreement on the Russian question, 
judging by their ideological commitment to the Russian people in the 
struggle against Bolshevism, their observations on pre-war German diplomacy, 
and the absence of any extreme racial elitism towards the Slavs. As in 
the case of Britain and Italy, they continued to criticize the actions 
of the current government in Russia, whilst retaining their belief in the 
possibility of collaboration with a future nationally-orientated govern- 
ment. On Russian affairs, Hitler seemed willing to accept Rosenberg's 
interpretation of events and to go along with his prognosis. After the 
leadership crisis in July 1921, then Hitler's own contributions to the VB 
became fewer and after Eckart took over editorial control of the VB in 
August, Rosenberg's influence over the party's interpretation of foreign 
affairs grew even more. He became the most regular contributor to the paper 
and did the bulk of the editorial work during Eckart's periods of 
indolence. As unofficial editor of the VB, Rosenberg was in a good position 
to sway opinion in the party. The VB became preoccupied with Bolshevik 
Russia, as Ernst HanfstKngl discovered when he tried to interest the 
VB in some newspaper clippings; "all Rosenberg wanted were articles and news 
items dealing with his particular anti-Bolshevist, anti-clerical, anti- 
semitic prejudices", Hanfstltngl later complained! 
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Though Hanfstängl must 
be treated as a hostile witness, the substance of his criticism is borne 
out by a reading of the VB in 1921 and 1922. Rosenberg had established 
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himself as a party authority on Russian affairs and was in a position 
of considerable influence. As the editor of a collection of Rosenberg's 
writings put it later, from his articles and speeches, "the editors, 
speakers, and politicians of our movement collected material for their 
struggle, and indeed material which was not only sharply honed but also 
true and incontrovertible. " 
(119) 
The signing of the treaty of Rapallo on 16 April 1922 by representatives 
of the Russian and German delegations to the Genoa economic conference 
provided a test of Nazi convictions on foreign affairs. As always, 
developments, which suggested that Germany might have friends abroad, posed 
problems of interpretation for Nazi audiences used to hearing that Germany 
was surrounded by hostile conspiratorial powers. In December 1921 Rosenberg's 
instinct had been to explain the limited trade agreement between Germany 
and the Soviet Union of 6 May 1921 as a pretext for Bolshevik intervention 
in German internal affairs: "The Moscow government of Hebrews has promised 
non-interference in non-Russian affairs in every treaty but not kept to it", 
he had declared. 
(120) 
And even before the news of the signing of the 
treaty of Rapallo broke, Hitler and Rosenberg had been suspicious of 
Russian offers of economic concessions to the capitalist West, fearing that 
the West might recognize the Soviet Union. 
(121) 
As it happened, it was 
Germany, not the Western powers, who bestowed de facto recognition on 
the Soviet regime by signing the Rapallo treaty. How would the Nazis 
react? 
The VB's first reaction on 19 April was to denounce it as a "great trick": 
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"Germany will be allowed to build up Soviet Russia 
with her technical science, her labour and her 
sweat, so that the stock exchange Jews from the 
rest of the world can take over the administration 
without risk.... The German-Russian treaty is the 
continuation of Pan-Jewish-Anglo-Saxon world 
policy and the exploitation of German impotence. " (122) 
On 21 April Hitler condemned the treaty because it furthered the destruction 
of the German as well as the Russian state which was the aim of the world 
stock exchange; "in Russia", he declared, "the Jews and their Chinese- 
Latvian security guards rule... Arrangements for the same are being made 
for us. Genoa means the lasting enslavement of Germany. " 
(123) "Russia", 
he concluded, "is not the last straw, which Germany, like a drowning man, 
can clutch, but a lead weight, which pulls us immediately down into the 
depths". 
(124) 
The ideological nature of Hitler's rejection of the Rapallo 
treaty is quite apparent; an alliance with the Bolsheviks was out of the 
question, but an alliance with the Russian people was still desired: "What 
can help us? ", he asked, "Not to negotiate with the despoilers of Russia, 
but to call upon the Russian people to shake off their tormentors, in order 
then to draw nearer to them (the Russian people). "t(125) 
Hitler's response to the Rapallo treaty does not appear to indicate any 
change in his attitude towards Russia. However, when Rosenberg expounded 
his analysis of Rapallo on 3 May 1922, the real significance of the treaty 
fOr the Nazis became clear. Rosenberg was very concerned with the 
Co Min tern's response to Rapallo, which was to call for a Russian 
alliance against France, a call, of course, which found a ready echo in many 
German nationalist circles. This was the test of the strength of Nazi 
views on Russia, for if the destruction of the arch-enemy France had been 
of paramount importance, then surely even a 'pact with the devil', the 
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Soviet Union, would have been an acceptable short-term price to pay. 
Significantly, Rosenberg did not agree: "We declare it to be the greatest 
crime against the German people if one called them, moreoever with the 
decaying Soviet Russia, into an active military struggle against France. " 
He noted that Germany had no weapons and that France would (with some 
difficulty) win such a conflict but he saw behind such an idea, which 
the Jewish press was propagating in France, an attempt by the stock exchange 
and Soviet Jews to reduce Germany to a state oP prostration. 
(127) 
From 
Rosenberg, this was entirely predictable. More surprising, in view of 
his stated preference to die in a Bolshevik Germany than to live in a 
frenchified Germany, was Hitler'. s repetition of precisely the same argument 
two days after the publication of Rosenberg's article: "Whilst inter- 
nationalism is being preached in Germany and today plans for a campaign 
against France are being worked out in communist lairs", Hitler claimed, 
,, the same frivolous game is being played in France the other way round, 
with extreme 'nationalism' "; only high finance, Hitler concluded, could 
profit from such events. 
(128) 
It is, of course, true that Hitler was unlikely to admit in public that he 
supported an alliance with Russia against France, even if he did so 
privately. Nazi propaganda, as ever, required the sharpest condemnation 
of government policies - in this case, that meant the treaty of Rapallo. 
So one cannot argue that Hitler's response to Rapallo necessarily showed 
that Hitler was moving away from the concept of a German-Russian alliance 
in the future. What is significant about Rapallo is that it seems to have 
brought home to Hitler the central importance of Bolshevik Russia to his 
party's Weltanschauung. On 21 April, in the immediate aftermath of the 
ngws of the RapallO agreement, Hitler declared that "the greatest task for 
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our people still stands before it: to be (the) leader in the coming 
struggle of the Aryans against the world-wide Jewish threat. ' 
129) 
For 
Hitler and the other party leaders, 
(130) 
Rapallo seemed to symbolize the 
partnership between capitalism and revolutionary socialism; in a speech 
on 22 June, Hitler described the Soviet representatives and the Western 
bankers walking arm-in-arm through the streets of Genoa and spoke of 
the need for a new Weltanschauung: 
"Bolshevism is the final consequence of materialistic 
Marxism. To rise against this is the mission of the 
German people. The goal: the Germanic Empire of the 
German Nation. The deadly enemy: Jewry. " (131) 
As yet, it must be stressed that little had seemingly changed in Hitler's 
outlook in foreign affairs; he still condemned collaboration with the 
Soviet Union and promised support to the Russian people and a future 
nationalist government. Perhaps, however, Hitler was now beginning to 
accept Soviet Russia as a permanent feature of the diplomatic scene and 
was making opposition to Bolshevism the pivot of Nazi ideology. The struggle 
against the Versailles Settlement (and the war of revenge against France) 
were only part of that ideology and no longer the main rationale behind the 
party. Perhaps, the treaty of Rapallo helped to crystallize the change, 
but there is evidence that this change was under way earlier in 1922. 
Early in 1922 Hitler went on a long tour of Germany trying to attract support 
from nationalist circles and from reports of one of these private 
encounters, Hitler's current assessment of the Russian question can be 
determined. During the tour - probably in March 1922 - Hitler delivered 
a speech to the Juniklub, an association whose name commemorated the signing 
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in June 1919 of the abhorred treaty of Versailles, and met its leading 
(132) 
light, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck. Moeller was, by all accounts, 
a quiet serious man, a political writer and cultural historian; he was not 
a gifted public speaker but wielded great influence over his associates 
by his prowess in discussion. 
(133) 
His major achievements were a new 
edition of Dostoevski's novels and the famous book often mistakenly taken 
because of its title Das Dritte Reich as anticipating the Nazi period. 
(134) 
Hitler's usual beer-hall tirade on the 'Breaking of Interest-Slavery' left 
the intellectually sophisticated, and by the end somewhat depleted, 
audience at the Juniklub quite unmoved, but a private conversation then 
ensued between Hitler and Moeller, later recounted by Rudolf Pechel, editor 
of Deutsche Rundschau and a member of the club, during which Moeller tried 
to establish Hitler's views on the problems of the day. Hitler emerged 
from the ensuing discussion greatly impressed by Moeller, reportedly 
exclaiming: "You have everything I lack. You create the spiritual frame- 
work for Germany's reconstruction. I am but a drummer and an assembler. 
Let us work together. " Unfortunately, the admiration was not mutual; 
,, that fellow will never grasp it", Moeller is said to have commented after 
(135) 
Hitler's departure: 
Hans Grimm, the poet and later author of the influential novel Volk ohne 
Raum who was a close friend and associate of Moeller has related the latter's 
account of the encounter with Hitler. 
(136) 
According to this account, the 
two men quarrelled over foreign policy; "it seemed to me", Grimm recalled, 
,, that Russia and Bolshevism and its significance for Germany had been 
touched upon by both men, and this had led to a basic differenaect opinion. " 
Moeller saw in Bolshevism hope for Germany; he expected that Russian 
nationalism would emerge, of necessity, from Russian Bolshevism and that 
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it would incline towards Germany. Hitler rejected this 'National 
Bolshevik' argument quoting a remark by Karl Radek, a member of the 
executive of the Comintern, to the effect that what the right-wing New 
Order in Germany and Europe needed was the addition of "squadrons of 
Asiatic Bolsheviks". 
(137) 
The full implications of this disagreement can only be grasped within the 
context of Moeller's overall views on foreign policy. Central to Moeller's 
whole outlook was his belief in the existence of 'young' and 'old' nations. 
The distinction between the two groups was apparent in Moeller's book, 
Die Deutschen, published in 1906: "today the earth belongs to the nation- 
alities", he wrote, "... humanity is no longer divided into young and old 
races but into young and old peoples"; 
(138) 
it was a distinction based 
principally on political longevity, cultural performance and population 
growth. The 'young nations' - Germany, Russia, and America - were newly- 
formed states, culturally prolific with expanding populations, whilst the 
'old'nations - France, England, and (perhaps surprisingly) Italy - were in 
decline. 
(139) 
The similarity with Oswald Spengler's ideas on the decline 
of the west is obvious. 
(140) 
From this early stage Moeller argued that 
Germany should "conquer a political share of the empire of the world, daily 
she conquers her civilizing (share) from Hamburg to Salonica". 
(141) 
This 
imperialistic expansion was justified by Moeller in terms of geopolitics: 
"as soon as the space has become too confined for the people", he wrote, 
"it breaks over its borders and leads us to a point where we must adopt a 
world policy (Weltpolitik) in order to become a world 
(142) 
people. " 
These ideas, first not out in 1906 underwent little modification over the 
years; Moeller's rejection of the Western European powers and his belief 
in the natural community of interest between the 'young nations', particularly 
Germany and Russia, survived the First World War, during which Russia and 
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America were at odds with Germany. During the war, the direction of 
Moeller's proposed German expansion became evident; he declared that 
"we must take a share of the East, to which we, in our own way, half 
belong and on which we border, if we want to have a share in the future: 
air to breathe, space for movement, time for development. " 
(143) 
This 
expansion could only take place at the expense of Russia, so how could 
Moeller hope for Russo-German collaboration at the same time? The answer 
was that Russia would turn her back on Europe after her defeat and resume 
her proper role as an Asiatic eastward-looking power, abandoning her non- 
Russian land in the West: "(in 1914) Russia was too large for Russia and 
Germany too small for Europe", Moeller remarked. 
(144) 
In August 1918, 
Moeller wrote that "Russia is returning to her natural frontier, spacially 
as well as spiritually. That is the result for Russia, for Europe. It 
is signified by the reciprocal action which is not pushing Russia towards 
the west, but rather (pushing) Europe towards the East. " 
(145) 
For Moeller, 
such expansion was not naked imperialism, but a resumption of the natural 
course of European development, which had been impeded only by Russia's 
claim to be a European power and which with the fall of Czarism was now 
possible. The areas to be acquired by the west (that is, Germany) were 
"the former Russian border areas, which, like the Baltic States, like 
Finland and Poland, have already been for a long time 'culturally' part of 
Central Europe. The same, however, applied to Russia Itself. " 
(146) 
After the war Moeller's attitude appears to have moderated. He produced 
what he called a "socialistic foreign policy" which consisted primarily of 
"adopting an association with Russia and playing off the revolutionary 
East against the capitalistic West. " Historians have been unable to 
agree whether Moeller's 'eastern orientation' was, in fact, a post-war 
rejection d expansion at Russian expense in favour of genuine German- 
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Russian collaboration. The majority have taken this more charitable 
view of Moeller's philosophy, that he expected Russian nationalism to 
become part of Russian Bolshevism and the creation of a cultural community 
in Eastern Europe. 
(148) 
Fritz Stern, for example, acknowledges an 
imperialistic streak behind Moeller's ideas but feels that it was "the 
vision of an aesthete", not based on an appraisal of the objective political 
situation but oneeathetical judgements. 
(149) 
On the other hand, others 
have seen the old imperialistic ideas hidden by the high-sounding talk of 
peaceful expansion, federations and so on; it was, according to one 
writer, simply the implementation of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk by other 
methods. 
(150) Though it is all too easy to indict others as imperialists 
the the basis of their writings, there is surely some justification for 
this charge. The whole trend of Moeller's writing before and during the 
First World War indicated a desire for German expansion eastwards; in the 
post-war period, he remained committed to the idea of imperialism, only 
the direction that it would take is in doubt. On the one occasion after 
the war when he was specific about his territorial ambitions for Germany 
in the East, Moeller showed that he had grossdeutsch ambitious at the very 
least; he wanted "the frontiers of nationality" not the "frontiers of the 
map". 
(ibi) In all probability, Moeller hoped, as he had done before the 
war, that Germany would expand eastwards and an 'Asiatic Russia' would 
cooperate with Germany's spatial requirements. What is certain is that if 
there was to be cooperation between Germany and Russia, it was to be very 
much on German terms. As Moeller explained in August 1920: "cooperation 
with Russia was only possible with independence from Russia"; the Russian 
revolutionaries, therefore, had to recognize that "each land has its own 
socialism" and they were not to try to impose Russian socialism on Germany. 
(152) 
The Bolsheviks had to abandon their international aspirations: "Bolshevism 
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is Russian. And it is only Russian" declared Moeller. Lenin had only 
to accept that Bolshevism was meant only for Russia and, in Moeller's 
view, Russo-German collaboration against their common enemies, France and 
England, could begin. 
(153) 
This was evidently the point over which Moeller and Hitler were at odds 
during their discussion. Hitler could not accept that the Bolsheviks would 
resist the temptation to extend Bolshevism to Germany. As a result, Hitler's 
verdict on the Treaty of Rapallo differed decisively from Moeller's. 
Whilst Hitler saw it as a fatal error to ally with Soviet Russia, for 
Moeller, "the decision of Genoa does not signify a goal... it signifies a 
direction.... The direct result of this decision is for Russia at the 
moment perhaps great, for Germany perhaps only small. But the indirect 
result is incalculable, because this decision is the first step on the way 
to a grouping of nations which want to live. " 
(154) 
In fact, the dispute with Moeller van den Bruck may reveal a change that 
had occurred in Hitler's outlook during 1922. In October 1921 as has been 
seen, Hitler had endorsed the view that a pre-war German alliance with 
Russia would have allowed Germany to expand eastwards - precisely the 
argument with which Moeller (and the Pan-Germans) had been associated at the 
time of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. 
(155) 
So it might be 
assumed that his disagreement with Moeller showed that Hitler had abandoned 
the idea of eastward expansion with a Russian alliance. This could mean 
either that Hitler was now taking very seriously the party's anti-Bolshevik 
ideology and would not consider an agreement with Soviet Russia or that he 
had more excessive demands to make on Russian territory. It needs to be 
stressed that, given the scanty evidence for the encounter between 
Hitler and Moeller, this suggestion of a modification of Hitler's outlook 
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remains fairly speculative at this stage. 
The treaty of Rapallo and the encounter with Moeller van den Bruck 
seem to show that Hitler may have been seriously affected by the party's 
autisemitic, anti-Bolshevik philosophy. The hardening of his attitude 
towards Soviet Russia evident in his reaction to both events was, of course, 
already occurring before this. The increased virulence of Hitler's anti- 
Bolshevism and his rejection of 'National Bolshevism' may have been attrib- 
utable to the influence of a more critical view of Russia propagated by 
Rosenberg during 1921-22 and perhaps also to Hitler's association with Dr. 
Max-Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, who had contacts with a group of Russian 
nationalists in exile in Southern Germany. The latter not unnaturally 
were opposed to any form of collaboration between Germany and the 
Bolshevik rulers of Russia. Certainly the changing views of Rosenberg on 
Russia and the influence of Rosenberg and Scheubner-Richter on Hitler 
deserve closer examination. 
Hitler's rejection of Moeller's arguments for Russo-German cooperation on 
the grounds that Germany would be subjected to the invasion of "squadrons 
of Asiatic Bolsheviks" seems clearly to have been influenced by Rosenberg's 
interpretation of Bolshevism as an "Asiatic pestilence". 
(156) 
'National 
Bolshevism' was impossible in Russia, according to Rosenberg, because 
Bolshevism was the product of an alien, non-Russian, culture. Rosenberg, 
by no means always a Russophobe as some have suggested, was a great 
admirer of Russian culture, particularly of the works of Dostoevski and 
Tolstoy; at first, therefore, he had denied that the Bolshevik leaders 
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were Slavs at all and claimed that the Bolshevik regime had been destroying 
everything that was genuinely Russian. 
(157) 
However, as the Russian people 
proved incapable of overthrowing Bolshevism during the Russian civil war, 
Rosenberg's view of Bolshevism and the Russian people very gradually began 
to change. The change was most apparent in his pamphlet, Peat in Russland, 
published in late June or early July 1922. Although Bolshevism was still 
regarded as a disease originating in the East, it was no longer totally 
alien to the Russian people. There was, Rosenberg now argued, a "dormant 
anarchistic impulse" in the Russian character, which surfaced occasionally, 
in the reign of Ivan the Terrible and in the Strelzi rising in Peter the 
Great's time, for example, and which formed a direct link with the 'anarchism' 
of Bakunin and Trotsky and Zinoviev. 
(158) 
This was quite a dramatic volte- 
. 
Ls* since Rosenberg had criticized the Russians in 1919 for their 
indolence and lack of aggression. Dostoevsky had shown, Rosenberg argued 
in 1922, that "even the most genial Russian for no accountable reason can 
suddenly become a criminal and murderer. " 
(159) 
On the other hand, the 
Russians were still not capable of systematic and cold-blooded torture 
and murder. The horrors and blood-letting, the rejection of western 
influence and, indeed, of the achievements of Russians themselves, epitomized 
by the Bolshevik Revolution were, in Rosenberg's view, the result of 
"a profound blood-mixture" during the period of Tartar domination of 
Russia. This also explained the tensions within the Russian character 
up to the present; the European and the Asiatic elements in the Russian 
character were constantly at odds with each other. Bolshevism, therefore, 
represented a resurgence of Asiatic blood, Rosenberg claimed in 1922; 
"a new deployment of the Near Eastern spirit against Europe". 
(160) 
The 
Jews, of courses were orchestrating this new 'Mongol' advance. 
(161) 
Never- 
theless, though Rosenberg's view of Bolshevism and the Russians had 
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changed, he had not abandoned the idea of a German alliance with a 
future non-Bolshevik Russia and, indeed, in the foreword to the second 
edition of Pest in Russland, he maintained that anti-Bolshevik forces 
were gaining in strength. 
(162) 
However, his doubts about the racial quality 
of the Russian people represented a marked lowering of his estimation of 
Germany's would-be ally. 
This change was also reflected in the appearance of a different attitude to 
separatist movements inside Russia. In May 1921, as has been seen, 
Rosenberg criticised the Berlin government at the time of the treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk for having encouraged separatist movements inside Russia, 
instead of trying to unite all Russians behind a nationalist government 
representing a united Russian Empire (Gross-russland) against the Bolsheviks. 
(163) 
But in 1922 Rosenberg showed he recognized the value of separatism, 
especially Ukrainian separatism, as a means of undermining the Bolshevik 
state. In Pest in Russland, he pointed out that the ruthless centralisation 
followed by Czarist officials had been the foundation of the Russian empire 
but that this policy pursued by the Great Russian advocates of empire 
was also a source of weakness; the Polish and Finnish officials of the 
empire were strongly opposed to St. Petersburg. 
(164) 
On two occasions he 
stressed the strength of Ukrainian demands for separate statehood without, 
it should be admitted, openly expressing support. 
(165) 
Once again, the 
modification was slight but significant; Rosenberg still opposed the 
granting of independence to Poland and the Baltic states which had 
contributed to Bolshevik success, but now he was beginning to recognise the 
usefulness of the unsatisfied nationalism of the Ukraine in his 
anti-Bolshevik crusade. 
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This had wider implications. Emerging in Rosenberg's mind at this time 
was a vision of a future Russia as a nation-state. Rosenberg, as he 
explained in his memoirs, had come to appreciate that the Russia of 1914 or 
1917 was "not a nation state in the sense of Germany or France. If one 
leaves aside the vexed question of the Ukraine or White Ruthenia, it 
was clear that Finland was not Russian. Neither the Balts, nor the 
Estonians, nor the Latvians, were Russians. All Caucasians were old 
peoples, Georgia was a state almost a thousand years old. The people of 
Turkistan were completely different from Russians. Russia was, therefore, 
despite the natural predominance of the Russians, a state of nationalities 
(Nationalitäten-Staat).. 
(iss) 
Just when Rosenberg began to draw this 
distinction between the Russian Empire and other nation-states is difficult 
to pinpoint. But in Pest in Russland the unspoken assumption was that 
one of the reasons for the Russian Revolution of March 1917 was that 
Czarism prevented the emergence of a "truly national Russia", that is a 
Russia devoid of its alien nationalities. 
(167) 
So Rosenberg's concept of 
the Russia of the future seems to have been of a truncated Russia, a re- 
creation of the Moscovite Russia of the pre-imperial period. 
If this was the case, it was but a short step to argue that Germany might 
benefit territorially from the dismantling of the Russian empire. It has 
to be emphasised, however, that Rosenberg did not suggest this explicitly 
at this time. However, Rosenberg in his analysis of the treaty of Brest- 
Litovsk in May 1921 had criticised its mildness; the preoccupation of the 
Germans with the rights of Poland and the Baltic states, had, in his words, 
"undermined the possibility of a strong far-reaching policy in Russia"; 
the result was "the historically unnatural and, in comparison to that of 
Versailles, positively mild peace of Brest-Litovsk. " (168) The implication 
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here surely is that a settlement more in tune with history would have 
been harsher, possibly splitting Russia into nation-states. 
Further evidence of Rosenberg's interest in German annexations in Europe 
can be found in his commentary on the party programme, Wesen, GrundsUtze 
und Ziele der NSDAP, written early in 1923. There he criticized the 
democratic parties of pre-war Germany for "preventing a systematic German 
colonial policy" which would have enabled Germany to absorb her growing 
population without the resort to emigration. It would not have been so 
bad if these parties which opposed a "colonial world policy" had at the 
same time, Rosenberg went on, "at least represented the German people 
forcefully on the European continent, but here too the Danes, Poles, etc. 
were protected and every attempt at a large-scale settlement in the East 
ran into the stiffest opposition". 
(169) 
Rosenberg, clearly, was interested 
in territorial expansion in Europe. When he referred to "settlement in the 
East" he did not have in mind simply the re-settlement of the depopulated 
eastern provinces of Germany as he revealed: 
"it is not possible under the present circumstances to 
indicate more clearly the European and extra-European 
areas in question which must come in consideration for 
colonisation. The imperialistic (Weltpolitik) opportunities 
of today can change in time. " (170) 
Despite the vagueness of this final comment, his elaboration of point 
three of the party programme - the demand for "land and soil (colonies)" 
to feed the German people - revealed Rosenberg's support for territorial 
annexation inside Europe as well as outside; Russian territory is not 
specified though there can be little doubt as to Rosenberg's ideas on the 
future of the Polish state, for which he had not the slightest respect. 
(171) 
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So all the indications are that Rosenberg's attitude towards Eastern 
Europe was changing: he was beginning to recognise the usefulness of the 
Ukrainisaseparatist movement; he seemed to envisage a "decolonized" 
Russia reduced to its original Muscovite core; finally, it seems possible 
that he felt Germany ought to benefit territorially from this process 
and then establish a firm alliance with this reorganised Russian state, 
when it was liberated from its Bolshevik leadership. These changes 
occurred at a time when Rosenberg's influence on Hitler was probably at its 
greatest. Hitler seems, for example, to have used Rosenberg's Pest in 
Russland as a sourcebook for his anti-Bolshevik tirades. 
(172) 
Hitler also 
oems to have been pleased with Rosenberg's pamphlet Wesen, Grundsgtze und 
Ziele der NSDAP taking time at the party confernece in January 1923 to 
thank Rosenberg publicly for "his resolute collaboration and the theoretical 
amplification of the party programs". 
(173) 
So Hitler was fully aware of 
the development of Rosenberg's ideas, if indeed, they did not merely 
reflect his own. 
At the same time as these changes were occurring, the Nazi party was in 
contact with Russian 
emigres, who had fled from the Bolsheviks in Russia 
and settled in southern Germany. There can be no doubt that they, too, 
reinforced Hitler's more virulent anti-Bolshevism. Themen who acted as 
an intermediary between Hitler and the Russian 
emigres was Max-Erwin von 
Scheubner-Richter, a Baltic German, who was killed at Hitler's side at 
the Feldherrnhalle on 9 November 1923 at the climax of the Munich 
(174) 
putsch. 
Scheubner-Richter's political career and contribution to the Nazi party is 
difficult to reconstruct due to his liking for backstage intrigue and 
secret diplomacy, nevertheless an attempt must be made to investigate the 
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role of the man, of whom Hitler said when referring to the "martyrs of 
9 November 1923", "all are replaceable but not he". 
(175) 
Scheubner-Richter's expertise on Russian affairs was rooted in his 
wartime experiences with the German Army in Eastern Europe. After apparently 
having had a command in Turkey and having led a political expedition to 
Persia and Afghanistan, Scheubner-Richter found himself in early 1918 in 
Riga in charge of the press office of Oberost, the German government of 
occupation in Latvia. 
(176) 
There he worked in close collaboration with 
August Winnig, the German commissioner in the Baltic provinces, who, 
after initial doubts, found him to be a "reliable and honourable character". 
(177) 
Already in evidence were the political views and personality traits, 
which were to characterize Scheubner-Richter until his futile death on 9 
November 1923. 
He told Winnig in 1919 that he was a "national socialist with no party 
affiliations"; he regarded himself as a "loner, mistrusted and rejected by 
one (party) as a reactionary, and by the others as a red". 
(178) 
He 
hoped that within five years Germany could recover from defeat. According 
to Max Boehm, an expert on the Auslanddeutsche (Germans living abroad), 
who also met Scheubner-Richter in Riga in 1918, "his outlook was in no 
way radical, but clever and cautious. In Baltic politics, we both rep- 
resented a tolerant line against the Latvians and Estonians and found our- 
selves at odds to a certain extent with the reactionary and pan-German 
tendencies especially in the Baltic aristocracy. " 
(179) 
Scheubner-Richter 
saw his own mission clearly enough: to defend the Germans in Latvia and, 
as the war continued to go badly for Germany during 1918, to defend Latvia 
against the obvious enemy, Russian Bolshevism. 
(180) 
In 1918, it seems, 
therefore, Scheubner-Richter was a moderate German nationalist, who 
rejected Pan-German ideas about annexing the Baltic States and understood 
the separatist feelings of Estonians and Latvians; his abiding fear, 
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however, was that Bolshevism would manage to spread its infection into 
Germany. 
In 1918 Scheubner-Richter was also displaying a taste for personal adventure 
which would remain with him till the fateful march to the Feldherrnhalle. 
As the Germany Army prepared to withdraw from the Baltic provinces at the 
end of 1918 in face of the approaching Red Army, Scheubner-Richter vol- 
unteered to remain in Riga as Winnig"s representative to negotiate with 
the Bolsheviks and the Latvian authorities. 
(181) 
Scheubner-Richter, as the 
last German consular official in Riga, tried to protect the German inhab- 
itants and their property and to organise transportation for any German 
(182) 
troops remaining in Riga. This Put Scheubner-Richter's life in 
considerable jeopardy from the Latvians, resentful of German rule, and the 
oncoming Bolshevik troops. In fact on 14 January 1919, Scheubner-Richter 
was arrested and sentenced to death, only to be reprieved in circumstances 
which are still far from clear. 
(183) 
Not surprisingly, his experiences in Latvia in January 1919, especially 
his own personal treatment and the daily executions which took place during 
the Soviet occupation, reinforced Scheubner-Richter's anti-Bolshevik 
convictions. 
(184) On his return to Germany, he rejoined August Winnig, 
now Reichskommissar for East and West Prussia, in Königsberg, where he 
helped to disseminate anti-Soviet propaganda. 
(185) 
At Scheubner-Richter's 
instigation in February 1918, the Wirtschaftspolitische Aufkllrungsdienst 
(WAD), an economic policy information service for the East, was established 
to publicize the destructive consequences of Bolshevism for economic life 
and to work for economic cooperation between Germany and the border 
states. 
(186) On 18 February 1919 the Ostdeutsche Heimatsdienst (OHD), the 
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Bast German Homeland Service, replaced it. 
(187) 
Max Boehm, who had 
dealings with Scheubner-Richter as chairman of the OHD, asserts that 
8cheubner-Richter, in no way, pursued "a radical nationalism, but organised 
the resistance of the threatened borderland against the danger from the 
East, which, for him, had become a pivotal phenomenon. " 
(188) 
Boehm fails 
to mention that Scheubner-Richter was also worried about another threat, 
felt particularly acutely in East Prussia, namely the threat from Poland. (189) 
In 1919, the OHD organized mass protests against the transfer of West 
Prussia to Poland, and on the issues of Danzig and Memel; in May 1919, it 
was decided to build the permanent head-quarters of the OHD in Danzig, the 
aim being "to convince the Reich government as well as the Entente of the 
need to support the Ostmark economically and militarily as a bulwark against 
Russian Bolshevism and not to cut it off from the Reich. " 
(190) 
Hence by 
the end of 1919, Scheubner-Richter's hostility towards Poland and Bolshevik 
Russia was well honed by personal experience. 
8cheubner-Richter's activities in Königsberg were abruptly curtailed by the 
Kapp putsch in March 1920. August Winnig was involved in the conspiracy 
to overthrow the Weimar Republic and was suspended from office in the 
aftermath and, predictably, Scheubner-Richter had mot been able to resist 
the lure of a conspiracy. 
(191) 
The decision to move from Königsberg to 
to Munich was, in retrospect, the turning-point in his life. Arno 
Schickedanz, a friend of Rosenberg's whom he had known in Riga in 1918, 
apparently got Scheubner-Richter interested in a project being organized by 
Rosenberg in Munich to establish trading links between Bavarian businessmen 
and the White Russian forces under General Wrangel in the Crimea. 
(192) 
Moving to Munich, Scheubner-Richter met Rosenberg and was introduced to 
leading industrialists and Russian emigres and eventually led a commission 
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to the Crimea in May 1920. The visit convinced him that White Russian 
forces, if properly supported from Germany and under united leadership, 
could rid Russia of Bolshevism. 
(193) 
Thus, Scheubner-Richter had found 
a new challenge - to foster friendly contacts between White Russians and 
German nationalists, and to this end, with his friend, Dr. Nemirovich- 
Danchenko, Wrangel's former press chief, he established the Neue deutsch- 
russische Gesellschaft. 
(194) 
By May 1921 it had 150 members and was 
re-formed as Aufbau. Wirtschaftliche Vereinigung für den Osten with its 
own journal Wirtschaftspolitische Aufbau-Korrespondenz (WPA), its aim 
being to attract German economic circles and unions in order to "advise 
them how reconstruction in the interests of Germany and Russia is possible". 
(195) 
Scheubner-Richter's mission to the Crimea, though fruitless, and the 
establishment of Aufbau and his undoubted charm; 
196) 
had established his 
credentials in the eyes of the Russian emigr4s in Southern Germany, so much 
so that he was entrusted with the organization of the Russian monarchist 
conference at Bad Reichenhall in Bavaria in May 1921. The fortunes of the 
Russian Emigres were at their lowest ebb at the beginning of 1921 since 
General Wrangel had abandoned his resistance to the Red Army at the end of 
1920. Also, the 4migr6O were united only in their opposition to Bolshevism; 
the supporters of the democratic parties opposed the monarchists. The 
democrats themselves were divided between the supporters of the Kadets under 
Milyukov and the Mensheviks under Nabokov. 
(197) 
The monarchists were also 
divided into supporters of a restored Czarism and constitutional monarchists 
and were further splintered into francophile and germanophile factions. 
Then, of course, when it came to choosing a new Czar, opinion was divided 
between three possible candidates: Grand Dukes, Cyril Vladimirovich and 
Dmitry Paviovich and the elder statesman Nikolai Nikolayevich. (198) 
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Not surprisingly, therefore, Scheubner-Richter made little progress at 
Bad Reichenhall towards his goal of uniting the Russian monarchist movement: 
the conference had to content itself with vague statements of principle 
which all could accept. 
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Scheubner-Richter persevered but the 
dwindling fortunes of the White Russian cause only seemed to aggravate the 
disunity of the emigr4s. The German signature of the treaty of Rapallo 
seemed to vindicate the arguments of the francophiles, and the German- 
based dmigres split into francophile and germanophile factions, the former 
supporting the candidature of Nikolai Nikolayevich, the latter that of 
Cyril Viadimirovich. 
(200) 
Meanwhile, of course, Scheubner-Richter had already established contact 
with the German Workers' Party. He met Adolf Hitler through Alfred 
Rosenberg in October 1920 and joined the party the following month and, 
according to the VB's retrospective on Scheubner-Richter, he found himself 
, In the following years, in ever closer collaboration with Adolf Hitler and 
his movement". 
(201) 
Most historians assert that Hitler and Scheubner-Richter 
only became very close collaborators in 1923 in the build-up to the abortive 
putsch, when Scheubner-Richter was secretary of the Kampfbund, the league 
of extreme right-wing groups, which Hitler came to lead in September 1923. 
However, it seems more likely that Scheubner-Richter had been in close 
contact with Hitler for some time and that they had, in fact, become 
personal friends; certainly Scheubner-Richter was involved in the planning 
(202) 
which led up to the Munich putsch. He had evidently come to feel that 
only a national revolution in Germany could change governmental attitudes 
towards Russia and Bolshevism; Scheubner-Richter saw in Hitler the 
tribune, "the new prophet" who would win over the maeee8 to the idea of 
revolution. 
(203) 
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But did Scheubner-Richter exert any influence over Hitler's developing 
ideas on foreign policy? Contemporaries and historians alike have tended 
to play down Scheubner-Richter's contribution to Nazi ideology, especially 
in comparison with that of Alfred Rosenberg. 
(204) 
But at least one 
contemporary, Arnold Rechberg, believed that in 1922 Scheubner-Richter 
was the "foreign policy adviser of the National Socialist movement,,. 
(205) 
Rechberg was a committed advocate of a French alliance and blamed Hitler's 
anti-western stance on the influence of Scheubner-Richter "who represented 
the interests of a group of Russian emigrants". The party leadership 
denied Rechberg's claims firmly in the VB; "it did not correspond to the 
facts that Dr. von Scheubner-Richter, whose personality and work is, of 
course, known to the leadership of the party and who because of this, 
and his anti-bolshevik operation is valued, is foreign policy adviser of 
our party. " 
(206) 
The party leadership also denied that Scheubner-Richter's 
Aufbau was exclusively a Russian organisation but consisted of Germans 
"who work for the revival of Germany in cooperation with a future national 
Russia, and Russians, who see the rise of their fatherland in the future 
in cooperation with a national Germany". 
(207) 
Though Scheubner-Richter 
also publicly denied being the party's adviser on foreign affairs, Rechberg 
refused to budge claiming that he was "considered as such". 
(208) 
Two things need to be stressed here: firstly the tact with which the party 
leadership managed to deny the role attributed to Scheubner-Richter 
whilst indicating how highly they valued him and the Aufbau organisation - 
without doubt, Scheubner-Richter and his Russian 
emigre friends were 
important to the leadership of the party. Secondly, the party was rather 
sensitive on the issue of 'advisers'; "the party had had no need so far 
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of a foreign policy adviser", the VB commented. 
(209) 
The reason was that, 
in the wake of Mussolini's 'seizure of power' in Rome in October 1922, 
Hitler was being consciously groomed by the party as the "German Mussolini"; 
the 'FUhrer image' was already being cultivated and Hitler could not 
publicly acknowledge someone else's advice on foreign affairs. In view 
of all this, it is as well to treat the party's riposte to Rechberg's 
suggestions with some caution. The fact remains that Scheubner-Richter 
and his Russian friends may have helped consciously or unconsciously to 
shape Nazi attitudes towards Russia. 
The views of Scheubner-Richter and his Russian emigris can only have 
strengthened Hitler's anti- Bolshevism; they were devoted to the idea of a 
German alliance with a revitalised post-Bolshevik Russia which Hitler's 
party was advocating in 1921-22. But did Scheubner-Richter also argue 
for the "annexation of areas of Western Russia as the indispensable granary 
of Germany" an Ernst Hanfstgngl suggests? 
'210) 
Did he, in other words, 
encourage Hitler's territorial ambitions in Russia? This is a crucial and 
difficult question to answer. 
Although Max Boehm has claimed that in 1918, as a member of the German 
occupation forces in Latvia, Scheubner-Richter had no Pan-German ambitions, 
it seems likely that he may have favoured the retention of Estonia and 
Latvia within the German Empire. 
(211) 
As the war went badly for Germany, 
Scheubner-Richter was involved in negotiations with the Latvian government, 
which aimed at giving German soldiers volunteering to fight to save Latvia 
from the Red Army the right to citizenship and to acquire land for 
settlement, which suggests that he wanted to maintain German influence in 
the area. 
(212) 
When the German army withdrew from Latvia, Scheubner-Richter 
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did offer to recommend that the German Foreign Office recognise Latvian 
independence, but, since Scheubner-Richter was fighting for the lives and 
property of remaining Germans (including himself) in Latvia, the offer 
can not be readily accepted as a commitment in principle to Latvian 
independence. 
(213) Later in 1919, Scheubner-Richter established branches 
of the Wirtschaftspolitische Aufkllrungsdienst in Riga and Reval to 
agitate for "a close, economic collaboration between Germany and the border 
states", which suggests he may have accepted the loss of the area but 
recognised the importance of maintaining trade with it. 
(214) 
Scheubner- 
Richter's views on the fate of the Baltic Provinces are, therefore, 
difficult to establish with any certainty since they seemed to change with 
successive stages in Germany's declining influence there. 
As Scheubner-Richter became involved with the Russian emigres any annex- 
ationist designs which he may have had on the Baltic States had to be 
concealed. The Reichenhall conference revealed how sensitive the 6migr6s 
were to the issue and also how divided they were; opinions were so divided 
that a discussion of the subject of the Baltic States was avoided, the 
conference lamely agreeing in principle that all states which took an 
active part in the re-building of Russia should have a right to join the 
Bmpire. 
(215) 
A majority at the conference wanted the Baltic States to be 
part of Russia but enjoying a degree of autonomy. Whether this corresponded 
to Scheubner-Richter's real wishes is unknown; his stated aim was, certainly, 
to unite all Russian forces opposed to Bolshevism and this included not 
only the Baltic States but also the other border regions, of whose 
separatist inclinations he was critical. In July 1922, Scheubner-Richter 
identified what he considered to be the fatal weakness in the anti- 
Bolshevik cause in the civil war as "the conviction that the Ukraine, 
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the Don region, the Kuban region, Georgia, the Crimea and Armenia on 
the borders of Russia could co-exist with aspirations of Bolshevism in the 
centre. " 
(Zig) 
The Ukrainians, for example, had said that they were 
not concerned about what happened in Greater Russia; in short, the border 
states had been selfish and this had accelerated the Soviet victory, in 
Scheubner-Richter's view. So it would seem that Scheubner-Richter 
would have no truck with separatist ideas either. Of course, even if he 
did think that Russia should be de-colonised, he could not express such 
views publicly and retain the support of his dmigre' friends. Indeed, the 
fact that Scheubner-Richter had friendly contacts not only with exiles 
from Greater Russia but also with Ukrainians such as Colonel Poltawetz- 
Ostranitza, Hetman Skoropadski's former Chancellor, and General Biskupski 
Mould suggest that Max Boehm's more charitable assessment of 
Scheubner-Richter's motives is perhaps closer to the truth, that is that 
in the 1920s he was genuinely concerned to overcome the many rivalries and 
intrigues in emigre circles and to unite the anti-Bolshevik forces 
abroad rather than to encourage the fragmentation of the Russian Empire 
and German territorial expansion. 
(217) 
All the evidence suggests that Scheubner-Richter genuinely desired a German 
alliance with a post-Bolshevik Russia. In September 1923, when reviewing 
his own career, Scheubner-Richter left no doubt about the evolution of 
his views on Russia; in 1918 he had criticised German diplomats for 
negotiating with the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk: "the one correct attitude 
towards the Eastern question would have been the installation of a 
Russian national government friendly to us, which (in) 1918 would have 
been relatively easy". 
(218) 
In 1919 after his release from prison in 
Riga, he had continued to warn the German Foreign Office about the 
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Bolshevik danger; both France and Russian Bolshevism were, he said, 
"tools in the hands of the Jewish International". The way forward for 
Germany was crystal clear to Scheubner-Richter: 
"in the future Germany and Russia, the German and 
Russian people must go together. It is obvious because 
both people are assigned to each other and complement 
each other. But before this can happen, a struggle will 
first have to be fought between the people and the 
oppressors, the deputies or representatives of the 
International. And the outcome of this struggle will 
afford the opportunity of a partnership between the 
two peoples. " (219) 
One of the first tasks of such a partnership, of course, would be the 
revival of Russia; however, as Scheubner-Richter explained at the Bad 
Reichenhall conference, "Russia can only be reconstructed by means of the 
surplus intellectual and technical power which we have in Germany", and 
to this end, Germany had to "lead the streams of emigration to Russia. " 
(220) 
Did this talk of Germans colonizing Russia imply settlement on the lines 
which Hitler was to advocate in Mein Kampf? To be fair to Scheubner- 
Richter, there seems to have been no suggestion of settlement after territorial 
conquest. What he wanted was to restore the dominant influence which 
German settlers had in Russia in pre-revolutionary days; in 1918 the 
demand for settlement rights for German soldiers staying on to defend 
Latvia against the Red Army was probably directed at the same goal. It 
was, one might argue, the natural dream of a Baltic German to want to revive 
Germanic influence in Russia rather than the desire for conquest of a 
Pan-German. 
(221) 
So, in public at least, Scheubner-Richter was a consistent supporter of a 
pro-Russian, anti-Bolshevik policy, untarnished by any dreams of German 
territorial expansion inside Russian territory. However, Scheubner-Richter 
206 
probably did have aggressive designs on Polish territory. In 1918-19, 
as has been seen, he opposed the transfer of West Prussia and the Polish 
Corridor to Poland and had feared Polish aggression towards East Prussia. 
According to one source, the Reichenhall conference had considered a 
German-Russian partnership whereby, in return for German assistance in the 
overthrow of Bolshevism, "Russia (would) guarantee the revision of the 
Versailles treaty, the economic strangulation of Poland, and economic 
concessions for Germany in Russia. " 
(222) 
In September 1923 when 'National 
Bolshevism' was being mooted, Scheubner-Richter indicated that the essential 
precondition of a German alliance with Bolshevik Russia against France 
would be a Soviet declaration of war on France's ally, Poland, and the 
latter's destruction and occupation by the Red Army. 
(223) 
That Russian 
and German nationalists should want to eliminate Poland should come as no 
surprise in view of the long-standing German and Russian attitudes 
towards her. 
This outlook on foreign affairs could only confirm the Nazi party's anti- 
Bolshevism and hostility towards Poland, whilst sustaining its interest 
in future Russo-German collaboration as opposed to an alliance with 
England. In February 1922, the WPA was arguing that Germany's condition 
was such that "Russia signified for the German Empire the only real chance 
of the restoration of her power"; for in negotiations with England one always 
had to beware of her ally, France "at our backs and behind her, the 
bayonets of Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia". 
(224) 
Scheubner-Richter 
did feel some sympathy towards England; whilst France was plainly out to 
destroy Germany, England could only suffer from the decline of Germany, 
which, at present, she was too weak to resist: "the British policy in the 
East and her acquiescence in the destruction of Germany will blow up the 
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British Empire which today appears so strong. " 
(225) 
In fact, like 
Rosenberg and Hitler, Scheubner-Richter began to recognise that France's 
harsh fulfillment policy on the reparations issue was at odds with the 
"more peaceful" line advocated by England and Italy, 
(226) 
and even to 
identify a more aggressive British stance towards the Soviets on the 
Eastern quest ion. 
(227) 
However, Scheubner-Richter would not have suggested, as the Nazi leaders 
were to do, a future Anglo-Italo-German alliance. Indeed, Scheubner- 
Richter was critical of Mussolini after his rise to power. Whilst he 
admired the Fascists' attack on Bolshevism, he did not regard Fascism 
as a probable friend of Germany because of the Germans of the South Tyrol 
for whom he predicted "difficult days will come". 
(228) 
Hitler, of course, 
was willing to overlook the South Tyrol question for the sake of Italian 
friendship, so clearly Scheubner-Richter did not agree with him on all 
matters of foreign affairs. 
They did agree, however, that France and Bolshevik Russia were Germany's 
two deadly enemies and it was on these subjects that Scheubner-Richter's 
voice may have been influential. It is possible, for example, that 
Scheubner-Richter helped to orchestrate the Nazi response to the Treaty of 
Rapallo. A German treaty with Bolshevik Russia, of course, realised all 
the worst fears of the Russian 
emigreis for the future. Scheubner-Richter 
was the first to respond to the treaty on 21 April 1922, arguing that 
Russia and Germany were natural allies; "that, normally, a state in Germany's 
position would be grateful for any valuable ally but a partnership with a 
state (Bolshevik Russia), which was directed by such leaders, would only 
be possible without danger for Germany, if the German people were led 
by a strong national government. Unfortunately this is not yet again the 
case, and one would have to be blind, to ignore the dangers which a close 
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partnership between Germany and Soviet Russia for the present could 
occasion. "(229) This, of course, is precisely the same argument that 
Hitler used in a speech the same day and that Rosenberg was to use in Pest 
in Russland; 
(230) 
both felt that a future (for this, read National Socialist) 
Germany could ally with Bolshevik Russia; but for Weimar Germany this 
might be fatal. All three men used the opportunity to condemn Rapallo 
which was, to quote Scheubner-Richter, "a further step towards the 
Bolshevisation of Germany" and urged Germans to consider an alliance only 
with a nationalist RUSS ia. 
(231) 
One cannot say unequivocally that Hitler and Rosenberg followed Scheubner- 
Richter's lead; indeed their response to Rapallo was entirely predictable 
in view of what they had said and written already but certainly Scheubner- 
Richter's view must have reinforced their determination to reassert their 
support for a post-Bolshevik Russia. It is equally clear that Rosenberg 
utilised Aufbau's resources; from the middle of 1921 articles on Russia 
from WPA began to appear in the VB. 
(232) 
In Pest in Russland, Rosenberg 
recommended WPA to those interested in reliable information on the Eastern 
(233) 
question. Rosenberg freely tapped WPA for information derogatory to 
the Soviet image; in Pest in Russland, he quoted evidence from WPA of 
the extravagant life-style of Soviet ambassadors in Constantinople to 
highlight the contrast with the starving Russian people. 
(234) 
It is also 
likely that details of Soviet persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church 
and the pillage of its wealth given by Rosenberg in Pest in Russland were 
taken from an article in WPA earlier in 1922. 
(235) 
Clearly, Scheubner-Richter helped to provide the Nazis with ammunition for 
their anti-aolshevik propaganda. But several points need emphasising. 
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Firstly, the WPA was only one of several sources. 
(236) 
Secondly, since 
Rosenberg collaborated with Aufbau, it is difficult to determine exactly 
who was responsible for collecting information. 
(237) 
Thirdly, and perhaps 
more importantly, Scheubner-Richter provided ammunition to reinforce 
existing ideological convictions rather than exerting a formative influence 
upon Nazi ideology. Scheubner-Richter continued to stress the need for 
a partnership between a nationalist Germany and a nationalist Russia 
until his death in November 1923; 
(238) 
by this time Hitler was already 
harbouring sweeping territorial designs on Russian territory, of which 
Scheubner-Richter could never have approved, at least publicly, because 
of his commitment to the emigre cause. 
What made Scheubner-Richter such an 'irreplaceable' loss to Hitler after 
the Munich putsch was not so much his expertise on foreign affairs as his 
connections with not only Russian monarchists but also leading figures in 
German political life. "He opened all doors for me", Hitler is supposed 
to have told Scheubner-Richter's widow. 
(239) 
The link with the Russian 
monarchists may have brought much-needed cash into the party coffers 
but more important to Hitler's cause in 1922 was the respectability which 
personal contact with General Ludendorff and the Bavarian royal house - the 
Wittelsbach - brought to it. 
(240) 
Although Scheubner-Richter had not 
introduced Hitler to Ludendorff, 
(241) 
Scheubner-Richter was "in close contact" 
with the German war hero throughout 1923, and acted as an intermediary for 
Hitler and Ludendorff who met several times at Scheubner-Richter's house 
to discuss the progress of the national revolution planned in 1923. 
(242) 
It is possible that contact with Ludendorff might have affected Hitler's 
Russian policy as well. Ludendorff had, of course, imposed on a reluctant 
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German Foreign Office the extensive territorial demands which were 
eventually put to the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. Ludendorff 
had decided that "for the future of Germany it was all-important that 
the whole Eastern problem should be be solved in a manner which satisfied 
the interests of Prussia and Germany and, as far as possible, removed 
the danger threatening from Poland. " 
(243) 
This meant that Germany had to 
receive a protective belt of agricultural land in Western Russia, which 
would ensure that Germany would be able to survive any future blockade, 
and a German union with the Baltic States of Courland and Lithuania, whilst 
Estonia and Latvia would be independent of Russia. In addition, Ludendorff 
wanted to weaken the Russian Empire by supporting separatist movements 
and so the German terms, eventually accepted in March 1918 by the reluctant 
but impotent Bolshevik leadership, also included recognition of 
Ukrainian and Finnish independence. 
(244) 
Ludendorff later claimed that "it 
was no desire of mine to destroy Russia or to weaken her so that she 
could no longer exist" but there seems little doubt that his aim was to 
remove the threat from the East in any future war by reducing Russia to her 
Yoscovite core by the establishment of a number of puppet-states and by 
supporting the demands of non-Russian nationalities for self-determination. 
(245) 
Hence this was close to the concept of a future Russia which Alfred 
Rosenberg was cultivating in 1922. So it is possible that Ludendorff's 
presence added weight to Rosenberg's argument for creating a national Russia 
when he was brought into contact with the Nazi movement at the end of 1922. 
(246) 
During 1922, therefore, Hitler's anti-Bolshevism was undoubtedly fed by his 
closest associates. Rosenberg argued that whilst Bolshevism was alien to 
Russia and that therefore 'National Bolshevism' was a chimera, it did 
correspond to a weakness in Russian blood; Scheubner-Richter urged him to 
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back the idea of collaboration with a 'post-Bolshevik'Russia, the dream 
of the Russian Emigres; and Rosenberg and Ludendorff from their different 
standpoints theorized about a truncated decolonized Russian state. But 
what effect did they have on Hitler? 
Aa has been indicated in this chapter, Hitler's views on Russia had begun 
to change during 1921 and 1922. Hitler still argued, however, in public 
in 1922, that a Russia purged of Bolshevism would be a suitable ally for 
Germany. But by the time Hitler was writing Mein Kampf in 1924, Russia 
had, of course, been finally relegated to the ranks of Germany's foes and 
there was no mention of a future national Russian government. The vital 
questions are, therefore, when and why did this change occur? 
In October 1921, as has been seen, Hitler had stressed that before the war, 
Germany had had the choice of allying with England or Russia; either would 
have, in his view, facilitated German expansion. 
(247) 
At that time, Hitler 
appeared to favour a Russo-German agreement as a "natural alliance". 
(248) 
These comments on pre-war German diplomacy can be taken as Hitler's 
instinctive, Pan-German preferences in foreign affairs but they also seem 
to suggest (in the absence of any other evidence) that Hitler had not 
yet formulated an alliance strategy of his own for the postwar world. 
In November 1922, however, Hitler publicly referred the possibility of 
German alliances with England and Italy in order to implement the Anschluss 
with Austria. This was the first indication that Hitler had a strategy to 
deal with postwar realities. It has been thought that Hitler did not make 
up his mind about the role of Russia in his foreign policy programme until 
1924. 
(249) 
But, in fact, a secret report on the Nazi Party dating from 
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December 1922 shows quite plainly that Hitler had already abandoned 
all ideas of an alliance with Russia at this time. Eduard Scharrer, the 
co-owner of the Munich daily Mdnchener Neueste Nachrichten and the rich 
proprietor of Schloss Bernried in Bavaria, submitted three reports on the 
Hitler movement to the chancellor of the day, Wilhelm Cuno. 
(250) 
One of 
the reports was Scharrer's account of an interview which he had arranged with 
Hitler in December 1922. During this interview, Hitler made it clear that 
he regarded England, above all others, as the power which had an interest 
in the further existence of the German people: "England has an interest in 
seeing that we do not go under, since, otherwise, France would become the 
greatest continental power in Europe, whilst England would have to be 
satisfied with the position of a third-rate power. " 
(251) 
English assistance 
would be forthcoming, Hitler told Scharrer, when Germany showed herself 
to be a viable economic proposition and an effective counter-weight to 
France, and provided, of course, "she posed no threat to England herself". 
(252) 
This meant, as far as Hitler was concerned, that Germany would have to 
avoid overseas commercial and colonial rivalry with England, which had 
caused problems before the First World War, but if she did so, English 
cooperation against Russia as well as France was possible: 
"Germany would have to adapt herself to a purely continental 
policy avoiding harm to English interests. The destruction 
of Russia with the help of England would have to be 
attempted. Russia would give Germany sufficient land for 
German settlers and wide field of activity for German 
industry. Then England would not interrupt us in our 
reckoning with France. " (253) 
Scharrer's account, whose authenticity there seems little reason to 
doubt, 
(254) 
shows that Hitler had fully thought out his alliance strategy 
in 1922: he felt that England could be enticed into an alliance against 
Bolshevik Russia as well as against France, though interestingly, he 
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seemed to expect British non-intervention rather than active assistance in 
the campaign against France. Thus, despite his continued public commitment 
to a future nationalist regime in Russia, Hitler had already eliminated 
this as a serious consideration in his foreign policy programme. 
To sum up, one can say that the relegation of Russia to the ranks of Germany's 
foes cannot be seen as a belated afterthought, a year or so after the decision 
to opt for an English alliance. Indeed, it is possible that Bolshevism's 
steadily increasing grip on Russia after 1921 persuaded Hitler to look to 
Russia's long-time imperial rival, Great Britain, as a future ally. That 
English policy was at the same time beginning, in Hitler's eyes, to assert 
its independence from France and to criticize her former ally's rigid 
stance on the question of Upper Silesia and of German reparations payments 
probably encouraged Hitler further in the belief that Britain was now once 
again following her traditional balance of power strategy towards Europe. 
To return to the first of the two questions posed at the beginning of this 
chapter - that is, what effect did ideology have on Hitler's alliance 
plans? It must be emphasized that, if the relegation of Russia to the 
ranks of Germany's enemies was the pivot of Hitler's alliance scheme, then 
more weight ought to be given to the influence of the party's antisemitic 
and anti-Bolshevik ideology; the success of 'Jewish' Bolshevism in the 
Russian civil war and the threat of the Bolshevization of Germany were 
probably the decisive factors in persuading Hitler to abandon the idea of 
an alliance with Russia. It can be objected, of course, that Hitler 
rejected Russia as an ally simply because he wanted territorial aggrandisement 
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at Russian expense in the form of the resurrection of the settlement 
reached at Brest-Litovsk in 1918. However, it should not be forgotten that 
in 1921 Hitler had been arguing like Moeller van den Bruck that an 
alliance with Russia before the war would have facilitated unlimited German 
expansion eastwards. So it is quite possible that an abhorrence of 
Bolshevism did help to determine Hitler's foreign policy design. 
It is also quite apparent, to return to the second question posed at the 
outset, that Hitler's decisions were very probably not - with the 
exception of the one on the Italian question (and even there LBdecke's 
involvement seems likely) - taken by him alone and in the teeth of party 
opposition. There were hints of a realignment with Britain in Rosenberg's 
ideological diatribes, which showed that British national interests were 
increasingly at odds with those of the Jews and compatible with those of 
the Germans, while Russian interests were increasingly determined by the 
Jews and directed against Germany. But, and this must be stressed, neither 
Hitler nor Rosenberg made any unequivocal public statements about their 
anti-Russian, pro-English foreign policy at this time. The Scharrer 
interview was confidential; Hitler often disguised his views in public 
analyses of pre-war diplomacy, whilst Rosenberg's were barely discernible 
amongst his revelations of the subterranean machinations c (the Jews. The 
reasons for these precautions will be investigated later but one may 
have been the desire to keep the support of influential and often rich 
Russian emigres, who would not look favourably on an anti-Russian as 
opposed to an anti- Bolshevik Nazi foreign policy. 
Finally, the exact point at which Hitler formulated his alliance strategy 
Is difficult to establish. If one believes Hitler's comments in Mein 
Kampf and accepts that foreign policy guidelines were drawn up which would 
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represent an emanation of the party's Weltanschauung, then a Russian 
alliance was out of the question as soon as the Bolsheviks were firmly 
entrenched in Russia and anti-Bolshevism firmly established as the keynote 
of Nazi ideology. The treaty of Rapallo and the party's reaction to it 
suggests that both of these preconditions had been fulfilled, no, perhaps, 
Hitler produced his blueprint for a Nazi foreign policy in the summer of 
1922. Certainly the fall of Lloyd George and the rise of Mussolini in 
October 1922, added to the continuing tension between Britain and France, 
amounted to a veritable diplomatic revolution, which might, as Ltidecke 
suggests, have forcedgitler's hand. 
The formalisation of a party alliance strategy did not represent a sudden 
innovation, however, but merely confirmed changes that had been evolving 
for some time. Nonetheless, as early as December 1922, the alliance 
scheme, which Hitler was to elaborate in Mein Kampf, and, some would say, 
to follow in the 1930s, had already been determined. 
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5. HAUSHOFER, HITLER, AND EXPANSIONISM 
Recently, historians have generally regarded the scheme of territorial 
expansion delineated in Mein Kampf as the result of Hitler's choice of possible 
allies; in other words, his alliance strategy determined the direction of 
Hitler's expansionism. 
(1) 
But one has to doubt whether Hitler chose 
his allies - and indeed his enemies - without consideration of the likely 
consequencies of such a choice, especially when one remembers that, in his 
retrospective analyses of pre-war German diplomacy, Hitler assessed the 
attractiveness of England and Russia as allies in terms of the territory 
which might be acquired as a result. 
(2) 
In short, it is far more likely that 
the choice of goal determined or at least helped to determine the selection 
of allies. So what did inspire Hitler's dream of eastward expansion? Was 
the pursuit of living-space in Eastern Europe part of Hitler's Pan-German 
heritage? Or was it the logical corollary of an ideological crusade against 
a 'Jewish-dominated' Soviet Russia? Or was Hitler influenced by the 
geopolitical theories of Karl Haushofer, the man usually blamed for 
feeding Hitler's territorial fantasies? 
(3) 
A great deal of rumour and 
speculation has clouded judgements about Haushofer over the years; it should 
now be possible with the aid of Haushofer's private papers and other newly 
accessible sources to evaluate more accurately Haushofer's likely cont- 
(4) 
ribution to Hitler's thinking. 
At first sight, it is difficult to imagine a more unlikely ally for the Nazi 
Party than Karl Haushofer. Born in 1869 into an intellectually and art- 
istically gifted Bavarian family, his military and academic career placed 
him in the higher echelons of Bavarian society, into which Adolf Hitler 
could make only brief and usually inglorious incursions under the patronage 
of the adoring and tolerant Frau Bruckmann. 
(5) 
After 21 years in the 
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German army, Haushofer was sent to study the Japanese army which had 
acquitted itself so well against the Russians in 1904-05; his mission, 
which took him through India, China, Korea as well as Japan between 1908 
and 1910, seems to have been a crucial turning-point in his life; much of 
his undoubted expertise and interest in Far Eastern affairs, which was 
to characterise his later work, was acquired during this visit. 
Haushof er retired from the army in 1919 as a major-general and began to 
lecture in geography at Munich University. In some ways, Haushofer's 
outlook conformed to that of the archetypal German officer, 
(6) 
who valued 
honour and respect for law, order, and the German Emperor above all else. 
In other ways, he was exceptional. He displayed a hard-headed political 
realism which made acceptance of the Weimar Republic easier for him than 
for many of his former colleagues in the Imperial army. He was a 
conservative, but never a reactionary: he believed that one could never 
turn back the clock. So, although still a monarchist at heart, he came to 
terms with the existing government. In 1919, for example, during the 'Red 
Revolution' in Bavaria, he established and participated in a soldiers' 
and workers' council in his division. 
(7 
Though critical of the Weimar 
Republic, Haushof er refused to participate in or condone rebellion against 
the government. Following the Munich putsch in 1923, he advised a fugitive 
Rudolf Hess to surrender to the authorities and accept punishment. 
(8) 
In 
fact, Haushofer engaged - albeit briefly - in parliamentary politics of the 
Weimar period following the family's Liberal political tradition and joining 
the Deutsche Volkspartei. The experience of party politics was, unfortunately, 
a short and evidently distestsful interlude for Haushofer; he drifted away 
from the party after lovely a year, apparently unable to treat people whom 
he knew to be dishonest as friends simply because they were party 
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colleagues. 
(9) 
From that point on, he kept free of party political 
commitments. 
Haushof er proceeded to devote himself to his teaching and to his writing. 
A veritable stream of articles flowed from his pen in the early 1920s; he 
became a regular contributor to the MUnchener Neueste Nachrichten(10)and 
to several well-known periodicals including Rudolf Pechel's Deutsche 
Rundschau. The family collection of his larger articles fills six weighty 
volumes. His appointment as honorary professor at Munich University in 
1921 and the accompanying reduction in his teaching duties facilitated 
this prolific outpouring. Haushof er used this opportunity to further what 
he by then considered to be his life's work: the establishment of the new 
'science' of geopolitics. 
His interest in geopolitics, which claims to study the relationship between 
political events and the natural environment taking into account such 
factors as the influence of soil, population pressure, frontiers and 
waterways on political development, was already evident during his visit 
to the Far East. 
(11) 
His observations on that Journey provided material 
for his doctoral dissertation on Japan, Dai Nikon, Betrachtungen Uber 
Grossjapans Wehrmacht, Weltstellung und Zukunft, which, according to his 
later colleague and friend Erich Obst, "betrayed on every page the developing 
geopolitician". 
12 
Haushofer himself later claimed that he gained his 
first insight into "the world-wide interconnections of political affairs" 
at the end of the Boer War, whilst visiting London: "after much striving 
for geopolitical knowledge, I first came to realize the contrast between 
the present state of Germany and the possible future of Germany in her 
living-space and in her world-relations. " 
(13) 
During the First World 
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War, he maintained his interest in the subject by reading the works of 
the Swedish political scientist, Rudolf Kjellen, who is credited with 
coining the term Geopolitik. He exchanged letters with Kjellen and at one 
stage contemplated doing research under him at the end of the war. 
(14) 
However, the outcome of the war altered Haushof er's attitude towards geo- 
politics; in the words of a friend, "he recognised more fully and earlier 
than very many others the deficient education of the German people in 
world politics as one of the reasons why our opponents could triumph over 
us. "(is) He was determined to remove this deficiency by producing a body of 
geopolitical learning - essentially a synthesis of his experiences in the 
Far East and the lessons of the First World War - which would provide Germans 
with an accurate picture of the world. In 1929 Haushofer explained the 
rationale behind his work: "when a nation after enormous sacrifices... 
experiences such a senseless dissection and mutilation of her living- 
space as the German people... then it has a right to ask what was lacking 
in those who were appointed, in the first instance, as protectors of this 
unit of life (Lebensform) in its living-space. "(ig) Men of insufficient 
insight should not be allowed to secure such positions again and "out 
of this elementary craving for better scientific protection of the political 
unit and of the folkish and cultural base originated the challenge of 
Geopolitics". 
ý17ý 
In 1924 Haushofer established with the young publisher Kurt Vowinckel the 
Zeitschrift flier Geopolitik (ZfG), which became the main vehicle for 
geopolitical ideas and the focal point of Haushofer's attempt to make 
geopolitics , the geographical conscience of the state". 
(18) 
Despite 
occasional ridicule of its scientific pretensions from the geographical 
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profession, the journal developed an international reputation. The 
journal might have been destroyed by dissensions between the various 
editors, had it not been for Haushofer's patience and willingness to com- 
promise. 
(19) 
He was no longer a young man (he was 55 years old in 1924) 
and he pinned all his hopes on the survival of the journal. This may be 
a key to his relationship to the Third Reich in the 1930s. A note of 
anxiety verging on desperation can be discerned in a revealing letter to a 
co-editor in 1931: "I believe that my relationship with geopolitics is, 
after all, even more close than yours.... You can nail your flag any day to 
a new fighting journal sailing towards similar goals without your fighting 
spirit undergoing the slightest change. My flag will remain struck 
forever if it is hauled down from the mast, at which it is now flying. 
Anyone of your age, who stumbles or falls, can jump up again; he who falls 
at my age, runs the risk of staying on the ground forever, because he is 
unable, perhaps, to muster either the desire or the energy to start building 
up his life's work from scratch for the third time. "(20) Here, perhaPa. 
is, in essence, the tragedy of Karl Haushofer's later career - an old man, 
lacking immutable political conviction and willing to swim with the 
prevailing tide, a man who recognised the shortcomings of the Nazi regime, 
but who was prepared to overlook them (he steadfastly refused to sanction 
the idea of rebellion) 
(21) 
in the hope of securing a life-long ambition. 
However in the early 1920s, Haushofer's social and academic background 
made his an unlikely fellow-traveller for the politically and intellectually 
impoverished party. To understand how Haushof er came to the notice of 
the youthful Nazi party, one has to examine his political activities at 
this time. 
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Two events bridged the chasm which separated Naushofer from the Nazi 
Party and, for that matter, the vast majority of the German people. The 
defeat of Germany in the First World War and the ensuing political 
disillusionment hardened by the Versailles Settlement created a kinship 
born of acute disappointment, which cut across economic and social barriers. 
"How much the unfortunate outcome of the Great War weighed on a man of his 
ilk can be truly understood only by those who were near him at the time", 
wrote Erich Obst in 1929. 
(22) 
Haushofer was galvanised into action not 
only by the need to correct the deficiences which had led to Germany's 
defeat but also by the desire to expose the injustice of the Versailles 
Settlement. The principle of national self-determination, closely associated 
with President Wilson's famous '14 Points', could safeguard peace only, 
Haushofer argued, if it were applied to all nations, both victors and 
vanquished. The rights of Germans in Alsace-Lorraine, South Tyrol, Upper 
Silesia and Danzig had been overlooked at Versailles. 
(23) 
The question of 
German 'War Guilt' - the basis of the treaty's punitive measures against 
Germany - irritated Haushof er perhaps more than anything else. In a speech 
in June 1924, he declared: 
"I say with complete conviction: conscious guilt 
was nowhere on our side-on the contrary, evidence 
of the terrible guilt of our enemies is at hand. 
Where is it written that of all the great nations 
of the earth ours alone should be so bruised and maimed 
in her living-space, and that we alone should not 
have the right to breathe freely? " (24) 
Haushofer refused to accept the Versailles Settlement as a fait accompli 
and his political energies were devotedto an attempt to keep alive the 
sense of burning injustice felt towards the treaty in the hope of bringing 
about its revision. He delivered speeches regularly for the Deutsche 
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Kampfbund gegen die Kriegsschuldltige 
(25) 
and the Akademische Arbeit- 
sauWhuss gegen Friedensdiktat und Schuldlüge (AA) 
(26) 
during the 1920s. 
Another way of thwarting the settlement was to maintain contacts with the 
areas lost in 1919. Haushof er was very concerned lest the Germans now cut 
off from the fatherland should abandon their cultural heritage, and he 
was soon involved in cultural propaganda for the Verein fuer Deutschtum im 
Ausland (VDA) 
ý27) 
In a speech in September 1922 he admonished the govern- 
ment for having damaged relations with the Auslanddeutschen by not 
supporting their claims for compensation for war damages. 
(28) 
In 1923 
he was elected chairman of the Bavarian branch of the VDA(29) and his 
appointment as head of the Praktische Abteilung of the new Deutsche Akademie 
in May 1925 gave him further scope to work with Germans living abroad. 
(30) 
These contacts, Haushofer hoped, "would contribute mta little to breaking 
the chains of the peace treaty", and to the eventual reunion of the lost 
(31) 
areas with the fatherland. Haushofer and the VDA, accordingly, opposed 
anything which might hinder such a reunion; in 1925, for example, the 
Gauleiters of the Bavarian branch of the VDA declared that a treaty between 
the German and Czechoslovakian governments, then being mooted in the after- 
math of the Locarno agreements, would be "tolerable only if the right of 
the Sudeten Germans to self-determination is in no way impaired by it. 
Not only the Bavarian but the whole German people would reject even a 
temporary abandonment of the right of the Sudeten Germans to a reunion 
with the German motherland as a betrayal of the fate of almost 4 million 
Germans and would never recognise it. "(32) 
Clearly Haushoter's political views were quite consistent with his vol eutsch 
activities. 
(33) Furthermore his endeavours evoked a sizeable response. 
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Awareness of Germany's humiliation in the eyes of the world was so keenly 
felt amongst all classes of German society that academics, such as 
Haushofer, attracted large audiences for lectures on the Versailles 
Settlement. So it is likely that, even without his friendship with Rudolf 
Hess, Haushof er would have come to the notice of the NSDAP. His collab- 
oration with Bund 'Oberland' (BO) -a pressure group, whose leaders were 
well-known to the Nazi leadership - made this almost inevitable. 
(34) 
Bo's grossdeutsch orientation, together with its party political non -aligiime, vt 
must have appealed to Haushof er. The three aims of BO effectively summ- 
arized his own political ambitions for Germany: 
"1. The external liberation of Germany, which is the 
precondition for self-determination and self-styling 
of Germany's life and future. 
2. The creation of a Greater Germany. 
3. The construction of a Third Reich. " (35) 
It seems probable that Haushofer never actually became a member of BO, 
but he was certainly an active supporter in the early ]920s, regularly 
attending the annual conference at Burg Hoheneck, delivering speeches, 
and writing articles for the association's periodical, Das Dritte Reich. (36) 
Baushofer's relationship with Bund 'Oberland' helps to identify his position 
in the political spectrum. BO represents a kind of half-way house between 
Haushofer's academic and volkdeutsch activities and the NSDAP. The 
membership of BO was undoubtedly of a very different calibre from the 
rank and file of the Nazi movement; 
(37) 
nevertheless, the two were cast in 
very similar ideological moulds. Gustave Sondermann, one-time editor of 
Das Dritte Reich, thought that the two were "very basically different 
ºr (38) forms of our movement. Friedrich Weber, leader of BO at this time, 
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wrote in 1927 that "on the level of ideas, the National Socialist 
movement stands especially close to us". 
(38) 
Though Weber was often 
criticized by his colleagues for his pro-Nazi standpoint, his observation 
seems to have been substantially accurate. 
(40) 
This perhaps explains 
Haushofer's refusal of an executive post in BO in 1925; his own explanation 
was, of course, different; he wrote in April 1925 rejecting the offer of 
such a post "with sincere regret that this attempt at a connection with 
the association has, against my wishes, been undertaken - since the role 
of vice-chairman or even committee member would lead to a situation 
unsuitable to my age and to my personality, and an alternative can 
scarcely be considered, so it must remain, after all, a free relationship. " 
(41) 
Age and personality were not, however, the most important reasons for 
Haushofer's reluctance to commit himself, as he revealed privately to a 
close friend: 
"As you know, I am completely absorbed in helping to 
establish in the German Academy a centre for Germandom..., 
the success or failure of which depends very much on 
whether men take me seriously. " (42) 
Evidently he did not intend to destroy his credibility by vouching "with 
my name for personalities, for whom, after: ecent experiences, I can give 
no such guarantee. " The essential problem was BO's association in 1925 
with the newly re-formed Nazi Party. As Haushofer put it, "the flag of 
Oberland by Hitler in the Bt1rgerbräukeller, the name of Friedrich Weber 
at the head: that signifies a programme that I could not argue away with 
the tongue of angels. " 
(43) 
Clearly Haushofer appears to have little 
sympathy with the Nazi Party programme and he had apparently "opposed 
steadfastly the participation of the BO in the Kampfbund" before the Munich 
putsch. 
(44) This evidence hardly supports the view that Karl Haushofer was 
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the 'eminence grase' behind the Nazi party at this time. In 1925, at 
least, his overriding concern was to avoid associating with right-wing 
extremists at what was a vital stage in his career. So how close was 
Haushoßer's contact with the Nazi Party? 
As might be expected, there is little solid evidence of close and continuous 
contact between Haushofer and the Nazi Party in the 1920s. What evidence 
there is, revolves around Haushofer's close friendship with Rudolf Hess. 
"My friendship with Rudolf Hess", Haushofer wrote later, "began in 1918 and 
is, like his attendance at my lectures at the university, four years older 
(sic) than the foundation of the Nationalist Socialist Party. " 
(45) 
Hess 
became Haushofer's favourite pupil, even though Haushofer recognized that 
"his heart and his idealism were greater than his intellect. " 
(46) 
Later, 
following the Munich putsch, Haushofer sheltered Hess and, after Hess's 
release from Landsberg gaol, he secured him a post at the German Academy. 
He was justifiably infuriated by his friend's eventual decision to quit it 
to become Hitler's secretary. 
(47) 
When Haushofer first met Hitler is not clear. A few months before his death, 
Haushofer claimed that he had first seen Hitler in 1922. However, his 
memory seems to have let him down. 
(48) 
Hess already knew Hitler very well in 
the summer of 1921 and supported him publicly during the leadership 
crisis. 
(49) 
Early in 1922, Haushofer was in a position to arrange - at 
short notice - through Hess an interview with Hitler for Rudolf Pechel, 
the editor of Deutsche Rundschau. 
(50) 
Without doubt, Haushofer was known 
to the party and, indeed, was kept informed by fiese of developments within 
it. (51) 
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The Völkischer Beobachter first began to take an interest in Haushofer's 
activities in 1922; his lectures were thought to be instructive for party 
members and, according to one reporter, 'proved that knowledge is not there 
to be stored in books, but it also provides us with weapons in the struggle 
for the right to live.  
(52) 
In 1924 Haushot er made regular visits to 
Landsberg gaol to see Rudolf Hess - at the very time when Hitler was 
dictating Mein Kampf to Hess - and it is commonly believed that Hitler's 
ideas received their geopolitical colouration as a result of these visits 
and Hess's own influenceý53) 
It is difficult to establish what sort of relationship existed between 
Haushof er and Hitler; the former later claimed that he had had little 
to do with Hitler until the 19308 and this is probably true but the evidence 
suggests that Haushof er was aware of the attractiveness of his ideas to 
Hitler and that the Nazis were willing to make use of those ideas. In 
1938, for example, Haushofer wrote a confidential letter to the Dean of 
Natural Science at Munich University, explaining his relationship with 
the Nazi Party. He had been "well acquainted and friendly with significant 
personalities in the NSDAP since 1919" but he had not become a member of 
the party, he explained "for reasons of camouflage". 
(54) 
He also revealed 
that several books and articles had been written , at the suggestion of the 
FUhrer's representative" (Hess); he mentioned several from the 1930s 
but also two from the 1920s: an article, NationalerSozialismus und soziale 
Aristokratie published in 1924 and a book, Grenzen in ihrer geographischen 
und politischen Bedeutung published in 1927. 
(55) 
It is a little difficult 
to believe that these works were written at Hess's instigation; certainly 
Haushofer had been studying the frontier problem for quite some time before 
he wrote Grenzen. Nevertheless, there is no obvious reason why Haushof er 
should invent such a story to impress the Dean and, even if there was, 
227 
why did he chose to include the titles from the 1920s? Possibly Hess 
in a private capacity did suggest the subjects to Haushofer; an article 
ox National Socialism, though it did not deal with the NSDAP, would 
obviously be of interest, as would an analysis of the frontier problem, 
which loomed large in Nazi foreign policy discussions. At the very least, 
the letter shows that Haushof er had identified those writings, which were 
of some relevance to the Nazi party, and which, perhaps, conformed with 
Nazi thinking. 
This impression is reinforced by a second document. In June 1924, the 
Grossdeutsche Volksgemeinschaft (GDVG), to which most of the former members 
of the then banned NSDAP belonged, issued a leaflet, urging its followers 
to attend an address on 'Living-space and the War Guilt Lies' to be 
delivered by Haushofer for the Deutsche Kampfbund gegen die KriegsschuldlUge. 
(56) 
This was an unusual step, one perhaps partly explicable in terms of 
Hitler's own absence from the scene, but one which nonetheless suggests 
that Haushofer's views met with the approval of the Nazi leadership. The 
address, which the Nazi rank and file duly attended, certainly introduced 
them to the concept of German Lebensraum, which was to be crucial to the 
foreign policy programme outlined by Hitler in Mein Kampf. 
(57) 
Contacts between the leading geopolitician and the Nazi party in the 1920s 
may have been 'camouflaged' because Haushofer wanted to conceal his rel- 
ationship with right-wing extremists. But one should not exaggerate the 
significance of this; contact between Haushof er and the Nazi party was 
probably very infrequent. Haushof er was a friend of Rudolf Hess, not of 
the party. He had no reason to take the party at all seriously ine 
mid-1920s; he could not have predicted Hitler's spectacular rise to power. 
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Nevertheless, the fact remains that by the time Hitler did come to power 
in 1933, the Nazi party had been paying, at least, lip-service to geo- 
political ideas for several years and one has, therefore, to assess their 
impact on Nazi thinking. 
During the Second World War, it was claimed that Haushofer was the 'brains' 
behind the Nazi party; he had masterminded Hitler's foreign policy. 
(58) 
Such exaggerated claims are at least understandable when Haushof er's ideas 
are studied. It is difficult even now to believe that Haushofer could 
conceive that his plans were realisable without the likelihood of war. 
This is not simply because of the difficulty of forgetting what happened 
between 1939 and 1945. It is also due to the fact that geopolitics, as 
popularized by Haushofer, was itself a child of conflict, a product of the 
First World War. As he admitted himself later, "a doctrine, evolving at a 
time of such emergency for one's own country, must show traces of the 
circumstances and the place of its origin as well as the shortcomings"; a 
German 'scientist' could not, he claimed, "disregard the inadequacy of the 
distribution of living-space in Central Europe" after the Versailles Sett- 
lement. 
(59) 
It was the deep commitment to the redistribution of the world's 
living-space, together with Haushofer's pugnacious and often fairly opaque 
style, which led to the conviction that geopolitics was synonymous with Nazi 
imperialism. But how justified was this belief? It is important to 
remember that geopolitics was not an individual tour de force from the 
pen of Karl Haushof er; it drew heavily on earlier work by political geo- 
graphers and to understand fully the nature of geopolitics one has to 
examine its evolution. 
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Though Haushof er was greatly impressed by the works of the Americans, 
A. T. Mahan aid Brooks Adams, and by the British geographer, Halford J. 
Mackinder, his ideas on geopolitics were derived mainly from the German 
scholar, Friedrich Ratzel. Rudolf Kjellen, Haushof er's Swedish correspondent 
and mentor, appears only to have rationalized Ratzel's rather diffuse 
observations. 
(60) 
Ratzel was a distinguished political geographer, who 
studied the dependence of a state on climate, geographical location, 
water-bodies, soil and physical resources. He compared the state to a 
living organism, capable (f growth, stagnation and decline. States were 
always vying with each other for space. Hence, it followed that no people 
had originated in the land which it now inhabited; nor would it remain on 
this land forever. Since peoples expand, contract, and migrate, frontiers 
are only temporary phenomena or, as Ratzel put it, "the frontier as the 
periphery of the nation belongs to the nation... (but)... the frontier is, 
by its very nature, always changing. " 
(61) 
In short, nations have no natural 
rights to the land, which they inhabit. Viewed out of context and bearing 
in mind German history since 1900, Ratzel's ideas can easily be interpreted 
as encouraging disregard for the boundaries of other nations, and hence as 
a justification of aggression. Though Ratzel was not averse to political 
polemic or immune to the germs of German nationalism, it would be unfair to 
lable him as the geographical sponsor of German imperialism. He was a 
serious scholar attempting to classify observations about the impact of 
earthbound phenomena on political decision-making. 
Karl Haushofer, on the other hand, wanted to utilize the fruit of exhaustive 
analyses of individual regions as the 'scientißc' basis for forecasts of 
future developments and for prescriptions ßßr future policy. Geopolitics, 
therefore, was (to give its official definition) "the theory of the close 
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relationship between the soil and political events. It is based on the 
wide basis of geography, especially political geography, as the theory of 
political organisms and their structure. The character of regions or areas 
of the world dealt with by geography provides the framework, within which 
political events must take place if they are to have lasting success. The 
politicians (Trager des politischen Lebens) will, of course, on occasion 
exceed the framework, but, sooner or later, the close tie with the soil 
will reassert itself. Recognizing this fact, geopolitics wants to provide 
the tools tDr political action and wants to be a signpost in political life. 
In this way, it becomes an applied theory, capable of directing practical 
policies up to the necessary point of departure from firm ground. " 
62) 
Hence, geopolitics was less concerned with the observation and classification 
of geographical information for its own sake and more concerned to discover 
the geopolitical determinants of political action. Haushofer admitted that 
geopolitical forces constituted only twenty-five percent of the historically- 
active forces which determined political events, but this twenty-five 
percent was worth knowing; the disaster of 1918 might have been averted 
by such knowledge. 
(63) 
The assumption that scientific investigation could provide some insight 
into the mysterious workings of political destiny effectively marked the 
boundary between political geography and geopolitics. Ratzel's comparison 
of the state to a living organism was treated as a fact of life by Haushofer 
and his colleagues and the state was considered to be "a supra-individual 
living being". 
(64) 
Once this 'leap of faith' had been taken, the dividing- 
line between objective analysis and political propaganda became very 
blurred. As Haushofer himself admitted later, "the borderline between pure 
science and practical science is easily crossed in such times of tension. 
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It happened, therefore, that I overstepped those borders occasionally. " 
(65) 
In fact, of course, Haushofer's 'science' was a "practical science" by 
definition (-propaganda might have been a more accurate description). 
By trying to furnish the 'scientific' basis for successful government 
policy-making, Haushofer allowed his own political views to dictate the 
field of his research - he resented the reorganization of the frontiers of 
Central Europe at Versailles and set out to assess the settlement by 
examining it in geopolitical terms. The verdict, of course, preceded and, 
therefore, determined the analysis: Germany's living-space was inadequate 
and the new frontiers were geopolitically unjustifiable. 
At this point it would appear that Haushof er was very much on the same 
wavelength as Adolf Hitler and the other right-wing radicals determined 
to overthrow the Versailles Settlement. However, Haushof er would have 
pointed to one significant difference between geopolitics and the outlook 
of the Nazi Party: namely that geopolitics did not purport to be an 
ideology. It was not a 'secular religion', a system of beliefs designed 
to mobilize people into action, but an eclectic hotch-potch of principles 
drawn from social darwinism and geographical determinism. Geopolitics 
was also free from any party political bias. Every party and every 
individual had something to learn from this new 'science'; every political 
leader would perform his duties better "if he possesses geopolitical exper- 
ience and knowledge then if he lacks it, irrespective of his ideological 
or party background.  
(66) 
Haushofer seemed to think that this non-part- 
isanship alone guaranteed the objectivity of geopolitics. Furthermore, the 
self-confessed mission of the German geopoliticians was to educate their 
masters, to emancipate them from a narrow world-view and to enable them to 
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think in terms of large spaces; it did not aim to provide its own 
political programme. As Haushofer's son, Albrecht, wrote when asked for 
an unequivocal statement of a geopolitical foreign policy, "one does 
not refer ideological fanatics to an educational scheme in order to allow 
a new pseudo-ideology to be offered by geopolitics. "(67 Geopolitics, it 
was claimed, did not offer a ready-made foreign policy programme to Germany's 
leaders. 
But did it? Certainly the geopoliticians did draw attention to the 
"geographical foundations of foreign policy", the most important of which 
was the need for the state to extend its living-space - the land available 
to it - in order to keep pace with an increasing population. As Karl 
Haushof er put it: 
,, The main duty of foreign affairs is always at least to 
maintain and take care of the living-space bequeathed to 
it by past generations and to extend it when it has 
become too narrow, without creating a threat to the 
life and existence of the people, yet meeting any 
unavoidable danger with the full power of the nation, 
for the sake of the continued existence of the nation. " (68) 
This assessment, though written in 1926, effectively summarized the gist 
of Haushofer's thinking over several years and closely resembles, of 
course, Hitler's own analysis of a völkisch foreign policy in Mein Kampf. 
(69) 
Haushof er made use of up-to-date figures on population density to argue 
that only two advanced nations could prove undeniably that they were over- 
populated; "only Germany and Japan have to settle, feed, and clothe more 
than 130 people on one square kilometer (of land)" (regional variations 
could, he pointed out, push this figure up to 800 per square kilometer in 
the Ruhr area, and the quality and fertility of the soil also affected the 
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level of overpopulation. ) 
(70) 
Ouch arguments could certainly be seen as 
providing the framework of a foreign policy programme. 
Haushof er also had a definite conception of the existing balance of world 
power. A gradual polarization was taking place, he believed, between on 
the one hand, the "oceanic" powers, the "space-owning imperialists" of the 
western hemisphere (England, France and the United States), and on the 
other, the oppressed "continental" powers of "Eastern Eurasia" (China, 
Japan, India and Russia). 
(71) 
The "oceanic" powers were the opponents of 
Germany as well as the nations of "Eastern Eurasia"; they were "the great 
predatory powers", "the attackers and disturbers of overseas lands and the 
exploiters of Eurasia". 
(72) 
The Germans were, therefore, not alone in 
"striving for the rightto self-determination and the freedom to move at 
will within our own living-space or, at least, to wander through the earth's 
unused spatial resources; three-fifths of the human race", he claimed, "are 
striving for the same goal. " 
(73) 
Germany could, therefore, find support against the "space-owning" powers 
"not just in the Far East, in the rising Pan-Asiatic movement, but also in 
Japan... and in intelligent cooperation with the spatial requirements of 
the Russian homeland (Volksboden). " 
(74) 
Cooperation with the "Pan-Asiatic 
movement", most apparent in China and India, was possible because the 
Chinese and the Indian peoples were, like Germany, suffering from exploit- 
ation by the Western powers and were beginning to show signs of resistance. 
(75) 
Germany had, therefore, to decide whether she belonged alongside the "space- 
owning imperialists" or alongside the "oppressed" nations. In 1925 the 
negotiations of the Locarno treaties and German entry into the League of 
Nations, Haushofer felt, brought matters to ahead: "it is up to us to 
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decide whether we want to join the League of Nations in the only way 
possible to-day - burdened with the hatred of the suppressed, the deprived, 
the humiliated, and the wronged and with their curse. " 
(76) 
The German 
signature on the Locarno Treaty obviously disappointed Haushof er, but he 
continued to hope for German support for the nationalist movements of 
India and China. Common interests also drew Japan and Germany together; 
both had been threatened by the same powers (Britain and France) since the 
1890s and "more than once" Germany had rejected the prof erred hand of 
Japanese friendship. 
(77) 
Furthermore, Japan had faced similar spatial 
problems to Germany, and had successfully extended her Lebensraum with the 
seizure of Korea after a press campaign had highlighted Japan's shortage 
of space and mobilized public opinion. What is more, Haushofer had 
witnessed all this first-hand and obviously hoped for similar success in 
Germany. 
(78) 
Most interesting of all in Haushofer's and the geopoliticians' outlook 
was the position occupied by Russia. She was neither economically exploited 
by the Western powers nor short of space; nevertheless, she was to be the 
mainstay of the "Eurasian" alliance against the West. This may have been 
because of the Soviet denunciation of Western imperialism; (79) but this 
seems unlikely since Haushof er advocated spatial cooperation with the needs 
of the Russian homelands "irrespective of whether they be organized by 
the soviets or any other power". 
`80) 
Neither ideological nor racial prejudice 
appears to have clouded Haushofer's judgement of the unchanging geopolitical 
realities: , the worse the situation appears", he wrote, "the more reason 
for a nation to think in planetary terms without regard for mistaken racial 
prejudices. " 
(81) 
Even no, it is quite evident that Haushofer did not trust 
the Russians; in 1925 he noted that they had not yet shown themselves to 
be reliable allies; 
(82) 
and two years later, he was clearly disillusioned 
by the results of Russian collaboration with the Chinese nationalist forces. 
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It was, he said, "a sad lesson for all those who believe that one can 
cooperate in foreign affairs with Russia without being betrayed and sold 
out by other Russians. " 
(83) 
Such disappointments did not, however, shake his conviction of the need 
to work with Russia because, as he explained, "geopolitics judges daily 
events not according to their sentimental value, but on the firm foundation 
of interests, which arise with a degree of permanence from the land and 
living-space and are dictated by its broadness or narrowness and the 
stern demands of self-maintenance. " 
(84) 
To understand why these 'interests' 
necessitated a Russo-German alliance, in Haushofer's view, one has to consult 
the ideas of the English geographer, Halford J. Mackinder, which seem 
to have made a great impression on Haushof er. Mackinder believed that the 
'Heartland', roughly the area controlled by Russia at the time, was "the 
pivot region of world politics"; it was potentially a vast economic world 
in itself and only the backward state of the Russian economy prevented it 
from dominating the rest of the world. 
(85) 
A German alliance might tilt 
the balance of world power in favour of the 'Heartland' and then, Mackinder 
argued, , the empire of the world would be in night. " 
(86) 
Whether Haushofer 
was intoxicated by this dream of a 'world-empire' is a question to which 
we shall return shortly, but clearly he was Impressed by Mackinder's general 
scenario; "the greatest of all geographical world-views", he called it. 
(87) 
In particular, Haushof er picked up Mackinder's forecast of a confrontation 
between Russia and the 'oceanic powers' and this seems to have been the 
main basis for his concept of a Eurasian alliance between Germany, Russia, 
Japan and the emerging nationalist movements of India and China. 
(88) 
Russia's vast resources of land and population, together with her pivotal 
geographical position could relieve the pressure of the 'Anglo-Saxon 
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powers' on Asia and the Far East, as well as Central Europe. 
It is quite evident from the above analysis that, whatever the geopoliticians 
might have claimed, Karl Haushofer, at least, had developed, in broad 
outline, a foreign policy programme of his own; he had devised an alliance 
strategy for the German state. But how and where did Haushofer envisage 
the extension of Germany's living-space - the prime goal of German foreign 
policy - taking place? Was he simply an impractical and irresponsible 
idealist, who furnished arguments for indiscriminate territorial expansion? 
This judgement would, on balance, be a little harsh. Haushofer was aware 
of the difficulties which his scheme faced. However, he believed that the 
time was right for territorial changes; "the redistribution of power on the 
earth has not come to an end with the world war", he wrote, "but has only 
just begun. " 
(88) 
Germany could convince world opinion of her need to 
expand if she could demonstrate that "a cultivatab1 area (Kulturboden) 
can support no greater density of population without endangering the surr- 
ounding areas". He felt that Japan and Italy had achieved this already- 
(90) 
Figures showing population density, the number of inhabitants per square 
kilometer, were, he felt, "the weightiest weapon of geopolitics in this 
(91) 
process of persuasion. " The fact that peaceful persuasion had real- 
istically little chance of success does not necessarily mean that Haushof er 
was insincere in seeking a non-violent solution to Germany's spatial 
problems. Whether he would have supported more violent means if persuasion 
failed is another question and, of course, whether force would be necessary 
would depend largely on the direction and extent of German expansion. 
Like Hitler, Haushof er thought that a future 'Third Reich' should solve 
its spatial problems by expansion in Europe; "the ideal of the Third Reich', 
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he wrote, "is an ideal ratio of settlement to the land. With such a 
density of settlement there will be no room for foreigners. " 
(92) 
The 
return of her overseas colonies lost at Versailles would be insufficient to 
correct the imbalance between population and land; "the old colonial area 
itself", he argued, "could only accommodate 3 to 4 million German settlers 
at most. " 
(93) 
The European continent and, in particular, Germany's border- 
lands, had more to offer: 
,, It is much more important to strive towards the borderlands... 
in which every German field is defended, even if at first 
under a foreign flag or under foreign control. We must 
place much more emphasis on a conscious widening and 
retention of our frontier area and on a strong balanced 
internal structure than on questionable overseas possessions. " (94) 
However, Haushof er seemed reluctant to explain how such expansion was to 
occur and, more importantly, to specify which areas made up the 'borderlands'. 
Only very rarely did he tackle these questions. On one notable occasion in 
1925, in an essay entitled Die geopolitische Betrachtung grenzdeutscher 
Probleme, he did point out several ways in which a peaceful devolution of 
the borderlands to Germany might be facilitated. The first -a logical 
extension of Haushofer's work with the VDA - was by maintaining contact 
"between separated and endangered areas and the whole body of the larger 
unit... In cultural, economic and political affairs. " 
(95) 
A second way was 
to sustain "the strong awareness of regional unity, especially in those 
lands, which our enemies are seeking, with good reason, to divide admin- 
istratively, like Eupen-Malmedy, Alsace-Lorraine, Tyrol and the regions of 
the Vistula. " Thirdly the publication of geopolitical studies could 
create a "community of feeling with all the people around the world, who 
are oppressed like us.  
(96) 
Such methods, it was hoped, would prove 
successful not only in forging ties between Germany and her borderlands 
but also in convincing world opinion of Germany's right to absorb them. 
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Haushof er made no mention of the possibility of using force to achieve this 
goal and it is, perhaps, significant that the areas which he considered 
to be the 'borderlands' all had either sizeable German-speaking communities 
or historical ties with Germany; in this same revealing essay, he mentioned 
"North Schleswig, Eupen-Malmedy, the Saar, the Palatinate, Lorraine, Alsace, 
Vorarlberg and Tyrol, Carinthia, Styria, Burgenland, Moravia, the Austro- 
Hungarian diaspora, the old duchies of Auschwitz and Zator, Eastern Upper 
Silesia, Austria (Ostmark), Danzig, and Memelland. "(97) Though these 
areas were all beyanö German control at that moment, Haushofer does not 
appear to have publicly advocated the absorption of territories with no 
German connexion. He did suggest on another occasion, however, that Germany 
should be allowed "freedom to wander (Wanderfreiheit) through the unused 
reserves of space in the world. " 
(98) 
As has been seen, he also argued that 
Germany could benefit from "intelligent collaboration with the spatial 
needs of the Russian homelands (Volksboden). " Precisely what these cryptic 
remarks meant was never made clear. Did it mean a peaceful transfer of 
land? A possible clue can be found in an article published in the ZZG in 
1925, in which Haushof er expressed a hope that a lasting settlement be found 
of the conflicting claims of China, Japan and the Soviet Union to Manchuria - 
referred to as part of "the empty spaces of the Soviet Union"; such spatial 
collaboration, he thought, might reduce diplomatic tensions around the world 
and, in the long run, might help to "alleviate the frightful position of 
Central Europe. " 
(99) 
Despite the prolific outpouring of books and articles, Haushofer's actual 
proposals remain vague and imprecise and this was, perhaps, his greatest 
failing. He constantly reiterated the need for Germany to expand her 
living-space but only very rarely did he make plain his belief in a 
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peaceful transfer of territory, to which she had some claim on the basis 
of past history or linguistic or cultural identity. As a result, many 
believe that he may have fired Hitler's lust for expansion. 
How justified is one in attributing Hitler's expansionism to the influence 
of Haushof er and geopolitics? This question poses complex problems. In 
addition to the ever-present difficulty of ascribing one man's ideas to the 
influence of another, there is, in this case, the uncertainty about the 
exact nature and frequency of contacts between the two men in the early 1920s. 
As more information has come to light on this matter, historians have 
become more circumspect about what they attribute to Haushofer's inspiration, 
so all judgements must remain speculative. 
(100) 
These problems are compounded 
by the fact that many of Haushofer's ideas were similar to those expressed 
in Pan-German propaganda before, during, and after the First World War, 
which Hitler may already have absorbed. Distinguishing geopolitical ideas 
from the traces of Pan-Germanism in Hitler's speeches and writings is, 
therefore, especially problematical. It is quite possible that Hitler's 
expansionist outlook had taken shape before he came across Haushofer. As 
has been shown earlier, Hitler's awareness of Germany's supposed over- 
population and the possible solutions to it - evident in early speeches in 
1920-21 - can be traced to Pan-German literature. Hence, even when Hitler 
jotted down in his notes for a speech in 1921 the phrase "population increase 
implies increase in territory", one cannot, with certainty, point to a 
geopolitical influence. 
(101) 
Even when he asked in a speech in May 1921 
if it was fair that every Russian adult had eighteen times as much land 
available as every German, he could just as easily have been drawing on 
Pan-German propaganda as Haushofer's geopolitics, since both waxed 
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indignant about the inequity of land distribution in Central Europe. 
(102) 
However, such comments were infrequent in Hitler's speeches before 1922; 
thereafter, Germany's spatial dilemma seemed to acquire greater significance 
and prominence. It is possible (though this is only conjecture) that 
Hitler's heightened awareness of the problem was attributable to his 
acquaintance with Haushofer's ideas and work. This would certainly coincide 
with the interest which the VB began to show in the latter's activities. 
On 2 November 1922, for example, Hitler declared that "all political economy 
is subject to the natural conditions of growth and death, depending upon 
whether its proprietors, the people, the state survive the crises or 
collapse in order to create room for new forces. " 
(103) 
This comment may 
simply reflect the recurrent theme of Social Darwinism in Hitler's thought, 
but it may also reflect the geopolitician's treatment of the state as a 
living organism. On 10 April 1923 in a survey of pre-war policy, Hitler 
revealed how he would utilise any geopolitical observations: 
"Geographically speaking, the situation of the fatherland 
was one of the most unfavourable in Europe; (she) could not 
subsist on her own land and soil alone and had to fight to 
gain new soil. However Germany had wanted peace .... Since 
she did not want to fight, she was compelled to industrialise. 
We have to conquer the world peacefully (said the sirens). 
Economic well-being, however, is the product of military 
might. Today we no longer have the sword, therefore, nor 
well-being either. Behind the plough, the sword must be 
held ready. " (104) 
The assertion of the interdependence between economic prosperity and military 
strength leaves little doubt about the way in which Hitler wanted to solve 
Germany's problems. As he put it on another occasion, "the conditions 
necessary for the life of the nation (Lebensbedingungen) will be improved 
only by the political determination to expand. " (105) 
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As has been seen, as early as December 1922, Hitler had decided that 
such expansion should occur primarily at Russia's expense; "Russia would 
provide sufficient land for German settlers and a wide field of activity for 
German industry. " 
(106) But can one really see such ambitions as the product 
of a geopolitical 'education' during 1921 and 1922? This seems unlikely 
on the whole. Since relations between Hitler and Haushofer were at best 
fairly 'distant' before their meetings in Landsberg gaol in 1924, it 
seems probable that Hitler's dreams of imperial conquest had other origins. 
(107) 
In fact, his scheme of eastward expansion flatly contradicted Haushofer's 
conviction of the need for 'collaboration' with Russia over the question of 
space, which was to be the basis for his larger design of an 'East Eurasian' 
alliance. Indeed Haushofer"'s views bore a strong resemblance to those of 
Moeller van den Bruck, with whom Hitler had clashed in 1922. 
(108) 
Both 
argued that Germany's future lay in the East, but not, seemingly, as a 
result of a campaign of conquest: both believed that Russia and Germany were 
somehow drawn together by destiny and that, together, they could solve each 
other's problems. Moeller put this rather ethereal relationship down to 
a cultural affinity, Haushof er to rather more concrete geographical realities. 
Accordingly, both refused to accept political changes, such as the emergence 
of a Bolshevik government, could alter this destiny. By 1922, Hitler, 
of course, felt differently. Hitler may originally have shared the outlook 
of Haushof er and Moeller; it will be recalled that he had argued that 
a Russo-German alliance before the war would have enabled Germany to 
expand eastwards (presumably at Russian expense). And again he seemed to 
regard the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as having implemented this strategy; 
the treaty, Hitler argued on 29 May 1921, had secured Germany's future 
"by the acquisition of land and soil, by access to raw materials, and 
by friendly relations between the two lands". 
(109) 
(My italics). However, 
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Hitler's original enthusiasm for a Russo-German alliance was evidently 
based on far less immutable conviction than Haushofer's or Moeller's 
and seems to have been eroded during 1921 and 1922 by his growing aversion 
towards Bolshevik Russia. By the end of 1922, Hitler was planning "the 
destruction of Russia with the help of England". (Myitalics). 
(110) 
This 
was quite a different matter and would not have received Haushof er's 
approval. 
Haushofer's geopolitics, in short, did not supply the model and the inspir- 
ation for Hitler's campaign of conquest and destruction at Russia's expense 
in Eastern Europe and the disparity between the political philosophies of 
Hitler and Haushofer should not be underestimated. 
(111) 
Nevertheless the 
arguments of the geopoliticians were to be grist to Hitler's mill. The 
foreign policy sections of Mein Kampf leave little doubt that he found 
geopolitical theories highly useful. Haushofer later claimed that the 
Nazis had "misused" and "misinterpreted" geopolitics, but does this claim 
stand examination? 
(112) 
When interrogated by the Allies in 1945, Haushofer denied any part in the 
composition of Mein Kampf; it is, perhaps, significant though that he 
argued thAt "a scientific comparison of my style of writing and the style 
of the book" would prove this. 
(113) 
Haushof er was defending himself 
against the charge that he actually helped to write Mein Kampf, conveniently 
avoiding the issue of whether he influenced the trend of its argument. 
In addition, since the Allied interrogators knew that Haushof er had 
frequently visited Rudolf Hess in Landsberg gaol in 1923 and 1924 and 
that he had, on occasion, spoken with Hitler there, Haushofer argued that 
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he had never seen Hitler "alone". 
(114) 
This was an attempt to conceal 
the fact that he had had discussions with Hitler and Hess, who had been 
reading Ratzel's Politische Geographie, and that he supplied them with 
further geopolitical literature. 
(115) 
There can be no doubt that this 
exchange of ideas and information bore fruit in Hitler's autobiography 
and that Haushofer knew it. 
(116) 
In chapter four of the first volume of Mein Kampf, published on 19 July 
1925, Hitler reviewed pre-war German diplomacy and four options open to 
it in dealing with Germany's growing population. He had discussed the 
same subject in a speech on 29 May 1921 and it is interesting to see how 
this essentially Pan-German analysis had developed in the intervening 
years. 
(117) 
Hitler rejected birth control - the first option - on pseudo- 
Darwinistic rather than geopolitical grounds: 
"While Nature, by making procreation free, yet submitting 
survival to a hard trial, chooses from an excess number of 
individuals the best as worthy of living, thus preserving 
them alone and in them conserving the species, man limits 
procreation, but is hysterically concerned that, once a 
being is born, it should be preserved at any price. " (118) 
In short, whilst nature intervenes occasionally to limit the size of population 
and only the fittest survive, birth control breeds weakness. Hitler's 
conclusion that "anyone who wants to secure the existence of the German 
people by a self-limitation of its reproduction is robbing it of its 
future" is perfectly consistent with Ratzel's definition of Realpolitik 
as "the policy which secures for a growing people the land indispensable 
for the future" but also with the ideas of Heinrich Class and the ADV, which 
Ratzel helped to found. 
(119) 
One cannot, therefore, point unequivocally 
to direct geopolitical influence here. 
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Evidence of the impact of geopolitical ideas is more easily traceable 
in Hitler's assessment of the usefulness of internal colonization - the 
second option. Admittedly, Ratzel, Class and, in his turn, Hitler accepted 
that Germany should make maximum use of her own land before external colon- 
ization was undertaken and all doubted whether this alone would be sufficient 
in the long term to feed a growing population. 
(120) 
However, in. fein 
Kampf, Hitler developed one further argument against internal colonization, 
which seems clearly attributable to his reading of Ratzel's Politische 
Geographie. In the book, Ratzel stressed that one of the advantages of 
territorial expansion was that a larger area simplified foreign relations 
by reducing the number of possible neighbours. 
(121) 
In other words, the 
size of a state materially affected its security. Hitler turned this 
argument around to suit his own purposes when he stated that: 
,, The limitation to a definite small area of soil, inherent 
in internal colonization,... leads to an exceedingly 
unfavourable politico-military situation in the nation 
in question. 
The size of the area inhabited by a people constitutes in itself 
an essential factor for determining its outward security. 
The greater the quantity of space at the disposal of a 
people, the greater its natural protection. " (122) 
Whilst a large amount of territory acted as a deterrent against frivolous 
attack, a small amount acted as "a positive invitation to seizure" in 
Hitler's view. 
(123) Ratzel's geo-military deliberations clearly proved 
useful to Hitler in his attempt to discredit the idea of internal colonization. 
Hitler's arguments concerning the third and favoured option - the 
acquisition of new soil for settlement of the excess population - reflect 
a variety of influences. The first argument, namely that such a policy 
would help to rectify the balance between the agricultural and industrial 
245 
sectors of the economy and make "the subsistence of the people as a 
whole more or less independent of foreign countries", repeated almost 
verbatim the analysis of Heinrich Class in the 'Kaiserbuch'. 
(124) 
However, 
these goals could not be met, in Hitler's view, by overseas expansion but 
by aggrandisement "almost exclusively in Europe". 
(125) 
Writing before the 
First World War, Ratzelsad Class believed that expansion in Europe could 
only be achieved by resort to war and, therefore, both preferred colonies 
overseas; 
(126) 
Hitler, writing after the war, had no qualms about starting 
another. Perhaps drawing on Ratzel's exposition on the transient nature 
of political frontiers, Hitler then argued that "we must not let political 
boundaries obscure for us the boundaries of eternal justice. If this earth 
really has room for all to live in, let us be given the soil we need for 
our livelihood. " 
(127) 
Hitler's final argument in favour of territorial 
aggrandisement in Europe seems to derive from Ratzel's observations on the 
fleeting success of trading powers, who acquire colonies but whose homeland 
is insufficient in size tovarrant such an empirý12PAr he asserted that: 
"Many European states are like pyramids stood on their heads. 
Their European area is absurdly small in comparison to their 
weight of colonies, foreign trade etc. We may say: summit 
in Europe, base in the whole world; contrasting with the 
American Union, which possesses its base in its own continent 
and touches the rest of the earth only with its summit. And 
from this comes the immense inner strength of this state 
and the weakness of most European colonial powers. " (129) 
Hitler dismissed the fourth alternative, that is the policy of sustaining 
Germany by commercial exchange and overseas colonization which had been 
followed by the imperial government before 1914, because it was based on 
two fallacies. The first was that peaceful economic conquest of the world, 
which the German politicians sought, was feasible; "if we chose this road", 
Hitler wrote, "England would some day inevitably become our enemy"; indeed, 
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the history of the British Empire itself showed that economic conquest 
(130) 
could not be achieved peaceably. The second was the belief, encouraged 
by Germany's successful technological and industrial revolution, that 
"the state itself primarily represented an economic institution... that its 
very existence depended on economics. " This heresy Hitler attributed 
to the insidious influence of the Jews. The state, in fact, was "a national 
organism not an economic organization", Hitler pointed out. 
(131) 
In 
discrediting both fallacies, Hitler seems to have drawn, consciously or 
otherwise, on the arguments of his precursors; Class for his critique 
on imperial Germany's commercial policy and Ratzel for the biological roots 
of statehood. 
(132) 
In developing his analysis of pre-war German foreign policy for Mein Kampf, 
Hitler, therefore, seems to have rifled Ratzel's Politische Geographie in 
search of 'scientific' justification for a campaign of conquest in Eastern 
Europe, which was already implied in his speech on 29 May 1921 by his 
support for the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and probably inspired originally 
(133) 
by Pan-German propaganda. It should be stressed that Hitler used 
Ratzel's ideas out of context and conveniently overlooked the latter's own 
(134) 
political opinions. 
In the second volume of Mein Kampf, published on 11 December 1926 and 
presumably written after his release from Landsberg gaol, Hitler felt 
obliged to defend his views on eastward expansion, which had not received 
wholesale acceptance from within the ranks of the Nazi party. 
(135) 
Now 
Hitler described the Russian question not only as probably "the most 
decisive concern of all German foreign affairs", but also as "the touchstone 
for the political capacity of the young National Socialist movement to 
(136) 
think clearly and act correctly. " Faced with the challenge to his 
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conception of a future German foreign policy, Hitler looked again at the 
ideas of the geopoliticians in search of positive reinforcement. It 
seems he was not disappointed. His observations on the strategic and 
military significance of a larger territory and on the validity of Europe's 
frontiers seem to show that he had again pilfered geopolitical ideas. 
In particular, Hitler appears to have drawn on Karl Haushofer's developing 
views on military geography (Wehrgeographie). In an unpublished article 
in 1926 comparing Germany's living-space with those of her neighbours, 
Haushofer found that Germany's had become "highly unfavourable from a 
military-geographical standpoint. " 
(137) 
It was threatened "along deep 
inroads" by Poland and Bohemia in the east and France in the west. To make 
matters worse, the population was maldistributed, tending to accumulate 
in the "exposed areas" of the Upper Rhine, Upper Silesia and Saxony. 
Furthermore "over 160 km of coastal frontier belongs to East Prussia, (which 
is now) cut off (from Germany) and the whole Baltic coast cannot be 
protected as it is unusually accessible by sea (leicht angesegelt), as the 
appearance of the English fleet off Swinemlinde before the war showed. " 
In total, Germany had "3,305 kilometers of wholly unprotected land frontier 
and 1,440 kilometers of open coastal frontier.,, 
(138) 
In addition, Haushof er 
stressed that Germany's shortage of raw materials, such as oil, copper, 
tin, zinc, not to mention coal and iron, and the situation of her limited 
resources in vulnerable areas would have deleterious effects on Germany's 
ability to resist attack. Hence, Haushofer concluded gloomily, the 
German Empire is "an over-industrialized industrial state without a chance 
of feeding its population from its own land, and therefore, in its present 
form, mutilated and split into two, particularly susceptible to aggression. " 
(139) 
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Whilst there is no evidence to suggest that Hitler had access to this 
unpublished article or that he had discussed 'military geography' with 
Haushofer, it does seem probable that he was acquainted with the subject when 
he wrote the second volume of Mein Kampf. Hitler shared Haushofer's 
concern for the "extremely unfavourable situation of the Reich from the 
viewpoint of military geography. " "The coastline especially", Hitler 
observed, "was unfavourable from a military standpoint for a fight with 
England; it was short and cramped, and the land front, on the other hand, 
disproportionately long and open. " 
(140) 
Like Haushofer, Hitler believed 
France's position to be more secure - whilst Germany suffered from 
centrifugal tendencies, France was "rigidly centralised", 
(141) 
Again, 
like Haushof er, Hitler now considered access to food and raw materials to 
be a vital part of Germany's state security; his projected Anglo-German- 
Italian alliance would, he argued, free Germany from her "unfavourable 
strategic position" by ensuring "the most powerful protection on our flank 
on the one hand" and the "complete guarantee of our food and raw materials 
on the other. " 
(142) 
These strategic arguments led to the somewhat 
predictable conclusion that "only an adequately large space on this earth 
assures a nation of its freedom of existence. , 
(143) 
If Haushofer's findings helped to justify Hitler's expansionist programme 
on the grounds of self-sufficiency and military security - and the 
congruence between their ideas is, at least, remarkable - Ratzel's analysis 
of the geopolitical value of frontiers also proved attractive to Hitler. 
Here again, Haushof er may have been an important intermediary, drawing 
attention to the results of Ratzel's deliberations in order to cure what 
he saw as the ignorance of Germans (from "the man in the street" to the 
Memberct the Reichstag) of the 'true' nature of frontiers. 
(144) 
Hitler 
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seems. to have been one of Haushofer's most receptive students. In 
Politische Geographie Ratzel argued that a frontier was "organic", "a 
peripheral organ", that it was subject to growth and contraction according 
to the state of a particular nation. As a result, frontiers were "by their 
nature inconstant (ver. nderlich)"; "the apparently rigid frontier" was, in 
fact, "only the resting-point of a movement"; in short, there were "no 
absolute frontiers". 
(145) 
These views were echoed by Hitler in the second 
volume of Mein Kampf when he stated that: 
"Just as Germany's frontiers are fortuitous frontiers, 
momentary frontiers in the current political struggle 
of any period, so are the boundaries of other nations' 
living-space. And just as the shape of our earth's 
surface can seem immutable as granite only to the 
thoughtless soft-head, but in reality only represents 
at each period an apparent pause in a continuous 
development, created by the mighty forces of Nature 
in a process of continuous growth, only to be transformed 
or destroyed tomorrow by greater forces, likewise the 
boundaries of living-spaces in the life of nations. " (146) 
Hitler, however, used such arguments for his own ends, firstly to undermine 
respect for the existing frontiers: 
"For no people on this earth possesses so much as a 
square yard of territory on the strength of a higher 
will or superior right.... State boundaries are made by 
man and changed by man " (147) 
and secondly, to discredit the idea of limiting German ambitions to the 
restoration of the frontiers of 1914: those frontiers were "neither 
complete in the sense of embracing the people of German nationality, nor 
sensible with regard to geo-military expedience. They were not the 
result of considered political action, but momentary frontiers in a 
political struggle that was by no means concluded. " 
(148) 
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There seems little doubt, therefore, that in the second volume of his 
autobiography, Hitler marshalled Haushofer's arguments concerning 
Germany's lack of self-sufficiency and military security to add greater 
conviction to his expansionist programme and Ratzel's observations on the 
transient mture of frontiers to overcome any moralistic reservations which 
his followers might have about such a programme. Though both these 
were not without significance in the later foreign policy of the Third 
Reich, it has to be remembered, however, that they were used to bolster a 
decision which had already been taken; they did not determine that 
decision to expand nor, moreover, the direction which that expansion was to 
take. In Mein Kampf geopolitics were harnessed to an antisemitic, anti- 
Bolshevik racial ideology, which reinforced Hitler's already evident interest 
in an eastward course of territorial aggrandisement. 
(149) 
Haushof er's 
claim that the Nazis 'misused' or 'misunderstood' geopolitics is, at 
best, a half-truth. Hitler certainly misused geopolitical arguments. They 
were meant to convince world opinion of the need for a peaceful redist- 
ribution of territory in Europe; they were used to justify the resort to 
force in the pursuit of the same goal. Nevertheless, Haushofer's ideas (and 
to a lesser extent Ratzel's) were open to the interpretation which Hitler 
put on them. Haushofer's assertions of Germany's need for more living- 
space had an obvious political implication, when, as so often, they were 
unaccompanied by a rider urging peaceful territorial change. 
Some historians now believe that the extension of Germany's Lebensraum 
may not have been Hitler's ultimate goal. The conquest of territory in 
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Eastern Europe may have been only the first of several 'stages' in the 
creation of a German world dominion. After the successful establishment 
of European hegemony with the defeat of France and the conquest of Russia, 
Germany would try, so the argument runs, to acquire a colonial empire in 
the Mediterranean and the Atlantic in preparation for a confrontation with 
the United States, which would result in world domination by Germany. 
(150) 
But how convincing is the evidence that Hitler was mulling over such 
fantastic schemes in the early 1920s when he was a largely unknown orator 
and even the first step in the relaisation of such ambitions - gaining 
power in Germany - appeared to be a pipe-dream? Lowly status does not, of 
course, preclude grandiose dreams and, if such notions were in Hitler's 
head, what inspired them? 
Some historians have found evidence of Hitler's interest in German world 
dominion, and perhaps the inspiration behind it, in the antisemitic ideology, 
which he adopted after 1919. The belief in an international Jewish 
conspiracy to take over the world instilled the idea that the Aryan race 
had a mission, a world-wide life-and-death struggle against the Jews and 
it is, therefore, conceivable that Hitler envisaged an Aryan-dominated 
world if the Jews were defeated. It has been argued that Hitler accused 
his arch-enemy - the Jew - of pursuing world conquest in order to disguise 
his own ambitions for Germany. 
(151) 
If this is true, then Hitler was 
dreaming of world dominion as early as 13 August 1920, when he claimed 
in a speech that the Jew was trying to "lower the racial level of other 
peoples" in order to "organise, build up and maintain his definitive world 
dominion (Weltherrschaft). " 
(152) 
However, this interpretation is, of course, 
highly speculative. One can, with some justification, argue that Hitler 
stressed the world-wide nature of the Jewish threat merely to provoke a 
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national response and ultimately a national revival in Germany. In the 
same speech in August 1920, for example, he went on to suggest that one 
could not "fight fire with fire" and that the grip of international Jewish 
capitalism could only be broken "by national strength". 
(153) 
Indeed, the 
slogan of nationalism versus internationalism was constantly reiterated 
in Nazi propaganda at the time and the party's main ideologues had since 
1919 belaboured those institutions, which were seen to have universal 
aspirations: the Catholic Church, the Freemasons, as well as the Communist 
Party. 
(154) 
So one wonders if a national revival was not the extent of 
Hitler's ambitions in 1920 and antisemitic propaganda was geared solely 
to that and. 
Some historians have suggested, however, that by the time he wrote Mein 
Kampf, Hitler's antisemitism had 'hardened' or 'sharpened'; in 1920, it 
is pointed out, the Nazi party was calling for the treatment of Jews in 
Germany as aliens and, at worst, for their expulsion; by 1924 Hitler was 
writing of the need to eradicate the Jewish bacteria in the German body. 
(155) 
One might, therefore, assume a causal connection between the increasing 
violence of Hitler's solutions to the Jewish question and an emerging 
preoccupation with the idea of German world dominion. However, this 
interpretation also has to be treated cautiously for several reasons. 
Firstly, Hitler had, in fact, been using the violent language of Mein Kampf 
in private discussion of the problem since 1920; in a letter in July 1920, 
Hitler referred to the Jews as "baccili", which must be combatted "by the 
annihilation of its germs (Erreger)". 
(156) 
In December 1922 he told 
Eduard Scharrer in a confidential interview that "a solution to the 
question of the Jews has to come. If it is solved sensibly, this will be 
best for both parties. If this is not achieved, then there are only two 
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other possibilities, either the German people will become a nation like 
the Americans or the Levantines, or a bloody showdown (Auseinandersetzung) 
would result. " 
(157) 
So one has to question whether there was any 
hardening of Hitler's attitude towards the Jews between 1920 and 1924 and 
hence any corresponding increase in his interest in German world dominion. 
Secondly, one should resist the temptation to see in Hitler's talk of 
"showdowns" and the "annihiliation of germs" the origins of the 'Final 
Solution' attempted in the gas-chambers of Auschwitz in the Second World 
War. It may have been pure rhetoric and certainly, as Hitler himself 
admitted, other more "sensible" solutions, such as creating a national home 
for the Jews, were possible. Alfred Rosenberg suggested the re-settlement 
of the Jews in Uganda; but Madagascar and even Southern Russia were mooted 
as possible locations. 
(158) 
So there are for grounds questioning the 
assumption that in the early 1920a Hitler saw in the physical destruction 
of world Jewry the route to German world dominion. 
However, in Mein Kampf, Hitler did speculate on the long-term implications 
of a carefully considered racial policy. In the first volume he suggested 
that "a racially pure people which is conscious of its blood can never 
be enslaved by the Jews.  
(159) 
In the second volume he implied that such 
a people might actually come to dominate the world itself: 
"A state which in this age of racial poisoning 
dedicates itself to the care of its best racial 
elements must some day become lord of the earth. " (160) 
Indeed, this might be a necessity: 
"We all sense that in the distant future humanity 
must be faced by problems which only a highest race, 
become master people and supported by the means and 
possibilities of the entire globe, will be equipped 
to overcome. " (161) 
What he meant by all this, Hitler never made clear. One question, above 
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all others, however, zeds an answer. Was it the German state or the 
Aryan race which was so destined? The evidence supports both interpret- 
ations. On one occasion, he argued that "if the German people in its 
historic development had possessed that herd unity which other peoples 
enjoyed, then the German Reich would doubtless be mistress of the globe. " 
(162) 
On another, he called upon "the Germanic states" to halt the bastardization 
of the race. 
(163) 
It is, perhaps, interesting to note that Alfred Rosenberg, 
who probably introduced Hitler to the concept of the Aryan race and the 
Jewish world conspiracy, did not identify the Aryan solely with the German. 
He wanted , the organic grouping of the states of Europe and other continents 
according to race and nationality" in readiness for a racial confrontation. 
(164) 
He recognized England and the United States as potential defenders of the 
Nordic race. 
(165) 
If Rosenberg did look forward to a future world dominion - 
and this is unlikely as he described the idea of a "political world 
dominion (Weltherrschaft)" as'both immoral and inorganic" - it was likely 
to be achieved by a group of Nordic powers, not by Germany alone, in 
his view. 
(166) So it is possible that Hitler assigned the future dominance 
of the Aryan race to the German people alone by mistake. Equally feasible, 
however, is the conclusion that these racial theories made Hitler crave 
such an exalted destiny for the German people alone. 
signs of Hitler's interest in the concept of German world dominion are 
not to be found exclusively in his antisemitic and racial theorizing. It 
is quite tenable to suggest that the ideas may have evolved from his 
observations on power politics. Hitler's occasional references in Mein 
Kampf to the terms 'world power' (Weltmacht) and 'world dominion' 
(Welerrsý=t) have led some historians to conclude that Hitler had a 
vague, but fairly concrete, long-term strategy by which Germany could come 
to dominate the world. However, the obliqueness of Hitler's hints and 
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a certain confusion over the meaning of the terms which Hitler used, may 
have misled historians as to the actual goals envisaged. There appear 
to be three stages in Hitler's foreign policy programme in Mein Kampf. 
Firstly, he sought to secure the continued existence of the German nation: 
"Today we are not fighting for a position as a world 
power (Weltmacht); today, we must struggle for the 
existence of our fatherland, for the unity of our 
nation and the daily bread of our children. " (167) 
This was to be achieved in alliance with England and Italy against the 
French. 
The second stage would see the establishment of Germany as a world power, 
primarily by the acquisition of more Lebensraum in Europe largely at the 
expense of Russia. Though Germany had 'supposedly' been a world power in 
1914 with her far-flung imperial possessions, in reality she had not been; 
but as Hitler said: 
"IS the German nation ini914 had had a different relation 
between area and population, Germany would really have 
been a world power (Weltmacht). " (168) 
What was needed, in the first instance, was not colonies overseas but 
"exclusively... the acquisition of a territory for settlement, which will 
enhance the area of the mother country and hence not only keep the new 
settlers in the most intimate community with the land of their origin, but 
secure for the total area those advantages, which lie in its unified 
magnitude.... And for world power she needs that magnitude. " 
(169) 
Hitler 
hinted, though, that whilst overseas colonies had low priority at the 
moment, they might be valuable later; in a retrospective assessment of 
pre-war German policy, he argued that the strengthening of Germany's 
continental power by territorial aggrandisement in Europe "seemed to place 
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a completion by later acquisitions of colonial territory within the 
realm of the naturally possible. " 
(170) 
The third stage and - in the view of this writer - the ultimate ambition 
harboured by Hitler at this time was to make Germany the dominant world 
power. It is here that the looseness of Hitler's language may have created 
confusion. Hitler claimed that the lack of racial unity amongst Germans 
had robbed them of 'world dominion' (Weltbsrrschaft); but for this, Germany 
would have been 'mistress of the globe' (Herrin des Erdballs); Germans would 
have enjoyed 'the right of masters' (Herrenrecht). 
(171) 
All three terms - 
Weltherrschaft, Herrin des Erdballs and Herrenrecht, - seem to imply world 
conquest or world mastery by Germany. But this may be misleading. Hitler's 
usage of these terms needs clarification. For example, in Mein Kampf, 
Hitler referred to the "reinforcement of British world dominion (Weltorrschaft)" 
as the goal of British foreign policy at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. 
(172) 
Clearly in this context Weltherrschaft did not mean world 
mastery; by no stretch of the imagination could Britain be said to have 
enjoyed such a position. Britain did have a world-wide empire, which 
gave her a predominant influence in world affairs; she was, as Hitler put 
it elsewhere, "the greatest world power on earth". 
(173) 
On another occasion, 
he referred to a "British world hegemony (britische Welt-hegemonie)", one 
that had been challenged by a "Germanic world hegemony" in 1914. 
(174) 
The 
result had been war. Hitler's terminology was evidently inconsistent, but 
it seems likely that he wanted for Germany what Britain currently enjoyed. 
Whether he called it Weltherrschaft or Welt-hegemonie, he meant not actual 
world conquest, but a position of predominance or pro-eminence amongst 
the world powers. 
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An analysis of Hitler's use of the term "Herr" leads to the same conclusion. 
America, Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf, "seems to be growing into a new 
mistress of the world (neue Herrin der Welt)". 
(175) 
The implication here 
is again not that America was about to conquer the world but that she 
would become the foremost world power amongst the other world powers. 
Hitler seemed to believe that it was 'natural' or 'instinctive' for the world 
powers to vie with one another for predominance. 
(176) 
In brief, Hitler's 
ambition was to make Germany the foremost world power, the dominant 
influence in world politics; in this sense, Germany would be Herr der Erde. 
(177) 
This interpretation is a tentative one - of necessity, given the paucity 
of the evidence and the ambiguous nature of Hitler's global fantasies - 
and does not apply to Hitler's later 'plans' when in power. 
It is perhaps worth considering finally the origins of Hitler's fascination 
with the concept of 'world power status' (Weltmachtstellung) and 'world 
dominion'. The example of the British Empire was obviously of paramount 
importance. As early as December 1919, he had described England as "the 
world power (who) possesses every world monopoly", 
(178) 
These monopolies 
had, in his view, been challenged in the years leading up to the outbreak 
of the First World War by Germany, who had "in recent years gained foot- 
holds on every continent and was in the process of emerging at the head of 
 the world powers . 
(179) In a speech on 17 April 1920 Hitler expressed 
interest in how a country with such a small population could rule "a 
fifth of the entire globe" and control world trade. 
(180) 
What emerges from 
these speeches is that Hitler seemed to regard 'world dominion' as consisting 
of the possession of a world-wide empire serviced by a mighty navy and 
sustained by great commercial strength; hence the German challenge to 
Britain's pre-eminence amongst the world powers emerged when she acquired 
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those attributes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
These views, without much doubt, had been consciously or unconsciously 
absorbed from Pan-German literature; Heinrich Class, as has been seen, 
laid great emphasis on overseas colonies; he described the British fleet 
as "the basis of her position as a world power". 
(181) 
Perhaps most inter- 
eating of all, Class was prone to the same kind of hyperbole as Hitler 
later on when describing Britain's power; Class argued, for example, that 
with the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902, "England became 
master of world affairs (Herr der Weltlage)". 
(182) 
So it seems possible that the concept of 'world dominion' (Weltherrschaft) 
- so vital in understanding Hitler's 'Stufenplan' - was a legacy from 
Pan-Germanism. However, between 1920 and 1924, the idea did undergo some 
refinement. In particular, it should be noted that in 1919 Hitler felt 
that Germany, with her empire, navy and growing commercial strength, had been 
a 'world power' in 1914. In Mein Kampf, as has been seen, he denied this. 
The change was evidently wrought by his growing conviction that expansion 
into contiguous areas in Europe was preferable to overseas expansion. 
In May 1921 he argued that, since Germany had entered the colonial race too 
late, Germany could only attain an "importance in tie world" commensurate 
with the size of her population by acquiring land in Europe along the lines 
indicated by the treaty of Brent-Litovsk. 
(183) 
The change was reflected 
in Hitler's emphasis on the need for an army rather than a navy; in a 
critique of pre-war policy in August 1922, he described the creation of 
a German army as a "necessity of life" if Germany were to maintain her 
"position as a world power (Weltmachtstellung)". 
(184) 
Significantly, he 
was not yet denying Germany's world power status, which tends to confirm 
what has been suggested above, namely that Hitler began to take note of 
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geopolitical ideas only when he was writing Mein Kampf; and that his 
conversion to a policy of continental aggrandisement was affected before 
then by a heady mixture of Ostpolitik, as sponsored by Ludendorff in 1918, 
and antisemitic and anti-Bolshevik prejudice, as supplied (interminably) 
by Alfred Rosenberg. 
It is only in Mein Kampf, that Hitler dwells at any length on the concept 
of Wels t and his observations bear the stamp of Ratzel's ideas. In 
Politlache Geographie Ratzel identified two types of great powers - those 
with a large landed base and those with an imperial base - and estimated 
that an area of 5 million square kilometers was an adequate foundation for 
genuine great power status. 
(185) 
The British Empire, in Ratzel's view, was 
the only genuine 'world power', a power which "is represented through her 
own possessions in all parts of the known world and particularly in the 
decisive places also". For Ratzel, Weltmachtstellung was a position of 
pre-eminence which one power attained and retained until she wassupplanted 
by another; as he commented: 
"What England is today, Spain used to be, and Rome before that. " (186) 
Karl Haushofer called it a "Wanderpokal" -a kind of trophy which passed 
from one nation to another. 
(187) 
Size alone, however, did not, in Ratzel's 
view, assure a state real power; it must have an adequate population as 
Nell: 
"Alongside the increase in the amount of space, the 
number of people must also grow, and it must be realised 
how the value of one determines the value of the other. " (188) 
Furthermore, newly acquired land had to be settled to be of value. 
Hitler's comments in the second volume of Mein Kampf seem to reflect this 
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argument quite faithfully. He accepted both of Ratzel's criteria for 
great or world power status. He identified America, Russia and China as 
the "giant states" and the imperial powers, England and France as "power 
states", '1Whose area above all is the chief support of the political power". 
(189) 
As has been noted above, since 1919 Hitler had spoken of Britain's pre- 
eminent position in world affairs using the term Weltherrschaft; Ratzel's 
use of the term Weltmachtstellung may, in part, explain some of the 
confusion in Mein Kampf. 
Certainly, Hitler's denial of Germany's status as a world power in the 
pre-par period seems attributable to Ratzel's comments about the amount of 
territory required and its location; Germany did not qualify because the 
"mother country is limited to the absurd area of five hundred thousand square 
kilometers". 
(190) 
To become a world power, Germany had not only to expand 
her territorial base but also, in apparent conformity with Ratzel's views, 
to increase her population to settle the new land acquired. As Hitler wrote: 
"This foreign policy will be acknowledged as correct only 
if, after scarcely a hundred years, there are two hundred 
and fifty million Germans on this continent, and not living 
penned in as factory coolies for the rest of the world, but: 
as peasants and workers, who guarantee each other's livelihood 
by their labour. " (191) 
So it seems possible that Ratzel's work may have provided Hitler with a 
doctrine of self-perpetuating expansionism in the pursuit of world power 
status for Germany since any territorial expansion would require a 
population increase, which, in turn, would necessitate further territorial 
expansion. 
(192) 
It has to be emphasised again, though, that what Hitler 
had done was to rifle Ratzel's work in search of scientific arguments to make 
a preconceived policy of crude expansionism more respectable; he ignored 
much which did not suit his purpose. 
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One other concrete legacy of the geopoliticians to Hitler may have been 
their larger conception of foreign affairs; they may have taught him to 
think in terms of continents, instead of nations. 
(193) 
The polarization of 
world power was a frequent theme in geopolitical writing and it is 
conceivable that Hitler's vague notions about a future confrontation between 
a Europe under German hegemony and America derived from this source. Rather 
surprisingly Hitler seemed to think that Britain would not side with 
America in such a tussle and he may have been swayed in this direction by 
the regular accounts of a growing alienation between Britain and America 
in geopolitical publications. Though the geopoliticians were obviously 
not the only ones to note this, their arguments are worth examination. 
Haushofer, for example, described on several occasions how Britain's 
commercial monopoly was being undermined by America's commercial expansion 
and how the Americans were "visibly annoyed" at British (and French) 
imperial policies in the Far East. 
(194) 
Erich Obst, the Zeitschrift für 
Geopolitik's correspondent on European affairs, described the emerging 
conflict thus: 
"The world war unleashed in part by England gave the 
Americans the opportunity which they knew very well how 
to exploit and which will first begin to bear fruit in 
a few decades. Then will the fateful hour in its 
truest sense approach for Great Britain and her economy, 
and she is preparing herself for the coming confrontation 
with the United States. Whether the struggle will be 
decided on power-political or politico-economic grounds, 
England needs allies against America in any case. " (195) 
It may be a coincidence but it is one worth mentioning that Hitler wrote in 
Kein Kampf that "no ties of kinship can prevent a feeling of envious 
concern in England towards the growth of the American Union in all fields 
of international economic and power politics. The former colonial 
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country, child of the great mother, seems to be growing into a new 
master of the world. It is understandable today that England re-examines 
her old alliance with anxious concern and British statesmen gaze with 
trepidation towards a period in which it will no longer be said: 'Britannia 
rules the waves'. But Instead: 'The seas for the Union'. " He also 
believed that, in the last resort if it came to a confrontation, England 
would be doomed without allies. 
(196) 
In short, therefore, the geopoliticians encouraged the idea that America 
would increasingly challenge Britain's pre-eminence as a world power and 
it is possible that Hitler saw the chance for Germany, once she was 
dominant in Europe, to seize that position herself by exploiting Anglo- 
American tensions. 
All told, therefore, it seems likely that Hitler had a rather ill-defined 
scheme in mind by which Germany, by stages, would recover her strength and 
become a world power again. His ultimate ambition at this time was to 
make Germany the predominant world power. His interest in this concept 
was, undoubtedly, aroused initially by Pan-German propaganda about the pre- 
eminence enjoyed by Great Britain at the end d the nineteenth century, 
but it was fed by the geopolitical preference for a large block of contiguous 
territory rather than a world-wide empire as the basis of 'world dominion'. 
It is possible that Haushofer taught Hitler to "think in terms of cont- 
inents" and encouraged the latter's musings about a distant confrontation 
between a German-dominated Europe and America, in which Great Britain would 
probably be forced to side with Germany. 
263 
Two conclusions, arising out of this chapter, need to be reiterated. 
Firstly, there is no substance in the claim that the geopoliticians helped, 
wittingly or unwittingly, to determine the goals of Hitler's foreign 
policy. Hitler merely utilized geopolitical arguments to reinforce his own 
pre-determined schemes and remained quite immune to the Weltanschauung 
underlying much of German geopolitics. Ultimately, Hitler found accounts 
of Russian racial inferiority and the invidious power of the Jews in 
Bolshevik Russia more convincing - or perhaps simply more useful in 
buttressing his own territorial ambitions - than geopolitical assessments 
of the value of future Russo-German collaboration. 
(197) 
Certainly it would 
seem that, for Hitler by 1925, racial questions were of primary importance 
and geopolitical insights were a secondary consideration; as he wrote in 
Mein Kampf: 
"However much the soil, for example, can influence men, 
the result of the influence will always be different 
depending on the races in question. The low fertility 
of a living space may spur the one race to the highest 
achievements; in others it will only be the cause of 
the bitterest poverty and final undernourishment with 
all its consequences. The inner nature of peoples is 
always determining for the manner in which outward 
influences will be effective. " (198) 
This was the crux of the difference between Haushofer and Hitler. Haushofer's 
respect for other races prevented him from advocating large-scale 
annexations of alien territory. His solution to Germany's spatial problems 
was to develop her 'borderlands'. His geopolitical researches and his 
practical work for the German Academy and the VDA were designed to hasten 
the devolution of these areas to Germany by peaceful means. His long-term 
ambition was to see anature Germany predominant amongst the great powers. 
(189) 
Like so many Germans at this time, Karl Haushofer shared the same dream 
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as Hitler of a resurgent Germany as a leading world power, but not his 
ruthlessness in the pursuit of its realization. 
Nevertheless, a second conclusion is inescapable. Haushofer's ideas were 
a positive encouragement to Hitler. The popularization and development of 
the concept of Lebensraum and, in particular, its emphasis on the pursuit 
of autarky as a military necessity, was Haushofer's main legacy to the 
Nazis. It was to be of crucial importance in the formulation of and just- 
ification for Hitler's foreign and domestic policies in the 1930s. Hitler 
may already have been aware from Pan-German literature of the term Lebensraum 
and of the argument that the absence of self-sufficiency had been Germany's 
Achilles' heel in the First World War, but the geopolitical theorization 
about Lebensraum elevated the problem to a pseudo-scientific level and, as 
a result, made Hitler's solution more palatable. That Hitler chose to 
pursue 'autarky by conquest' was not Haushofer's fault, but the latter does 
deserve a share of moral culpability for making - albeit inadvertently - 
Hitler's mission more respectable. Even so there is no reason to question 
the judgement of the Allied interrogators in 1945, who decided not to put 
Haushofer on trial at Nuremberg. 
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S. HITLER'S ALLIANCE STRATEGY - OPPOSITION AND REFINEMENT. 1924-28 
Hitler's alliance strategy seems to have been formulated and discussed in 
private, for example with Eduard Scharrer, as early as December 1922. But, 
although Hitler dropped hints about Germany's future allies during 1923 
expressing the hope that England and Italy would agree to a German- 
Austrian Anschluss and describing England and Italy as the only powers with 
an interest in the continued existence of the German state, nevertheless 
he was silent about the use to which these allies would be put in relation 
to Russia. In fact, not until 1925 when the first volume of Mein Kampf 
was published, did he unveil his full strategy in public and even then 
only by implication. 
An late as the spring of 1924 Hitler remained reticent about his alliance 
policy. In an article published in April 1924 entitled Warum musste ein 
8 November kommen? he repeated what he saw as Germany's foreign policy 
options before the First World War, stating that: 
"Either she decided to win farm land by renouncing 
overseas trade and colonies, and by renouncing over- 
industrialization etc., in which case the German government 
had to recognize that this was only to be achieved in 
alliance with England against Russia; or she wanted 
sea-power and world trade, in which case only an 
alliance with Russia against England could be considered. " (1) 
Though there can be little doubt that Hitler believed that post-war Germany 
faced the same choice, he still gave no clear indication of his own 
preference. The rest of the article went on to emphasize the likelihood of 
future Anglo-German collaboration against the French. The English, in 
his view, would oppose the French goal of annihilating, or "Balkanizing", 
Germany because it would create French hegemony in Europe and destroy 
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the balance of power, which England considered to be the guarantee of her 
"world hegemony": 
"Hence England was once the enemy of Spain, then of Holland, 
then finally of France, now of Germany, and will in future 
again be the enemy of the power which undertakes to strive 
for the forbidden hegemony in Europe. " 
As proof of the correctness of his analysis, Hitler pointed to the French 
decision, following the partition of Upper Silesia in the autumn of 1922, 
to "inflict the same fate on the Ruhr area". 
(2) 
This step, Hitler argued 
on 28 February 1924 during his trial, caused England to reverse her policy 
so that "at the start of the Ruhr conflict, England took, in effect, a pro- 
German stance and did not want the Ruhr to pass to France. " 
3) 
So, whilst Hitler indicated fairly plainly the alliance strategy which 
Germany should adopt against France, he did not suggest that it might also 
have been applied against Russia. In fact, Hitler avoided making a choice 
in public between expansion overseas and territorial aggrandisement in 
Burope, even though some of the geopolitical arguments about the state as 
a "folkish organism" and the duty of the state "to give to a people the 
nourishment and political power which was its due", which were later to 
justify the pursuit of Lebensraum in Eastern Europe, were in evidence at 
his trial. 
(4) 
Clearly, Hitler's failure to reveal in public until July 1925 
the second stage of his alliance strategy, which had been determined as 
early as December 1922, requires explanation. 
(5) 
One possibility is that Hitler had not finally decided upon the goals of 
his foreign policy. Alfred Rosenberg argued in January 1923 that it was not 
possible to be specific about the party's foreign policy because "the present 
conditions in world politics can change in time" and the makers of foreign 
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policy would have to adjust to such changes. 
(6) 
However, given the 
unequivocal nature of Hitler's comments to Scharrer in December 1922, and 
his unbending commitment to his chosen course later in life, it is doubtful 
whether Hitler was affected by such qualms. Indeed, one wonders whether 
Rosenberg was not himself covering up either the absence of a coherent party 
stance on foreign affairs or the existence of a concept which would alienate 
support if it were made public at that time. Axel Kuhn favours the first 
of these interpretations: 
(7) 
in his view, Hitler was still uncertain about 
his attitude towards Russia; nor had he as yet connected the Anglo-Italian- 
German alliance against France with his territorial ambitions; furthermore 
as Hitler still aimed at securing the return of Germany's overseas colonies, 
a policy which he admitted that England would oppose, he had clearly not 
resolved an inherent contradiction to his strategy. However, the records 
of Hitler's conversation with Scharrer show quite conclusively that Kuhn 
is mistaken: there was, in fact, no contradiction because Hitler had already 
decided to acquire land at Russian expense, and to abandon any colonial 
ambitions overseas thus "avoiding any damage to English interests". 
8) 
In 
short, Hitler's alliance scheme already took note of his territorial ambitions 
and, though in need of refinement, it was essentially complete in 1922. 
A more likely explanation of Hitler's and Rosenberg's reticence is that 
disclosure of these foreign policy goals would antagonise their supporters. 
The revelation of Hitler's territorial ambitions in Russia would certainly 
alienate the support of the fiercely nationalistic Russian emigres, which 
Scheubner-Richter had attracted to the Nazi movement between 1921 and 1923. 
It was expedient, therefore, to continue to pay lip-service to the idea of 
a future German alliance with a post-Bolshevik Russia for which Scheubner- 
Richter and the 4migr4s were working. 
(9) 
268 
Miawever, it might be thought that Hitler's arrest and imprisonment 
following the Munich putsch and Scheubner-Richter's death during it had 
eliminated the prospect of further assistance from the Russian nationalists, thus 
the need for caution on Hitler's part would have been removed. In fact, 
during his imprisonment in 1924 and in the first six months of 1925, 
Eitler remained silent in public about his vision of conquest in Eastern 
sorope. Perhaps, with the party in a state of collapse, Hitler preferred 
to cling to faint hopes of renewed 4migri support. A more likely explanation 
W" that the anti-Russian concept and its presumed architect, Alfred 
Rosenberg, were unpopular inside the Nazi party. 
I ,t is difficult to assess the extent of the opposition in the party to the 
anti-Bolshevik and anti-Russian line at this time; Ernst Hanfstgngl, an 
influential American recruit, who figured prominently in Hitler's social 
life, way have been an isolated critic. 
(10) 
However, the personal animosity 
between Alfred Rosenberg and other leading Nazis, jealous of his influence 
over Hitler, was unmistakeable; 
Hanfsthngl regarded him as a "charlatan" 
and claimed later that Dietrich Eckart regretted having introduced Rosenberg 
(11) 
When Hitler appointed Rosenberg to lead the party in his to the party. 
absence after November 1923, the resentment towards Rosenberg burst forth. 
gernan Esser and Julius Stlbicher accused him of having partly Jewish ancestry 
4d of having spied for France during the war and set about undermining 
his leadership of the rump of the Nazi P arty. 
(12) 
Hitler refused to be 
drawn into this internecine conflict and it is conceivable, therefore, that 
he was unwilling to endorse publicly a russophobic foreign policy, closely 
associated with Alfred 
Rosenberg, because it would compromise his studied 
impartiality in the party rivalries of 1924. In 1925, after his release 
from prison and his re-formation of 
the party under his own leadership, it 
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would matter far less. 
One further consideration deserves mention. Hitler's only public utter- 
ances in 1924, which consisted of his speeches at his trial and his article 
Warum musste ein 8 November kommen?, were designed to show that the Munich 
putsch had been the only rational step for a German patriot. The invasion 
of the Ruhr conveniently justified rebellion against a German government 
which preferred passive to active resistance against the French, and 
also provided evidence of potential English and Italian support. 
(13) 
Hitler could not produce an equally compelling case for a programme of 
territorial conquest in the Soviet Union; a diatribe against the Soviet 
Union based solely on antisemitic and anti-Bolshevik prejudices would 
scarcely have enhanced his stature as a patriotic politician defending the 
fatherland. 
The absence of a convincing justification for his imperialistic designs 
 ay have concerned Hitler all the more because of the opposition which his 
anti-Russian line would arouse within the party. 
By the time he was writing the first volume of Mein Kampf in the summer of 
1924, 
(14) 
however, he was beginning to find justification for his views 
by drawing upon the arguments of the geopoliticians. In chapter four of 
the book he again posed the alternative solutions to pre-war Germany's 
problem of overpopulation: "either a territorial policy, or a colonial 
and commercial policy". This time he made his own preference clear by 
stating unequivocally that: 
"... the healthier way would, to be sure, have been the first. 
The acquisition of new soil for settlement of the excess 
population possesses an infinite number of advantages, 
particularly if we turn from the present to the future. " 
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An increase in the area under cultivation would help to preserve a healthy 
peasant class, and maintain a healthier balance between industry, commerce 
and agriculture, and thus secure virtual self-sufficiency. 
(15) 
In addition, 
Hitler now argued - again as a result of his perusal of geopolitical 
literature - that a small European home base was a source of weakness for 
a power with world-wide colonies, consequently for Germany "the only 
possibility for carrying out a healthy territorial policy lay in the 
acquisition of new land in Europe itself. " 
(16) 
Furthermore, Hitler observed 
that "the size of the area inhabited by a people constitutes in itself an 
essential factor for determining its outward security. Greater size 
meant greater depth of defence and deterrence against frivolous attack. , 
(17) 
For all these reasons, expansion on the European continent was preferable 
to the acquisition of colonies. Such land, Hitler felt, could be 
obtained, by and large, only at the expense of Russia, "and for such a 
policy there was but one ally in Europe: England. " 
(18) 
With England to 
protect her rear from attack, Germany could take on the Russians. Though 
Sitler did reiterate that the alternative colonial strategy of alliance 
with Russia against England had been an option for the diplomats in pre- 
war Germany, the less easy and slower process of colonizing land in Europe 
would have been his choice since it offered "gradual, yet solid, and 
ý, 
(19) 
continuous growth. In short, it had greater long-term potential. 
So it was only with the publication of the first volume of Mein Kampf on 
19 July 1925 that the second phase of Hitler's foreign policy - the 
conquest of more Lebensraum in Eastern Europe with English assistance - 
was revealed in public for the first time by implication in his analysis of 
pre-war diplomacy. This strategy had been discussed in party circles at 
least as early as December 1922 but because of the party's reliance on 
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support from Russian emigre sources and, later, because of tensions 
within the party following the Munich putsch and, perhaps, also because 
of the absence of a rational and pseudo-scientific pretext for Hitler's 
naked imperialism, Hitler chose not to endorse it publicly before 1925. 
If there had been opposition within the Nazi party before 1925 to the pro- 
English and anti-Bolshevik line advocated by Hitler and Rosenberg it was 
certainly either muted or subsumed within clashes of personality. However, 
the publication of the first volume of Mein Kampf and the diplomatic 
negotiations throughout the summer of 1925, which culminated in the 
signature of the Locarno treaties in October 1925, brought previously hidden 
differences of opinion within party circles to the surface. For if Gustav 
Stresemann's offer of security treaties, guaranteeing the Western European 
frontiers laid down by the Versailles Settlement was accepted by the major 
powers, it was likely to be 
followed by Germany's entry into the Anglo-French 
dominated League of Nations. This would clearly lead to a western orientation 
of German foreign policy. To Gregor Strasser, his brother Otto, and later 
Joseph Goebbels, this development seemed like an unwarranted reversal of 
the trend signified by the Treaty of Rapallo with the Soviet Union in 1922. 
The emergence of this dissenting group reflected the growth in power and 
influence and, indeed, the relative independence of Gregor Strasser. Strasser, 
a pharmacist from Landshut 
in Bavaria and later Gauleiter of Lower Bavaria, 
rose to prominence following the Munich putsch. He had organised and 
commanded the Landshut battalion of the SA, which secured the Wittelsbacher 
Brücke during the night of 8-9 November, and he had marched his men 
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back to Landshut and disbanded them successfully on 9 November. On 
the strength of these exploits, it has been argued, 
(20) 
he was elected 
to the Bavarian Landtag in May 1924 as a member of the Völkischer Block, 
the parliamentary group representing the then-banned Nazi Party, and 
soon became its chairman. Membership of the Landtag provided Strasser 
not only with a political platform but also free rail travel throughout 
Bavaria, an important asset, which enabled him to keep in regular contact 
with the scattered local branches of the party. During 1924 he attempted 
to mediate between the warring factions within the former party, prin- 
cipally between Rosenberg, head of the Grossdeutsche Volksgemeinschaft, 
the official rump of the party, and Herman Esser and Julius Streicher. 
With Ludendorff and Albrecht von Graefe, leader of the North German-based 
conservative and antisemitic Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei, Strasser 
established the Nationalsozialistische Freiheitspartei in an unsuccessful 
attempt to re-unite the disintegrating movement. 
(21) 
In December 1924, 
Strasser was elected to the Reichstag which gave him a national platform and, 
of more immediate and practical value, free rail travel nationwide. During 
the year and a half following Hitler's trial, Strasser was the most 
prominent spokesman of the Nazi hierarchy even after Hitler's release in 
December 1924, since Hitler was banned from public speaking in many important 
(22) 
Lgnder for over two years. In October 1925 the VB acknowledged 
Strasser's tireless devotion to the party, noting that he had addressed 
thirty meetings in the previous two months and a total of 216 meetings in 
the nineteen months since March 1924. 
(23) 
By October 1925, the re-formed 
Nazi Party was no longer merely a Bavarian pressure group; it now 
possessed an embryonic national organization and this was largely Strasser's 
achievement. Hitler paid tribute to Gregor Strasser's efforts at a 
conference of party representatives on 
19 October 1925; "it was", he 
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said, "thanks to the activities of Strasser that a wide area of Germany 
had been opened up for National Socialism. -(24) 
What emerges from even a brief examination of Gregor Strasser's activities 
is that he had become an extremely valuable asset to the party and that he 
enjoyed, by virtue of his membership of the Reichstag and the freedom of 
movement which it gave him, a degree of independence from the Munich head- 
quarters of the party. However, it is also clear that he was committed to 
Hitler's leadership and was unlikely to have harboured thoughts of leader- 
ship himself. 
(25) 
Hitler's attitude towards Strasser suggests that he perceived 
no challenge to his own authority in the first instance. Indeed, the fact 
that the party leadership reacted with no great alarm when Strasser began 
do express opinions at variance with Hitler's and Rosenberg's would tend to 
confirm this. In fact, Alfred Rosenberg published the articles by Strasser 
and later Goebbels in the VB, usually with his own counter-arguments 
appended, and, on one occasion at least, appeared to welcome the debate, 
cosenting that "through argument and counter-argument, the viewpoints will 
be clarified. Hitler himself did not issue any public refutation 
of Strasser's views though they were clearly not in line with his own 
observations in Mein Kampf. But how different were the ideas of the 
'Strasser group' and what effect did the emergence of dissenting voices 
have on the development of Hitler's own ideas? It is to these questions 
which we must now turn. 
It should be stressed at the outset that all the party's leading spokesmen 
condemned Stresemann's Locarno policy for various reasons. Firstly, it 
was believed that the security 
treaties, by tying Germany more closely to 
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the western European powers would, as Strasser put it, "complete what the 
Dawes Plan had introduced, the economic enslavement of Germany and the 
German working class to Jewish-international capitalism". 
(27) 
Secondly, 
the treaties would confirm the legitimacy of the territorial settlement in 
Western Europe effected at Versailles, which was, needless to say, totally 
unacceptable to the Nazis, who would, again in Strasser's words, "never 
ewer renounce Alsace-Lorraine, Eupen and Malmedy, the Saar and (Germany's) 
colonies". 
(28) 
Thirdly, the Nazis 
conducted concurrently with Poland 
that Germany's acceptance of the wi 
Settlement would be accompanied or 
Germany's eastern frontiers. Thus 
feared that since negotiations were being 
and Czechoslovakia, there was a danger 
astern frontiers imposed by the Versailles 
followed by a similar agreement about 
all hopes of reversing the post-war 
settlement by negotiation would be crushed. 
(29) 
So Strasser was in agreement with Hitler and the rest of the party over the 
need to oppose Stresemann's policies and to hold out for a revision of the 
Treaty of Versailles. Where Strasser parted company with Hitler was, firstly, 
in his assessment of some of the major powers and, secondly, in the extent 
of his ambitions for German foreign policy. 
The contrast between Strasser's evaluation of the major powers and Hitler's 
is most apparent in his appraisal of England. As far as Strasser was 
concerned, England was one of the "moneyed" capitalist powers who had an 
interest in shackling Germany; as he put it: 
"The profit economy of the moneyed powers, England and 
America, requires a pacified Europe; this pacified Europe is 
only to be secured when Germany can be moved to abjure 
the natural desire for vengeance against France produced 
by the agony of the Versailles Treaty, and (when she) 
comes to terms with the politico-military rule of France 
over Europe-and by giving up all national political 
desires and enrols in the huge profit business of world finance. " (30) 
275 
Though Rosenberg had often written in similar vein about Western capitalism, 
he regarded such policies, when pursued by the English, as more aberrations, 
attributable to the distorting influence of the Jewish stock exchange; 
is May 1925, for example, hermote that nine-tenths of the policies of 
"England" (as well as "France" and the "United States") were "determined 
today by the supra-state powers and in the first instance by international 
31 
high finance. " 
Rosenberg and Hitler, armed with this ideological corrective, could still 
present the English as suitable future allies for a National Socialist 
Germany, whilst condemning Stresemann's current collaboration with the 
English. Strasser, it seems, had no time for such sophistry; for him, 
England remained one of the capitalist powers, and a 'Western orientation' 
of German foreign policy was ruled out. 
Furthermore, Strasser did not share Hitler's predilection and respect for 
the British Empire and certainly did not regard its interests as compatible 
with Germany's. "English imperialism", he wrote in an article entitled 
Russland und wir in October 1925, "is not only indifferent to us - it is 
our enemy, which will always deny us every opportunity for activity around 
the world. (32) Significantly, in his reply to this article, Rosenberg 
made no criticism of this comment on British Imperialism. 
(33) 
The explanation 
is simple; Rosenberg and Hitler agreed that the English would oppose 
Germany's overseas ambitions but, unlike Strasser, they were prepared to 
sacrifice (at least for the forseeable future) those aspirations for the 
sake of English friendship. 
Essentially, the difference between Strasser and Hitler and Rosenberg 
arose from the greater emphasis placed by Strasser on the socialistic elements 
in National Socialism. The radicalism of the Strasser group has, undoubtedly, 
been exaggerated, in particular by Otto Strasser, in retrospective 
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apologia; in fact, whilst Gregor Strasser campaigned for the abolition 
of large landholdings, the socialization of large corporations and the 
nationalization of parts of German industry, he also supported the 
^saintenance of private enterprise" and "regard for the rights of property". 
(34) 
Yet, though more anti-capitalist than genuinely socialist, his 'radicalism' 
nevertheless coloured his outlook on foreign affairs. In his view, the 
postwar world was characterized by a "vertical division" between "victor and 
vanquished, oppressor and oppressed, exploiter and exploited" and since all 
the "oppressed nations" (he included India, Persia, Morocco and China as 
well as Germany in this category) had the same aim - the overthrow of the 
status quo created by the peace settlement - they should form a League of 
oppressed Nations to confront the League of Nations and the capitalist 
world. 
(35) 
Perhaps predictably, Strasser regarded Germany as "the natural 
champion and ally" of the exploited in their struggle against "French 
despotism, English imperialism and American financial exploitation". As he 
put in in July 1925: 
"Germany, not Russia who uses such movements only for selfish 
purposes, Germany which has the same suffering, the same hopes, 
the same struggles and the same will to victory - this Germany 
is the natural leader of the League of Oppressed Nations. " (36) 
The concept of such a League may have been a pure abstraction - and it is 
noticeable that Strasser did not present any concrete proposals 
for making 
the union a reality - nevertheless, it clearly reflected a profound 
distrust of the Western capitalist powers. This outlook explains not only 
his hostility to both Stresemann's 'Western orientation' of Germanforeign 
policy but also to Hitler's projected Anglo-German alliance. 
As if this were not a serious enough departure from the party line, Strasser 
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also believed that the best guarantee of Germany's future lay in coll- 
aboration with a non-capitalist Russia. However, he claimed to support an 
entente with Russia "not out of love for Russia, least of all out of love 
for Soviet Russia, but solely in the interests of winning back German freedom". 
(37) 
Furthermore, in Russland und Wir, he explicitly rejected "international 
Bussiin communism" and "Marxist international socialism" because they could 
not secure "the foreign policy freedom of Germany or the economic eman- 
cipation of the German workers". 
(38) 
The securing of these freedoms, Strasser 
maintained, "determines our attitude to all foreign policy problems, to all 
forces and constellations on the political stage", and, since the Versailles 
Settlement was the greatest single obstacle to the realization of this 
goal, every power which opposed the settlement was Germany's natural ally. 
on these grounds, he concluded, Russia, even Bolshevik Russia, could be 
a fellow-traveller of the Germans - provided that she refrained from 
interference in Germany's domestic affairs. 
(39) 
No natter how Strasser might qualify his support for an alliance between 
Germany and the Soviet Union, 
(40) 
it was impossible to disguise the fact 
that his views flatly contradicted those of Hitler and Rosenberg. It was 
precisely the danger of Soviet meddling in German affairs that eliminated 
Soviet Russia from their alliance considerations. Collaboration with the 
Soviets might be conceivable, Rosenberg admitted, for a strong National 
Socialist Germany but the Soviets would not be interested in it because 
the spreading of Soviet propaganda - the real purpose of such collusion 
from the Soviet standpoint - would be cut of the question because Marxism 
would already have been eradicated in a National Socialist Germany. 
(41) 
To counter such views, Strasser and his friends stressed that the Soviets 
no longer wanted to export socialism; nationalism, not internationalism, was 
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now pervading the rank and file of the Bolshevik movement. The Soviet 
system survived, in Goebbelds view, not because it is Bolshevik, Marxist 
or internationalist, but "because it is nationalist, because it is Russian". 
(42) 
Goebbels even went as far as to suggest that there was an awakening "National 
Socialism" in Russia. 
(43) 
These 'National Bolshevik' ruminations must have 
had a familiar ring in Hitler's ears; he had clashed in 1922 with Moeller 
van den Bruck over the latter's prediction that Russian nationalism would 
eventually supersede the internationalism of Bolshevism, and there can 
be little doubt that the ideas of the Strasser group owed a great deal to 
Yoeller's inspiration. 
(44) 
The significance of the challenge posed by the Strasser group's obser- 
vations should not be underestimated. The concept of 'National Bolshevism' 
threatened to undermine the entire antisemitic and anti-Bolshevik ideology, 
pieced together principally by Alfred Rosenberg, by questioning one of its 
initial premises, namely, that Bolshevism was "by its very nature anti- 
(45) Goebbels touched a very sensitive nerve when he suggested Y ggested 
on one occasion that "the Jewish question, that is Bolshevism, is more 
complicated than one imagines. It is, by no means, certain that the 
Capitalist and the Bolshevik Jew are one and the same thing. Perhaps in 
the last resort (Endeffekt) but never in actual practice. " 
(46) 
No doubt 
aware that he was on dangerous ground, Goebbels avoided questioning the 
belief that Jewish capitalism and Jewish Bolshevism were two inter-related 
weapons in the Jewish conspiracy to take over the world but merely asserted 
that, at the present time, nationalist forces were far stronger in Russia 
than the internationalist or "mercantile interests" of the Jews. 
(47) 
Rosenberg, replying to Goebbe]s's article in the VB, admitted that there 
had been differences of opinion between the Moscow, New York and London 
Jews, but insisted that "Russia's" policy remained "Jewish"; to talk of 
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"National-Bolshevism" was a "nonsense" because Bolshevism combined 
Jewish Marxism and a "Russian nihilism" derived from the inter-mixture of 
Nordic Russian with Tartar and Mongol blood. 
(48) 
Bolshevism, therefore, 
remained essentially alien to Russia, and, even if the Soviet government did 
pursue a nationalistic and Pan-Slavic foreign policy, it was still in the 
hands of the Jews. This tortuous reply revealed the vulnerability of 
Bosenberg's central tenet when exposed to the thrust of the Strasser group's 
argument. 
go the Strasser group favoured a Russian alliance in order to destroy the 
shackles of the Versailles Settlement and to free Germany from her enslave- 
sent to the capitalist West. Though Gregor Strasser reminded his readers 
that this policy was "a temporary one and negative in terms of its objective", 
(49) 
the fact remains that Strasser's assessment of England and Russia quite 
clearly contradicted the ideological creed of Alfred Rosenberg and the 
alliance strategy tentatively put forward by Hitler in the first volume of 
Kein Kampf 
The objective of Hitler's strategy was to acquire living-space in Eastern 
Europe, thus reviving Germany's Ostpolitik of 1918 and destroying Russia 
at the same time. But what' re the goals of the Strasser group in foreign 
affairs apart from restoration of Germany's freedom of manoeuvre? They 
were, perhaps, most succinctly formulated in the programme produced for the 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft ct North and West German Gauleiters of the NSDAP between 
December 1925 and January 1926, which eventually provoked Hitler to move 
against the dissenting group. The programme seems to have been the product 
of compromises; significantly the concept of Ostorientiering was soft- 
pedalled, and the programme also reflected the views of the group rather than 
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one individual; Goebbels certainly revised Gregor Strasser's original 
draft. 
(50) 
Four foreign policy objectives were set out in the programme. 
The first objective was the restoration of "the frontiers of 1914, including 
colonies, and the unification of all the Germans of Central Europe in a 
Greater German Empire (including Austria, Sudetenland, South Tyrol)". 
(51) 
As has been seen, Strasser objected to the Locarno treaties because they 
were based on acceptance of Germany's losses in Western Europe, and he 
feared an 'eastern Locarno', which would entail "the renunciation of Danzig 
and Memel, the renunciation of the recovery of the Corridor, of Posen 
and Gnesen and Thorn, that is the recognition of the theft of Upper Silesia". 
(52) 
Strasser was prepared to contemplate forcible revision of Germany's 
eastern frontiers, since he considered the prospect of peaceful revision, 
under the auspices of the League of Nations to be "utopian" and that of 
alterations in the frontiers of Poland by voluntary agreement to be a 
""=antaay". 
(53) 
In addition, he believed that France had undertaken at 
Locarno to defend the frontiers of Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
(54) 
The 
group's first goal was attainable, therefore, only by forcible means and, 
in Gregor Strasser's view, that meant conflict, first and foremost, with 
Poland; as he declared bluntly: 
"Our eastern enemy is Poland, not Russia on whom we 
do not even border. " (55) 
gitler and Rosenberg were unlikely to. quibble with the idea of a 
confrontation with Poland; Hitler's Ostpolitik almost certainly envisaged 
the elimination of Poland and this, perhaps, had always been Rosenberg's 
highest priority. Rosenberg even conceded that a temporary Russo-German 
alliance against Poland might be necessary, although he insisted that 
only a National Socialist Germany would make "pacts - albeit temporarily - 
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with the Devil". Nevertheless, while the grossdeutsch aspirations of the 
'Strasser programme' were largely compatible with the'Munich line' on 
foreign affairs (the return of the South Tyrol excepted), on their own 
they would be insufficient to satisfy Hitler's appetite. 
The second goal of the North German Nazi programme was "the establishment 
of a customs union with Switzerland, Hungary, Denmark, Holland and Luxemburg". 
'57) 
This was clearly linked to the programme's third goal, the creation of a 
'United States of Europe', described in the programme as: 
"A European league of nations with uniform measurement 
and coinage systems. Enlargement by tariff union with 
France and the other European states, otherwise complete 
reciprocal preference. " (58) 
The Idea of a 'United States of Europe' was reminiscent of Richard Graf 
Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa scheme, which had already been pilloried 
in the Nazi press as racially destructive and Jewish-inspired. 
(59) 
Though 
never explained fully, the 
Strasser conception appears, however, to have 
differed in, at least, two important respects from Pan-Europa and indeed 
to have owed more to Friedrich Naumann's Mitteleuropa. 
(60)Firstly, 
as we 
have seen, a precondition of Strasser's scheme was the restoration of the 
frontiers of 1914 whereas Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa was to be 
based on the postwar territorial settlement. 
(61) 
Secondly, Gregor Strasser 
insisted on Germany being the dominant force in the United States of Europe; 
the programme called for "the organic arrangement and the powerful racial 
concentration of the German nation 
in a Greater German Reich"; this new 
Reich was to be "the centre of gravity for a Central European customs union 
and a dominant force (Schwergewicht) 
in the United States of Europe". 
(62) 
Or, as he put it less ambiguously elsewhere: 
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"Central Europe under German leadership.... From 
Memel to Strasburg, from Hamburg to Vienna- the 
German Central Europe as heart and head, as 
supreme power and backbone of Europe. " (63) 
It is unclear whether Strasser envisaged unashamed German hegemony in 
Europe or merely a federated Europe with Germany as primus inter pares, but 
even this second, less ambitious, design clearly differed from that of 
Coudonhove-Kalergi'a. 
(64) 
Otto Strasser, perhaps the author of this concept, revealed the raison 
d'etre of a united Europe, as being: 
"to achieve that political and economic consolidation, 
which alone enables it (Europe) to sustain itself 
economically against the great economic powers, such 
as the United States of America, the British Empire, Russia 
with Siberia, Japan with China and Mongolia, and which 
alone enables it to endure in face of the great 
political problems of the next century: defence of the 
white race against the rejuvenated Asia, (and) the 
awakening Africa. " (65) 
This concept did not, of course, meet with the approval of Hitler and his 
Munich clique. Indeed it was criticized sharply from within the ranks 
of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft when it met on 26 January 1926 in Hanover to 
(66) 
discuss the draft programme. However, whether it visualized outright 
German hegemony or not, it certainly aimed at restoring Germany's pre- 
eminence in Europe and, therefore, avoided the internationalism which damned 
Coudenhove-Kalergi's conception in Nazi ideas. Furthermore, Rosenberg 
conceded on one occasion that he could conceive of a united Europe, provided 
that it was united under the banner of National Socialism and organised 
in defence against the yellow and black races. 
(67) 
So whilst the Strasser 
group's vision of a united Europe was not shared by the rest of the Nazi 
Party, it did, at least, have the virtues of a nationalistic inspiration 
and a racial rationale. 
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The final foreign policy goal specified in the Strasser programme was the 
creation of "a central African colonial empire (former German colonies, the 
Congo state, Portuguese colonies, in part French colonies)". 
(68) 
This 
raises further doubts about the supposedly radical and socialistic nature 
of the group's outlook, and also about Otto Strasser's later claim that "we 
had no territorial demands". 
(69) 
In July 1925 Gregor Strasser had described 
Colonies as "a vital interest for a politically self-sufficient, independent 
Germany 't. 
(70) In the same month, Otto Strasser wrote approvingly about 
Russian support for those nations suffering at the hands of Anglo-French 
imperialism but added that, whilst Germany should be sympathetic to those 
oppressed nations who were, after all, "the enemies of our enemies", "economic 
and political pressures" prevented Germany from taking over Russia's role. 
(71) 
So it would appear that the Strasser brothers supported colonialism in 
the pursuit of autarky and would even consider a German seizure of Belgian, 
Portuguese and French colonies in Central Africa. 
(72) 
What is clear from this analysis of the outlook and goals of the Strasser 
circle in foreign policy is that the group was not as radical and socialistic 
as was once believed. Its approach to foreign policy was not as selfless 
and lacking in national chauvinism or imperialistic designs, as Otto 
Strasser would have posterity believe. However, its commitment to overseas 
empire and a federated Europe under German leadership, as well as to an 
albeit temporary alignment with Soviet Russia against the Western powers did 
mount to a serious alternative programme to that briefly sketched by 
Hitler in the first volume of Mein Kampf. 
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The relationship between the Strasser circle and Hitler and his Munich 
acolytes is a fascinating example of factional opposition in a party, 
otherwise seemingly characterised by authoritarian control and rigid 
ideological conformity. Not surprisingly, some historians have suggested 
that what was at issue was not differing opinions, so much as "the principle 
<73) 
of absolute leadership". In other words, Hitler was more concerned that 
party ambers were loyal to his leadership than that they conform 
absolutely to his ideas. Hence, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft of the North and 
West German Gauleiters and its journal, the Nationalsozialistische Briefe, 
could receive Hitler's "express approval" despite the views which they 
(74) It was only when the Strasser group produced an alternative expounded. 
to the party programme of 1920 and directly challenged Hitler's status as 
the party's chief Programmatiker that he was stung into action and summoned 
the dissenters to a meeting in Bamberg on 14 February 1926 and forced them 
to withdraw their draft programme. That Hitler did not discuss the alter- 
native programme seems to lend weight to the view that he was disturbed not 
so auch by its contents as 
its very existence. 
(75) 
It may well be accurate 
to argue that the more formulation of an alternative programme was 
sufficient to draw Hitler into a confrontation with the Strasser circle; 
nevertheless it is misleading to 
imply that Hitler was relatively unconcerned 
about the views as expressed by the group in speeches and articles. Other 
evidence points to a quite 
different interpretation. 
Firstly, the foreign policy section in the second volume of Mein Kampf, 
written by Hitler's own admission 
in August 1925, 
(76) 
reveals his awareness 
of opposition within the party's ranks to his proposed alliance policy and 
bis attempts to defend himself against criticism. He admitted, for example, 
that "even for us, of course, it is hard to represent England as a possible 
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future ally in the ranks of our movement". This difficulty he attributed 
to agitation about the loss of Germany's colonies and the destruction of 
German seapower by the British, which prevented the Germans from recognising 
that "what we have to fight for today is not 'sea power' etc. " 
(77) 
Germany 
needed to re-establish her position on the European continent first and, 
for that, English support was vital. Hitler also tried to discredit the 
Strasser group's strategy of supporting "oppressed nations" against the 
British; as he commented: 
"It just so happens to be impossible to overwhelm with 
a coalition of cripples a powerful state that is 
determined to stake, if necessary, its last drop of 
blood for its existence. As a folkish man, who 
appraises the value of men on a racialbasis, I am 
prevented by mere knowledge of the racial inferiority 
of these so-called 'oppressed nations' from linking 
the destiny of my people with theirs. " 
The idea was not simply unrealistic; it was also "catastrophic" because 
it distracted the German people "again and again from the practical 
possibilities, making them devote themselves to imaginative, yet fruitless, 
(78) 
hopes and illusions. " 
Turning to the Russian question which he felt to be "the touchstone for the 
political capacity of the young National Socialist movements to think 
clearly and to act correctly", 
(79) 
Hitler restated his case for the 
conquest of more Lebensraum at Russian expense, but again admitted that 
', not only in German-National but even in folkish circles, the idea of such 
is violently attacked. " 
(80) 
In all probability, Eastera policy y, this was 
another reference to the Strasser circle. When Hitler criticised the 
restoration of the frontiers of 1914 as a suitable goal for German foreign 
policy, he was again attacking views expressed "even in so-called folkish 
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circles" - that is by the Strasser group. The restoration of Germany's 
pre-war frontiers was insufficient justification for a further letting 
of German blood. Only a policy which aimed "to secure for the German 
people the land and soil to which they are entitled on this earth" - that 
is the conquest of more Lebensraum - would justify that. 
'81) 
Hitler also 
considered the proposal put forward by the Strasser group, of a Russo-German 
alliance against the West but found it wanting in several respects. 
Firstly, it would mean that the ensuing war would be fought on German soil; 
secondly, Russia would have to subdue Poland before she could render 
assistance to Germany; Germany, in other words, would have to fight the 
war almost single-handedly; and finally, there was the unreliability of 
the Bolshevik leadership and the risk that such an alliance would spread 
the debilitating influence of Bolshevism inside Germany. 
(82) 
In short, therefore, it appears as if Hitler wrote the foreign policy 
section in chapters thirteen and fourteen of the second volume of Mein Kampf, 
in part at least, to refute the arguments originating, mainly but not 
exclusively, from the Strasser faction. That he wrote, at least, the 
chapter on Germany's postwar alliance policy in August 1925 - months before 
the draft programme was formulated - is unmistakeable evidence that Hitler 
was perturbed by the dissenting views of the North German group even 
before they openly challenged his authority by drawing up an alternative 
party programme. 
A second piece of evidence to be borne in mind when assessing Hitler's 
reaction to the emergence of dissenting voices in the party is the content 
of his speech at Bamberg on 14 February 1926. The speech was devoted to 
three issues: the defence of his alliance strategy; the question of whether 
the land of the German princes, confiscated in 1918 should be returned to 
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then or expropriated; and, finally, the inadvisability of public discussion 
of religious issues by National Socialists. Hitler was concerned primarily 
to reiterate his own views on Germany's alliance strategy and to discredit 
the Eastern orientation propagated by the Strasser group in the Nazi 
press but omitted from the draft programme. 
(83) 
This, once more, seems to 
suggest that he was worried as much by the general outlook of the group as 
by the content of their programme. Gottfried Feder, who attended the meeting 
of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft on 26 January which discussed the Strasser 
programme, shared this concern; he wrote later of his "increasing astonishment" 
at the outspokenly pro-Russian and pro-Soviet line in the Nationalsozialistische 
Briefe and said of Joseph Goebbels that "even a communist agitator could 
speak no differently". 
(84) 
In discussing the question of the expropriation 
of the princes, Hitler over-ruled the resolution of the North German group 
on the 26th January which favoured expropriation, arguing that the princes 
"should have nothing that they do not own, and lose nothing that they do 
owll. 
(gb) This second rebuke probably reflects Hitler's growing fear that 
the socialistic stance of the North German faction and in particular its 
hostility to the sanctity of property, could well jeopardise the support 
already enjoyed by the party in conservative circles as well as his hopes of 
attracting support in business quarters in the future. Hitler was also 
determined to avoid getting the party embroiled in religious controversy, 
which, he argued, would "undermine its political effectiveness". These 
cosisents may have been directed at the anti-clerical propaganda which his 
former ally, Ludendorff, had drummed up after 1924, though they are more 
'86) 
likely to have been directed against Alfred Rosenberg. What linked 
all three elements in Hitler's speech together aas his disquiet over the 
Ideas being expressed within the party. And his speech represented, as 
the VB's report emphasized, 
"directives on the position which National 
Socialism takes on the most important issues of the day''. 
(87) 
So, whilst 
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Hitler might well have been stirred into action by the appearance of the 
draft party programme, his anxiety was more general in nature. 
This interpretation is confirmed by a third piece of evidence: Hitler's 
decision in February 1926 to publish a pamphlet, Die SHdtiroler Frage und 
das deutsche Bündnisproblem. This later became chapter thirteen of the 
second volume of Mein Kampf and was probably composed in August 1925. 
It is true that the South Tyrol problem was again in the news following the 
Bavarian Minister-President Held's public condemnation in January 1926 of 
Italy's oppressive measures in the province and talk of a possible retaliatory 
economic boycott against Italy. 
'(88) However, there can be little doubt that 
the decision to publish it at this time was affected by the controversy 
within the party. The Strasser group had, of course, called for the return 
of the South Tyrol as part of a Grossdeutschland, but the pamphlet had 
a purpose other than simply the refutation of this anti-Italian stance of 
the North German Nazis and of those in German nationalist circles. It was 
intended to re-establish Hitler's reputation as the party's leading spokesman 
on foreign affairs: 
"Mussolini has spoken! Stresemann has also spoken. 
The League of Nations is in confusion! " (89) 
So ran the advertisement of the pamphlet in the VB clearly implying that 
where other statesmen had tried and failed, Hitler had the solution to the 
thorny problem of the South Tyrol. 
These arguments are not intended to cast doubt on Goebbels's allegation 
that Hitler was enraged by the formulation of a new party programme. 
(90) 
But the foreign policy sections of the second volume of Mein Kampf, his 
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speech at Bamberg, and the publication of his pamphlet taken together do 
suggest that Hitler was already very disturbed at the opinions being voiced 
at meetings and in the Nazi press. The publication of an alternative party 
programme simply brought matters to a head and Hitler determined to lay 
down an official party line on current issues. Once this had been done and 
the draft programme had been officially rejected and withdrawn, Hitler did 
not force the party to speak with one voice. To have done so might have 
forced Gregor Strasser and Joseph Goebbels to leave the party which was 
clearly not in its best interests; the organisation of the party in North 
and West Germany was the most, and perhaps the only, encouraging development 
in the gloomy year following the party's reformation in February 1925. So 
Eitler tried instead to heal the wounds of the conflict by wooing Strasser 
and Goebbels over to his side in long discussions and by invitations to 
Munich. This strategy produced dividends with Goebbels, who was soon 
doubting - if one believes the entries in his diaries - his previous con- 
victions about Russia; 
(81) 
the 'National Bolshevik' line disappeared 
fron his speeches and articles and in March 1926, apparently impressed by 
Hitler's "amazingly lucid" pamphlet on the South Tyrol, Goebbels wrote an 
article advocating the sacrifice of the Germans in the area to the needs of 
(92) 
an Italian-German alliance. 
Gregor Strasser proved less willing to compromise his ideals. When the Treaty 
of Berlin was signed by Russia and Germain April 1926, for example, 
Btraaaer admitted that he "more than any other circles in the party had 
eaphasised the need for 
Germany to look eastwards". 
(93) 
On occasion, he 
was to express his fears about 
the alliance strategy favoured by Hitler; 
it was a mistake, he insisted in November 1926, "to keep Russia in a state 
of impotence, for Russia sits on 
the flank of Poland and our eastern 
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enmy is Poland not Russia". Following what he described as a "geo- 
political" maxim of "always choosing one's friends so that they sit on the 
flanks of the next enemy", Strasser added that he could approve of a 
German alliance with Italy because Italy was situated on the French flank 
.d though he admitted that "geo-politically, this also applied to England", 
he added that "here limitations of another kind come into play". 
(94) 
Strasser's cause was further bolstered by Count Ernst 2u Reventlow, who 
joined the NSDAP in February 1927 and proved to be another vocal and 
influential critic of British foreign policy. 
(95) 
Thus Gregor Strasser 
adhered to his vision of a Grossdeutschland based on Central Europe as 
the most sensible goal of the future Nazi foreign policy, whilst his 
brother, Otto, continued to expound the notion of Mitteleuropa with 
Germany as , the leader of Europe, not the ruler", rejecting a Pan-European 
solution in favour of an exclusively German one. 
(96) 
Despite these displays of heterodoxy, Gregor Strasser continued to control 
the party's propaganda department until January 1928 when he was given 
control of the organisation department, which he retained until 1932; 
Reventlow became the party's leading spokesman on foreign affairs in the 
Reichstag and was invited to speak on the subject at the party rally in 1927. 
(97) 
Both were invited regularly to speak in Bavaria. In all probability they 
refrained on these occasions from overt criticism of Hitler's foreign policy 
programme. Rosenberg certainly sought to avoid "unpleasant debates" by 
refusing to publish a number of articles written by Gregor Strasser. 
(98) 
Nevertheless their continued defiance of the party's guidelines was well- 
known to observers inside the party and outside. 
(99) 
That Hitler was 
prepared to tolerate and even to promote members of this dissenting group, 
who were joined in 1927 by 
Herman Goering, was probably due to three 
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considerations: firstly, Hitler considered these men to be useful in 
attracting support to the movement; secondly, he recognised that their 
views, though heterodox, were basically moderate and inspired by the 
spirit of German nationalism and did not explicitly contradict the movement's 
ideological tenets; and finally, and most surprisingly, Hitler was 
relatively indifferent after February 1926 to evidence of dissension. It 
would seem, therefore, that the confrontation at Bamberg occurred primarily 
because the Nazi leadership had not yet established a coherent outlook, 
especially in foreign affairs. In 1925 Hitler began to fear that party 
members and potential supporters would be confused by the conflicting 
opinions being expressed particularly in the Nazi press. Hitler, therefore, 
sought in mein Kampf, in his foreign policy pamphlet and in his speech at 
Bamberg, to establish the party's official line. Once that was firmly 
established, dissent was not welcome but could at least be recognised for 
what it was. One can say, therefore, that it was concern about the 
Strasser group which probably forced Hitler to include the first serious 
rationalisation of a future Nazi foreign policy in the second volume of 
Mein Kampf in August 1925. 
(100) 
Hitler's foreign affairs programme was virtually complete when he finished 
the second volume of Mein Kampf in 1926. However, he was not satisfied with 
its elaboration in Mein Kampf, which he admitted later had been "structured 
on general national socialist insights as a premise"; in the time and 
space available, it had not been possible to give "a real fundamental 
proof of the soundness of our national socialist conception of foreign 
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policy". 
ýiQ1ý 
For this reason he chose to write a second book between May 
July 1928, but eventually decided not to publish it. 
(102) 
Between 1926 
and 1928, however, the foreign policy programme had been amplified and 
its main assertions substantiated. An analysis of these modifications 
may serve to highlight the hidden assumptions behind Hitler's approach to 
the foreign powers. 
First of all, in relation to Italy, the South Tyrol issue stubbornly refused 
to remain dormant for long. In February 1928 it was again in the fore- 
front of political debate after the revelation that the Italian language was 
to be used in religious instruction in the schools of the province. The 
Austrian chancellor, Ignaz Seipel, had declared that there could be no 
question of friendly relations between Austria and Italy until the 
problems of the province had been resolved. Mussolini responded on 4 March 
by threatening to use force against the Austrians if they continued their 
agitation in the province. 
In his pamphlet on this issue, Hitler had argued that the regaining of lost 
German territories was lese important than the restoration of the political 
power and independence of the mother country and to the latter goal, "the 
interest of the lost territories must be ruthlessly subordinated". Since 
Germany's recovery required Italian collaboration, in his view, the South 
(103) 
Tyrol had to be sacrificed. This argument may have impressed Joseph 
Goebbels butotherNazi writers on foreign affairs - Hitler, Rosenberg and 
even Hermann Goering in a rare series of articles - strove to give it 
greater conviction. They were not prepared, of course, to condone 
Mussolini's oppressive measures in the province, 
(104) 
but they questioned 
why the South Tyrolean 
Germans should be singled out for special commiseration 
293 
from the millions of oppressed Germans under French, Polish and Czech 
rule, and also why the South Tyrol should become the determinant of German 
foreign policy. 
(105) 
In his second or Secret Book, Hitler asserted that, 
since two-thirds of the inhabitants of the province were Italian, if it 
were to become a German territory, then an even greater injustice would 
(106) 
have been done to Italy. This rare concern for justice only serves to 
emphasise Hitler's commitment to an Italian alliance at any cost. 
Judging by the pamphlet on Germany's post-war alliance policy and by Mein 
Kempf, the case for Italo-German collaboration rested on two assertions: 
the continuation of the rivalry between Italy and France, and the alleged 
ccmpatability between Italian and German ambitions. As evidence for the 
first, Hitler referred briefly in Mein Kampf to Franco-Italian competition 
in the Adriatic; in his speech at Bamberg on 14 February 1926 he also noted 
Italo-Franco tensions over the Riviera. 
(107) 
These rivalries were more fully 
documented by Alfred Rosenberg in articles in the VB and later in his book 
Zulntnftswe einer deutschen Aussenpolitik; in this book, published in the 
autumn of 1927, Rosenberg pinpointed the causes of the troubles on the 
Riviera as. the frenchification of 500,000 Italian Immigrants in the Tolouse- 
Nice area as well as the changes in statehood experienced by this area and 
by Corsica in previous centuries. 
(108) 
He also stressed Franco-Italian 
rivalry in North Africa. 
(109) 
Rosenberg also traced the evolution of 
France's relations with the 'Little Entente' in the VB and felt that 
Franco-Yugoslav cooperation was particularly menacing for Italy given her 
Adriatic ambitions. Significantly this point was reiterated by Hitler in 
(110) 
his Secret Book. 
on the other hand, Italian interestawere not seen as conflicting with those 
294 
of Germany, "not in the most essential points, at least", as Hitler put 
It. 
"") He failed to elaborate further on this point in Mein Kampf but 
in the years following he and Alfred Rosenberg seemed readily to appreciate 
that Italy, like Germany, was over-populated and needed to expand her 
living space. However, since the land available to the two countries lay 
in different directions: "Italy to the south, widening to the south-west 
and the south-east, Germany to the east and north-east", as Rosenberg 
phrased it, then Germany and Italy need not become rivals. 
(112) 
"The east 
coasts of the Baltic Sea are for Germany what the Mediterranean Sea is for 
Italy"; this was how Hitler summed up the position in his Secret Book. 
(113) 
Hitler and Rosenberg also seemed to have examined the strategic realities 
of the Italian position in more depth. In a speech on 30 March 1927, Hitler 
explained that because of her exposed coastline, Italy could never afford to 
take on the British in view of the latter's naval strength whilst Rosenberg 
later cautioned the Italians against risking conflict with the British by 
expanding eastwards along the North African coast towards 
Eygpt because of 
Britain's naval strongholds in the Mediterranean and because of the super- 
iority of her fleet. 
(114) 
Hitler concluded in the Secret Book that Italy 
had, of necessity, to be inclined to collaborate with the English; this, 
and not her unreliability as an ally, explained her withdrawal 
from the 
Triple Alliance when Austro-Hungarian policy provoked conflict with Britain 
in 1914. 
(115) 
Mussolini`s opposition to the Anschluss with Austria was the only real bone 
of contention and, whilst 
Hitler thought Mussolini should recognise the 
advantage of having a smaller 
Austria on the Italian frontier, Rosenberg 
could appreciate Mussolini's resistance to the scheme as long as a pro- 
French government was in power in Berlin; but a folkish government might 
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make thejrospect more appealing. 
(116) 
Both Hitler and Rosenberg seemed to 
have been curiously blind to the fact that Italy might well be apprehensive 
about exchanging Austria for Germany as her northern neighbour. Hitler's 
support for an Italian alliance, which in the Secret Book he repeatedly 
insisted dated from 1920, seems to have been based primarily on Italy's 
dissatisfaction with the territorial settlement of 1919/1920 and her 
consequent hostility towards France, its main defender. 
(117) 
This together 
with the rise of Mussolini convinced Hitler that he should overlook Italy's 
oppressive policy in the South Tyrol and her opposition to the German- 
Austrian Anschluss. 
Secondly, as far as France was concerned, the "spirit of Locarno" sparked 
off considerable discussion in some right-wing circles in Germany about the 
possibility of Franco-German collaboration. Arnold Rechberg, a sculptor 
and member of a wealthy family of industrialists, who had bng been a pass- 
ionate advocate of a Franco-German understanding, was profoundly dis- 
appointed with the Locarno treaties. He urged the signing of an economic 
treaty between the two countries, to be followed by a military alliance 
provided France agreed to a rapid withdrawal from the occupied territories 
and to the revision of Germany's eastern frontier. 
(118) 
These ideas were 
adopted by the Jungdeutscher Orden under the leadership of Arthur Mahraun 
as its foreign policy programme. 
(119) 
This programme, perhaps because of 
its revisionist as well as anti-Bolshevik and anti-parliamentarian platform, 
soon came to the attention of the Nazi Party. It was discussed at a 
meeting of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft of North and West German gauleiters 
on 22 November 1925. Later Gregor Strasser published an article criticising 
the scheme on the grounds that France (along with Britain) had a "vital 
interest in keeping Germany politically and economically weak". 
(120) 
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The signing of an international steel agreement by Germany, France, 
Belgium and Luxemburg on 26 September 1926 and of a Franco-German commercial 
treaty a week later naturally revived interest in the idea of Franco- 
German cooperation and also in the Jungdeutscher Orden's programme. In 
November 1926 Rosenberg published a series of articles, which were later 
published in a pamphlet Nationalsozialismus und Jungdeutscher Orden. Eine 
Abrechnung mit Arthur Mahraun, and in which he listed the reasons why 
Franco-German collaboration was out of the question. 
(121) 
Firstly, the 
French were "a nation in racial decay" because of the onset of democratic 
ideals since the French Revolution and because of "mulattoization" of her 
population caused by immigration from her African Empire. Secondly, the 
French, despite Mahraun's optimism, had not abandoned their "thousand year 
ambition" of securing the Rhine as a frontier; because of her "immutable 
geographical position", bounded tolhe north and west by the Atlantic Ocean 
and to the south by the mountains of Spain, France could only ever expand 
eastwards in Rosenberg's view. Thirdly, there was no possibility that 
France would accept German military equality as a basis for an agreement; 
France's preoccupation with security, as illustrated by her alliances with 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, excluded this possibility. The most serious 
fault which Rosenberg identified in Mahraun's proposals, was the absence of 
any provision to deal with the problem of Germany's over-population; in fact, 
with the French as an ally, a solution to that problem was impossible 
because a Franco-German agreement would alienate the British and thus rule 
out the acquisition of overseas colonies on the one hand, whilst, on the other, 
expansion eastwards was "feasible only after a confrontation with the Poles 
and Czechs", who were, of course, allies of France. Rosenberg concluded, 
therefore, that it was not the duty of a German foreign minister to draw 
up an agreement with the French but rather "to strengthen the prevailing 
French 'angoisse' by all diplomatic means, by stirring up Spanish-French, 
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Italian-French and British-French tension". 
(122) 
The Nazis evidently were more impressed by French construction of an 
allianceegºstem in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe than by the "spirit of 
Locarno". France's alliances with Poland (1921) and Czechoslovakia (1924) 
and later with Rumania (1926) and Yugoslavia (1927) served to reinforce 
Nazi fears of French opposition to any revival of German power and even 
prompted them to consider other potential allies. In September 1926, in 
another article on Arthur Mahraun, Rosenberg included Spain (along with 
England and Italy) as one of the powers interested in "hindering the growth 
of French power"; the following month he observed that Germany would prefer 
Spanish rather than French control of Morocco. 
(123) 
Soon Hitler, too, was 
talking about a possible alliance between Germany, England, Italy and 
(124) 
Spain "to encircle France". The same criterion of making allies of 
France's enemies also brought Hungary into the reckoning; the 'Little 
intents' of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania had originally been 
formed to resist Hungarian revisionism; now French support for the 'Little 
intents' powers drove the Hungarians into the welcoming embrace of Benito 
Mussolini, who initialled a ten-year treaty of friendship with the Hungarians 
in April 1927. The Nazis welcomed this development and reiterated their 
call for Germany to join the emerging anti-French coalition. Hitler put 
it quite succinctly in his Secret Book: 
"that already today probably Spain and Hungary are also 
to be reckoned as belonging to this (anti-French) 
community of interests, even if only tacitly, lies 
grounded in Spain's aversion to French colonial 
activity in North Africa as well as in Hungary's 
hostility to Yugoslavia, which is at the same time 
supported by France. " (125) 
Though Spain and Hungary can, at best, be described as potential junior 
partners in Hitler's projected alliance system, their 
inclusion does show 
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that, on some occasions at least, Hitler's selection of allies against 
France was determined primarily by considerations of power politics 
unaffected by racial prejudice or personal predilection. The incident also 
seems to confirm Alfred Rosenbergs continuing influence on the develop- 
ment of Nazi policy; as editor of the VB which obliged him to comment 
every day on current events, he was ideally placed to help the shape of 
Nazi attitudes on foreign affairs. 
Thirdly, Nazi attitudes towards England underwent some modification between 
1926 and 1928. The case for an Anglo-German alliance was, perhaps, the 
weakest part of Hitler's programme. In the second volume of Mein Kampf, 
Hitler asserted that England had opposed and still opposed the French bid 
for hegemony in Europe and, as a result, would be amenable to a revival of 
German power to counter this threat. He also asserted that England would 
allow Germany to dominate the European continent provided that the latter 
renounced her ambitions to 
be a world-wide colonial and commercial power. 
As proof of the first assertion, Hitler had been able to point in Mein 
Ka pff to British opposition to the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr; 
(126) 
for the second assertion, Hitler had offered no proof whatsoever; on the 
face of it, one could be forgiven for wondering whether an England, which 
was fighting against French hegemony in Europe, might not 
do the same to 
prevent German hegemony. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
Hitler and Rosenberg 
looked around for further evidence to substantiate these two claims because, 
without it, the case for collaboration with 
Russia against Western 
European powers might seem more attractive and tangible. 
The evidence of alleged British interest in a German revival uncovered by 
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Hitler and Rosenberg arose out of what they saw as the growing threat to 
the security of the British Empire and the British mainland and Britain's 
relative impotence to deal with it. In a five-part series called Englands 
Schicksalsstunden published in the VB in June 1927 and later reproduced 
as part of the Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik, Rosenberg 
catalogued Britain's difficulties. 
(127) 
First and foremost, Rosenberg 
assured his readers, England was on the verge of war with the Soviet Union 
following the deterioration of relations over the Zinoviev letter, Russian 
meddling in various parts of the empire - particularly in India - and Russian 
support for the anti-imperialist movement in China, development which 
culminated in the breaking-off of diplomatic relations in 1927. Britain, 
therefore, needed allies. Furthermore, Rosenberg recognised signs that 
British foreign policy was now beginning to reflect real British interests 
as opposed to those of the Jewish stock exchange; since the return to power 
of the conservative government in 1924, a trend away from the internationalist 
ideas associated with the League of Nations and towards English imperialism 
was discernible. A new difficulty faced by the British was presented by 
"the politics of oil"; the British pursuit of oil supplies brought her 
into conflict with the interests of the American oil industry all over 
the world and was also another source of friction between the British diplomats 
and the "Jewish" City. What was even worse, England, for financial reasons, 
had had to abandon the "two-fleet standard" and allow naval parity with 
the United States, to whom she was also heavily indebted. Rosenberg 
concluded in Zukunftsweg that, looked at realistically, Britain was not in 
a position on her own to mount a military campaign against the Soviet Union; 
she would have to rely on either "anti-Bolshevik elements in Russia itself, 
be they nationalistic Greater Russians or peoples with separatist inclinations", 
or on the Baltic nations 
in order to defeat the Moscow regime. 
(128) 
But 
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even then, as Rosenberg had written earlier, success was not assured; 
bland needed German support for such a venture and this would require "a 
change of the policies heretofore of both sides: a rejection on the part of 
England as well as Germany of all ties with France.,, 
(129) 
$itler had already noted in Mein Kampf the vulnerability of the British 
Isles to air attacks from France and of her shipping lanes to a submarine 
campaign orchestrated by the French in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. In 
his Secret Book, he repeated these observations referring also to the 
abandonment of the two-power standard and concluding that at that time 
France was "the state that is most dangerous to England". Hitler also 
acknowledged the Russian threat to India and Russia's possession of oil 
resources "which today have the same importance as once possessed by iron 
and coal mines in past centuries". 
(130) 
Hitler devoted less time than 
Alfred Rosenberg to "ideological" evidence of Britain's growing need of 
German support; his reference to the "decisive influence which world Jewry 
also possesses in England" in the penultimate paragraph of his chapter on 
England in his Secret Book looks like an afterthought; 
(131) 
nevertheless, 
towards the end of the bookla clearly thought it worthwhile to include the 
cosment that: 
"If the Jew were to triumph in England, British interests 
would recede into the background.... On the other hand, if 
the Briton triumphs than a shift of England's attitude via 
a via Germany can still take place. " (132) 
Rosenberg, predictably, placed Anglo-German relations in a more apocalyptic, 
racial perspective. The threat to the British Empire from national self- 
determination was only part of a more widespread challenge from the "coloured 
nations" to white Nordic supremacy. There was only one solution in his 
view; England had to "undertake, along with Germany, the protection of 
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the white race: England on the sea, Germany on the continent", 
(133) 
In 
Rosenberg's scenario, England was to protect the white race in Africa, 
India and Australia; North America to protect it on the American continent; 
and Germany - in alliance with Italy who was to control the Adriatic - was 
to isolate France and defeat her attempt to lead black Africa against a 
white Europe. 
(134) Thus racial considerations were also driving England 
and Germany together. 
Hitler did not resort to racial theories to illustrate this argument; in 
fact, in the Secret Book, he was more concerned to prove his second assertion 
that England would allow Germany to dominate Europe, provided the latter 
abandoned her hopes of becoming a major commerical and colonial power. 
It looks as if someone had pointed out the contradiction in his alliance 
strategy, for at one point he remarked that: 
"There is a very enrneous and widespread notion, especially 
in Germany, according to which England would immediately 
fight against any European hegemony. As a matter of fact 
this is not correct. England actually concerns herself very 
little with the European conditions as long as no threatening 
world competitor arose from them, so that she always 
viewed the threat as lying in a development which 
must one day cut across her dominion over the seas and 
the colonies. " (135) 
He pointed out that England had fought Spain, Holland and later Napoleanic 
France only because they were, or aspired to be, overseas powers. 
Furthermore, England's friendly relations with Prussia in 
the eigk*eenth century, he felt, proved that she did not automatically 
oppose the pre-eminence of a military power in Europe, as long as "the 
foreign policy aims of this power are manifestly of a purely continental 
character". once Germany began to build a fleet and to conquer overseas 
territories, the English attitude altered dramatically and the result 
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tns the First World War. 
(iss) 
This rather strained argument did not 
convince all the doubters. 
(137) 
That it all suggests is that Hitler was 
trying to rationalize, in retrospect, a concept of Anglo-German 
friendship, based partly on personal predilection, partly on a misreading 
of British history, and perhaps even partly on a prior decision taken 
about Russia. 
Fourthly, as regards Russia, Hitler had still some way to go before all 
opposition to his new policy was overcome. Whether his hostility was 
inspired primarily by the belief that her Bolshevik government was 
controlled by the Jews or by the conviction that Germany needed to annex 
Russian territory may still be uncertain. But what is certain is that 
both premises had been questioned by the Strasser circle, which believed 
that nationalist sentiment was gradually weakening Jewish influence over 
the Bolshevik lvernment, and which, in any case, favoured a more limited 
revisionist and grossdeutsch solution to Germany's territorial problems. 
On both counts, Russia appeared a feasible ally for Germany against the 
capitalist West. Not surprisingly, therefore, after 1926 the Nazi leader- 
ship sought to discredit this pro-Russian stance and the limited territorial 
conception which accompanied it. 
In the Secret Book, Hitler discussed the possibility of a German-Russian 
understanding but repeated that it would be folly "as long as a regime 
rules in Russia, which is permeated by one aim: to extend into 
Germany the 
Bolshevik Poison". 
(138) 
He devoted more time to showing how "incomprehen- 
sible" it Was to consider waging a war against the capitalist West 
in 
alliance with this Russia; 
"present-day Russia", he argued, "is anything but 
an anti-capitalist state"; 
though the Bolsheviks might have destroyed 
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Russia's national economy, it was only in order to place the country 
in the hands of international finance capitalism; this and the fact that 
the German capitalists supported the idea of a Russo-German agreement 
revealed, to Hitler's mind, the fraudulence of Soviet anti-capitalism. 
Eitler also discussed the possibility to which the Strasser group had 
referred, that nationalist elements were "crowding out" Jewish elements 
and turning Bolshevik Russia into a genuinely anti-capitalist state. 
This, Hitler conceded, was conceivable but, even if such a development 
occurred, it would provoke an attack by the capitalist nations of Western 
Europe. In these circumstances, a German-Russian alliance would be 
"coaplete insanity", for two main reasons. Firstly, the alliance could not 
be kept secret and Germany would not be allowed time to re-arm for this 
conflict; secondly, strategically Russia would have to defeat Poland before 
she could aid Germany because Russian troops could not bypass Poland and 
land troops in Germany from the sea because of Anglo-French naval control 
(139) 
of the Baltic. 
Over and above this, of course, was Hitler's fervent belief that any 
kind of Russo-German alliance was incompatible with his solution to Germany's 
problem of over-population. Hitler ruled out the idea of settling 
Germany's surplus population in overseas colonies because, unless they 
could be kept in a "close political and governmental relation with the 
a other country", this was equivalent to allowing Germans to emigrate. 
(140) 
Since colonies had no longer been available even in the late nineteenth 
century, a solution had to be 
found in Europe. In Mein Kampf, Hitler had 
made it clear that this meant the acquisition of Russian territory; in the 
Secret Book, he was more explicit: 
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"The thinly settled western border regions which already 
had once received German colonies as bringers of culture 
could likewise be considered for the new territorial policy 
of the German nation. " (141) 
No Russian government would ever concede this territory voluntarily as the 
price of German friendship. Indeed Hitler was convinced, anyway, that 
the dream of creating a Pan-Slavic empire was a perpetual enticement for all 
Russian governments to pursue expansion westwards. 
(142 In short, Russia 
and Germany were set irreversibly on a collision course. 
Hitler's arguments in his Secret Book were designed to make his anti-Russian 
stance impregnable irrespective of any current or future developments inside 
the Soviet Union. In view of this, one wonders whether he and his 
associates in the Nazi party would ever have seriously considered in the 
19200 an alliance with Russia even if Bolshevism had been overthrown. Was 
the talk in 1922 and 1923 of an alliance with a nationalist Russia merely 
a deceit designed to solicit support under false pretences from the 
Russian Emigres? In Hitler's case, the revelation of his lust for Russian 
territory to Eduard Scharrer in December 2922, makes this extremely likely. 
But can the same be said of Alfred Rosenberg, the chief advocate of an 
alliance with a post-Bolshevik Russia? 
It has long been assumed that Rosenberg was in full accord with Hitler's 
territorial ambitions. 
(143) 
However, this cannot be substantiated from 
Rosenberg's books, pamphlets and articles. In fact, in all his comments on 
the settlement of Germans in the East, Rosenberg, with notable consistency, 
declared that the land necessary was to be acquired "from the Poles and 
the Czechs". 
(144) 
In September 1926, furthermore, Rosenberg cautioned 
against the cultivation of "utopian plans of conquest" when he remarked 
that: 
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"We had no cause to spin out plans beyond the 
essentials as if there were an empty Lebensraum in the 
east. The direction of this impulse is towards the 
Poles and the Czechs. Beyond that we can, in no sense, 
reflect in any practical way. " (145) 
Not once before 1927 did he publicly argue that Russian land should be 
settled by the Germans; he could, therefore, argue (without contradiction) 
in favour of future alliance between Germany and a nationalist Russia. As 
he saw it, Germany needed Polish territory and this necessity "in no way 
hinders friendship with Russia, which, likewise, can have no interest in a 
strong Poland. This necessity must, however, be recognised as absolutely 
legitimate by nationalist Russia. " 
(146) 
If she did not accept the German 
claim, then Russia could expect German hostility. Rosenberg's public 
utterances, therefore, sustained the notion of a "national Russian alliance" 
long after the prospect of support from the Russian 4migris had disappeared. 
Thin suggests that, in his case, the notion may well have been based on 
genuine conviction. 
Rosenberg's attitude towards the separatist movements inside Russia 
reinforces this impression. He believed that one day the Russian empire 
would disintegrate into its component parts; the Soviet empire was a 
"great bluff" and was being torn apart by separatist movements in the 
Ukraine and the Caucasus. 
(147) 
If Germany were to assist the Ukraine movement 
actively, she would not simply weaken the Soviet Union; she would also 
"discover new foreign policy opportunities" in the shape of an ally against 
the Poles, since the Ukrainians were "the deadly enemies of Poland". 
(148) 
Rosenberg summed up his strategy in Zukunftsweg as follows: 
,, i! we now accept that the removal of the Polish state is 
Germany's first priority, then an alliance between Kiev and 
Berlin and the creation of a common frontier becomes a 
tolkish and a national necessity for a future German policy. " 
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8o it would seem that Rosenberg did not envisage, in the first instance 
at least, German annexation of the Ukraine, the vital grain-producing area, 
a vision which probably fascinated Hitler. 
(149) 
However, Rosenberg did not want another partition of Poland and Czechoslovakia 
between the great powers. In March 1927 he wrote that, if a future nation- 
alist Russia was prepared "to give up her right to land in the struggle against 
the Czechs and the Poles, so that a 100,000,000 Germans can feed themselves 
well", then "nothing would stand in the way of good political relations". 
(150) 
in other words, it seems that Rosenberg hoped that a nationalist Russia 
would allow Germany to absorb the Polish and Czechoslovak states in their 
entirety. In Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik, however, Rosenberg 
reluctantly admitted that a nationalist Russia was not a realistic prospect 
"at least not in the foreseeable future, which comes into consideration for 
a practical German foreign policy" and that, even if it were, it would be 
unlikely to pander to Germany's wishes concerning Ostaiedlung. 
(151) 
This 
change could mean that Hitler had finally browbeaten Rosenberg into accept- 
ing his own Ostpolitik or that the idea of seizing Russian territory had 
always been Rosenberg's secret dream. However, it is more likely that 
Rosenberg had entertained unrealistic hopes that a future nationalist 
Russia would prove to be amenable to Germany's territorial requirements and 
that these hopes were finally shattered by the publication in July 1927 
of Archduke Cyril Vladimirovich's book, lit oder gegen Moskau. Archduke 
Cyril, a descendant of the Czar and the choice of most Russian 4migrds as 
leader of a post-Bolshevik Russia, recognised that Germany was over-populated 
but was interested only in attracting German technicians to help to rebuild 
Russia; though he urged Russo-German collaboration, he had no intention of 
Germany to expand eastwards. 
(152) 
The allowing pre-condition for Rosenberg's 
German alliance with a nationalist Russia had, therefore, been eliminated. 
The fact that Rosenberg repeated his support for Ukrainian independence in 
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his analysis of the future of German foreign policy would seem to suggest 
that he was still committed, however, first aid foremost, to an anti-Polish 
eastern policy. Whether this was only to be the first step along the path 
which led to the annexation of Western Russia is unknown; Rosenberg merely 
indicated that, after the Ukrainians had achieved independence, Germany's 
attitude towards the truncated Moscovite state would depend on English 
policy towards Germany. 
(153) 
Though after 1927 Rosenberg's conception of Ostsiedlung may well have come 
into line with Hitler's, it is important to realize that, previously, 
they differed. Rosenberg was working for the annexation of the whole of 
Poland and Czechoslovakia with Ukrainian assistance and, if possible, with 
a guarantee of Russian neutrality. His aim, therefore, was not as limited 
as the revisionist policy favoured by the Strasser brothers but nor was 
it as extensive as the Ostpolitik favoured by Hitler. 
! if thly, Hitler's views on America also underwent some change in the period 
1926-28. In general, America continued to be neglected in Nazi appraisals 
of foreign affairs. This was hardly surprising in view of the limited 
involvement of the United States in European affairs in the 1920s and the 
necessarily eurocentric conception of a Nazi foreign policy, geared to 
removing the Versailles Settlement. Hitler had, however, begun to 
appreciate the enormous potential of the United States in geopolitical terms; 
in Mein Kampf, he had described America as "a giant state" and was 
clearly impressed by the very favourable relationship between the amount 
of land available and the size of the American population; America was now 
beginning to challenge the pre-eminence of Great Britain in both the naval 
(154) 
and the economic spheres. 
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In his Secret Book, Hitler added a racial dimension; the Americans, he said, 
were "a young and racially select people", who had "for centuries received 
the best nordic forces of Europe by way of immigration". Furthermore, they 
were conscious of the need for racial purity, having already introduced 
selective immigration control. 
(155) 
Hitler did, however, see one cloud on 
the horizon; the second wave of immigrants from South-Eastern Europe and 
the Far East were not being as easily assimilated as the first, racially 
similar wave; as he commented: 
"the American union has not been able to fuse people 
of an alien blood, who are stamped with their own 
national feeling or race instinct. " (156) 
Nevertheless, Hitler identified in America an albeit long-term threat to 
the economic well-being of Europe and to the established balance of world 
power. He believed that England, provided she remained "true to her great 
world-political aim", would join the "new association of nations", which 
would eventually stand up to the threat of American world domination. 
'157) 
Thus, Hitler hoped that competition with the United States would drive 
England into a German alliance. Hence Hitler showed some awareness of the 
long-term potential of the United States, but he clearly did not consider 
her likely to be an active opponent of the re-establishment of German power 
in Europe - his first goal. 
Alfred Rosenberg also omitted America from his deliberations on Germany's 
eastern policy. He certainly noticed the signs of increasing Anglo- 
American competition in naval and economic affairs, but tended to see the 
hand of the "Jewish" financiers of Wall Street behind the machinations of 
U. S. foreign policy. 
(158) 
In fact, Rosenberg regarded Nordic America as 
a valuable ally in the racial confrontations of the future; in the First 
World War, America and Britain had been on the wrong side and had aided 
309 
prance, "the champion of the black racial pestilence"; but in future, 
America along with Britain and Germany, would defend the white race against 
the emerging challenge from Africa. 
(159) 
8o, Rosenberg, like Hitler, did not expect the United States to play an 
important part in the restoration of Germany's position in Europe. However, 
unlike Hitler, Rosenberg did not appear to appreciate fully the danger which 
North America would present in the future to the established balance of 
world power. He seems also to have had fewer doubts about the racial purity 
of Nordic America or about her willingness to orchestrate the defence of 
the white race on the American continent. 
Finally, Japan also received relatively short shrift from the National 
Socialists. She did not feature prominently in the alliance systems of 
the Strasser circle or of Hitler and Rosenberg. Nevertheless, Japan was 
not overlooked entirely. Indeed, Ernst Hanfstgngl claims that during a 
discussion with Hitler in Landsberg gaol, "late in 1924", Hitler had 
insisted that "only in alliance with the hard-working, martially aware, and 
racially unspoiled people, the Japanese, which is 'without space' just 
like the German people and consequently our natural partner in the struggle 
against Bolshevik Moscovitism, can we lead Germany into a new future". 
(160) 
If this story is true, one has to ask what lay behind this judgement and 
why Hitler chose not to reiterate it in Mein Kampf or even in his 
unpublished second book. 
When Hanfstüngl heard Hitler's argument, he at once attributed it to the 
influence of Karl Haushof er, who, through Rudolf Hess, had the ear of Hitler 
during his imprisonment. This seems quite likely, as Haushof er, a keen 
advocate of German-Japanese co-operation, considered Japan to be the rising 
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Asiatic power and frequently compared Japan's demographic and spacial 
predicament with Germany's. Significantly, Rosenberg's appraisal of Japan 
was based on the same criteria. In June 1926 he welcomed the emergence of 
Japan at the head of a Pan-Asiatic movement and hoped that she would succeed 
in pushing the Russians out of China. 
(161) 
He also noted Japan's surplus 
population and her consequent need to expand and find an outlet in East 
Asia. 
(162) 
He recognised that this "ßolkish imperialism" pursued in 
China had incurred for Japan the hostility of America and Britain; this 
had, in fact, driven her to look for support from the Bolsheviks whom she 
distrusted. 
(163) 
Rosenberg's admiration for the Japanese was obvious; he 
described Japan as "almost the only nation state opposed to the international 
stock exchange". 
(164) 
However, even though Japan'e interests and outlook 
were evidently compatible with those of Germany, Rosenberg stopped short of 
advocating an alliance. 
Hitler showed similar restraint. In Mein Kampf he argued that the Jews were 
determined to destroy the Japanese nation state, but, unable "to mimic" the 
,, yellow Asiatic races" and to assimilate amongst them and to undermine them 
from within, as they had done in Europe and America, the Jews were forced 
to incite the other powers against Japanese militarism and imperialism. 
Hitler also commented on the strained relationship between Japan and the 
(165) 
United States. Nevertheless, though he had established both an 
ideological and a strategic pre-condition for German-Japanese collaboration, 
Hitler did not proceed to advocate this. It is possible that racial anti- 
pathy towards the Asiatics prevented him; however, there is no concrete 
evidence to support this view and, indeed, since Alfred Rosenberg, the 
party's racial theorist, found the Japanese unobjectionable on racial grounds, 
it is unlikely that Hitler did. It is more probable that British abandonment 
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of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1922 and signs of increasing disenchantment 
between the two powers, which Hitler attributed in Mein Kampf to the 
British-Jewish press and evidence of Russo-Japanese collaboration in the 
Far Bast, prevented him from including Japan alongside Britain as Germany's 
allies in the future campaign against the Russians. 
(166) 
Since Hitler was 
not usually deterred by evidence of a country's current stance in foreign 
affairs, one should, perhaps, retain an open mind on this issue. But the 
osiesion of Japan, for whatever reason, must indicate a lack of conviction 
on Hitler's part. Suffice it to say that Hitler as early as 1924 - if 
one believes Hanfstgngl - was aware of the potential usefulness of the 
Japanese in realising his programme of conquest at Russian expense, but chose 
not to include Japan in his publicised alliance programme. 
what emerges from an analysis of Nazi literature during the years 1924-28 
is that the Nazi party, despite the virulence of its francophbbic and anti- 
Bolshevik propaganda, had not delineated a coherent programs on foreign 
affairs publicly and unequivocally before the publication of Hitler's 
pamphlet on the South Tyrol question in February 1926. This omission 
reveals not the absence of such a programme in the mind of leadership; one 
certainly existed in fairly concrete outline in Hitler's mind at least, 
but Hitler refused to publicise it. This decision was dictated partly by 
tactical necessity - for it would alienate the support of the imigrds - 
partly by the fear that it would stir up opposition within the party and 
partly by the absence of an even superficially convincing justification for 
the extensive territorial ambitions contained in it. 
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The reaction of the Strasser group to the negotiation of the Locarno 
treaties in the winter of 1925-26 challenged the assumptions, still largely 
concealed from the public, behind Hitler's new alliance strategy. This 
forced Hitler in February 1926 to reveal his foreign policy programme 
which by this time was embellished by the pseudo-scientific reasoning 
culled from geopolitical literature. However, Hitler established the 
authority of his proposals primarily by relating them to the ideological 
tenets of the Nazi movement. He, therefore, offered very little objective 
data to confirm the correctness of his analysis. Consequently, after the 
publication of the second volume of Mein Kampf in December 1926, Hitler 
and Rosenberg, who sympathised with the broad outline of Hitler's proposals, 
set about finding the necessary corroborative evidence. In 1927 Alfred 
Rosenberg published findings accumulated in his day-by-day editorial work 
for the VB in his Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik, while Hitler 
planned to produce his own version in a second book. Why Hitler chose 
ultimately not to publish this book is uncertain. It could be, as has 
been suggested, that Mein Kampf was not selling well and Hitler did not 
want to produce a book which would compete with it, particularly one which 
was concentrated almost entirely on foreign affairs; 
(167) 
or it may be 
that the developing association with the orthodox right-wing in its campaign 
against the Young Plan in 1929 compelled him to reconsider the publication 
of what was an embittered attack on bourgeois politicians. Perhaps, also, 
Hitler decided that the publication of a more detailed analysis of foreign 
policy - like the publication of an expanded party programme - would only 
encourage more debate within the party and expose Hitler to harmful counter- 
attacks. In any case, Rosenberg's book had elaborated the main arguments 
most conveniently without associating Hitler with them by name. 
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The observations of Hitler and Rosenberg were intended to establish the 
immutability of Franco-German and Russo-German hostility. Thus, France, 
despite the absence of any need for more territory, was said to be unshakeably 
determined for reasons of security and by the facts of geography to obtain 
a Rhineland frontier with Germany and to dissolve Germany into a multiplicity 
of small states. 
(168) Russia, irrespective of changes in her government, 
was depicted as being driven westwards by the impetus of Pan-Slavism and 
would not, therefore, peacefully accommodate the territorial requirements 
of an over-populated Germany. Their arguments about Italy and England were 
designed to substantiate the belief that these two powers would collaborate 
with Germany in the first instance against the French (in this 
fight, they 
might be assisted by Spain and Hungary) and then, in the case of England 
at least, against the Russians, and finally, if need be, perhaps also against 
the distant threat of American world hegemony. To give credence to these 
arguments Hitler and Rosenberg employed racial and geopolitical 
theories 
as well as observations about power politics. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study has attempted to examine the evolution of Nazi ideas on foreign 
policy between 1919 and 1928 by considering the views of Adolf Hitler within 
the context of those of the Nazi Party as a whole and of those of the 
political circles) in which the Nazi Party leaders moved. Four broad 
issues have been discussed: firstly, who influenced the foreign policy 
concepts of the party and, more especially, who influenced Hitler's emerging 
programme on foreign affairs? Secondly, how important was the racist 
and antisemitic ideology in fashioning that programme? Thirdly, what was 
the full extent of Hitler's territorial ambitions? Finally, how uniform 
was the Nazi Party's outlook on foreign affairs in the 1920a? The threads 
can now be drawn together and some tentative answers to these questions 
formulated. 
1, Who Influenced Hitler? 
When Hitler first encountered the infant German Workers' Party in September 
1919, his political outlook had largely been fashioned by Pan-German 
literature, probably absorbed over many years. The resentment, which he 
felt towards the former Austro-Hungarian empire, suggests that it was the 
Austrian Pan-German Movement under Georg von Schdnerer rather than the 
Berlin-based Alldeutscher Verband, which first left its imprint on Hitler's 
mind. 
") 
However, it also seems quite clear that by 1919 Hitler had read 
and internalized much of 
the literature produced by the ADV in Germany, 
especially items written 
by its long-serving chairman, Heinrich Class. The 
similarities between Hitler's comments on foreign policy between 
the years 
1919 and 1921 and the views expressed in Class's books Wenn ich der Kaiser 
wür sad Deutsche Geschichte are 
too similar to be entirely coincidental. 
in some case, the cryptic records of 
Hitler's early speeches are fully 
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Intelligible only by reference to pre-war Pan-German propaganda. 
(2) 
It is, 
of course, all too easy to attribute all of Hitler's ideas to Pan-German 
inspiration. Nevertheless, Hitler's emphasis in his early speeches on 
(;. r any's need to expand because of her alleged overpopulation together with 
his discussion of the relative merits of overseas expansion and aggrandisement 
in Europe are so reminiscent of Class's earlier analysis in Wenn ich der 
]Kaiser w Kr that one rightly suspects plagiarism. 
(3) 
Both men favoured 
overseas colonisation on the grounds of practicality but secretly harboured 
designs on territory in Eastern Europe. Both felt also that the treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 provided all that Germany needed and both were 
drawn towards the idea of a Russo-German alliance since, they argued, the 
two powers had few conflicting interests. It may seem remarkable that 
they believed that Russia would accept the transfer of territory on the lines 
of Brest-Litovsk and remain amenable to collaboration with Germany; but, 
as has been seen, Hitler and Class were not alone in sharing this pipe- 
dream. Finally, both considered Britain, France and America to be Germany's 
irreconcilable enemies. 
Though Class established and maintained contact with the NSDAP between 
1920 and 1923, it is possible that Hitler outgrew his Pan-German mentality; 
certainly Hitler's renunciation of the South Tyrol showed that he was not 
committed to carrying out the Pan-German creed to the letter. But generally, 
it is more likely that his Pan-Germanism only appeared to have been over- 
shadowed by the onrush of new ideas. Hitler retained a certain sympathy and 
respect for the ADV largely on the basis of its initially correct and 
far-sighted analysis ctthe mistakes of Wilhelminian politicians; a he 
remarked in the Secret Book: 
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"We cannot think of those men without a deep compassion, 
men condemned by fate to lDresee a collapse for twenty 
years, and who now, having not been heeded and hence 
in no position to be of help, had to live to see their 
people's most tragic catastrophe. " (4) 
However, Hitler was also increasingly critical of the ADV's inability to 
reach the masses and to do anything concrete; by their training, the Pan- 
German leaders were geared too much "to a purely literary treatment of the 
problems". 
(5 
Hitler's lack of patience with the slow-moving backstage 
aachinations of Heinrich Class may explain, in part, the Munich putsch of 
9-9 November 1923, which was seen by Class, at least, as an attempt at a 
'pr. -emptive strike' by Hitler. 
In terms of Hitler's ideological development, Class's influence had already 
boon supplanted in 1920 by that of Dietrich Eckart, and, more especially, 
Alfred Rosenberg. Whilst Eckart's relationship with Hitler and the German 
Worker's Party should not be overlooked - his early support was instrumental 
in attracting larger audiences and his ideas on the "Jewish-materialistic 
spirit in and around us" did stimulate discussion and found their way 
into the party programme of February 1920(6) - it did not contribute as 
such in terms of the development of ideological and foreign policy tenets 
as the collaboration between Hitler and Alfred Rosenberg. 
Rosenberg was largely responsible for providing Hitler and the NSDAP with 
an international perspective on the Jewish question. The idea of the 
existence of a world-wide 
Jewish conspiracy to overthrow established nation- 
states, which Rosenberg continually postulated, was of tremendous value to 
the new party, for it explained not only Germany's remarkable internal 
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collapse in 1918, but also the hostile international environment which 
she then faced. The threat of left-wing revolution inside Germany after 1918, 
the menacing power of Bolshevik Russia and the danger of Germany's economic 
enslavement to the victorious capitalist nations of the West were all 
traceable to the same source. This scenario (by no means Rosenberg's own 
creation) had the effect of reducing a very complex national and international 
scene to a delightfully simple and infinitely adaptable formula. This 
formula was easily understood by mass audiences and provided an indispensable 
guideline for international affairs; all developments, which looked likely 
to harm Germany, could be attributed to the execution of the plans of 
world Jewry: all those which favoured Germany could be presented as 
evidence either of Jewish trickery or of the existence of nationalistic 
groups, concerned to combat the prevailing tide of Jewish influence in their 
country. This antisemitic ideology, therefore, served as an essential 
sheet anchor for Nazi analyses of foreign affairs. 
It seems very likely that Hitler moderated his early support for the idea 
of a Russo-German alliance because of Rosenberg's revelations about 'Jewish' 
Bolshevism. From September 1920 onwards, Hitler argued that such an 
alliance would only come about when Jewry was deposed in Russia. 
(7) 
How far 
Hitler's eventual plan for the conquest of Russian territory was the 
direct result of this ideological transformation in Hitler's stance on 
foreign affairs will be considered more fully below. But, first of all, 
it is necessary to determine just how similar Rosenberg's concepts on 
foreign affairs were to Hitler's. There were, perhaps, two main areas of 
disagreement between the two men, which were largely hidden from contemporaries. 
Firstly, some disparity is evident onlhe question of policy towards 
Russia. Rosenberg's real attitude towards Russia had been the subject of 
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auch debate. Walter Laqueur regards Rosenberg as being distinctly anti- 
Russian because of his Baltic German heritage, whilst Ernst Hanfstdngl 
(quoting Eckart) described Rosenberg as a 'National Bolshevik' - that is, 
one who favoured a Russo-German alignment once concern for national interests 
superseded the internationalist aspirations of early Bolshevism; an 
interpretation also advanced by Wolfgang Horn. 
(8) 
Both interpretations 
fail to understand Rosenberg's perception of Russia. Laqueur's view is 
based on Rosenberg's comments on the racial inferiority of Slavs to 
Germans; but, as has been shown, Rosenberg nonetheless did regard Russians 
and Germans as compatible in some ways. 
(9) 
The Slavs were not the equals 
of the Germans but they were not subhuman eitler. Horn's view of Rosenberg 
as a 'National Bolshevik' is rooted in a misunderstanding of his consistent 
avowal of supportfor a 'national Russia'. This 'national Russia' was to be 
not a 'National Bolshevik' Russia, but a post-Bolshevik Russia; a Russia 
treed from her 'Jewish' Bolshevik government would be an attractive ally 
for Germany. 
(10) 
Rosenberg remained publicly committed to this line long after the Bolshevik 
victory over the nationalist forces in the Russian civil war eliminated all 
realistic hope of the overthrow of Bolshevism in the near future. So 
Rosenberg was neither virulently Russo- nor Slavophobic nor a supporter of 
'National Bolshevism'. In the first instance, he simply opposed a 
Bolshevik-led Russia. 
However, Rosenberg was violently opposed to the existence of the Polish and 
Czechoslovak states created at Versailles out of the ruins of the Russian, 
Austro-Hungarian, and German empires. From the outset, he was determined 
that Germany should destroy these states. It seems likely, however, that 
319 
this revisionist impulse was overtaken by a growing preoccupation with 
the need for Germany to expand her Lebensraum in Eastern Europe. 
(11) 
This may have been the result of Hitler's impact on him. It did not, 
however, produce an eastern policy identical to Hitler's. Nowhere did 
Rosenberg express his support for a campaign of territorial expansion at 
Russian expense. For Rosenberg, Poland was the main enemy and he hoped that 
a future German foreign policy would eliminate Poland and Czechoslovakia 
and incorporate the territory of these two states within a German Empire to 
furnish the necessary Lebensraum. Russia, of course, would not be easily 
persuaded to accept this German annexation of what was, in part, formerly 
Russian territory; therefore Rosenberg wanted Germany to support the 
separatist movements, especially that of the Ukrainians, inside Russia. These 
movements could tear Russia apart and ensure her inability to oppose German 
D1 . 
(12) Rosenberg envisaged the shrinkage of the Russian Empire, as a 
result of the establishment of new nation-states by the separatist movements, 
to its former Muscovite core; Hitler envisaged a similar outcome but by 
different means - that is, as the result of a German conquest of Western 
aussia. 
The second area, over which a certain disparity, perhaps, existed between 
Rosenberg and Hitler, was about the role of England in their plans. Both, 
though initially hostile to England, were advocating by the end of 1922 an 
Aagio-German alliance as part of a future National Socialist strategy, 
designed to defeat first France, then Russia. The reasons for this volte- 
face will be examined below; the important point at issue here is the 
level of commitment of Hitler and Rosenberg to the proposed alliance. 
[laus Hildebrand has argued that Hitler's commitment to an English alliance 
was based essentially on power politics, whilst 
Rosenberg's was based 
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mainly on racial grounds; hence Hitler believed in long-term, but not 
indefinite, Anglo-German cooperation, whilst Rosenberg believed in an 
eternal alliance. 
(13) 
This interpretation may be slightly misleading. Essentially, the English 
alliance would serve two purposes, as Rosenberg explained in Der Zukunftsweg 
einer deutschen Aussenpolitik, one short-term, the other long-term. In 
the short run, it would facilitate German acquisition of land in "an 
easterly - Polish - direction" - that is the acquisition of Lebensraum. 
Significantly, Rosenberg explained why England would be willing to cooperate 
in this action - admittedly unconvincingly - in terms of power politics. 
England wanted to combat the Russian threat to her empire and would, there- 
fore, support Germany, the Baltic States, and the Russian separatist 
movements against Moscow; this might initially only produce "interim 
solutions" (Zwischenl sungen)to Germany's problems but would eventually ensure 
her acquisition of living-space. 
(14) 
Rosenberg's short-term alliance 
strategy was, therefore, as follows: a combination of Germany, England, 
Italy and the Ukrainian separatists in opposition to France and Russia; the 
aase combination was capable also of destroying "the Jewish world state" 
showing that Rosenberg had not abandoned his ideological frame of reference. 
(15) 
In the longer term, Rosenberg was horrified by the spectre of the rising 
challenge of the black races to white supremacy; he wanted England and 
Anorica to join Germany as "stalwarts against the black racial pestilence"; 
England was to protect the white race in Africa, India and Australia, 
America to defend it on the American continent, and Germany and Italy to 
defend it in Europe. 
(16) 
So, whilst Rosenberg's long-term vision of Anglo- 
German cooperation was based on racial considerations, and there is, 
perhaps, the implication that these were immutable, his short-term strategy 
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did owe much to calculations based on alleged strategic realities. 
Certainly, one can appreciate that Rosenberg's conception of foreign 
affairs was identical only in broad outline to Hitler's. The differences 
in their policies towards England and Russia do not, of course, preclude 
Rosenberg's having exerted considerable influence over Hitler's thinking 
on foreign affairs, not merely on the Russian question but, perhaps, on 
t11ewhole issue of alliance strategy. 
Certainly, Rosenberg did not allow his differences of opinion with Hitler 
to surface in public and, after the publication of the second volume of 
Nein Kampf, he strove hard to substantiate the foreign policy programme 
endorsed by Hitler. The fact that Rosenberg failed in his ambition to 
become German Foreign Minister after 1933 and that he was later given the 
Unpleasant Job of Commissioner for the Eastern European Regions should not 
be considered as in any way diminishing his early contribution to Nazi 
ideology. If (and this has to be proven) he was relatively overlooked in 
the 19309 and 1940s, it was, in part, because Rosenberg had powerful enemies 
within the party, who, jealous of the high esteem in which 
Rosenberg was 
held by Hitler, had been working for some time to undermine his standing. 
(17) 
It has to be admitted, though, that Rosenberg's main asset to Hitler and 
the party was his ability to uncover useful antisemitic propaganda and to 
coment on current events, especially 
in the field of foreign policy. 
Once a foreign policy programme had been constructed, and the conduct of 
foreign policy was largely in Hitler's own hands, Rosenberg, a poor public 
speaker and rather withdrawn character, could not seriously claim a place 
amongst the foremost party officials on merit or personality. 
In 1922 and 1923 Hitler came 
into contact with a number of political 
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theorists who had either established political or academic reputations in, 
or practical experience of, foreign affairs. Whether these encounters 
left any indelible imprint on Hitler's approach to foreign policy is 
debatable. His meeting with Moeller van den Bruck in March 1922 forced 
Hitler to come to terms with the concept of 'National Bolshevism'. His 
refection of it was probably not a turning-point in the refinement of Hitler's 
programme, but showed, instead, the firmness of his anti-Bolshevik 
convictions at this fairly early stage in the construction of his alliance 
(118) 
strategy. 
His increasingly close association with Max-Erwin von Scheubner-Richter 
in 1922 and 1923 reflected Hitler's desire to attract the support of the 
nationalist Russian 
6migrbs, with whom Scheubner-Richter was in regular 
contact, and provided substance to his claim to support an alignment of 
Germany with a future post-Bolshevik Russia. Hitler and Scheubner-Richter 
became fairly close friends, so it is possible that the latter's early 
career in the Baltic States in 1918, when he was engaged 
in negotiating 
with the Latvian government an agreement which would give German soldiers 
the right to acquire land for settlement in the area, may have revitalised 
Hitler's interest in a policy of conquestin Eastern Europe along these 
lines. It is curious, for example, that, in his second book, he should 
write that the sole aim, which would 
justify the horrific slaughter of 
a world war, "could consist only in the assurance to 
German soldiers of 
so and so many hundred thousand square 
kilometers to be allotted to front- 
line fighters as property, or to be placed at the disposal of a general 
colonisation by Germans". 
(19) 
It is more than likely, however, that 
Hitler had already reached this conclusion before he grew particularly 
fond of Scheubner-Richter and, of course, such a scheme would cut across 
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the type of Russo-German collaboration, for which the latter was 
working with the Russian 
emigres in the early 1920s. 
A great deal of attention has been devoted to the part played by Professor 
Karl Haushofer's geopolitical theories in the formulation of Hitler's 
foreign policy schemes. Klaus Hildebrand has argued, for example, that 
in 1923 Hitler's alliance strategy was evolving but one ingredient was 
missing: a spatial policy; this Hitler acquired through his contact with 
Karl Haushof er, especially during the former's imprisonment in Landsberg 
gaol between November 1923 and December 1924. This analysis cannot now be 
accepted in view of the conclusions already reached in this thesis. Hitler 
had already adopted a spatial policy involving expansion at Russian expense 
by December 1922, as he revealed to Eduard Scharrer. 
(20) 
Haushofer's role 
is likely, therefore, to have been far less crucial than has been hitherto 
imagined, since Hitler's original scheme of conquest in Eastern Europe 
predates any substantial contact with Haushof er and was probably a 
revival of the Ostpolitik advocated by the ADV and executed by the High 
Command in theearly months of 1918. Nevertheless, Hitler's introduction to 
geopolitics proved extremely fruitful in the sense that it furnished a pseudo- 
scientific justification for his nakedly imperialistic impulses. The 
second volume of Mein Kampf and Hitler's second book drew heavily on the 
geopolitician's strategic, autarkic, and demographic arguments in favour 
of larger living-spaces. 
C21j 
In fairness to Haushof er, it has to be stressed 
that, whilst his continued talk of the need to expand German living-space 
was irresponsible and open to mis-use, Hitler did deliberately pervert 
Haushofer's theories for his own ends. In Hitler's hands - and it does 
sees to have been Hitler's own concoction - Lebensraum became the key 
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concept. in. Nazi philosophy. An increase in Germany's living-space would 
ensure a healthy Volk and, hence, as Hitler put it in his Secret Book: 
"A healthy foreign policy therefore will always keep the 
winning of the basis of a people's sustenance immovably 
in sight as its ultimate goal. " (22) 
It would also secure for Germany a greater supply of food and raw materials, 
thus making her less dependent on ßDreign trade and more Self-sufficient. 
(23) 
Greater space would also guarantee greater strategic security for the 
(24) 
German state. Since such space was to be acquired primarily at Russian 
expense, the pursuit of Lebensraum also neatly dovetailed into the anti- 
Bolshevik stance which had been developed since 1920. 
(25) 
That none of 
this was anticipated by Karl Haushof er is certain; the one intentional piece 
of advice on foreign affairsdhich Haushofer undoubtedly prof erred - that 
is, a careful appraisal of the rising power of a Japaiwhich, allegedly, had 
similar problems and appetites to Germany - was taken up but, in the 
short-term at least, not to great effect as far as the party's alliance 
structure was concerned. 
Such were the main influences on Hitler's emerging Weltanschauung. The 
early ingestion of Pan-German propaganda and Hitler's introduction by 
Rosenberg to the subterranean workings of the Jewish world conspiracy appear 
to have been genuinely formative experiences. Hitler was always adept at 
imbibing and assimilating useful concepts and theories; his exploitation 
of geopolitical ideas illustrated his skill at maximising the political 
gain from a relatively small imput. 
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2. Now important was the racist and antisemitic ideology in fashioning 
Hitler's programme? 
Attempting to unravel the motivations behind Hitler's decision-making is 
particularly difficult. The first question one has to pose is: which came 
first -a decision about the goals of Nazi foreign policy, which determined 
the selection of suitable allies, or the selection of allies, which 
determined the goals of Nazi foreign policy? According to Hitler's view 
after 1922 (adopted from the Pan-Germans), Germany could either expand 
overseas (by regaining her former colonies or acquiring new ones) or in 
Eastern Europe. Furthermore, in order to avoid a repetition of the 
disastrous two-front war, which had eventually defeated her in1918, Germany 
had to ally either with Britain or with Russia. Since Britain would, in 
his view, oppose a revival of Germany's overseas ambitions, and Russia would 
oppose German territorial expansion in Eastern Europe, the choice appeared 
to be clear-cut; the choice of one ally or one territorial goal would almost 
automatically predetermine the rest of the programme. 
(26) 
So which was 
the decisive selection? The answer to that question will largely determine 
the answer to the second question: what part (if any) did the party's 
racist or antisemitic ideology play in that decision? 
Axel Kuhn attempted to resolve these dilemmas in a study of Hitler's foreign 
policy programme published 
in 1970. He decided that Hitler had espoused 
the concept of an Anglo-German alliance in order to be able to fight a 
revisionist war against the arch-defender of the Versailles 
Settlement, 
France. Hitler had noted England's emerging distaste for French pre- 
eminence in Europe as shown by her increasing disengagement 
from France's 
harsh policytwards Germany, which culminated in the disagreements over 
the Ruhr invasion in January 1923. Hence Hitler's decision, according to 
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Kuhn, was based on strategic considerations and had nothing to do with 
Nazi ideology. 
(27) 
Having taken the crucial first decision and opting for an 
alliance with England, Hitler belatedly - two years later in fact - 
produced a corresponding not of foreign policy goals: the conquest of 
territory in Eastern Europe at Russian expense. 
(28) 
Leaving aside the 
question of the two-year period of gestation following the initial decision 
(which Kuhn does not adequately explain), does his interpretation stand 
up to close scrutiny? 
The first question one has to ask is whether the desire to fight a rev- 
isionist war against France was, by itself, sufficient cause for Hitler 
to abandon his previous view of England, which as expressed in 1919-20 
waa that she was one of Germany's 'deadly enemies' on the grounds of the 
naval, colonial and commercial rivalry, which underlay the outbreak of the 
First World War. 
(29)Furthermore, 
Hitler's argument that England opposed 
French hegemony in Europe and would, therefore, help Germany to destroy 
it and not oppose the resulting German hegemony was, at best, tenuous, 
it that was its full extent. But, in fact, as Eduard Scharrer's record 
of his interview with Hitler in December 1922 indicates, Hitler revealed 
that his projected Anglo-German alliance aimed not merely at revising the 
Versailles Settlement but also at the conquest of Russian territory, 
and, furthermore, that he hoped Germany's express renunciation of an over- 
seas colonial policy would prevent England from opposing German ambitions 
in Eastern Europe. 
(30) 
At first sight, Scharrer's evidence might appear 
to make more plausible Kuhn's argument that Hitler's choice of England 
determined his attitude towards Russia; it makes it quite clear that Hitler 
was fully aware of the implications in Eastern Europe of a decision in 
favour of an English alliance and that he envisaged a way to avert British 
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hostility from German hegemony in Europe. On closer inspection, however, 
this evidence can be seen as further weakening Kuhn's interpretation. 
In fact, it suggests an entirely different interpretation, which is worth 
considering, namely that the English alliance was merely a response to a 
prior decision whether that be a negative one, that is the rejection of 
a Russo-German alliance, or a positive one, that is the adoption of a plan 
for aggrandisement at Russian expense. 
(31) 
Each of these alternative explanations of theariginal motivation behind 
Hitler's alliance strategy is tenable. The first is explicable in terms 
of Hitler's progressive disillusionment with Russia following the revel- 
ations about 'Jewish' Bolshevism and the increasing likelihood of a 
Bolshevik victory in the Russian civil war. This interpretation is attractive 
since Hitler's qualification of his support for a Russo-German alliance 
in 1920 (that it could only come about after Jewry had been removed) is 
the first overt and concrete change in his outlook after 1919. Later, 
it is true, Hitler argued that the westward ambitions of Pan-8lavism put 
Eussis on a collision course with Germany. 
(32) 
But since, only a few months 
earlier, Hitler had declared that Germany and Russia had no conflicting 
interests, this is unlikely to explain Hitler's altered stance on the 
Russian question. It is feasible, therefore, that Hitler did take seriously 
the anti-Bolshevik and antisemitic propaganda of his party and that, as 
the Soviet regime looked increasingly likely to remain in power, so Hitler 
was encouraged to take an 
increasingly virulent anti-Russian line. The 
fact that during this same period, 1921 to 1922, there was a rehabilitation 
of England's standing in Rosenberg's antisemitic world view 
is also 
interesting. Until 1921, England was portrayed as the "patron saint" of 
world Jewry; after 
1921, Rosenberg began to identify signs of English 
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resistance to Jewish plans and he began to argue that the centre of 
Jewish activity was considered to have moved from London to New York. 
(33) 
No real explanation for this rehabilitation is given, though a possible 
one would be the more lenient attitude of the British government in its 
relations with Germany. However, since the signs of such a moderation in 
British policy were fairly intermittent in 1921, one could suggest that 
Britain was being rehabilitated in the ideological field because of 
Hitler's emergent anti-Russian policy and in preparation for the announcement 
of a future Anglo-German alliance, which would be vital in its execution. 
This interpretation is advanced tentatively in the knowledge that it 
carries with it the suggestion that, perhaps, Hitler believed that the 
Russian Revolution was the first step in the Jewish world conspiracy or, 
at least, that Bolshevik leadership of Russia made an alliance with her out 
of the question. 
However, it is possible to argue that the second alternative to Kuhn's 
interpretation, that is that Hitler's alliance strategy was primarily 
motivated by his adoption of a plan of territorial acquisition at Russian 
expense, is also plausible. It is known that Hitler approved of Germany's 
Ostpolitik in 1918; and in June 1921 he declared that the treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk, signed by Russia and Germany in March 1918, and the con- 
sequent land transfers to Germany, would have met the latter's requirements. 
One problem with the argument is that Hitler may have desired territorial 
expansion at Russian expense all along. And, until 1922, Hitler did 
not regard an English alliance as a necessary prerequisite for this; as 
has been seen, he seems to have believed that a German-Russian alliance 
before the war would have allowed Germany to expand eastwards and that the 
treaty of Brest-Litovsk could have been followed by Russo-German 
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collaboration. 
(34) 
Thus, until 1922, Hitler seems to have thought that 
his territorial ambitions for Germany in Eastern Europe could be realised 
without the need for an alliance with England. During 1922 Hitler abandoned 
the idea of Russo-German collaboration in solving Germany's spatial problems 
in favour of the conquest of Lebensraum in the East and the destruction of 
Russia. The most likely reason for this change is Hitler's acceptance of 
anti-Bolshevism as the corner-stone of Nazi philosophy. So whilst Hitler 
 ay have been drawn towards England (and Italy) by their evident opposition 
to French policies, it seems possible that it was Hitler's alienation from 
Russia under its Bolshevik leadership, which determined his eventual 
alliance strategy. 
The purpose of this section has been to indicate that interpretations of 
the evolution of Hitler's alliance strategy, other than that advanced by 
Axel guhn, are possible, although admittedly impossible to prove beyond all 
doubt. It has, hopefully, also served to re-instate with some force the 
possibility that Hitler's schemes were inspired originally by genuine anti- 
Bolshevik convictions, though not entirely, of course, as the supposed 
dichotomy between Britain and Russia, on which Hitler's choice of allies 
rested, was also based on his reading of the strategic realities of 
Europe. If, once the alliance strategy had been published, Hitler seemed 
rather to neglect ideological factors, it may only have been because of his 
need to convince the doubters in his own party by more rational arguments. 
This is certainly one explanation of his opening remarks in his Secret Book, 
written in 1928: 
, 'During the last two years, of course, it has become clearer 
to me that my writing of that time was in fact structured on 
general National Socialist insights as a premise. It also became 
clear that many do not follow us, less out of ill-will than 
because of a certain inability. At that time, within the 
narrowly drawn limits, it was not possible to give a real 
fundamental proof of the soundness of our National Socialist 
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conception of foreign policy. Today I feel 
compelled to make up for this. " (35) 
g. What was the full extent of Hitler's territorial ambitions? 
Hitler's alliance strategy was, of course, only one part of his overall 
foreign policy programme. The entire programme, it is fair to say, was 
justified by Hitler in terms of race. The ultimate goal, it was claimed, 
was the defeat of the Jews and the survival of the Aryan race, hence in 
Alfred Rosenberg's view: 
"In the final analysis, all history is racial history. " 
(36) 
The role of this racial ideology should not be overlooked in any assessment 
of the Nazi programme. In the last resort, the racial values of a people, 
not its geopolitical position, would, it was believed, determine its fate. 
(37) 
For this reason, the preservation of the quality of the race was absolutely 
vital. To ensure this, the pursuit of greater living-space was crucial; 
as Hitler said in the Secret Book: 
,, The compulsion to engage in the struggle for existence 
lies in the limitations of the living-space; but in the lifT38) 
struggle for this space lies also the basis for evolution. " 
A healthy people, he argued, would secure the necessities of life by 
expanding its living-space; a healthy people also would expand 
in number 
continuously; therefore, the acquisition of living-space would permit 
further population growth, which 'ould, in time and in turn, necessitate 
further territorial expansion. The heady mixture of race and Lebensraum, 
therefore, produced, as Martin Broszat has argued, a doctrine of apparently 
(39) 
golf-perpetuating expansionism. 
But did Hitler seriously envisage the eventual German conquest of the world? 
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The evidence for this has already been discussed above, but a few final 
cosments might be useful. 
(40) 
It is certainly true that implicit in 
Hitler's racist theorizing is the idea that one race, the Aryan race, could 
eventually dominate the world; it can be argued that his attribution to 
the Jews of schemes of world conquest merely disguised his own. But it 
has to be borne in mind that Aryan world domination was not necessarily 
synonymous with German world conquest. The Aryan race extended beyond 
Germany's frontiers and was likely to remain that way indefinitely. Though 
Hitler might talk of defeating the mighty American Union in some future 
apocalyptic battle, this did not necessarily entail the physical conquest 
of the United I 
States by Germany. What Hitler initially envisioned for 
Germany was, perhaps, the securing of a position of pre-eminence as the 
leading world power, a position which Hitler, like his Pan-German mentors 
before him, thought that Britain had enjoyed at the turn of the century. 
Later, Hitler realized that Britain's pre-eminence amongst the world powers 
had not been unchallengeable and, perhaps, then Hitler's ultimate 
ambitions for Germany were pushed even higher. It is probable that, at 
this time at least, these still stopped short of physical conquest of the 
world and the elimination of the other world powers. As Rudolf Hess wrote 
in December 1928: 
"World peace is certainly an ideal worth striving for; in 
Hitler's opinion it will be realizable only when one 
power, the racially best one, has attained complete and 
uncontested world supremacy. " (41) 
"Uncontested world supremacy", not global conquest, was probably the extent 
of Hitler's publicized fantasies for his new Germany in the 1920s. 
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4. How uniform was the party's outlook on foreign affairs in the 1920s? 
Hiaua Hildebrand in The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich has identified 
''four different positions" on foreign affairs within the Nazi party during 
the Weimar Republic. 
(42) 
Two of them, the "Wilhelmine imperialists", 
represented by Franz Xaver Ritter von Epp and HermannGoering, and the 
Agrarian Radicals, led by Walter Darre, are outside the chronological 
scope of this study, though Hitler shared many of the views of the first 
group in the early 1920s. The views of the other two: the "revolutionary 
'Socialists' " of the Strasser group and Hitler himself have, hopefully, 
been adequately explored. It should now be clear, however, that there were 
more than four conceptions represented within the Nazi party and its 
iamediate environment. The differing ideas of Allied Rosenberg, Max-Erwin 
von Scheubner-Richter, Karl Haushofer (shared by Rudolf Hess before he 
fell finally under Hitler's spell), Ernst Hanfstängl, and Kurt LSdecke have 
all surfaced during this study. There was, in short, a wide range of view- 
points represented within the party, which Hitler largely 
tolerated because, 
with the notable exception of the controversy in 
January and February 1926, 
the groups or individuals concerned were either not organised sufficiently 
to pose a threat to Hitler's authority or were unwilling to risk a public 
confrontation with Hitler over foreign affairs. The clash with 
the Strasser 
group probably convinced him of the need to assert more clearly 
the 'official' 
party line but, thereafter, the same laissez-faire attitude 
towards dissenting 
voices reasserted itself. 
Before the plebiscite on the Young Plan and the 
Great Depression changed its fortunes, the Nazi Party could not afford to 
alienate its most able and articulate propagandists 
by insisting on strict 
conformity on all issues. 
One should not conclude from this that the flexibility of Hitler's actual 
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foreign policy in the 1930s was, necessarily, a result of unresolved 
conflicts of opinion which became institutionalised in the government of the 
Third Reich. But it is certainly a possibility. 
(43) 
Nonetheless, when 
Hitler chose to exert his power in the area of foreign policy-making as he 
did especially at the end of 1937 and the beginning of 1938, there is no 
doubt, as in February 1926, that Hitler got his way. The crucial question, 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis, then arises: did he then try to 
implement the foreign policy programme formulated in the 1920x? 
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Jacobsen, op. Cit., I, pp. 202-209. 
387 
10. Dr. Tim Klein, who was in charge of 'Literature and Art' for the Münchener 
Neueste Nachrichten (MNN), invited him to write a regular 'Ostasiatische 
Rundschau', which appeared from February 1921; Klein's letter of 7 
January 1921 to Haushofer in Haushof er Nachlass folder 923 (d). 
11. S. Zweig described Haushofer's behaviour on the trip: "he worked on the 
ship the whole day, following every detail (of the region's geography) 
with field glasses, writing reports, studying encyclopeadia", op. cit., 
pp. 217-18. 
12. E. Obst, 'Karl Haushofer zum 60. Geburtstag' Zeitschrift fair Geopolitik 
(ZiG) 6 (1929), p. 711. The degree was awarded in 1913 by the University 
of Munich. 
13. H. Haushofer, Geopolitische Grundlage des deutschen Staates, essay dated 
14 December 1925, quoted in D. H. Norton, op. cit., p. 39. 
14. Copy of letter from Haushofer to Kjellen, 10 October 1917, Nachlass 955(d). 
15. E. Obst, 'Karl Haushofer', loc. cit., p. 711. 
16. H. Haushofer, Was ist Geopolitik?, unpublished manuscript 28 May 1929, 
Nachlass 834. 
17. Ibid. 
18, K. Haushofer, E. Obst, H. Lautensach and 0. Maull, 'Ober die historische 
Entwicklung des Begriffs 'Geopolitik' ", Bausteine zur Geopolitik (Berlin, 
1928), p. 27. 
19. For details see Karl-Heinz Harbeck, Die Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, 1924- 
1944, doctoral dissertation, Kiel University, 1963 , ap ssim. 
20. K. Haushofer to E. Obst, quoted in R. H. Harbeck, op. cit., pp. 52-53. 
21. Interview with HeinzHaushofer. This later led to quarrels between Karl 
Huashofer and his eldest son, Albrecht, who was involved with the 
resistance to Hitler and was executed following von Stauffenberg's 
unsuccessful attempt on Hitler's life. See also Ursula Laack-Michel, 
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